Date: 20071004
Docket: T-1526-07
Citation: 2007 FC 1020
BETWEEN:
RON CROWE
Plaintiff
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CANADA, THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA BEVERLY McLACHLIN, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE CHARRON, THE HONOURABLE
JUSTICE ROTHSTEIN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF ONTARIO ROY McMURTRY, THE
HONOURABLE JUSTICE FELDMAN, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LANG OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOR ONTARIO, THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE JANET WILSON OF THE ONTARIO SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HONOURABLE RICHARD SCOTT, CHIEF JUSTICE OF MANITOBA AND
CHAIRPERSON OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
(in their judicial and private capacities) THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, THE
MARITIME LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, now known as THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, MANULIFE FINANCIAL, DOMINIC D’ALESSANDRO, ARTHUR R. SAWCHUK, JOHN
CASSADAY, LINO J. CELESTE, GAIL COOK-BENNETT, THOMAS P. D’AQUINO, RICHARD B. DE
WOLFE, ROBERT E. DINEEN JR., PIERRE Y. DUCROS, ALLISTER P. GRAHAM, THOMAS E.
KIERANS, LORNA R. MARSDEN, HUGH W. SLOAN JR., GORDON G. THIESSEN (in their
corporate and private capacities), PAOLO GRECO
Defendants
REASONS FOR
ORDER
HARRINGTON J.
[1]
Mr.
Crowe has parlayed the disputed settlement of an action in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice on a disability insurance policy to a $5 billion dollar action
in this Court against the underwriters, their directors and officers, his
former attorney who represented him in the Ontario action, various judges of
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Ontario Court of Appeal, and Supreme
Court of Canada, the Canadian Judicial Council (and its Chair) as well as the
Attorney General on behalf of the Federal Crown. The underwriters, and the
individuals associated with them, Mr. Crowe’s former counsel, Paolo Greco, and
the Attorney General of Canada have all moved this Court to have the action
dismissed or, failing that, for lesser relief. Counsel appeared for the
Canadian Judicial Council which had apparently refused to investigate Mr.
Crowe’s complaint about the conduct of the judges, as well as for the named
judges with the exception of the three judges of the Supreme Court. He informed
the Court that as he had just been recently retained, he had not had the
opportunity to bring on his own motion, but supported the Attorney General.
[2]
Following
argument, I informed Mr. Crowe that I would be dismissing his action as against
the moving parties, such dismissal only to take effect upon signing the
appropriate orders and issuing written reasons.
[3]
The
Statement of Claim is some 62 pages in length. Mr. Crowe alleges that he became
disabled in November 2003. He claimed long and short‑term disability
benefits from the underwriters whom I shall call Manulife. He alleges that
Manulife failed, refused or neglected to pay him, and so he retained Mr. Greco
to take action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. At a mandatory
mediation session, he signed Minutes of Settlement, which called upon him to
sign a Full and Final Release. He alleges that that release was contrary to
what had been agreed at the mediation. This led to a motion by the underwriters
for summary judgment and a cross-motion by Mr. Crowe for dismissal thereof.
Madam Justice Wilson ordered that the motions “…proceed by way of Summary Trial
to determine whether the Plaintiff [Mr. Crowe] is bound by the settlement
reached at the mediation.”
[4]
According
to Mr. Crowe, this means the issue would be decided on simplified procedures. Madam
Justice Wilson could not order the trial of an issue by way of simplified
procedure without his consent, which he had not given. He is of the view that
her order presumptively assumes that a settlement exists in consequence of the
minutes signed. Apparently, she thereby shielded Manulife and effectively
granted it immunity from any claims which he may bring against it for
extra-contractual, punitive and special damages in consequence of its improper
conduct, tortious or otherwise. In so doing, Madam Justice Wilson acted in bad
faith.
[5]
Likewise,
the judges of the Ontario Court of Appeal who upheld her by refusing to grant
leave to appeal, and the judges of the Supreme Court who refused an application
for leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal, were, among other
things, knowingly complicit in this unjust enrichment of Manulife and
maliciously and without cause removed his substantive right to be heard.
[6]
In
the same way, the Canadian Judicial Council conspired by refusing to act upon
Mr. Crowe’s complaint against these judges.
[7]
Furthermore,
or so it is alleged, the Crown in Right of Canada has a vested interest in the
enrichment of insurers such as Manulife and, together with the Canadian
Judicial Council, “…wilfully refused or failed its responsibility to protect
the inviolable constitutional and quasi-constitutional rights not only of the
plaintiff but of all Canadians, by enabling the Canadian judiciary under the
rubric of immunity to purposefully subvert justice in order to effect the
unjust enrichment of Manulife at the expense and the prejudice of the plaintiff
and others.”
[8]
Mr.
Crowe seeks exemplary, punitive and special damages in the amount of $5 billion
dollars.
THE HEARING
[9]
The
hearing before me proceeded in two stages. As the Attorney General’s motion
record had been filed later than the other two, Mr. Crowe had been given until
the morning of the hearing to file his Memorandum in Reply. He did so, but
expressed concern as to whether I would have sufficient time to consider it.
Therefore, I decided to first proceed with the claims of Manulife and Mr.
Greco.
Manulife and Mr. Greco
[10]
I
informed Mr. Crowe, who is self-represented, that if these motions were to have
been decided on the basis of written representations alone, as per rule 369 of
the Federal Courts Rules, I would have granted them on the grounds that
the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims. Consequently,
I invited him to first address the issues which I identified as follows.
[11]
Under
the Constitution Act, 1867, legislative authority is divided between the
Parliament of Canada on the one hand, and the legislative assemblies of the
provinces on the other. Under section 91, Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to such matters as the regulation of trade and commerce,
navigation and shipping, bankruptcy, patents of invention and criminal law.
[12]
On
the other hand, section 92 gives the provincial legislatures exclusive
jurisdiction to make laws in relation to, among other things, local works and
undertakings and property and civil rights in the province.
[13]
Furthermore,
subsection 92(14) gives the provincial legislatures the right to make laws in
relation to:
|
14.
The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of
Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters
in those Courts.
|
14.
L'administration de la justice dans la province, y
compris la création, le maintien et l'organisation de tribunaux de justice
pour la province, ayant juridiction civile et criminelle, y compris la
procédure en matières civiles dans ces tribunaux;
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[14]
These
courts, such as the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, deal with all manner of
disputes whether based on federal or provincial law, unless that jurisdiction
is removed.
[15]
However,
by way of exception, section 101 of the Constitution goes on to provide:
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101. The
Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to
Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General
Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional
Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada.
|
101. Le parlement du Canada pourra, nonobstant toute disposition
contraire énoncée dans la présente loi, lorsque l'occasion le requerra,
adopter des mesures à l'effet de créer, maintenir et organiser une cour
générale d'appel pour le Canada, et établir des tribunaux additionnels pour
la meilleure administration des lois du Canada.
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[16]
The
Supreme Court of Canada is the general court of appeal. Parliament has
established four additional courts for the better administration of the laws of
Canada, the Tax
Court of Canada, the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Court
Martial Appeal Court of Canada.
[17]
In
order for the Federal Court to have jurisdiction:
a. the matter in
dispute must fall within a federal legislative class of subject;
b. there must be
actual and applicable federal law; and
c. the
administration of that law has to be confided upon it (Quebec North Shore
Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054; ITO-International
Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752).
[18]
By
way of example, I referred to criminal law as a federal legislative class of
subject. There is actual federal law, the Criminal Code. However, the
administration of that law has not been given to the Federal Court on either an
exclusive or concurrent basis, and so rests with the provincial courts. The Bankruptcy
Act is another example.
[19]
Turning
specifically to the claim against Manulife, and its officers and directors,
irrespective of whether it is framed in contract, tort or otherwise, it relates
to a policy of insurance. Insurance is matter of property and civil rights in
the province (Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App.
Cas. 96 and Zavarovalna Skupnost Triglav (Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.)
v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283).
[20]
As
regards his claim against his former lawyer Mr. Greco, Mr. Greco has been
authorized to practice by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and was acting in an
Ontario action. As
in the case of Manulife, I doubted that the claim related to any matter with
respect to which Parliament could legislate.
[21]
Mr.
Crowe was unable to establish that the cause of action fell within a federal legislative
class of subject. He referred to several statutes such as the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms found in the Constitution Act, 1982,
the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Office of Superintendent of
Financial Institutions Act. The only act which clothes the Federal Court
with any jurisdiction is the latter, which provides that persons who are found
by the Superintendent to have committed a violation considered to be serious or
very serious have the right to appeal to the Federal Court. Although that Act
applies to companies to which the Insurance Company Act applies, it is
not applicable relevant to Mr. Crowe’s alleged cause of action and does not
nourish the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. Mr. Crowe is wrong in his assumption
that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to administer federal statutes at
large. That jurisdiction must be specifically confided to it.
[22]
Mr.
Crowe has the overall theory that even if the Federal Court would not otherwise
have jurisdiction, since he is unable to obtain justice in the Ontario courts, the
Federal Court may assume jurisdiction. This suggestion is completely meritless.
[23]
Consequently,
the Statements of Claim are struck, without leave to amend, and the action is
dismissed as against these defendants because the Federal Court lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter. That being said, it was not necessary to
consider other allegations they advanced, such as the claim being scandalous,
frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process of the Court.
[24]
The
Court then adjourned to consider Mr. Crowe’s written Memorandum of Fact and Law
in reply to that of the Attorney General.
ACTION AGAINST THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
[25]
The
action against the Attorney General is actually one against the Crown in Right
of Canada. The Attorney General was named pursuant to subsection 23(1) of the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act. Section 48 of the Federal Courts Act
in effect provides that in an action against the Crown, the defendant should be
“Her Majesty the Queen”. However, nothing turns on this possible irregularity.
[26]
There
appear to be two bases for Mr. Crowe’s assertions that the Crown is liable. One
is as guardian of the Constitution and protector of the people, the Crown is
personally liable to him. The second is that it is vicariously liable for the
actions of the judges who have decided against him.
[27]
Section
17 of the Federal Courts Act specifically gives this Court concurrent
original jurisdiction in all cases in which relief is claimed against the
Crown. However, it must be recalled that the Crown is not liable in tort in
common law (Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose‑leaf
edition, chapter 10.7 & ff). The only liability which could possibly be imposed
in this case derives from the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act by which
the Crown is liable for torts committed by its servants.
[28]
In
order for the Crown to be liable, two conditions must be met: a) someone else
must be liable in tort; and b) that someone else must be a Crown servant.
[29]
Mr.
Crowe had much to say about judicial immunity. He alleges that Madam Justice
Wilson and the other judges did not simply get it wrong; they all maliciously
and purposefully subverted justice in order to unjustly enrich Manulife at his
expense.
[30]
Irrespective
of the state of the law as regards judicial immunity, judges simply are not
servants of the Crown. The Crown exercises virtually no control over judges.
Judicial independence from the Crown is a fundamental principle of our
democracy (Reference re: Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial
Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at paragraphs 82-109).
[31]
It
follows that even if the astounding allegations in the Statement of Claim are true,
the action shall be dismissed as against the Crown on the ground that it
discloses no reasonable cause of action. Again, in reaching this conclusion, it
is not necessary to consider whether the Statement of Claim is scandalous,
frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process of the Court.
CANADIAN JUDICIAL
COUNCIL ET AL.
[32]
Even
though the Canadian Judicial Council and the judges had not filed a motion,
their counsel suggested that the Attorney General’s motion was sufficiently broad
and called for the striking of the Statement of Claim against all defendants.
However, since counsel for the Attorney General stated that he had no mandate
from the Canadian Judicial Council or any judge, and indeed given that judges
are not servants of the Crown, I was not prepared to dismiss the action against
named parties who had not so moved. Indeed, it is not clear if they have even
been served, or at least validly served.
[33]
I
was then invited on my own motion to strike the action on the grounds that even
if the judges could possibly be liable, this Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim. While I am convinced that I could move so as
regards the judges, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Wire Rope
Industries of Canada (1966) Ltd. v. B.C. Marine Shipbuilders Ltd. et al,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 363, I certainly would not do so without giving Mr. Crowe ample
notice.
[34]
Furthermore,
as regards the Canadian Judicial Council, this Court has jurisdiction to
consider its decisions by way of judicial review. Although it could be said the
proceedings against it are faulty in that an action has been taken rather than
an application for judicial review pursuant to rule 300 and following (Canada
v. Grenier, 2005 FCA 348, [2006] 2 F.C.R. 287), it is possible for such
“faulty” actions to be stayed, rather than dismissed (Momi v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 738, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 291).
COSTS
[35]
Although
some of the parties had originally sought costs on a substantial indemnity
basis, come the hearing Manulife proposed lump sum costs of $1,000, and the
other two parties $500. Since these parties could have taxed more under the
default provision of Tariff B, Column III, these proposals were more than
reasonable, and shall be granted.
[36]
As
a result of the orders accompanying these reasons, the style of cause shall now
read:
RON CROWE
Plaintiff
and
THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA BEVERLY McLACHLIN,
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE CHARRON, THE
HONOURABLE JUSTICE ROTHSTEIN OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, THE HONOURABLE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF ONTARIO ROY McMURTRY,
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE FELDMAN, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LANG OF THE COURT OF
APPEAL FOR ONTARIO, THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE JANET WILSON OF THE ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HONOURABLE RICHARD SCOTT,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF MANITOBA AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE OF THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL (in their judicial
and private capacities) AND THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Defendants
“Sean Harrington”
Montréal,
Quebec
October
4, 2007
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