Date: 20110125
Docket: T-702-08
Citation: 2011 FC 83
Ottawa, Ontario, January 25, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Simpson
BETWEEN:
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TARGET EVENT PRODUCTION LTD.
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Plaintiff
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and
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PAUL CHEUNG AND LIONS COMMUNICATIONS
INC.
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Defendants
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
[1]
Following
a nine day trial, the Plaintiff, Target Event Production Ltd. (Target) was
awarded damages against both Defendants in the amount of $15,000.00 for copyright
infringement and passing off, a declaration that copyright subsists and was
infringed in the Plaintiff’s Market Site Plan, an injunction against further
copyright infringement, and solicitor and client costs.
[2]
The
Federal Court of Appeal subsequently varied the costs award by changing it to
party and party costs. As well, while the injunction was upheld, its terms were
modified. The Court of Appeal also indicated that the parties could bring a
motion asking me to give directions to the assessment officer pursuant to Rule
403. The Plaintiff so moved and this decision deals with that motion.
THE MOTION
[3]
Target
seeks:
(i)
A
direction that costs be assessed at the higher end of Column V in Tariff B;
(ii)
A
direction that trial fees be allowed for a second counsel under Tariff B, item
14 (b);
or,
in the alternative,
(iii)
An
award of fixed costs pursuant to Rule 400(4).
[4]
Since
the Defendants have agreed that a lump sum award should be made, these reasons will
not provide directions. Instead, they will deal with the quantum of an award of
fixed costs.
[5]
Target
and the Defendants have filed affidavits and written submissions which provide
their suggested figures for fees and disbursements, as well as their arguments.
FEES
[6]
Target’s
position is that the award should be greater than costs assessed at the high
end of Tariff B, Column V. That amount, before tax, is $96,555.00. This
calculation includes fees for two counsel at trial. To provide context, Target indicates
that its solicitor and client fees, before tax, are $221,111.95. Target also
asks for costs in the amount of $2,500.00 for this motion.
[7]
The
Defendants, on the other hand, have calculated fees for one counsel. They say
that Tariff B, mid column III should be the maximum award and suggest that a
figure as low as one based on mid column I would be appropriate. They say that a
lump sum award should reflect fees between $13,065.00 and $32,825.00 before tax.
Their calculations are as follows:
Tariff B
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Mid Column I
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$13,065.00
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Excluding tax
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Tariff B
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Mid Column II
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$20,215.00
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Excluding tax
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Tariff B
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Mid Column III
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$32,825.00
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Excluding tax
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Tariff B
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Low Column V
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$38,090.00
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Excluding tax
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Tariff B
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Mid Column V
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$57,005.00
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Excluding tax
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Tariff B
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High Column V
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$77,350.00
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Excluding tax
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DISBURSEMENTS
[8]
Target
claims $15,310.17, before tax. The Defendants suggest that the proper figure, before
tax, is $11,859.37.
SUBMISSIONS
[9]
The
Plaintiff relies on the complexity of the issues, the Defendants’ conduct
before and during the trial and the Plaintiff’s success in establishing liability
to justify an award above the high end of Tariff B Column V.
[10]
The
Plaintiff notes that the trial covered nine days in May and June 2009. Fourteen
witnesses were called and many documents and recordings were in Chinese. The
Plaintiff says second counsel was needed at trial to assist with all aspects of
the case including the Chinese materials. The Plaintiff also says that a speedy
trial was essential and that second counsel helped to achieve that objective.
[11]
The
Defendants focus on the low damage award ($15,000.00) and equate it to the
value of the claim. They also focus on my finding that Raymond Cheung was not
truthful when he said that, but for a shortage of vendors caused by the
Defendants, he could have opened a market in 2008. They note that second counsel
did not speak at trial and say that his fees should not be permitted because
his main contribution was his knowledge of Chinese. Lastly, they point out
several instances in which they say that unreasonable amounts have been claimed
as fees and disbursements.
DISCUSSION
The Value of the Claim
[12]
During
final argument, the Plaintiff submitted a draft judgment in which it sought
damages against the Defendants on a joint and several basis in the amount of
$681,054.14 for infringement of copyright and for passing off in contravention
of subsection 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act, R.S. 1985, c. T-13. This
amount was arrived by amalgamating and reducing amounts which had initially
been claimed under the following headings:
(i)
a
claim of $1,404,579.53 for estimated lost profits for markets which Target was
allegedly unable to hold from 2008 to 2010;
(ii)
a
claim of $50,000.00 as aggravated damages; and
(iii)
a
claim of $100,000.00 for loss of goodwill.
[13]
However,
the Plaintiff was awarded only $15,000.00 principally because I did not believe
his evidence to the effect that he had located a suitable site and could have
held a night market in 2008 if the Defendants had not “stolen” his vendors.
[14]
That
said, Target did establish two other critical aspects of its case.
[15]
First,
it established copyright in its Market Site Plan and showed that it was
knowingly and repeatedly infringed. Without this infringement, the Defendants
would not have been able to open their market as they did in June of 2008. In
this regard, I refer to my Reasons for Judgment and Judgment of
January 11, 2010 (the Reasons) at paragraphs 45 to 49, 98, 111, 112 and
231. Target’s success in proving this claim led to both declaratory and
injunctive relief.
[16]
Second,
Target proved that it had valid distinctive trademarks and that the Defendants
knowingly and repeatedly passed off their night market to potential visitors as
Target’s earlier highly successful night market. In this regard, see the
Reasons at paragraphs 159, 202-204, 207, 210 and 227.
[17]
For
these reasons, I have rejected the Defendants’ assertion that the damages
awarded are indicative of the value of the Plaintiff’s action.
Credibility
[18]
Paul
Cheung gave evidence that I concluded was untruthful. Many important aspects of
his curriculum vitae were overstated to the point of being complete fabrications.
Further, and more critically, he testified that representatives from the city
of Richmond and Lions’
architect advised him that Target’s Market Site Plan represented the only
viable way to stage a night market on the property on Vulcan Way. However, no
evidence was called to corroborate this testimony and, since he had no
expertise, I rejected his evidence and the Defendants’ submission that
copyright did not subsist in the Market Site Plan because of its functionality
(see Reasons, paragraphs 86 and 87).
[19]
In
sum, both Raymond and Paul Cheung were untruthful when they thought it would be
to their advantage. However, the Plaintiff’s untruthful testimony took more
time at trial and contributed to an inflated claim for damages. For these
reasons, credibility has had a negative impact on the lump sum award.
CONDUCT
[20]
The
affidavit of Paul Smith, senior counsel for the Plaintiff, indicates that,
during the pre-trial period, the Defendants:
·
Failed
to deliver an affidavit of documents within the time period provided in the Federal
Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106;
·
Failed
to provide the documents once the affidavit had been delivered;
·
Refused
to answer undertakings given on discovery so that a motion was needed; and
·
Provided
documents in boxes which included material which was never listed in an
affidavit of documents.
[21]
As
well, the Defendant Paul Cheung defied an order of the Court during trial. An
order was made prohibiting parties from speaking to the press about the
litigation. Yet, on the day the order was made, he gave an interview to CBC TV
in which he speculated about the possibility that the Court would grant
injunctive relief.
[22]
On
the other hand, the Defendants responded in a substantive manner to the
Plaintiff’s requests to admit and those admissions significantly reduced the
length of the trial. I have therefore concluded that the Defendants’ conduct
only slightly favours an increased award.
COMPLEXITY
[23]
In
my view, neither the multiple issues nor the lengthy facts were particularly
complex. However, I agree that the involvement of spoken and written Chinese
significantly complicated matters during preparation and at trial when translations
and explanations for the Court were required. This factor suggests a somewhat
increased award.
OFFERS TO SETTLE
[24]
The
Plaintiff made written offers to settle of $500,000.00 and $250,000.00 plus
injunctive relief. On May 11, 2009, the Defendants offered $10,000.00 with
meaningful injunctive relief relating to both the Market Site Plan and the
Vendor Application Form. The Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendants’ offer
and the trial started the next day. The Defendants say that this exchange of
offers illustrates that damages were the issue which drove the case to trial.
[25]
The
Plaintiff makes no submissions on this point. However, in my view, an offer
delivered on the eve of trial does not carry the same weight, when considering
costs, as one delivered earlier when the recipient has reasonable time to
reflect and confer with counsel.
[26]
For
this reason, I have not treated Defendants’ offer as a factor which will reduce
the award.
THE AMOUNT OF WORK
[27]
In
my view, this case required and received substantial pre-trial preparation. The
extensive facts were presented in a clear fashion and the many documents were
well organized. These efforts were overlaid by the need to translate many of
the materials and the need to bring motions to require the Defendants to
respond to the claim in a timely way. This factor favours an increased award.
SECOND COUNSEL
[28]
The
Defendants also seek to avoid a second counsel fee on the basis that (i) he did
not speak at trial and (ii) his primary role was to provide translations. In my
view, the first point is not determinative and the second is unsubstantiated. I
am satisfied that, given the extensive factual and documentary record, second
counsel contributed in a meaningful way to the effective and expeditious
presentation of the Plaintiff’s case. Accordingly, a second counsel fee at
trial will be factored into the lump sum award. Given that a unit is valued at
$130.00, if the mid-point of Column III is used (i.e., 2.5
units) second counsel generates a fee of $8,612.00.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS
(a) Fees
[29]
The
Defendants take issue with the following amounts claimed in the Plaintiff’s
draft bill of costs at the high end of Column V (Exhibit D to the affidavit of
Paul Smith). The Plaintiff has not provided submissions responding to these objections:
(i)
Tariff item 27
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Re:
other services
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The
Defendants say that 20 units are claimed but the tariff maximum is 5 units
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In my view, this objection is well founded.
Since 1 unit is valued at $130.00, $1,950.00 has been overcharged.
(ii)
Tariff item 5
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Re:
September motion
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The
Defendants say that 11 units are claimed for a contested motion even though 6
units are the maximum and the motion was not contested.
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In my view, the motion was contested when
filed and that is what the tariff requires. However, there is a 5 unit or
$650.00 overcharge.
(iii)
Tariff items 10
and
11
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Re:
Two case management conferences
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The
Defendants say that 14 units are claimed for preparing and for attending but each
conference lasted only 15 minutes.
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I agree and would allow 2 units for
preparation and 1 for attendance at each conference for a total of 6 units.
This means that there is an overcharge of 8 units or $1040.00.
(iv)
Tariff item 11
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Re:
Pre-trial conference
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The
Defendants say that 2 hours or 10 units are claimed for attendance when only
one hour was actually used as a conference.
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In my view, only 1 hour or 5 units should
have been claimed. This results in an overcharge of 5 units or $655.00.
(v)
Tariff item 13(b)
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Re:
Trial preparation
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The
Defendants say 9 days are claimed when 8 days is the proper number
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I agree with this submission and note an
overcharge of 8 units or $1,040.00.
[30]
Based
on the Plaintiff’s criticisms, the total fees excluding tax of $96,555.00 based
on the high end of Column V should be reduced by $5,335.00 for a revised figure
of total fees plus tax of $91,220.00.
(b) Disbursements
[31]
The
Defendants object to the disbursements described below. Again, the Plaintiff
has not replied to the objections.
[32]
Investigator
fees of $1,323.49 are objected to on the basis that they were incurred to
protect the Plaintiff’s trademarks and not for the litigation. However, in this
case, Ms. Kolton was retained to impersonate a prospective vendor. Her work was
primarily directed to the issue of passing off (see the Reasons paragraph 200.)
Accordingly, the disbursement is appropriate.
[33]
The
Defendants object to disbursements for online research of $1,270.17 and for the
rental of audio-visual equipment for use at trial $54.51. In my view, these are
appropriate disbursements.
[34]
The
Defendants also object to the charge for certified copies. Since I cannot tell
from the account what documents were certified, the disbursement of $567.00 will
be disallowed.
[35]
Meal
disbursements of $125.63 will also be disallowed.
[36]
The
cost of $100. 00 to expedite the trademark will be disallowed because I am not
able to determine why this charge was incurred.
[37]
Interpreter
costs of $1,010.00 are challenged. In my view, this disbursement is appropriate.
Given the volume of material in Chinese, it was reasonable to have an
interpreter present to assist the Court during the entire presentation of the
Plaintiff’s case.
[38]
These
conclusions reduce the disbursements by $792.63 for a revised total of
disbursements before tax of $15,310.17 minus $792.63 = $14,517.54.
CONCLUSIONS
[39]
The
Federal Court of Appeal has ordered party and party costs. In setting a lump
sum, I am mindful of the normal rule that Tariff B, Column III governs party
and party costs. For the reasons given above, I have reached the following
conclusions:
·
The
damage figure of $15,000.00 does not represent the value of the litigation.
This means that a figure below column III is not appropriate.
·
The
Plaintiff was untruthful about a material aspect of his claim and the damages
claimed were unreasonably inflated so a figure based on or above Column V is
not appropriate.
[40]
The
mid-point of Column
III generates (according to the Defendants) a figure for fees of $32,825.00. To
this, I have added a second counsel fee of $8,612.00 and $2,500.00 for this
motion. I have then rounded the total of $43,937.00 up to $47,000.00 as a result
of the Defendants’ conduct before and during trial and because of the amount of
work involved in pre-trial preparation.
[41]
Accordingly,
I will award the following: $47,000.00 for fees before tax and $14,517.54 for
disbursements before tax. The applicable taxes are to be added to reach the
final award.
ORDER
THIS
COURT ORDERS that costs
in the amount of $47,000.00 for fees (plus tax) plus $14,517.54 for
disbursements (plus tax) are forthwith to be paid by the Defendants to the
Plaintiff and that the Defendants’ liability for costs is joint and several.
“Sandra
J. Simpson”