Date: 20070308
Docket: IMM-4240-06
Citation:
2007 FC 265
Ottawa,
Ontario, March 8, 2007
Present:
The Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer
BETWEEN:
KENNY
MERCERON
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) of a negative
decision by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and
Refugee Board dated June 28, 2006, determining that the applicant is not a
Convention refugee as defined in section 96 of the Act or a person in need of
protection under section 97 of the Act, on the ground that he is a person
referred to in Article 1F(a) and 1F(c) of the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention).
[2]
The
applicant, Kenny Merceron, is a citizen of Haiti. He states that he worked for
the Haitian National Police (HNP) in Haiti from 1999 to 2003. He worked as a
driver and body guard for a senior government minister.
[3]
He
alleges that he was arrested and threatened with death for visiting one of his
police officer friends who was imprisoned in the national penitentiary. After a
minister intervened, he was released, and his service weapon was seized in
August 2003. Fearing for his life, he travelled to Canada on August 16, 2003,
and sought refugee protection in December 2004.
[4]
The
RPD heard the claim on May 15, 2006. The respondent Minister intervened to ask
the RPD to apply the exclusion clauses in Articles 1F(a) and 1F(c) of the
Convention on the ground that the applicant was a member of the Haitian
National Police from 1999 to 2003 after receiving four months of military
training in 1998. The Minister was successful on this issue.
1. The
appropriate standard of review
[5]
A
decision by the RPD that certain acts fall within the definition of “crimes
against humanity” is a question of law, and the standard of review is
correctness (Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Mendez-Levya v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 846 (QL), 2001 FCT 523;
Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 3 F.C.
646, [1994] F.C.J. No. 765 (QL).
[6]
The
applicant’s complicity in acts committed by the Haitian National Police and his
exclusion under Article 1 of the Convention is a mixed question of law and
fact. The standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter
(Harb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration 2003 FCA 39, [2003] F.C.J. No. 108 (C.A.)(QL); Salgado v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 1, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1 (F.C.T.D.)(QL).
2. Excluding the
applicant
[7]
Section
98 of the Act provides that a person referred to in section E and F of Article
1 of the Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of
protection.
[8]
Paragraphs
(a) and (c) of section F, which are relevant to this proceeding, read as
follows:
|
(a)
He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes;
|
a) Qu’elles ont commis un
crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au
sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions
relatives à ces crimes;
|
|
…
|
[…]
|
|
(c)
He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
|
c) Qu’elles se sont rendues
coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations
Unies.
|
[9]
In
Harb, above, the Federal Court of Appeal held that Article 1F(a) must be
interpreted so as to include international instruments concluded since the
Convention was adopted in 1951, including the definition of “crime against
humanity” in the Rome Statute, which was adopted on July 17,1998, and
came into effect on July 1, 2002.
[10]
Paragraph
7(1) of the Rome Statute (see Appendix) states that a “crime against
humanity” is “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population” and includes murder, torture, rape,
persecution against any identifiable group on political, racial, national,
ethnic or cultural grounds, and other inhumane acts of a similar character.
[11]
Paragraph
7(2) of the same Statute provides that such an attack against a
population involves the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack . . .”
[12]
The situation envisaged is not one in which isolated incidents
of international offences have occurred but where the commission of such
offences is a continuous and regular part of the operation (Ramirez v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306; Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433); (Penate v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79 (F.C.T.D.)).
[13]
The onus is on the Minister to lead evidence demonstrating that
there are “serious reasons for considering” that the applicant has been
complicit in crimes against humanity (Moreno,
above, Ramirez, above). The applicable standard of proof is something
more than mere suspicion but less than the balance of probabilities standard (Lai
v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2005] F.C.J. No. 584 (QL), 2005 FCA 125; Mugesera
v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100).
[14]
The purpose of Article 1F(c) is to exclude those
individuals responsible for serious, sustained or systemic violations of
fundamental human rights which amount to persecution in a non‑war setting (Pushpanathan,
above).
Complicity by
association
[15]
Complicity
by association means that a person may be held responsible for crimes committed
by others because of his or her close association with those who committed them
(Sivakumar, above).
[16]
In
such circumstances, it is the nature of the crimes alleged against the
organization with which the person is associated that leads to his or her
exclusion (Harb, above).
has committed a crime against humanity, has
knowledge of the group’s activities, actively supports the group and has
failed to disengage himself or herself from it at the earliest opportunity (Penate v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79 (T.D.)).
[18]
Essentially, complicity rests on the existence
of a shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in
question may have of it (Ramirez, above; Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(1996), 205 N.R. 282, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1209
(C.A.)(QL)).
[19]
Mere
membership in an organization that commits international crimes is an
insufficient basis on which to invoke the exclusion clause against the
applicant (Ramirez, above), unless the very existence of this
organization is primarily directed to a limited, brutal purpose (Saridag v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 85 F.T.R. 307).
[20]
However,
association with an organization responsible for
international crimes may constitute complicity if there is personal and knowing
participation or toleration of the crimes (Sivakumar,
above at paragraph 13).
[21]
In
Collins v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC
732, at paragraph 24, Mr. Justice Yves deMontigny summarized the mental
element required to establish complicity in crimes against humanity as follows:
The mental
element required to establish complicity in crimes against humanity has been
characterized variously as “shared common purpose”, “personal and knowing
participation or toleration of the crimes”, and participation in an
organization knowing it commits crimes against humanity, when combined with a
failure to stop the crimes or disassociate oneself.
[22]
Moreover, the case for an individual's complicity in international crimes
committed by his or her organization is stronger if the individual member in
question holds a position of importance within the organization. The closer one
is to being a leader rather than an ordinary member, the more likely it is that
an inference will be drawn that one knew of the crime and shared the
organization’s purpose in committing that crime. In such circumstances, an
important factor to consider is evidence that the individual protested against
the crime or tried to stop its commission or attempted to withdraw from the
organization (Ramirez,
above; Sivakumar, above).
Application
to this case
[23]
The
RPD analyzed the crimes and acts committed by the Haitian National Police and
the Chimères and concluded that crimes against humanity were involved.
However, the RPD did not find that the organization’s existence was solely
directed to a limited and brutal purpose, such that mere membership was a
sufficient basis on which to invoke the exclusion clause (Ramirez, above).
Mr. Merceron could not be regarded as complicit in crimes against humanity
based solely on the fact that he was a member of the Haitian National
Police.
[24]
In Loordu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),
[2001] F.C.J. No. 141 (T.D.) (QL), where the applicant
was also a member of a police force recognized as an organization that
committed international crimes (the Sri Lankan police), the Court found that
mere membership in a police service does not meet the definition of
“persecuting group” as interpreted in Penate, above.
[25]
The
RPD then had to determine the existence of a “shared common purpose” and “the
knowledge that all of the parties in question may have of it” (Ramirez,
above; Moreno, above).
[26]
The
case law has established the factors to consider when determining whether there
are serious reasons to believe that a claimant could be considered as an
accomplice in the perpetration of crimes referred to in section 1F of the
Convention. These factors are: the method of
recruitment, the claimant’s position and rank in the organization, the nature
of the organization, the knowledge of atrocities, the length of time in the
organization and the opportunity to leave the organization (Ali v.
Canada (Solicitor General), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1590 (QL), 2005 FC 1306; Fabela
v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1277 (QL), 2005 FC 1028).
[27]
In
this case, the RPD analyzed and considered the following elements in
determining whether the applicant was aware of the acts of violence and human
rights violations committed by the police and the Chimères:
- He freely joined
the police force in 1998 and underwent military training before returning
to his position as a police officer;
- He would have
learned about police violence from his brother, who was a police officer,
and from his training in 1998;
- He was a member of
the close protection unit for the office of the delegate for the west and
an armed driver for a minister, and therefore was even more aware of the
police violence at the time;
- He learned
techniques for the defence of the country’s security and knew that the
police were suppressing the population in the name of defending the
country’s security;
- He acknowledged
that he had heard about human rights abuses committed by police officers;
- He and the minister
for whom he was a bodyguard often met with members of the Chimères,
a [TRANSLATION]“militia group
dedicated to the bloody suppression of opponents”;
- As a police officer
and bodyguard, he could not have been unaware of the brutal and violent
repression by the security forces, but did not distance himself from them.
[28]
The
fact that the applicant knew about the crimes was not in itself enough to
establish that he shared a common purpose with the perpetrators of the crimes (Collins,
above, paragraph 28).
[29]
As
stated by Mr. Justice Joseph Robertson in Moreno, above, at paragraph
50:
It is settled law that acts or omissions amounting to passive
acquiescence are not a sufficient basis for invoking the exclusion clause.
[30]
The
RPD had no evidence before it to infer from the applicant’s mere knowledge that
he shared a common purpose of consciously participating in serious crimes. The
RPD did not refer to
any fact, event or act by the applicant
that would support a finding that he shared a common goal
with the perpetrators of the crimes.
[31]
Despite
the lack of evidence on this point, the RPD stated that the applicant [TRANSLATION] “would not
have survived in such a situation if he had not been perceived as sharing the
common purpose of abusing the people.”
[32]
If
that were the case, every member of the Haitian police force during that time,
regardless of his or her position, would be excluded from the Convention.
[33]
The
RPD could not find that the applicant was complicit in crimes against humanity
without evidence to that effect.
[34]
For
these reasons, I find that the RPD made a reviewable error. The application for
judicial review is allowed, and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a
differently constituted panel.
JUDGMENT
The application for judicial
review is allowed, and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a
differently constituted panel.
“Danièle
Tremblay-Lamer”
Certified true translation
Mary Jo Egan, LLB
Appendix A
Statutory Provisions
Subsection
2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states that the term
“Refugee Convention” means “the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva on July 28, 1951.”
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2.(1)
The definitions in this subsection apply in this Act.
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2.(1)
Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
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|
…
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[…]
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“Refugee
Convention”
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« Convention
sur les réfugiés »
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|
Refugee
Convention means the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, signed at Geneva on July 28, 1951, and the Protocol to
that Convention, signed at New York on January 31, 1967. Sections E
and F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention are set out in the schedule.
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La
Convention des Nations Unies relative au statut des réfugiés, signée à Genève
le 28 juillet 1951, dont les sections E et F de l’article premier
sont reproduites en annexe et le protocole afférent signé à New York le
31 janvier 1967.
|
|
…
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[…]
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Sections
96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
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96. A Convention
refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
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96. A qualité de
réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques:
|
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(a) is outside
each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
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a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
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|
(b) not having
a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to
that country.
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b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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|
97. (1) A person
in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
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97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée:
|
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(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
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a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
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(b) to a risk
to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
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b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant:
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(i) the person is unable or, because
of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne
veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by the
person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu
de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y
trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des
normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
|
|
Section
98 of the Act reads as follows:
|
98.
A person referred to in section E and F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention
is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
|
98.
La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la
Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de
personne à protéger.
|
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of
section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention read as follows:
|
(a) He has committed a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
|
a) Qu’elles ont commis un crime contre
la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au sens des
instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à
ces crimes;
|
|
…
|
[…]
|
|
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
|
c) Qu’elles se sont rendues coupables
d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations Unies.
|
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
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Article
7
|
Article
7
|
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1. For the purpose of this
Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack;
|
1. Aux fins du présent Statut, on entend par crime contre
l’humanité l’un quelconque des actes ci-après lorsqu’il est commis dans le
cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique lancée contre toute
population civile et en connaissance de cette attaque:
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(a) Murder;
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a) Meurtre;
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(b) Extermination;
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b) Extermination;
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(c) Enslavement;
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c) Réduction en
esclavage;
|
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(d) Deportation or
forcible transfer of population;
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d Déportation ou
transfert forcé de population;
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(e) Imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law;
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e) Emprisonnement
ou autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des
dispositions fondamentales du droit international;
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(f) Torture;
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f) Torture;
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(g) Rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
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g)Viol esclavage
sexuel, prostitution forcée, grossesse forcée, stérilisation forcée ou toute
autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité comparable;
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(h) Persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3,
or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
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h) Persécution de
tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre
politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste au sens
du paragraphe 3, ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement
reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international, en corrélation avec tout
acte visé dans le présent paragraphe ou tout crime relevant de la compétence
de la Cour;
|
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(i) Enforced disappearance
of persons;
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i) Disparitions forcées de
personnes;
|
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(j) The crime of apartheid;
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j) Crime d’apartheid;
|
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(k) Other inhumane acts of
a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury
to body or to mental or physical health.
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k) Autres actes inhumains
de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou
des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou à la santé physique ou
mentale.
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2. For the purpose of
paragraph 1:
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2. Aux fins du
paragraphe 1:
|
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(a) "Attack
directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack;
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a) Par
« attaque lancée contre une population civile », on entend le
comportement qui consiste en la commission multiple d’actes visés au
paragraphe 1 à l’encontre d’une population civile quelconque, en
application ou dans la poursuite de la politique d’un État ou d’une
organisation ayant pour but une telle attaque:
|
|
(b)
"Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions
of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine,
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;
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b) Par
« extermination », on entend notamment le fait d’imposer
intentionnellement des conditions de vie, telles que la privation d’accès à
la nourriture et aux médicaments, calculées pour entraîner la destruction
d’une partie de la population;
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(c)
"Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise
of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women
and children;
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c) Par « réduction
en esclavage », on entend le fait d’exercer sur une personne l’un
quelconque ou l’ensemble des pouvoirs liés au droit de propriété, y compris
dans le cadre de la traite des être humains, en particulier des femmes et des
enfants;
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(d)
"Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted
under international law;
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d) Par
« déportation ou transfert forcé de population », on entend le fait
de déplacer de force des personnes, en les expulsant ou par d’autres moyens
coercitifs, de la région où elles se trouvent légalement, sans motifs admis
en droit international;
|
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(e)
"Torture", means the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
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e) Par
« torture », on entend le fait d’infliger intentionnellement une
douleur ou des souffrances aigués, physiques ou mentales, à une personne se
trouvant sous sa garde ou sous son contrôle; l’acception de ce terme ne
s’étend pas à la douleur ou aux souffrances résultant uniquement de sanctions
légales, inhérentes à ces sanctions ou occasionnées par elles;
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(f) "Forced
pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population
or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition
shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy;
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f) Par
« grossesse forcée », on entend la détention illégale d’une femme
mise enceinte de force, dans l’intention de modifier la composition ethnique
d’une population ou de commettre d’autres violations graves du droit
international. Cette définition ne peut en aucune manière s’interpréter comme
ayant une incidence sur les lois nationales relatives à la grossesse;
|
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(g)
"Persecution" means the intentional arid severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of
the group or collectivity;
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g) Par
« persécution », on entend le déni intentionnel et grave de droits
fondamentaux en violation du droit international, pour des motifs liés à
l’identité du groupe ou de la collectivité qui en fait l’objet;
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(h) "The crime
of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those
referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one
racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the
intention of maintaining that regime;
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h) Par
« crime d’apartheid », on entend des actes inhumains analogues à
ceux que vise le paragraphe 1, commis dans le cadre d’un régime
institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe
racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans
l’intention de maintenir ce régime;
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(i) "Enforced
disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or
a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
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i) Par « disparitions forcées de personnes », on entend
les cas où des personnes sont arrêtées, détenues ou enlevées par un État ou
une organisation politique ou avec l’autorisation, l’appui ou l’assentiment
de cet État ou de cette organisation, qui refuse ensuite d’admettre que ces
personnes sont privées de liberté ou de révéler le sort qui leur est réservé
ou l’endroit où elles se trouvent, dans l’intention de les soustraire à la
protection de la loi pendant une période prolongée.
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