Date: 20071113
Docket: T-906-06
Citation: 2007 FC 1176
Ottawa, Ontario, November 13,
2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Barnes
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant(s)
and
SCOTT
FRAZEE
Respondent(s)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
application for judicial review concerns an Adjudicator's decision
made under s. 92 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-35 (Act).
The only issue before the Court involves the Adjudicator's assumption of
jurisdiction over the Respondent's grievance against his employer, the
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). The Adjudicator found that the CFIA’s
treatment of the Respondent was disciplinary resulting in a suspension and,
therefore, he assumed jurisdiction over the grievance. He then found that the
discipline imposed by the CFIA was unwarranted and he upheld the Respondent's
grievance. The Applicant contends that the Adjudicator erred by accepting
jurisdiction over the grievance in circumstances that were outside of the arbitral
authority conferred by the Act and he seeks to have the decision quashed.
Background
[2]
The
Respondent, Scott Frazee, is a veterinarian employed by the CFIA. In the spring
of 2003, Dr. Frazee was working at Larsen Packers Ltd. (Larsen), where he was
the veterinarian-in-charge. Larsen operates a federally regulated meat
slaughtering and processing plant located in Berwick, Nova Scotia. Dr.
Frazee's responsibilities included ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections of
livestock to ensure that the animals were free of disease. An animal found to
be unfit for human consumption would be condemned. As the veterinarian-in-charge,
Dr. Frazee was also responsible for the supervision of one other veterinarian
and six animal health inspectors. He reported to Dr. Ken Chew, Inspection
Manager for Nova
Scotia.
[3]
In
early May of 2003, Dr. Chew received complaints from Larsen and from the New
Brunswick Pork Producers Association that too many hogs were being condemned as
unfit at the Larsen facility in Berwick. Larsen alleged that its condemnation
rate was more than double the rate experienced by other Canadian packing
plants. In a letter dated May 7, 2003, the Chairman of the New Brunswick Pork
Producers Association made the following complaint to Dr. Chew:
We are writing at this time in regards to
a situation that has been on-going at the Larsen Packer plant in Berwick Nova Scotia for some time.
We are very concerned about the large
number of hogs being condemned at this facility and it is unprecedented
according to our history in the business. This situation is placing an unfair
burden on our producers and is resulting in great financial loss.
We understand that Dr. Scott Frazee was
not supposed to be present on the kill floor the last couple of days and another
vet would be conducting the inspections. Apparently, this has not been the
case. We understand that he has been present on the kill floor and the
condemnation of our hogs continues. This situation is unacceptable to
our producers and cannot continue.
We are requesting that Dr. Scott Frazee
be removed from the Larsen Packer plant immediately or our producers will have
no other option but to redirect their hogs to another facility. No other
option is acceptable.
[Emphasis
original].
[4]
It
is thus apparent from the record that CFIA management was caught in the middle
of a dispute involving Larsen and its customers on one side and Dr. Frazee on
the other.
[5]
Dr.
Chew's approach to the problem was to put in place a correlation review by
outside experts to determine if Larsen's complaint of over-condemnation was
valid. Dr. Chew and Dr. Frazee discussed this plan and it was agreed that
Dr. Frazee would not be involved with final condemnations for two weeks. An
e-mail from Dr. Chew to Dr. Frazee and others dated May 6, 2003 reflects the
following understanding:
Dr. Frazee has suggested some short term
remedies to address the concerns;
...
2.
That he (Dr.
Frazee) stay off the final condemnations for this week since the industry
is questioning his condemnation rates. I indicated that this should be for two
weeks concurrent.
…
At the discussion with the RD, Peter and
I brought up the possibility of having a national Red Meat expert on
condemnation visit Est 150 and perform a correlation review on-site with our veterinarians.
This is actively being looked into. We also discussed about the possibility of
having Dr. Frazee visit a swine slaughter plant in Ontario or Québec to perform a "reverse
correlation". No decision was made on this.
[6]
Dr.
Frazee appears not to have removed himself completely from condemnation
inspections and Larsen continued to object to his involvement. Notwithstanding
the clarity of Dr. Chew's May 6th e-mail, Dr. Frazee explained his
continued involvement as a misunderstanding of what was expected of him.
[7]
Larsen
continued to put pressure on the CFIA to have Dr. Frazee removed from its
Berwick facility. An inflammatory and inappropriate e-mail from Mike Larsen was
sent to Dr. Chew on May 8, 2003 which described Dr. Frazee as unprofessional
and stated that "there is no solution that is acceptable to us other than
the immediate removal of Dr. Frazee.”
[8]
An
e-mail exchange between Dr. Frazee’s union representative, Maureen Harper, and
Dr. Chew illustrates the rancorous tone of the dispute and Dr. Frazee’s
increasing level of frustration with his work status:
Hello Ken. I am writing because I have
some very grave concerns about what is happening at the abattoir where Scott
has been working for a number of years. I understand that plant management has
expressed consternation about their recent rates of condemnation. I believe
that CFIA has a responsibility to investigate the plant's concerns. This should be done by a
national correlation team as is done with similar complaints in poultry plants.
What is concerning me is how Scott is
being treated. I believe by removing Scott from his duties, you are not only
sending the wrong message to industry (the tale of the dock wagging the dog),
but you are also unjustly treating one of your employees. What ever happened
to being innocent until proven guilty? I am even more concerned to learn that
you feel Scott is not entitled to union representation in this matter. You and
plant management have tried to have him removed from performing his duties at
the abattoir and you think that he is not entitled to be represented by the
union?
This is becoming an all too frequent
occurrence in this Agency. Plant management makes a complaint to CFIA if they
perceive a vet is too stringent in performing his duties which causes an
economic loss to the plant and CFIA pulls the vet from the job to keep the
industry happy. And we dare call ourselves a regulatory Agency! This issue is
scheduled to be discussed at the national UMC on June 16. I will personally be
addressing it. I am tired of continually hearing about veterinarians in
abattoirs being subjected to harassment not only from plant management, but
also CFIA. This all has to stop because quite frankly, the CFIA does not have
any vets to spare when they keep removing them from the abattoirs.
I would suggest that you really need to
be careful how you handle the situation.
…
Hi Maureen, I appreciate and value the
comments you raised. I am not sure if you have been presented with all the
facts though. I personally find it very difficult when faced with some facts
and some strong assumptions already made.
I have asked Dr. Frazee temporarily to
stay away from the kill floor and he has cooperated by doing so. Both my
Regional Director and myself have indicated that this is not a punitive
measure. We have made no assessment of blame or acknowledgment that any fault
has been made.
Maureen, when you have separate Pork
Marketing Boards from two different provinces and various swine producers as
well as the management of the abattoir all suddenly demanding the removal of
the veterinarian, there is a very urgent need to diffuse the situation and be
able to talk and listen to them. Yesterday I spent pretty well most of the day
at Larsen Packers, Est. 150 with 13 angry swine producers from New Brunswick, the chairman of the New
Brunswick Pork Marketing Board and their veterinary swine consultant.
I explained to them our action plan.
Further, that we are presently arranging for a veterinary pathologist and a national
veterinary correlator, experienced in swine condemnation to be on-site to spend
time with our veterinarians. I also informed the group that I shall be
bringing Dr. Frazee back on the kill floor to spend time with the pathologist
and correlator. A couple of the producers, including a major one suggested
that if Dr. Frazee was found lacking in some areas, that he be send for
further retraining. I think you can see in which direction we are heading.
There are a lot of issues to separate out, a big one being miscommunication.
Maureen I am sorry I cannot give you
details but if you feel you need to talk to me, give me a shout.
[9]
The
record indicates that the outside correlation review was not completed as
quickly as planned and, in the result, Dr. Frazee's return to full inspection
duties was delayed. An e-mail from the CFIA Regional Director, Freeman Libby,
to Dr. Frazee dated May 28, 2003 described the situation as follows:
Scott; This is a follow-up to our
conversation this morning. As you are aware management is trying very hard to
get some help from the Ontario Area vis-a-vis some veterinarians with expertise
in red meat (hog) slaughter to come to Larsons to work with you and the staff
at Larsens. The main goal of this is to address the "disposition"
issue working towards ensuring consistency in our approach.
It is hoped that this will take place
early next week. I will advise you as soon as possible when this has been
confirmed.
Until we get this in place I am asking
that you refrain from working the kill floor. I want to re-emphasize with you
that in no way is this viewed as "disciplinary" action by
management. By remaining off the kill floor it allows the Agency time to
address the issue in a manner that I described to you during our calls.
I want to thank you for your cooperation
and I want to reiterate that I am committed to getting this issue resolved
ASAP.
[10]
On
June 6, 2003, Dr. Frazee was again told not to participate in final
dispositions at the Larsen plant until he had an opportunity to work with an Ontario veterinarian
scheduled to arrive within the following two weeks.
[11]
By
June 25, 2003, the CFIA had completed its internal reviews of Larsen's
condemnation complaints and it found them to be unmeritorious. Dr. Frazee was
then returned to full duties at the Larsen plant but with instructions to
rebuild his working relationships.
Issues
[12]
(a) What
is the appropriate standard of review?
(b) Did
the Adjudicator err by holding that Dr. Frazee had been subjected to a disciplinary
suspension?
Analysis
[13]
The
Adjudicator could only assume jurisdiction over Dr. Frazee’s grievance if he
found that the CFIA’s treatment of Dr. Frazee constituted a form of discipline
resulting in a suspension. At the time, this adjudicative authority was conferred
by s. 92(1) of the Act which read:
92. (1) Where an employee has presented a grievance, up to
and including the final level in the grievance process, with respect to
(a) the interpretation or
application in respect of the employee of a provision of a collective
agreement or an arbitral award,
(b) in the case of an employee
in a department or other portion of the public service of Canada specified in
Part I of Schedule I or designated pursuant to subsection (4),
(i) disciplinary action
resulting in suspension or a financial penalty, or
(ii) termination of employment
or demotion pursuant to paragraph 11(2)(f) or (g) of the Financial
Administration Act, or
(c) in the case of an employee
not described in paragraph (b), disciplinary action resulting in termination
of employment, suspension or a financial penalty, and the grievance has not
been dealt with to the satisfaction of the employee, the employee may,
subject to subsection (2), refer the grievance to adjudication.
Approval of bargaining agent
(2) Where a grievance that may
be presented by an employee to adjudication is a grievance described in
paragraph (1)(a), the employee is not entitled to refer the grievance to
adjudication unless the bargaining agent for the bargaining unit, to which
the collective agreement or arbitral award referred to in that paragraph
applies, signifies in the prescribed manner its approval of the reference of
the grievance to adjudication and its willingness to represent the employee
in the adjudication proceedings.
Termination under P.S.E.A. not grievable
(3) Nothing in subsection (1)
shall be construed or applied as permitting the referral to adjudication of a
grievance with respect to any termination of employment under the Public
Service Employment Act.
Order
(4) The Governor in Council
may, by order, designate for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b) any portion of
the public service of Canada specified in Part II of Schedule I.
|
92.
(1) Après l'avoir porté jusqu'au dernier palier de la
procédure applicable sans avoir obtenu satisfaction, un fonctionnaire peut
renvoyer à l'arbitrage tout grief portant sur:
a) l'interprétation ou l'application, à son
endroit, d'une disposition d'une
convention collective ou d'une décision arbitrale;
b) dans le cas d'un fonctionnaire d'un ministère ou secteur de
l'administration publique fédérale spécifié à la partie I de l'annexe I ou désigné par décret pris au
titre du paragraphe (4), soit une mesure disciplinaire entraînant la
suspension ou une sanction pécuniaire, soit un licenciement ou une rétrogradation
visé aux alinéas 11(2)f) ou g) de la Loi sur la gestion des finances
publiques;
c) dans les autres cas, une mesure
disciplinaire entraînant le licenciement, la suspension ou une sanction
pécuniaire.
Approbation
de l'agent négociateur
(2) Pour pouvoir renvoyer à l'arbitrage un grief du type visé à
l'alinéa (1)a), le fonctionnaire doit obtenir, dans les formes
réglementaires, l'approbation de son agent
négociateur et son acceptation de le représenter dans la procédure
d'arbitrage.
Exclusion
(3) Le paragraphe (1) n'a pas pour effet de permettre le renvoi
à l'arbitrage d'un grief portant sur le
licenciement prévu sous le régime de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction
publique.
Décret
(4) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par
décret, désigner, pour l'application de l'alinéa
(1)b), tout secteur de l'administration publique
fédérale spécifié à la partie II de l'annexe I.
|
[14]
Both
the parties to this application characterized the issues under review as matters
of mixed fact and law subject to a standard of review of reasonableness simpliciter.
They both see the question of what constitutes a disciplinary suspension as
requiring the application of relevant facts to a set of defining legal
principles. In that sense, they have correctly identified the Adjudicator’s
task. However, the issue facing the Court on this application is somewhat
different. Where a legal issue or the identification of a legal standard going
to jurisdiction can be isolated from its factual surroundings, it should be
assessed on a standard of correctness: see Canwell Enviro Industries Ltd.
v. Baker Petrolite Corporation, 2002 FCA 158, 288 N.R. 201 at para. 51 and Dynamex
Canada Inc. v. Mamona, 2003 FCA 248, 242 F.T.R. 149 at para. 45.
[15]
The
issue as I see it is whether the Adjudicator applied the correct legal
principles to the evidence before him. To the extent that the Adjudicator
failed to apply those principles to the evidence, the standard of review is
correctness and not reasonableness.
[16]
In
the end, however, whether the standard of review is correctness or
reasonableness, the result is the same – the Adjudicator’s decision in this
case is deficient and must be set aside.
[17]
The
Adjudicator seems to have concluded that what began as an administrative
investigation of an outside complaint slipped into a disciplinary suspension of
Dr. Frazee. The Adjudicator's reasons for characterizing the CFIA's
actions as disciplinary are contained within the following brief passage from
his decision:
Firstly, the decision of the employer was
directed personally against Dr. Frazee, and none of the other members of the
CFIA inspection staff at the Larsen Packers Ltd. plant were involved in similar
allegations of excessive condemnation during that period. Secondly, the
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Dr. Frazee were repeatedly made.
Thirdly, Dr. Frazee was directed on four different occasions not to perform an
important part of his duties within a short period of time. Fourthly, the CFIA
management decided that they could not perform their investigation into the
allegations of excessive condemnation without suspending him from an important
part of his duties in postmortem evaluations. In those circumstances, I
conclude that the suspensions from performing final condemnation and from being
present on the kill floor between May 5 and June 25, 2003 imposed on Dr. Frazee
were disciplinary in nature; the CFIA justified those decisions on the basis of
the allegations of excessive condemnation rates.
The disciplinary nature of the employer's decision to suspend Dr. Frazee
from an important part of his duties is adjudicable pursuant to subparagraph
92(1)(b)(i) of the former Act and gives me jurisdiction to adjudicate the
grievance.
[18]
The
issue before the Adjudicator was whether the CFIA's decision to remove Dr.
Frazee from performing condemnation inspections for six weeks was
administrative or disciplinary in nature. That was an issue of mixed fact and
law which required an examination of both the purpose and effect of the
employer’s action. It required the Adjudicator to apply the largely undisputed
evidence of what took place to a set of accepted standards or legal principles
which define discipline in the employment context.
[19]
Whether
an employer's conduct
constitutes discipline has been the subject of a number of arbitral and
judicial decisions from which several accepted principles have emerged. A
useful summary of the authorities is contained within the following passage
from Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration (4th ed.) at para. 7:4210:
[…]
In deciding whether an employee has been
disciplined or not, arbitrators look at both the purpose and effect of the
employer’s action. The essential characteristic of disciplinary action is an
intention to correct bad behaviour on an employee’s part by punishing the
employee in some way. An employer’s assurance that it did not intend its
action to be disciplinary often, but not always, settles the question.
Where an employee’s behaviour is not
culpable and/or the employer’s purpose is not to punish, whatever action is
taken will generally be characterized as non-disciplinary. On the basis of
this definition, arbitrators have ruled that suspensions that required an
employee to remain off work on account of his or her health, or pending the
resolution of criminal charges, were not disciplinary sanctions. Similarly,
transfers and demotions for non-culpable reasons, the revocation of a civil
servant’s “reliability status”, financial levies that were compensatory rather
than punitive, shift assignments designed to facilitate closer supervision, and
deeming an employee to have quit his or her employment, have all been
characterized as non-disciplinary. For the same reason, counselling and
warning employees about excessive but innocent absenteeism have generally not
been regarded as disciplinary. On the other hand, it has been held that even
where an employee falls ill during the course of serving a disciplinary
suspension and is in receipt of sick pay benefits for part of the time he or
she is off work, that hiatus will not alter the disciplinary character of the
employee’s suspension.
A disciplinary sanction must at least
have the potential to prejudicially affect an employee’s situation, although
immediate economic loss is not required. Suspensions with pay, which have the
essential objective of correcting unacceptable behaviour, for example, would
still be regarded as disciplinary even though they do not sanction the employee
financially.
[Footnotes omitted]
[20]
The
authorities confirm that not every action taken by an employer that adversely
affects an employee amounts to discipline. While an employee may well feel
aggrieved by decisions that negatively impact on the terms of employment, the
vast majority of such workplace adjustments are purely administrative in nature
and are not intended to be a form of punishment. This point is made in William
Porter v. Treasury Board (Department of Energy, Mines and Resources) (1973)
166-2-752 (PSLRB) in
the following passage at page 13:
The concept of "disciplinary
action" is not sufficiently wide to include any or every action taken by
the employer which may be harmful or prejudicial to the interests of the
employee. Certainly, every unfavourable assessment of performance or
efficiency is harmful both to the immediate interests of the employee and his
prospects for advancement. In such cases, it cannot be assumed that the
employee is being disciplined. Discipline in the public service must be
understood in the context of the statutory provisions relating to discipline.
[21]
The
case authorities indicate that the issue is not whether an employer’s action is
ill-conceived or badly executed but, rather, whether it amounts to a form of
discipline involving suspension. Similarly, an employee's feelings about being
unfairly treated do not convert administrative action into discipline: see Fermin
Garcia Marin v. Treasury Board (Department of Public Works and Government
Services Canada) 2006 PSLRB 16 at para.
85.
[22]
It
is not surprising that one of the primary factors in determining whether an
employee has been disciplined concerns the intention of the employer. The
question to be asked is whether the employer intended to impose discipline and
whether its impugned decision was likely to be relied upon in the imposition of
future discipline: see St. Clair Catholic District School Board and Ontario
English Catholic Teachers Association (1999) 86 L.A.C. (4th) 251
(Re St. Clair) at page 255 and Re Civil Service Commission and
Nova Scotia Government Employees Union (1989) 6 L.A.C. (4th) 391
(Re Civil Service Commission) at page 400.
[23]
It
is accepted, nonetheless, that how the employer chooses to characterize its
decision cannot be by itself a determinative factor. The concept of disguised
discipline is a well known and a necessary controlling consideration which
allows an adjudicator to look behind the employer's stated
motivation to determine what was actually intended. Thus in Gaw v. Treasury
Board (National Parole Service) (1978) 166-2-3292 (PSSRB), the employer's
attempt to justify the employee's suspension from work as being necessary
to facilitate an investigation was rejected in the face of compelling evidence
that the employer's actual motivation was disciplinary: also see Re Canada
Post Corp. and Canadian Union of Postal Workers (1992) 28 L.A.C. (4th)
366.
[24]
The
problem of disguised discipline can also be addressed by examining the effects
of the employer's action on the employee. Where the impact of
the employer's decision is significantly disproportionate to the administrative
rationale being served, the decision may be viewed as disciplinary: see Re
Toronto East General & Orthopaedic Hospital Inc. and Association of Allied
Health Professionals Ontario (1989) 8 L.A.C. (4th) 391 (Re
Toronto East General). However, that threshold will not be reached where
the employer's action is
seen to be a reasonable response (but not necessarily the best response) to
honestly held operational considerations.
[25]
Other
considerations for defining discipline in the employment context include the
impact of the decision upon the employee's career prospects, whether the
subject incident or the employer's view of it could be seen to involve
culpable or corrigible behaviour by the employee, whether the decision taken
was intended to be corrective and whether the employer's action had an
immediate adverse effect on the employee: see Re St. Clair, above, and
Re Civil Service Commission, above.
[26]
It
is against the above-noted considerations that the Adjudicator’s decision must
be assessed in this proceeding.
[27]
The
Adjudicator’s conclusion that the CFIA's decision to temporarily remove Dr. Frazee
from his condemnation inspection duties was disciplinary is supported by only
four considerations:
(a)
The
removal of duties was directed only at Dr. Frazee and not against any of the
other CFIA on-site employees;
(b)
The
allegations of wrongdoing made against Dr. Frazee were repeatedly made;
(c)
The
CFIA directed Dr. Frazee on four occasions not to perform an important part of
his duties within a short period of time;
(d)
CFIA
managers decided that they could not perform their investigation without
suspending Dr. Frazee from an important part of his duties.
[28]
Having
found that the temporary removal of inspection responsibilities from Dr. Frazee
constituted "disciplinary" action, the Adjudicator then upheld the
grievance because Larsen's allegations were subsequently proven to be
unfounded.
[29]
The
problem with the Adjudicator’s analysis is that it failed to apply the accepted
legal principles for determining whether the alteration to Dr. Frazee’s terms
of employment was imposed as a means of discipline.
[30]
Of
particular concern is the Adjudicator’s failure to consider the significance and
validity of the CFIA's characterization of its decision which was
consistently stated to be non-disciplinary. The Adjudicator also failed to
consider the effect of the CFIA's decision on Dr. Frazee beyond pointing out
that a more appropriate review plan was probably available. In addition, the
Adjudicator failed to consider whether the CFIA's decision
was taken in response to what it saw as culpable or corrigible conduct by Dr.
Frazee and was intended thereby to have a corrective aspect.
[31]
Instead,
the Adjudicator appears to have wrongly imputed Larsen's allegations to the
CFIA without any evidence that the CFIA had acted in furtherance of Larsen's views of Dr.
Frazee’s competence. What evidence there was indicated only that the CFIA had
drawn no conclusions about the merits of the complaints against Dr. Frazee and
that it merely wanted to conduct an independent review. Even Dr. Frazee seems
to have initially accepted the decision to step aside temporarily from his
inspection duties.
[32]
It
is difficult to know what the Adjudicator had in mind in pointing out that Dr.
Frazee was the only CFIA employee affected by the correlation assessment. That
is not a particularly surprising fact given that Dr. Frazee was the
veterinarian-in-charge and the sole target of Larsen's complaint.
[33]
The
Adjudicator’s final observation that the CFIA’s decision to remove Dr. Frazee's
inspection responsibilities during the review process was, by itself, evidence
of discipline, represents circular reasoning. The stated purpose of the
decision was to ensure that Dr. Frazee's critics could not complain about his
involvement in the review. Whether, in the circumstances, a better decision
could have been made by the CFIA is not relevant to the proper characterization
of the decision taken, provided that it had a legitimate operational rationale
to support it. In the absence of evidence that the CFIA managers were acting
for some contrary or ulterior motive, the conduct of Dr. Frazee does not appear
to have been under scrutiny as blameworthy.
[34]
I
am of the view that the Adjudicator erred in this case by failing to take
account of any of the several recognized legal principles by which discipline
in the employment context is to be identified and, further, by taking into
consideration matters which were not relevant to that determination. In the
result, the Adjudicator’s decision is set aside.
[35]
While
I was invited by the Applicant to direct that the grievance should be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, I am not disposed to go that far. It is not plain
and obvious that no jurisdiction could ever be properly assumed in this case.
There is some authority indicating that the removal of significant employment
responsibilities can constitute a suspension under s. 92 of the Act: see
Evans v. Treasury Board (Department of the Solicitor General) (1982) 2
PSSRB 57 and Guay and Treasury Board (Revenue Canada, Taxation) (1995) 27
PSSRB 10. This would only be the case where an employer left its employee with
essentially no useful work to perform. I will say, though, that I do not agree
with the Adjudicator that a suspension is established where the employer
temporarily takes away an "important part" of an employee's duties.
The issue is not what is taken away but, rather, what remains. I have no doubt
that an employee left to sit mostly idle at a desk for six weeks has been suspended.
In this case, the record does not disclose what, if any, meaningful duties Dr.
Frazee retained over the six weeks he was taken off the kill floor and I
cannot, therefore, determine whether what occurred amounted to a suspension.
[36]
In
this case, there has also been no clear determination on the facts as to
whether the CFIA’s decision to remove Dr. Frazee’s inspection responsibilities
was so disproportionate, unnecessary or ill-conceived that an adjudicator might
find it to be a form of disguised discipline. It is also not beyond the realm
of all possibility that an adjudicator might find the CFIA’s actions to be
punitive such that they would overwhelm an ostensibly innocent administrative
intent in the same way that was of concern in Re Toronto East General,
above.
[37]
This
matter will, therefore, be remitted to a different adjudicator for
redetermination on the merits.
[38]
The
Applicant shall have the costs of the application.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES that this application for judicial review is allowed with the
matter to be remitted to a different adjudicator for redetermination on the
merits.
THIS COURT FURTHER ADJUDGES
that the Applicant shall have the costs of this application.
“ R. L. Barnes ”