Date: 20070212
Docket: IMM-3888-06
Citation: 2007 FC 153
Ottawa, Ontario, February 12, 2007
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
SALEEM AHMED RANA
FARHAT SALEEM
ISMA SALEEM
SEHRISH SALEEM
AFTAB AHMED RANA
TAIMOOR AHMED RANA
Applicants
and
MINISTER
OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), of a decision dated
June 2, 2006, by an officer of the Minister, Ms. Josée St-Jean
(officer), to reject the application for permanent residence of Saleem Ahemed
Rana (applicant) and his dependents (applicants) on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds.
I. The facts
[3]
On
October 12, 2000, following an anonymous tip, the applicants were
arrested. The Canadian authorities drafted an offence report against them for
having applied for refugee protection using false names. After the offence
report was issued, a deportation order was made against the applicants.
[4]
On
February 15, 2002, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)
rejected the applicants’ claim for refugee protection. The applicants applied
for judicial review of this decision, which was dismissed on May 16, 2002.
[5]
On
November 18, 2002, the applicants submitted an application for permanent
residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (H&C application),
alleging, inter alia, that they risked being persecuted if they
returned to Pakistan, since Mr. Saleem Rana (principal applicant) was a
member of the PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party).
[6]
On
June 2, 2006, the officer rejected the applicants’ H&C application.
This is the decision under judicial review.
[7]
In their
written submissions, the applicants raise a number of arguments against the
decision under review. Some of these arguments were not addressed during the
oral submissions. For the purposes of this review, I will strive to respond to
all the arguments where possible. The applicants also raised new arguments
during their oral submissions. Since these arguments were not raised in the
written submissions, however, I do not intend to comment on them. I would add
that they would not alter my determination in any way in this case.
II. Issues
(1) Was the officer acting within
her jurisdiction in ruling on the H&C application, including the risks of
return, before a PRRA decision was made?
(2) Did the officer err in failing
to ask the applicants to submit additional documents before making a decision
regarding their H&C application?
(3) Did the officer commit other
errors warranting the intervention of this Court?
III. Analysis
(1) Was the officer acting within
her jurisdiction in ruling on the H&C application, including the risks of
return, before a PRRA decision was made?
[8]
The
applicants allege that the officer could not rule on the H&C application,
including the risks of return, before processing their PRRA application.
According to the applicants, an officer of the Minister may not process an
H&C application until the applicant is deemed inadmissible under
subsection 25(1) of the IRPA. Since the applicants arrived in Canada when
the former Immigration Act, c. I-2, was still in force, they maintain
that they can be deemed inadmissible only following a negative PRRA decision.
[9]
Subsection 25(1)
of the IRPA reads as follows:
25. (1) The
Minister shall, upon request of a foreign national who is inadmissible or
who does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on the
Minister’s own initiative, examine the circumstances concerning the foreign
national and may grant the foreign national permanent resident status or an
exemption from any applicable criteria or obligation of this Act if the
Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and compassionate
considerations relating to them, taking into account the best interests of a
child directly affected, or by public policy considerations.
|
25. (1) Le
ministre doit, sur demande d’un étranger interdit de territoire ou qui ne
se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut, de sa propre initiative,
étudier le cas de cet étranger et peut lui octroyer le statut de résident
permanent ou lever tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables,
s’il estime que des circonstances d’ordre humanitaire relatives à l’étranger
— compte tenu de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant directement touché — ou
l’intérêt public le justifient.
|
[Emphasis
added]
|
[Je
souligne]
|
The wording of subsection 25(1) of the IRPA clearly
indicates that only a foreign national who is inadmissible or who does not meet
the requirements of the Act can make an H&C application. In this case, even
though the applicants are not deemed inadmissible in Canada, they do not meet
the requirements of the IRPA.
[10]
In this
regard, under subsection 11(1) of the IRPA, a foreign national must make
an application for permanent residence before entering Canada.
11. (1) A foreign national must, before
entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document
required by the regulations. The visa or document shall be issued if,
following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national
is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
|
11. (1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à son
entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent les visa et autres documents requis par
règlement, lesquels sont délivrés sur preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle, qu’il
n’est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
|
In this case, however, although the applicants entered Canada
before the IRPA came into force, their H&C application is governed by the
IRPA, in accordance with section 190 of the IRPA, which reads as follows:
*190. Every application, proceeding or matter
under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the
coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that
coming into force.
|
*190. La présente loi s’applique, dès l’entrée
en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et procédures présentées ou
instruites, ainsi qu’aux autres questions soulevées, dans le cadre de
l’ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour lesquelles aucune décision
n’a été prise.
|
*[Note: Section 190 in force
June 28, 2002, see SI/2002‑97.]
|
*[Note : Article 190 en vigueur le
28 juin 2002, voir TR/2002-97.]
|
That being said, even under the former Immigration Act a
foreign national had to apply for a permanent residence visa before entering
Canada. (See subsection 9(11) of the former Immigration Act.)
Consequently, the applicants in this case did not follow the rules established
in the IRPA or the former Immigration Act, and the officer was therefore
acting within her jurisdiction in ruling on the applicants’ H&C
application.
(2) Did the officer err in failing
to ask the applicants to submit additional documents before making a decision
regarding their H&C application?
[11]
The
applicants argue that the officer should have considered the documents they
submitted in the course of prior procedures related to their application for
permanent residence, such as the documents they submitted with their
application to be members of the post-determination refugee claimants in Canada
class (PDRCC) under the former Immigration Act.
[12]
It
has been clearly established by this Court that, as part of an H&C
application, the onus is on the applicant to satisfy an officer that permanent
residence status should be granted on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
In this regard, Gibson J. wrote the following at
paragraph 11 in Owusu v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 94, a decision that was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in Owusu
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 28:
11 The onus on an application for humanitarian or
compassionate relief lies with the applicant. In Prasad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), in
the context of judicial review of a visa officer decision, Justice Muldoon
wrote at paragraph 7:
The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the visa officer
fully of all the positive ingredients in the applicant’s application. It is not for the visa officer to wait and to offer the
applicant a second, or several opportunities to satisfy the visa officer on
necessary points which the applicant may have overlooked.
In Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), Justice Heald, once again in the context of judicial review
of a visa officer’s decision, but dealing with the issue of humanitarian or
compassionate grounds, wrote at paragraph 9:
The applicant submits that he is entitled to have all
relevant evidence considered on a humanitarian and compassionate application.
I agree with that submission. However, the onus in this respect lies with
the applicant. It is his responsibility to bring to the visa officer’s
attention any evidence relevant to humanitarian and compassionate
considerations.
[Emphasis added]
[13]
In
the case at bar, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) wrote to the
applicants twice, on February 25, 2006, and on May 15, 2006, asking
them to update their documents for their H&C application (tribunal record,
letter of May 15, 2006, page 452; tribunal record, letter of
February 25, 2006, page 255). The applicants did not submit any
documents. Submitting documents is the applicants’ responsibility. The officer
therefore did not commit an error in failing to consider the documents in
question. As for the criticism that the officer did not take into consideration
the documents submitted under the former Act, these documents were part of the
tribunal record. According to the Court’s case law, a decision-maker is not
required to mention all documents consulted in arriving at a determination.
(3) Did the officer commit other
errors warranting the intervention of this Court?
[14]
In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2 S.C.R. 817, at pages 857‑858, the Supreme
Court determined that, upon judicial review of a decision of an officer of the
Minister rejecting an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds,
the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter.
Although Baker was decided under the former Immigration Act,
there is no valid reason why the Court should believe that the standard of
review applicable to these decisions has changed. Recent case law from this
Court confirms that the appropriate standard of review for a decision rejecting
an application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds is reasonableness simpliciter
(Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FC 1192, at paragraph 13; Liang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2006 FC 967, at paragraph 7; Dharamraj v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 674).
[15]
In this
case, the applicants allege that the officer committed a number of errors when
she reviewed their H&C application, including the following:
-
The
officer concluded that the young girl, Sahrish Saleem, lied about her name on
her initial claim for refugee protection;
-
The officer
was not satisfied that Saleem Ahmed Rana was a member of the PPP;
-
The
officer did not allow a threatening letter from Lahore as evidence that the
applicants would be at risk if they returned to Pakistan;
-
The
officer concluded that it was not unreasonable to believe that the children
could continue their education in Pakistan;
-
The
disclosure of the letter of poison pen letter amounted to extrinsic evidence;
-
The two
children who work have employment that requires specialized training.
[16]
As for the
first error alleged by the applicants, the evidence in the record, that is, the
IRB’s negative decision of February 15, 2002, indicates that the
applicants made claims for refugee protection under the names Saleem Ahmed,
Farah Saleem, Amina Saleem, Ansa Saleem, Atif Ahmed and Arif Ahmed. The name
Sharish Saleem is not on this list of names. The officer’s conclusion that the
applicants all claimed refugee protection using false names is therefore
reasonable.
[17]
Moreover,
the applicants maintain that the officer could not reasonably conclude that
Mr. Rana had not been a member of the PPP, since, at his first hearing
before the IRB, the panel agreed that Mr. Rana had been a member of PPP.
In my view, it was reasonable for the officer to determine that Mr. Rana
was not a member of the PPP, as his PPP membership card was issued to Saleem
Ahmet, the false name the principal applicant used for his claim for refugee
protection dated November 23, 1999.
[18]
With
regard to the fact that the officer did not accept the threatening letter from
Lahore, it is reasonable to believe that this letter was not allowed as
credible evidence because its translation was not dated or authenticated in any
way. As for the stamped date, it is legible (November 30, 2000), even
though the officer stated that she was unable to read it. This is insufficient
to vitiate the officer’s determination regarding the threatening letter.
[19]
The
officer’s conclusion that the children could continue their education in
Pakistan is not unreasonable. The applicants argue that it would be impossible
for the children to continue their education in Pakistan because they cannot
read or write in Urdu, the language of instruction in Pakistan. Nevertheless,
according to the record, the children (the younger ones) attended a school in
Pakistan and their first language is Urdu. Although such a change will cause
major inconvenience, it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the
children could continue their education in Pakistan.
[20]
The
officer’s use of the poison pen letter does not amount to extrinsic evidence.
The applicants have known about the poison pen letter since fall 2000. There is
even documentation that seems to indicate that the letter was submitted during
the special ad hoc hearing on November 2, 2000. (See tribunal record, page
668.) It was therefore reasonable for the officer to use it for her analysis.
[21]
The
officer concluded that the older children’s jobs as restaurant managers did not
require specialized training and that, as a result, they would be able to find similar
work in Pakistan. I agree. Employment as a restaurant manager does not require
specialized training. Specialized training is required for professionals such
as engineers, physicians and lawyers, who usually require certification issued
by a professional order, the lack of which, depending on the situation, may be
an obstacle when looking for employment. This is not so in the case of
employment as a restaurant manager.
[22]
Before
concluding this decision, let me add that the applicants’ convoluted case history
does not make a decision-maker’s job any easier. The principal applicant made
decisions that did not help the family achieve its objectives. In addition, the
onus was on the applicants to submit documentation in support of their
application, which they did not do. At this stage, the case has to be
considered as is. Although the applicants and their counsel would like to take
a different approach, the legislation does not allow it.
IV. Conclusion
[23]
In light
of the reasons above, the applicants have not demonstrated that the officer’s
decision as a whole was unreasonable. The application for judicial review is
therefore dismissed.
[24]
No
question was submitted for certification, even though the parties were invited
to do so.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT
ORDERS THAT:
-
The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
-
No
question is certified.
“Simon
Noël”
Certified
true translation
Jason
Oettel