Docket: IMM-3751-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1251
Ottawa, Ontario, November 2,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN:
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LUIS ENRIQUE FLORES CABRERA
and MARIA SANTOS RUBIO
GARCIA
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
By motion made in writing, the applicants ask
this Court, pursuant to paragraph 72(2)(b) and (c) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, to extend the time for filing
and serving their application for leave and judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (RPD) dated May 12, 2011, that denied their claim for protection.
Those provisions provide as follows:
72. (2) The following provisions govern
an application under subsection (1):
...
(b) subject to paragraph 169(f), notice
of the application shall be served on the other party and the application
shall be filed in the Registry of the Federal Court (“the Court”) within 15
days, in the case of a matter arising in Canada, or within 60 days, in the
case of a matter arising outside Canada, after the day on which the applicant
is notified of or otherwise becomes aware of the matter;
(c) a judge of the Court may, for special
reasons, allow an extended time for filing and serving the application or
notice;
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72. (2) Les dispositions suivantes
s’appliquent à la demande d’autorisation :
…
b) elle doit être signifiée à l’autre
partie puis déposée au greffe de la Cour fédérale — la Cour — dans les quinze
ou soixante jours, selon que la mesure attaquée a été rendue au Canada ou
non, suivant, sous réserve de l’alinéa 169f), la date où le demandeur en est
avisé ou en a eu connaissance;
c) le délai peut toutefois être prorogé,
pour motifs valables, par un juge de la Cour;
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[2]
The burden of proof lies with the applicants.
The Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v Hennelly, [1999]
FCJ No 846 at para 3, set out the test to be applied when considering requests for
an extension of time:
The proper test
is whether the applicant has demonstrated:
1. a
continuing intention to pursue his or her application;
2. that the
application has some merit;
3. that no prejudice
to the respondent arises from the delay; and
4. that a
reasonable explanation for the delay exists.
These criteria are
conjunctive; the party seeking the extension must satisfy the Court that all
four have been established on the balance of probabilities.
[3]
Even if the other criteria are met – a
proposition I do not find, but merely assume for the purposes of this
application - I am not satisfied that the applicants have established that
their application for leave and judicial review has merit, nor have they
provided a reasonable explanation for the delay.
[4]
The applicants are citizens of Mexico. They filed a claim for protection
alleging that their lives were at risk as a result of reporting to the police
that a local man was selling drugs in the neighbourhood. They allege that he
had friends in the Federal Police and that those friends were friends with the
Los Zetas, a major criminal organization in Mexico. Without describing their evidence to the RPD in detail, it is
observed that they asserted that they had received threatening phone calls,
moved from their home in Los Cues, had the door of their new home kicked
in, were assaulted, and received death threats.
[5]
The RPD held that the applicants did not have a
well-founded fear of persecution with a nexus with any of the five Convention
grounds set out in s. 96 of the Act. It was also held that the applicants’
removal to Mexico would not, on a balance of probabilities, subject them
personally to a risk to their lives or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment as provided for in s. 97 of the Act. Further, the RPD held that the
applicants had an internal flight alternative in Mexico and that this was determinative of their claim.
[6]
In their submissions made in support of this motion,
the applicants submit that they were not given enough time for their lawyer to
properly prepare their case before the RPD, that they were poorly advised by
this lawyer, and that they did not know that they could have filed a complaint with
the Law Society of Upper Canada. They further submit that they left out three
important pieces of information that could have persuaded the RPD to come to a
different decision: (1) medical information which would have demonstrated that
the third assault was more severe than what the RPD believed it to be, (2)
proof that Mr. Flores Cabrera received a gunshot to the leg when he and his
wife were attempting to jump over the fence of their backyard, and (3) a
certificate from the Procuraduria General de Justicia in Mexico which
provides evidence of Mr. Flores Cabrera’s clean criminal record. The
applicants’ request for Legal Aid has been refused; they are acting on their
own behalf in this motion.
[7]
I have reviewed the entire record before the
Court and have concluded that this motion cannot succeed.
[8]
The applicants have not demonstrated that their
application for judicial review has merit. They have not filed any evidence
that shows that having a “good” lawyer, or having more time with their lawyer,
could have resulted in a different finding by the RPD. Further, and contrary
to the view of the applicants, I have determined that the medical info, the
gunshot wound and the criminal record certificate would not likely have
persuaded the RPD to render a different decision regarding the IFA. None was
germane to that issue. As that finding was determinative of the applicants;’
claim for protection, the result would not change even if the evidence was
admitted.
[9]
This Court has often held that waiting for a
response from Legal Aid is not a reasonable explanation for delay: Espinoza
v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (FCA),
[1992] FCJ No 437, and Zheng v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1005. Other than stating that they have difficulties
understanding the procedure before this Court, they have not advanced any other
explanation to justify their delay.
[10]
For these reasons, this motion must be
dismissed.
ORDER
THIS COURT
ORDERS that the applicants’ motion for an order under paragraph 72(2)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, extending the time for filing and serving
their application for leave and judicial review of the decision
of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board dated
May 12, 2011, is dismissed, without costs.
"Russel
W. Zinn"