Docket: IMM-7365-10
Citation: 2011 FC 1078
Ottawa, Ontario, September 20, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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MBAIOREMEM FRANCIS
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
Questions
regarding the weight of evidence and credibility are within the jurisdiction of
the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [Board]
as that of a trier of fact in respect of Convention refugee consideration (Brar
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] FCJ No 346 (FCA) (QL/Lexis));
therefore, the Court is in agreement with the position of the Respondent.
[2]
“The
"presumption" that a claimant's sworn testimony is true is always
rebuttable” (Adu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1995] FCJ No 114 (QL/Lexis)), and it is within the purview of the Board to
find that allegations are contrary to common sense. In Singh v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1448, Justice
Michel Beaudry, citing the
Federal Court of Appeal’s reasons in Shahamati v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 415 (QL/Lexis), found:
[14] The Board did not believe the
applicants and gave numerous examples why it came to that conclusion. It was
open to the Board and I see no reason for the Court's intervention. In this
regard, I would like to underline a comment made by Pratte J., in Shahamati
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 415
(C.A.) (QL), which states that the Board is entitled, in assessing credibility,
to rely on criteria such as rationality and common sense.
II. Judicial Procedure
[3]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Board, dated
November 29, 2010, wherein the Board determined that the Applicant, a citizen
of Chad, is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
[4]
The
Board determined that the Applicant was not credible on matters central to his
claim for protection.
III. Issue
[5]
Is
the Board’s decision reasonable?
IV. Analysis
[6]
It
is accepted that the Board, as a specialized tribunal, is in position to gauge
the credibility of an applicant. The Court accords the RPD a high level of
deference on findings of fact, which include matters of credibility (Aguebor
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 160 NR 315
(FCA)).
[7]
The
RPD pointed to aspects of the Applicant’s evidence, which were not considered
credible and explained why it had made the findings it did. A credibility
assessment is “the heartland of the discretion of triers of fact”, and in
making its determination, the RPD is entitled to take into account the
discrepancies, contradictions and omissions in the evidence and to view the
evidence from the perspective of rationality and common sense (Giron v
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 43 NR 238 (FCA); Aguebor,
above; Sheikh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990]
3 FC 238 (CA)).
[8]
In
the present case, it was not unreasonable for the Board to question the
Applicant’s narrative. The Board underlined several contradictions and
discrepancies in the Applicant’s testimony, as well as his failure to respond
in a straightforward manner in addition to his being vague in his testimony.
[9]
The
Board did not believe that the Applicant was targeted by rebels since the
objective documentary evidence rather demonstrates that citizens in Chad, in
February 2008, and especially those living in N’Djamena, as did the Applicant,
experienced the same chaotic situation. The Board concluded that the Applicant
was using the documentary evidence to invent a story to support his claim.
[10]
To
question the Applicant’s credibility, the Board raised concerns in respect of his
alleged membership card, his failure to give details regarding the cost of
membership and its renewal, as well as concerns as to the manner by which the
Applicant left his country of origin and his travel route. The Board also
raised legitimate concerns regarding his birth certificate.
[11]
The
Board was entitled to draw a negative inference with respect to evidence
submitted subsequent to the Applicant’s written narrative which, nevertheless, does
not cure the fundamental deficiencies of the narrative, itself.
[12]
Those
contradictions and discrepancies, as a whole, seriously undermine the
Applicant’s credibility. Contrary to the Applicant’s allegations, the Board did
not proceed by means of a microscopic examination of the evidence but
essentially provided examples by which to explain its finding of the lack of
credibility. The examples stem from the evidence itself and the Applicant’s own
behaviour.
[13]
The
Board is also entitled to base its decision on an applicant’s behaviour at a
hearing. The aptitude to answer questions in an honest and clear manner, the
coherence and the uniformity of the answers are subject to the appreciation of
the Board in respect of the credibility of the Applicant; thus, such findings in
respect of credibility warrant significant judicial reserve (Lapointe v
Hôpital le Gardeur, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 351; He v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 1107 (FCA); Wen v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 907 (FCA) (QL/Lexis)).
[14]
In
Wen, above, the Federal Court of Appeal specifies that the Board, which sees
and hears an applicant, is in a better position than this Court to appreciate
the credibility of a testimony. In that decision, Justice Arthur Stone specified:
[3] That
apart, we also observe that the adverse finding was based as well on the
appellant's answers being "confusing" and "evasive". This
assessment of personal demeanour ought not to be interfered with by this Court
which lacks the advantages available to the triers of fact. (See Clarke v.
Edinburgh Tramways Co. [1919] S.C. 35 (H.L.) quoted in Fletcher
v. Manitoba Public Insurance Company (1990) 116 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.), at
pages 12 - 13. [Emphasis added].
[15]
The
Board was entitled to raise the Applicant’s lack of subjective fear in light of
the evidence and the delay in his claiming refugee protection. The Applicant
arrived in the United States on April 14, 2008 with a U.S. visa; he did not
claim refugee protection. He took a bus to New York, then to Buffalo and
claimed refugee protection in Fort Erie (Ontario) on April 29, 2008. The Board
was correct in concluding that the delay was inconsistent with the behaviour of
a person who fears for his/her life as alleged.
[16]
The
delay in claiming refugee status in Canada is one more factor which the Board
properly took into consideration when questioning the Applicant’s credibility (Skretyuk
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1988), 47 Imm LR (2d)
86 (CF); Ali v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996),
112 FTR 9 (CF)).
[17]
Since
the Board found the narrative not credible, it was well-founded on its part to
give no probative value to the documents filed by the Applicant; thus, the
letter from the “Association pour la promotion des libertés fondamentales au
Tchad”, and the letter from a priest were considered to have been self-serving,
as were the photographs taken more than two years after the alleged events took
place. This conclusion is in conformity with the jurisprudence (R v Abbey,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 24).
[18]
The
evidence as a whole had been considered by the Board. The fact that the Board
did not mention in its analysis every single piece of evidence does not signify
that certain evidence was ignored (Woolaston v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1973] S.C.R. 102; Hassan v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration) (1992), 147 NR 315 (FCA); Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No. 598 (FCA) (QL/Lexis)).
[19]
In
Sheikh, above, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that a general finding
of a lack of credibility on the part of an applicant may extend to all relevant
evidence emanating from his testimony.
[20]
This
ruling of the Federal Court of Appeal was reiterated in Rahaman v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 89, [2002] 3 FC 537. In
this case, Justice John Maxwell Evans wrote:
[29] … as MacGuigan J.A.
acknowledged in Sheikh, supra, in fact the claimant's oral testimony
will often be the only evidence linking the claimant to the alleged persecution
and, in such cases, if the claimant is not found to be credible, there will be
no credible or trustworthy evidence to support the claim. Because they are
not claimant-specific, country reports alone are normally not a sufficient basis
on which the Board can uphold a claim. [Emphasis added].
[21]
The
decision of the Board met its test of reasonableness by its demonstration of
the lack of credibility on the part of the Applicant.
V. Conclusion
[22]
As
the Board’s conclusions were clearly based on evidence, supported by detailed
reasons and reasonably open to the Board, they are not considered unreasonable
and do not warrant the intervention of the Court. The Board’s conclusions are
reasonable on the basis of the analysis as rendered by it.
[23]
For
all of the above reasons, the Applicant’s application for judicial review is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS that the Applicant’s application for
judicial review be dismissed. No question of general importance for
certification.
“Michel
M.J. Shore”
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