Date: 20071114
Docket: T-1836-06
Citation: 2007
FC 1183
Ottawa, Ontario, November 14, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Johanne Gauthier
BETWEEN:
ALTANA PHARMA INC., and
ALTANA PHARMA AG
Applicants
and
NOVOPHARM LIMITED and
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Novopharm
appeals the portion of Prothonotary Milczynski’s decision granting Altana an
extension of time to file part of the affidavit of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger dated
July 17, 2007 and the affidavit of Dr. Brian Fennerty in the form provided in
Altana’s motion record.
[2]
The
standard of review applicable on such an appeal is not in dispute. As the
question raised in the motion before the Prothonotary is not vital to the final
issue of the case, the Court will only intervene if the order is clearly wrong,
in the sense that the exercise of discretion by Prothonotary Milczynski was
based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts (Merck &
Co. v. Apotex [2003] FCA 488 at para. 19, and Z.I. Pompey
Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V. [2003], 1 S.C.R. 450 at para. 18). In its motion record,
Novopharm submitted that the Prothonotary was clearly wrong in finding that the
proposed evidence:
a) was not available earlier
and that Altana has a reasonable explanation for its delay;
b) was relevant and admissible
and would not prejudice Novopharm, and;
c) should be subject to a
different treatment than previously given to it by Justice Puine Blais in
T-427-06.
[3]
With
respect to the first alleged error, it appears that the argument turns on
Novopharm’s interpretation of the following passage in the order:
“With respect to Senn-Bilfinger
affidavit, I am satisfied with the explanation provided as to why the in vivo
rat studies were not attached to Dr. Senn-Bilfinger’s earlier affidavit. He
was aware of the studies, knew they were important but could not, for various
acceptable reasons, locate them until later.”
[4]
According
to Novopharm, the cross-examination of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger on his second
affidavit indicates that even if he knew about them, those studies were not
mentioned in his first affidavit and he did not start looking for them until
months after his swore his said affidavit. Thus, the use of the words “locate
them until later” above indicates that Prothonotary Milczynski
misapprehended the evidence and wrongly believed that such search had started
prior to the filing of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger’s first affidavit.
[5]
Having
carefully considered the order, and the surrounding circumstances, the Court is
not satisfied that Novopharm has established that Prothonotary Milczynski
misapprehended the facts in respect of this finding.
[6]
The facts
as disclosed in the examination were not only clearly spelled out in paragraph
6 of Novopharm’s written representations but also in paragraph 24 of Justice
Pierre Blais’ decision, to which Novopharm referred at length and which
Prothonotary Milczynski discusses in detail in her order.
[7]
The
decision maker is presumed to have considered the material before her and
Novopharm admitted that reference to such facts was also made during the two
hours hearing before Prothonotary Milczynski.
[8]
The Court
finds that in fact, Novopharm is asking the Court to reassess the
reasonableness of the explanation given by Altana and to conclude that because
such explanation is not reasonable, the Prothonotary must have misapprehended
the facts.
[9]
This is
not what the applicable standard of review calls for and in any event, the
Court has not been persuaded that Prothonotary Milczynski could not come to her
conclusion unless she really believed that Dr. Senn-Bilfinger had started to
look for those studies before signing his first affidavit.
[10]
Turning now
to the third issue raised by Novopharm, the Court agrees with Prothonotary
Milczynski’s treatment of the decision of Justice Blais in T-427-06, (a
different NOC proceeding between Altana and Apotex involving the same patent).
The circumstances in that case were quite different than those before
Prothonotary Milczynski. At the time Altana sought permission to file the additional
affidavit of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger, Apotex had already filed its evidence. Thus, Justice
Blais presumably refers to the test applicable pursuant to Rule 312 for the
filing of reply evidence. There was also a clear prejudice to Apotex given
that permission to file this evidence was sought only a few months before the
hearing. In that respect, Prothonotary Milczynski did not misapprehend the
facts nor did she err in law. There is no doubt that she was not bound by this
earlier decision and could (in fact had to) properly exercise her own
discretion based on the facts before her.
[11]
The last
issue raised in Novopharm’s written material will be dealt with together with
another question added, or more clearly identified, by Novopharm in the written
representations filed after the hearing.
[12]
At the
hearing before the Court, it was unclear what part of the test Novopharm was arguing
Prothonotary Milczynski had misapplied in her analysis. In its written
material before Prothonotary Milczynski, Altana had originally presented its
motion pursuant to Rule 312; which, as pointed out by Novopharm, more properly
applies to the filing of reply affidavits. This test was developed to ensure
that parties do not split their case and it is clear that this is not an issue
here as Novopharm had not yet filed its evidence in chief when Altana brought
its motion.
[13]
Thus,
Novopharm indicated that, because Altana was effectively seeking an extension
of the time set out by Protonotary Milczynski, as case manager, for the filing
of its evidence in chief, the Prothonotary had to apply the four-pronged test
set out in Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelly [1999] F.C.J.
No. 846, that is that the party seeking
an extension must show: a) a continuing intention to pursue the application, b)
that the application has some merits, c) that a reasonable explanation for the
delay exists and d) that no prejudice arises from the delay. But it also
referred in its written representations to the two part test applicable to motions
for an extension of the time for filing affidavits set out in Mapei Inc. v.
Flextile Ltd. [1999]
59 C.P.R (3d) 211
(FCTD) ( a) there must be a valid reason for the delay and b) the affidavit
must provide the Court with evidence which is relevant and admissible).
[14]
In her
order, Prothonotary Milczynski only refers specifically to the four-pronged
test because, as argued by Altana, this is what the parties had agreed to at
the hearing before her. However, Novopharm denies having made such an
agreement.
[15]
Be it as it
may, neither in the Notice of Appeal nor in its written material before this
Court, did Novopharm argue that Prothonotary Milczynski had failed to turn her
mind to the two-pronged test; rather, it stated that she had erred in finding
that the additional evidence Altana sought to file was relevant and admissible,
particularly in light of the fact that the only evidence on this issue, Dr. Saibil’s
affidavit, showed that it clearly was not.
[16]
To answer
the Court’s request for clarification, it was agreed that the parties would file
additional submissions. It is in that context that Novopharm now argues that
Prothonotary Milczynski erred by not applying Mapei and by failing to
balance the reasons for the delay with the intrinsic worth of the proposed affidavits
(relevance, admissibility and potential use to the Court of the said affidavits).
[17]
The Court
agrees with Altana that strictly speaking this ground of appeal was not
mentioned in the Notice of Appeal in or the written representations of
Novopharm. Nonetheless, the Court will deal with it to avoid any further dispute
in this respect. The Court will however consider, among other things, the fact
that the alleged failure of the Prothonotary to turn her mind to this two-pronged
test was certainly not apparent on the face of the decision as Novopharm failed
to identify the alleged failure before the hearing of the appeal. In fact, it
appears that Novopharm assumed that she had considered it and simply misapplied
it.
[18]
It has
often been said that parties cannot expect orders of case managing
Prothonotaries on procedural matters to include detailed comments on each and
every issue they raised.
[19]
Here, as
noted, Prothonotary Milczynski did not refer specifically to Mapei or
the two-pronged test. However, a fair reading of her order indicates that she
clearly considered the relevance, admissibility and usefulness of the evidence
as such. For example, she did not grant Altana an extension to file a large
portion of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger’s affidavit, on the basis that said portion appeared
to be an attempt to simply bolster what he had said before. She refused an
extension in respect of Laura Meucci’s affidavit because this evidence was
inadmissible as hearsay. In so doing, she endorsed a similar earlier finding of
Justice Blais in the case referred to above. In respect of the remainder of
Dr. Senn-Bilfinger’s affidavit, she noted that she did not have the same
reasons as Justice Blais to question its relevance, given that the studies had
been filed and the proposed expert commentary provided.
[20]
All this
to say that Novopharm has not persuaded the Court that when Prothonotary
Milczynski concluded that she was satisfied that this new evidence should be
filed as part of the applicant’s evidence, she failed to turn her mind to the two-pronged
test referred to in Mapei, or to weigh the reasons for delay against the
intrinsic worth of the proposed evidence.
[21]
It is also
worth noting that the Mapei test is meant to be easier to meet then the
four-pronged test of Hennelly, because the party seeking the extension
does not have, in theory, to deal with the lack of prejudice and the overall
merits of its application (Strykiwsky v. Stony Mountain Institution,
2000 F.C.J. No. 1404 at paras. 7-8).
[22]
The second
condition in the two-pronged test appears to be an adaptation of the second requirement
originally set out in Grewal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), 1985 2 FC 263 (F.C.A.) that the Court look at whether the
position taken by the party seeking the extension has “some merit” (Stanfield
v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2005 FCA 107 at para. 3). But whether one
considers and weight four or only two factors, as mentioned recently in Canada (Minister of Human Resource Development) v. Hogervorst, 2007 FCA 41, [2007] F.C.J. 37 (QL) at para. 33, ultimately these
factors are only tools to determine how justice may best be done between the
parties. This is why, in appropriate cases, even a weak explanation for the
delay or no explanation at all will not prevent the granting of the extension
sought.
[23]
With respect to the “intrinsic worth” of the new affidavits, and
the Prothonotary’s finding that the evidence was
admissible and relevant,
the Court cannot agree with Novopharm that Prothonotary Milczynski could not
reach the conclusion she has because Dr. Fennerty’s affidavit was not sworn and
the only evidence before her was that of Dr. Saibil.
[24]
As noted in Prouvost
S.A. v. Munsingwear (C.A.), 2 1992 FC 541, the Court needed a
draft of Dr. Fennerty’s affidavit to assess its admissibility, relevance and
potential use for the Court.
[25]
Admissibility is a question
of law and given the admission of Altana as to why these studies were being
produced, that is, merely as an aide-memoire or to corroborate Dr.
Senn-Bilfinger’s evidence that the inventor had this information in mind at the
relevant time, Prothonotary Milczynski’s finding is not clearly wrong.
[26]
The relevance of the
evidence has to be assessed primarily on the basis of the pleadings. The
relevant portions of the NOC were reproduced in the motion material before
Prothonotary Milczynski and as case manager she was intimately familiar with the issues
raised by the parties in their pleadings.
[27]
Even
Novopharm noted, in paragraph 75 of its written representations before the
Prothonotary that the proposed evidence goes to a very contentious issue
between the parties.
[28]
At this stage of
proceeding, when looking at the relevance of the evidence proposed, the Court
(here, Prothonotary Milczynski) is not called upon to determine the exact
parameters of the question this evidence is set to answer or the ultimate
weight that should be given to conflicting evidence. Nor is the test meant to
provide an opportunity to Novopharm to cross-examine Altana’s expert on this
issue prior to the filing of its evidence in chief.
[29]
It may well be that
at the end of the day, the new evidence will prove insufficient considered alone
or with the rest of the evidence in this file to meet Altana’s burden of proof.
This may even be as a result of Dr. Saibil’s opinion if it is filed by
Novopharm as part of his evidence in chief but it was not for Prothonotary
Milczynski nor is it for this Court to decide this point.
[30]
Based on the evidence
of Dr. Senn-Bilfinger, particularly paragraph 36, it was open to Prothonotary
Milczynski to find that Altana’s position had some merit. It was also open to
her, based on the importance of the contested issue, the admissibility of the
evidence and having regard to the explanation given, that this evidence should
be filed as part of the Applicant’s evidence.
[31]
That said, even if
the Court were to assume that Novopharm has established that it should exercise
its discretion de novo, because for example it is not clear that
Prothonotary Milczynski applied the two-pronged test, the Court would have come
to the same conclusion as Prothonotary Milczynski and granted the extension of
this evidence. In coming to that conclusion, among other things, the Court does
accepted the explanation given for the delay in filing Dr. Senn-Bilfinger’s
evidence in respect of the studies, even if it is clearly a weak one. In respect
of the evidence of Dr. Fennerty, obviously his opinion on the impact of such
information could not be given before Altana was made aware that the inventors
had this information in mind.
[32]
The Court also finds
that at this stage, this evidence is admissible and although its ultimate
impact on the ability of the inventors to soundly predict the utility of the
invention is contested, it would be relevant, important and useful for the Court
to have the information available to it in order to decide this application on
the merits. Obviously and as mentioned, this finding is not intended to bind
in any way the judge hearing the merits be it in respect of the weight to be
given to the evidence or otherwise.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The appeal is
dismissed with costs.
“Johanne
Gauthier”
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1836-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: ALTANA
PHARMA INC ET AL v. NOVOPHARM LIMITED ET AL
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO
DATE OF HEARING: OCTOBER 15, 2007
REASONS FOR ORDER: GAUTHIER, J.
DATED:
APPEARANCES:
Kevin Sartorio FOR
APPLICANT
Mark Davis FOR
RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP FOR APPLICANT
Barristers & Solicitors
Toronto,
Ontario
Heenan Blaikie
LLP FOR
RESPONDENT
Barristers and
Solicitors
Toronto, Ontario