Date: 20070314
Docket: IMM-4374-06
Citation: 2007 FC 286
Vancouver, British Columbia, March
14, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Teitelbaum
BETWEEN:
ERNESTO
JESUS PONCE VIVAR
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to
subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c. 27 (IRPA), for judicial review of a decision the Immigration Division
of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board), dated July 21, 2006, wherein the
Board held that the Applicant, Mr. Vivar, was inadmissible pursuant to
subsection 35(1) of the IRPA.
I. Background
[2]
In
June 2004, Mr.
Vivar applied for refugee status in Canada.
On April 15, 2005, the Minister’s delegate referred the matter for an
admissibility hearing. Mr. Vivar’s refugee application was placed on hold
pending the results of the admissibility hearing.
[3]
Mr. Vivar
was declared inadmissible by the Board for allegedly having committed an act
outside Canada that constitutes an offence referred to in sections 4 through 7
of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, (S.C. 2000, c.
24) contrary to subsection
35(1) of the IRPA. It was accepted by the Board that Mr. Vivar did not personally
commit human rights violations, but rather that he was complicit in these
crimes.
[4]
Mr. Vivar
was a member of the Republican Guard in Peru between 1974 and 1985 and describes
himself as a “career military man”. He has risen through the ranks and, in 1982,
was in charge of approximately 40 men that were responsible for the exterior
security of the El Fronton prison which housed suspected terrorists. In 1983,
for two to three months, Mr. Vivar was enlisted in the Llapan Atic - an elite
counterinsurgency battalion - in what is referred to as an “Emergency Zone”. An
Emergency Zone is essentially a geographical area under political-military
control where the Peruvian government suspended many civil rights. During this
period, Mr. Vivar’s unit was responsible for security and detention of
individuals, occasionally being required to track down suspected terrorists.
Mr. Vivar, on one occasion, arrested and detained a suspected terrorist and
transferred him to the custody of the Commander of the Republican Guard. Mr.
Vivar understood that this prisoner was likely to be interrogated. During the
time in question, the Civil Guard, the Republican Guard and the Investigative
Police all reported to the commanding officer of the army under the same chain
of command.
[5]
Mr. Vivar
was aware that it was common practice, i.e. about 30-40% of the time, to
torture suspected terrorists although it must be noted that Mr. Vivar referred
to these acts as “strong interrogations.” Mr. Vivar was also of the opinion
that what occurred to the man he had taken prisoner was not his responsibility
once he was no longer in Mr. Vivar’s custody.
[6]
In 1984,
Mr. Vivar, having developed a nervous disorder, was temporarily transferred to
a water treatment facility near the Colombian border. However, in October 1985,
Mr. Vivar was ordered to help assist in putting down a prison riot at
Lurigancho detention facility. Several prisoners were burned to death during
this riot. Subsequently, Mr. Vivar returned to his duties at the water
treatment plant until the government informed him he was retired.
[7]
The Board
first determined that the acts committed were crimes against humanity. It was
established, via the documentary evidence, that extensive human rights
violations occurred in the Emergency Zones during the period between 1981 and
1985, by the Peruvian authorities, often as a result of the government
attempting to quell insurrections from the group known as the Shining Path. The
Board found that human rights abuses were committed by the Peruvian government.
The human rights violations included torture, arbitrary arrest, execution of
prisoners and enforced disappearances. The Board also noted that the prison
conditions of the time may also have constituted torture. These findings are
not in dispute in this judicial review.
[8]
The second
issue the Board had to determine was the Applicant’s role in the above human
rights abuses. The Board accepted that Mr. Vivar was credible and that the
organization in which he was a member did not commit human rights abuses to the
same extent as other branches of the government. However, the Board did
determine that the Applicant was aware of the events that transpired during his
time in his military service and was therefore complicit in crimes against
humanity.
[9]
The Board
placed considerable weight in reaching their conclusion on the following facts:
a) Mr.
Vivar voluntarily joined the Republican Guard and he did not retire of his own
free will. Retirement was forced upon him. When Mr. Vivar joined the Republican
Guard, the shining Path did not officially exist.
b) Mr.
Vivar had attended several years of officer training while a member of the
Republican Guard, rising to the rank of lieutenant, and was not merely a low
level soldier. This was also evidenced by his role in the elite anti-subversive
units that were active in the Emergency Zones.
c) The
Republican Guard worked closely with the other Peruvian authorities during the
time in question.
d) Mr.
Vivar was aware that suspected terrorists were mistreated and systemically tortured.
This included the person that Mr. Vivar had personally arrested and delivered
to the Civilian Guard.
[10]
Consequently,
a deportation order was issued against the Applicant.
II.
Legislative Scheme
[11]
Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24, s. 6, and Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 35:
|
6. (1) Every person who, either before or after the
coming into force of this section, commits outside Canada
(a)
genocide,
(b) a
crime against humanity, or
(c) a
war crime,
is guilty of an indictable
offence and may be prosecuted for that offence in accordance with section 8.
|
6. (1)
Quiconque commet à l’étranger une des infractions ci-après, avant ou après
l’entrée en vigueur du présent article, est coupable d’un acte criminel et
peut être poursuivi pour cette infraction aux termes de l’article 8 :
a) génocide;
b) crime contre
l’humanité;
c) crime de guerre.
|
Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27
|
35. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is
inadmissible on grounds of violating human or international rights for
(a) committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an
offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes Act;
(b) being a prescribed senior official in the service of
a government that, in the opinion of the Minister, engages or has engaged in
terrorism, systematic or gross human rights violations, or genocide, a war
crime or a crime against humanity within the meaning of subsections 6(3) to
(5) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act; or
(c) being a person, other than a permanent resident,
whose entry into or stay in Canada is restricted pursuant to a decision,
resolution or measure of an international organization of states or association
of states, of which Canada is a member, that imposes sanctions on a country
against which Canada has imposed or has agreed to impose sanctions in concert
with that organization or association.
Exception
(2) Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) do not apply in the case of
a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that
their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest.
|
35. (1)
Emportent interdiction de territoire pour atteinte aux droits humains ou
internationaux les faits suivants :
a) commettre, hors
du Canada, une des infractions visées aux articles 4 à 7 de la Loi sur les
crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre;
b) occuper un poste
de rang supérieur — au sens du règlement — au sein d’un gouvernement qui, de
l’avis du ministre, se livre ou s’est livré au terrorisme, à des violations
graves ou répétées des droits de la personne ou commet ou a commis un
génocide, un crime contre l’humanité ou un crime de guerre au sens des
paragraphes 6(3) à (5) de la Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les
crimes de guerre;
c) être, sauf
s’agissant du résident permanent, une personne dont l’entrée ou le séjour au
Canada est limité au titre d’une décision, d’une résolution ou d’une mesure
d’une organisation internationale d’États ou une association d’États dont le
Canada est membre et qui impose des sanctions à l’égard d’un pays contre
lequel le Canada a imposé — ou s’est engagé à imposer — des sanctions de
concert avec cette organisation ou association.
Exception
(2) Les faits visés
aux alinéas (1)b) et c) n’emportent pas interdiction de territoire pour le
résident permanent ou l’étranger qui convainc le ministre que sa présence au
Canada ne serait nullement préjudiciable à l’intérêt national.
|
III.
Issues
[12]
The issues are as follows:
1. Did
the Board err in applying the incorrect test for “complicity” in crimes against
humanity?
2. Did
the Board err by treating all Peruvian authorities as members of the same
organization, resulting in the Board determining that the Applicant had
knowledge of the crimes against humanity stemming from branches of the military
in which he was not a member?
IV.
Analysis
A.
Issue 1
(1) Standard of review for
applying the definition of "complicity"
[13]
It is agreed by the parties that the
standard of review on this issue - a question of law - is correctness.
[14]
However, if the Board did
apply the correct test, then the question becomes one of mixed law and fact and
is to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness as explained by Mr. Justice
Nadon in Au v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (2001), 202 F.T.R. 57, 2001 FCT 243.
(2) Decision if the Board
applied the correct definition of "complicity"
[15]
The Applicant argues
that the Board misapplied the test for complicity. It is argued that instead of
using the case of Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.), for guidance, the Board erroneously used the definition of complicity set out in the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia decision in Prosecutor
v. Miroslav Kvocka et al. (2001), Case No. IT-98-30.
Additionally, it is argued by the Applicant that the Board did not consider the
nature of the conflict or if the Applicant possessed a common purpose with
those who committed the crimes against humanity.
[16]
With respect to the Applicant, I find that the Board did in fact
properly rely on Ramirez. On page 5 of their decision, the Board
specifically says:
I applied the elements of
membership and complicity, as explained in Ramirez v. Canada, (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C.306 (C.A.), what is the
nature of the organization involved; what is the method of the enrolment and is
there a possibility to leave; what personal knowledge of the organization has
the person concerned; and what has been his role and involvement in the
organization.
[17]
Also, the
Board makes reference to the applicable “case law” and refers to Ramirez
in footnotes 4 and 8 of its decision. While I accept that merely mentioning a
case name is not proof that it was applied properly, I would find that the
Board’s reasons, when read as a whole, clearly demonstrate that Ramirez was
followed.
[18]
Madam Justice Reed in Penate v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79
(T.D.), summarized the state of Canadian law on complicity at paras. 5-6:
The Ramirez, Moreno, and Sivakumar cases all deal
with the degree or type of participation which will constitute complicity.
Those cases have established that mere membership in an organization which from
time to time commits international offences is not normally sufficient to bring
one into the category of an accomplice. At the same time, if the organization
is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, such as a secret police
activity, mere membership may indeed meet the requirements of personal and
knowing participation. The cases also establish that mere presence at the scene
of an offence, for example, as a bystander with no intrinsic connection with
the persecuting group will not amount to personal involvement. Physical
presence together with other factors may however qualify as a personal and
knowing participation.
As I understand the jurisprudence, it is that a person who
is a member of the persecuting group and who has knowledge that activities are
being committed by the group and who neither takes steps to prevent them from
occurring (if he has the power to do so) nor disengages himself from the group
at the earliest opportunity (consistent with safety for himself) but who lends
his active support to the group will be considered to be an accomplice. A
shared common purpose will be considered to exist. I note that the situation
envisaged by this jurisprudence is not one in which isolated incidents of
international offences have occurred but where the commission of such offences
is a continuous and regular part of the operation.
In the case of Ramirez, at
paragraph 38 it was accepted that Mr. Ramirez:
…was aware of a very large number
of interrogations carried out by the military, on what may have been as much as
a twice-weekly basis (following some 130-10 military engagements) during his 20
months of active service. He could never be classed as a simple on-looker, but
was on all occasions a participating and knowing member of a military force,
one of whose common objectives was the torture of prisoners to extract
information. This was one of the things his army did, regularly and repeatedly,
as he admitted. He was a part of the operation, even if he personally was in no
sense a "cheering section." In other words, his presence at this
number of incidents of persecution, coupled with his sharing in the common
purpose of the military forces, clearly constitutes complicity. We need not
define, for purposes of this case, the moment at which complicity may be said
to have been established, because this case is not to my mind near the
borderline.
[19]
I am
satisfied the facts of the present case are at least analogous to Ramirez. Mr. Vivar, by his own admission, was
aware of a large number of “strong interrogations” during his tenure with the
Republican Guard. A tenure, I might add, that went on for approximately 11
years - unlike the 20 months of service provided by Mr. Ramirez. I accept that
Mr. Vivar was not a “cheering section”; however, by providing a prisoner to the
people that conduct torture, it is reasonable to say that Mr. Vivar was sharing
a common purpose and was no mere on-looker.
[20]
It has been
determined that six factors must be considered when determining if an applicant
has been complicit in crimes against humanity (see: Ali. v. Canada (Solicitor
General) (2005), 279 F.T.R. 296, 2005 FC 1306):
(1) the nature of the organization;
(2) the method of recruitment;
(3) the position/rank in the organization;
(4) knowledge of the organization's atrocities;
(5) the length of time in the organization; and,
(6) the opportunity to leave the organization.
I will address each in turn.
(1) The nature of the
organization
[21]
The
Board accepted that the Republican Guard was not the worst offender amongst the
Peruvian authorities; however, the Board did not doubt they had indeed
committed crimes against humanity during the period in question. If an
organization has a limited, brutal purpose, personal and knowing participation in
a shared common purpose to commit excludable crimes may be assumed by
membership alone. If the Republican Guard does not have a limited, brutal
purpose, complicity must be established by Mr. Vivar's personal and knowing
participation in the Republican Guard’s crimes. That participation and Mr.
Vivar's shared common purpose with the Republican Guard is analyzed below.
(2) The method of
recruitment
[22]
As mentioned, the Applicant volunteered for service for 11
years. This also included volunteering for the Llapan Atic – the elite
anti-subversive unit.
(3) The position/rank
in the organization
[23]
I am
satisfied that the command of approximately 40 men, combined with officer
training, higher pay and a gradual increase in responsibilities, allows the
inference to be made that the Applicant was no mere foot soldier.
(4)
Knowledge of the organization's atrocities
[24]
This was admitted by
the Applicant in his testimony. The Republican Guard was in charge of prison
security and transfers of prisoners and it is not contested that the Applicant
knew that these prisoners were often subjected to human rights abuses. The Applicant
testified that it was “common knowledge” that prisoners were tortured and that
these “strong interrogations” included electrical shock and sleep deprivation. The
Applicant also testified that “[a]ll of the individuals who were arrested were
interrogated. Whatever happened to them afterwards, they were interrogated.”
(5) The length of time in the organization
[25]
As mentioned, the Applicant was in the Republican Guard for
approximately 11 years and did not leave voluntarily. It is well established
that an individual who is part of a group that is committing crimes against
humanity must withdraw or protest at the first reasonable opportunity. See: Valère
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 273
F.T.R. 33, 2005 FC 524.
(6) The opportunity to leave the organization
[26]
The Applicant has not presented any evidence that he made significant
efforts to leave the organization. During cross-examination the Applicant said
“Even though I was not in agreement with those procedures [referring to
torture], but what could I have done?" The answer is, of course, to
attempt to leave the offending organization.
[27]
I also note that the Applicant was transferred to a water treatment
plant for a year and a half and returned to the Republic Guard, knowing full
well their involvement in human rights abuses. These are not acts of
disassociation or actions of a man wishing to exit an organization.
[28]
The documentary evidence before the Board was that the Applicant would
face three months in prison for desertion, although the oral testimony
suggested that longer periods of incarceration could be administered. To echo
the words of the Federal Court of Appeal in Ramirez, the punishment for
desertion - a term of imprisonment - was much less than the torture facing the
victims of the military forces to which the Applicant was connected.
[29]
In conclusion, I
would suggest that none of the above factors assist the Applicant in arguing
that he was not complicit in crimes against humanity.
[30]
Although I agree with
the Applicant that the Board did not use the exact expression “common purpose”
in their reasons, it is clear that the Board properly applied the Ramirez test
in determining the role of the Applicant within the organization and if he had
a common purpose. The Applicant has not provided any case law to suggest that
the exact nomenclature of “common purpose” must be used and, in my opinion, to
require this exact wording would elevate form over substance.
[31]
Further, the finding
that a person holds a position of importance within the group that has
committed the crimes against humanity may serve to support a finding of
complicity and common purpose. In Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), [1993] F.C.J. No.
1145, at paragraphs 10-13, it was held that an inference can be drawn that the
closer to a leadership position a person is within the organization, the more
likely it is they were aware of the crimes and shared a common purpose. I would
suggest the same can be said for Mr. Vivar. Given his four years of officer
training, his command over approximately 40 men, and his testimony that he was
paid better than his underlings, the Board’s findings that the Applicant was in
a position to know are reasonable. Sivakumar therefore allows the
inference to be drawn that there was a common purpose.
[32]
Even if it were
accepted that Mr. Vivar was not a high-ranking officer, it is trite that even a
person in a low-ranking position may be found to have shared a common purpose with the organization if he continues in the
organization after becoming aware that international offenses are being
committed by those involved in it and does not take the earliest opportunity to
leave the organization. See: Gutierrez
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 84
F.T.R 227, 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 106, at paragraph 30.
[33]
It should also be remembered
that the burden of proof which must be met when establishing a common
purpose is less than the balance of probabilities. See: Januario v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 527. This standard
of proof is clearly met on the present facts.
[34]
As for the argument that the
Board improperly relied on Kvocka, I am of
the opinion this is a non issue. This portion of the Board’s decision occurs
after the Board had conducted their Ramirez analysis and, in any event, Kvocka
was recently cited by the Federal Court of Appeal in Zazai v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (2005), 259 D.L.R. (4th) 281, 2005 FCA 303, at
paragraph 16, during their analysis in determining an applicant’s complicity.
In my opinion, a Board cannot be faulted for following Federal Court of Appeal
guidance.
[35]
I do not accept the Applicant’s submissions that the existence of this
passage from Kvocka in the Board’s reasons implies that the Board
applied the wrong test. I do not think that the Board’s reasons are so broad
that they would catch “mere members” of the organization who have no mens
rea in contravention of the guidance of Ramirez. In my opinion, the
Board is quite clear from their analysis under the headings of “Method of
recruitment and possibility to leave”, the “Knowledge of the organization”, and
the heading which is dispositive of this argument, “Involvement and personal
implication of Ponce Vivar,” that the Board was considering more than just the
acts of the organization. They were considering the acts of the Applicant.
Under the latter of the three headings, the Board expressly says, “When making
a determination that someone has committed a crime against humanity, more is
necessary than mere benign membership in an organization that has, from time to
time, committed crimes against humanity.” In my opinion, the Board has
correctly understood the test and has not found that mere membership will
automatically equate to complicity, as the Applicant argues.
[36]
Recently, Mr. Justice
Barnes considered this issue and determined that “[a]t the end of the
day, it is not a person's membership status that is important. Rather it is the
nature and scope of one's activity in support of an organization engaged in
criminal behavior that is the measure of his complicity.” See: J.A.O.
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) (2006), 146 A.C.W.S. (3d) 132, 2006 FC 178 at paragraph 28.
[37]
While each “complicity” case must turn on
its own facts, on this set of circumstances I am of the opinion that the Board properly
understood the nature of the conflict and the actions of the Applicant, and
their reasoning stands up to a somewhat probing analysis.
B. Issue 2
(1) Standard of review on whether or not the
Board erred by finding the Republican Guard to be a member of a group that
committed crimes against humanity
[38]
Inadmissibility under
35(1) has been considered previously by this Court and the applicable standard
of review is reasonableness, as it is a mixed question of fact and law. See: Nezam
v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(2005), 272 F.T.R. 9, 2005
FC 446, and Andeel
v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), 240 F.T.R. 1, 1 2003 FC 1085.
(2) Decision
on whether or not the Board erred by finding the Republican Guard to be a
member of a group that committed the crimes against humanity:
[39]
The Applicant argues
that the Board erred by finding that the acts of the Republican Guard
overlapped with the more heinous acts of the Civil Guard and the Investigation
Police and erred by treating them all as one group.
[40]
Additionally, the Applicant
argues that the Board erred by interchanging the terms “National Guard” for
“Republican Guard”, which, according to the documentary evidence, are separate
entities. I will deal with this issue first.
[41]
In my opinion, the
use of the term “National Guard” stems from the finding that the Republican
Guard is a branch of the National Police. It does appear that the Board may
have conflated the respective names of the organizations in the course of their
reasons. However, it is abundantly clear from the reasons, and a reading of the
transcripts, that all parties concerned were discussing Mr. Vivar’s role in the
Republican Guard and not the National Guard. This is highlighted by the fact
that the Board was aware that the Applicant took a position in the elite anti-subversive
group of the Republican Guard and began their complicity analysis with the
sentences: “Ponce Vivar became a member of the Republican Guards in 1974,
following the family tradition”, and “Ponce Vivar remained in the Republican
Guards for 11 years…”.
[42]
This is not grounds
to grant judicial review.
[43]
As mentioned, the
Board accepted that the Republican Guard may have been the lesser of the evils
that plagued Peru during the time in question. However,
this does not entirely absolve them from culpability. The Board was clear that
Mr. Vivar worked in the prison system for years and knew of the abuses. Also,
around 1983, the Civil Guard was in effective control of the Emergency Zone in
which Mr. Vivar was stationed and the Civil Guard had de facto control
over the Republican Guard. The Applicant testified orally, at page 21 of the
hearing transcripts, that “…when the Republican Guard arrived to the emergency
zone, we would be under the disposition of the colonel of the army. ...” The Applicant
also testified at page 23 of the hearing transcripts that his Republican Guard
commander “…will report directly to the colonel, army colonel.” Also, at page
26 of the second day’s transcripts, when asked “…did the Republican Guard fall
under the command of the army within the emergency zone?”, the Applicant
responded, “Exactly. He was the one who gave the orders to our commander and
the commander passed those orders to us.”
[44]
It was also elicited
through cross-examination that the Republican Guard was part of the coalition
in the Emergency Zone.
[45]
I find that it was
reasonable for the Board to have determined that, in these Emergency Zones, the
chain of command and boundaries between the organizations was blurred and were
close to forming a “coalition” as it was referred to by the Applicant in his
testimony.
[46]
Also, the Applicant
volunteered for the Llapan Atic and was specifically sent into an Emergency
Zone, where Lurigancho prison was, in 1985. The documentary evidence showed
that torture, rape and murder were commonplace.
[47]
It was for these
reasons the Board found reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant had
knowledge of the crimes against humanity as a result of his role in the
Republican Guard and of his role in the Llapan Atic. I do not find the Board
acted unreasonably by finding that the oppressive organizations were closely
related, if not the same, for the purposes of their actions in the Emergency
Zones. The Board’s reasons are based on the evidence and survive a somewhat
probing analysis.
[48]
If I am wrong on this point,
I am of the opinion it still would not amount to a reviewable error, as, even
if we accept that these organizations were all discrete groups in the Emergency
Zone, the Applicant personally handed a person over to be “strongly
interrogated.” This prisoner was, according to the Applicant’s testimony,
denied food and detained on a Peruvian army base. It is clear from the
decision in Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (1996), 205 N.R. 282 (F.C.A.), that personal and knowing
participation in crimes against humanity does not require formal membership in
an organization engaged in those activities. In M.
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (2002), 221 F.T.R. 195, 2002 FCT 833, Madam Justice Dawson dismissed a
judicial review on the basis that it was implausible that the Applicant knew of
ongoing torture and did not resign. In the present case, the issue is not even
as a question of plausible deniability. The Applicant admits to having knowledge
of the torture, estimating that 30-40% of prisoners were tortured. It is for this reason that I do not
accept the Applicant’s role to have been passive acquiescence as explained in Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C.
298 (C.A.). It is no excuse to say that the torture was committed by a group,
other than the group the Applicant was a member of, if the Applicant is the one
handing over people to the group that commits the crimes against humanity.
[49]
The application for judicial
review is dismissed. No question was submitted for certification and none will
be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES that the application for judicial
review is dismissed.
"Max M. Teitelbaum"
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