Date: 20110419
Docket: T-716-06
Citation: 2011 FC
476
Toronto, Ontario, April 19, 2011
PRESENT: Madam Prothonotary Milczynski
BETWEEN:
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PAUL SLANSKY
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
Applicant in this proceeding filed a motion for an Order to require the
application for judicial review proceed in the form of an action, or in the
alternative, that the Respondent, Canadian Judicial Council (“CJC”) deliver the
complete record for the decision that is the subject of the review.
[2]
At the
hearing of this motion, submissions focused on the alternative relief, that the
CJC be compelled to release the record as contemplated by Rule 317 of the Federal
Courts Rules, and more specifically, the report of Professor Martin
Friedland dated October 27, 2005 (the “Friedland Report”). This report was
prepared for the CJC in respect of the complaint filed by the Applicant, Mr.
Paul Slansky against Mr. Justice Robert M. Thompson of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice. For the reasons below, the motion is granted in part. That
portion of the Friedland Report that contains facts in the record before the
decision-maker ought to be produced. The facts are not protected by either
solicitor-client or public interest privilege. Only the portions of the report
that constitute legal advice is protected by solicitor client privilege and
should be redacted from the copy produced and filed with the Court. Accordingly
it is not necessary to address the matter of converting this application for
judicial review into an action, or to rule on the disclosure of any other
documents that may subsequently come into issue, as those documents were not
put before the Court on this motion.
Background
[3]
The
underlying facts giving rise to this proceeding relate to the conduct of a
murder trial and more specifically, the conduct of counsel for the defence, Mr.
Slansky and the judge, Mr. Justice Thompson during the course of that trial.
The facts of what transpired during the trial need not be set out for the
purposes of this motion, except to say that both Mr. Slansky and Justice
Thompson took such exception to the other that each filed a complaint alleging
misconduct with the applicable governing bodies. Mr. Slansky filed his
complaint first with the CJC, followed by Justice Thompson who initially
considered having contempt charges filed against Mr. Slansky, instead caused to
be filed, a complaint against Mr. Slansky with the Law Society of Upper Canada.
[4]
Each
complaint was reviewed, and in the case of the complaint against Mr. Slansky,
the Law Society determined that the matter should not be the subject of
discipline or proceed to a hearing. The matter ended there, although the filing
of the complaint had significant consequences for Mr. Slansky both personally
and professionally.
[5]
In the
case of the complaint against Justice Thompson, the CJC conducted a review and
investigation. By letter dated March 9, 2006, Mr. Slansky received a lengthy
and very detailed response from Mr. Norman Sabourin, Executive Director and
General Counsel for the CJC wherein Mr. Sabourin reviewed the allegations of
misconduct and the steps taken by the CJC in its review and investigation, with
the conclusion that:
…while the conduct of the judge may at
times have fallen short of the ideal, Chief Justice Scott has concluded, for
the reasons outlined above, that his conduct does not constitute judicial
misconduct. The judge clearly kept an open mind about the guilt of the
accused, despite his personal opinion and ensured that both sides were able to
advance their positions in a fair and thorough manner. With regard to the
judge’s obligation to remain courteous, Chief Justice Scott finds that the
judge was, overall, remarkably restrained in his treatment of you, given your
own behaviour.
…
… Chief Justice Scott has come to the
view that your complaint does not warrant further consideration as it does not
establish judicial misconduct on the part of Mr. Justice Thompson. Accordingly,
he has directed me to close the file with this reply.
[6]
The
Applicant was not satisfied with this resolution of his complaint and commenced
the within application for judicial review, seeking a declaration that:
a. the CJC refused to exercise
its jurisdiction and conducted a flawed, faint and anemic investigation;
b. the CJC erred in law in its
interpretation of Justice Thompson’s conduct;
c. the CJC exceeded its
jurisdiction by passing erroneous and flawed judgment on the Applicant’s
conduct at trial, as defense counsel, as justification for the judge’s
sanctionable conduct; and that
d. the complaint mechanism of the
CJC, of having judges judging judges’ misconduct, is unconstitutional and of no
force and effect and gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of institutional
bias, and constitutes a breach of the Applicant’s rights under ss. 7 and 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[7]
The
Applicant also seeks an order quashing the decision of the CJC and returning
the matter back to the CJC to conduct a further and new review of the
complaint.
[8]
For the
purposes of this proceeding, the Applicant wrote to the CJC seeking the
following:
i.
a copy of
any and all documents, memos, electronic or otherwise, with respect to the
complaint, investigation, and decision at the Judicial Council with respect to
the complaint; and
ii.
a copy of
the Respondent’s entire file(s) with the Respondent touching upon the decision
to close the file regarding the complaint
[9]
On May 17,
2006, Mr. Sabourin replied, including copies of all material that were in the
possession of the CJC in coming to its decision, with the exception of
exchanges between the Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee of the
Council and his advisors in the matter, namely Mr. Sabourin himself, the former
counsel to the CJC, and Professor Martin Friedland. The objection to providing
this material was stated that it was prepared confidentially to assist the
Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee in his consideration of the
complaint and that it would be against the public interest to produce this
material. Solicitor-client privilege was also asserted.
[10]
In
determining whether the Friedland Report should constitute part of the record for
the purposes of Rule 317 and whether it can or should be produced, it is
important to set out the basis upon which it was prepared for the CJC.
Canadian Judicial Council – Statutory
Regime
[11]
The CJC
was established in 1971 pursuant to amendments to the Judges Act. It
consists of all chief justices and associate chief justices of the superior
courts of Canada and the chief judge and
associate chief judge of all courts whose members are appointed by the federal
government of Canada.
[12]
The
objects and mandate of the CJC are set out in s.60 of the Judges Act:
s.60(1) The objects of the Council are to
promote efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the quality of judicial
service, in superior courts and in the Tax Court of Canada.
s.60(2) In furtherance of its
objects, the Council may,
(a) establish
conferences of chief justices, associate chief justices, chief judges and
associate chief judges;
(b) establish
seminars for the continuing education of judges;
(c) make
the inquiries and the investigation of complaints or allegations described in
section 63; and
(d) make the inquiries
described in section 69.
[13]
Sections
63 and 64 of the Judges Act set out the framework for the Council’s
mandate to conduct investigations and inquiries:
s. 63(1) The Council shall, at
the request of the Minister or the attorney general of a province, commence an
inquiry as to whether a judge of a superior court or of the Tax Court of Canada
should be removed from office for any of the reasons set out in paragraphs
65(2)(a) to (d).
s.63(2) The Council may investigate any
complaint or allegation made in respect of a judge of a superior court or of
the Tax Court of Canada.
s.63(3) The Council may, for the purpose
of conducting an inquiry or investigation under this section, designate one or
more of its members who, together with such members, if any, of the bar of a
province, having at least ten years standing, as may be designated by the
Minister, shall constitute an Inquiry Committee.
s.63(4) The Council or an Inquiry Committee
in making an inquiry or investigation under this section shall be deemed to be
a superior court and shall have
(a) power to summon
before it any person or witness and to require him to give evidence on oath,
orally or in writing or on solemn affirmation if the person or witness is
entitled to affirm in civil matters, and to produce such documents and evidence
as it deems requisite to the full investigation of the matter into which is
inquiring; and
(b) the same power to
enforce the attendance of any person or witness and to compel the person or
witness to give evidence as is vested in any superior court of the province in
which the inquiry or investigation is being conducted.
s.64(5) The Council may prohibit the
publication of any information or documents placed before it in connection
with, or arising out of, an inquiry or investigation under this section when it
is of the opinion that the publication is not in the public interest.
s.64(6) An inquiry or investigation under
this section may be held in public or in private, unless the Minister requires
that it be held in public.
[14]
Section 65
of the Judges Act sets out the only bases upon which that the CJC may
recommend that a judge be removed from office:
s.65(1) After an inquiry or
investigation under section 63 has been completed, the Council shall report its
conclusions and submit the record of the inquiry or investigation to the
Minister.
s.65(2) Where, in the opinion of the
Council, the judge in respect of whom an inquiry or investigation has been made
has become incapacitated or disabled from the due execution of the office judge
by reason of
(a) age or infirmity,
(b) having been guilty
of misconduct,
(c) having failed in
the due execution of that office, or
(d) having been placed, by his conduct
or otherwise, in a position incompatible with the due execution of that office,
The Council, it its report to the
Minister under subsection (1), may recommend that the judge be removed from
office.
[15]
Thus, when
the CJC takes jurisdiction under the Judges Act, it may recommend that a
judge be removed from office on the grounds that the CJC has found the judge to
be incapacitated or disabled (as defined), or the Council may make no
recommendation.
[16]
The CJC
has passed “Complaints Procedures” to assist the conduct of the investigation
of complaints. Under these Procedures, the following initial outcomes are
possible:
a.
the
Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee (the “Chair”) can close the file
where the matter is trivial, vexatious, made for an improper purpose,
manifestly without substance or does not warrant further consideration;
b.
seek
additional information from the complainant;
c.
seek the
judge’s comments and those of his or her chief justice;
d.
after
obtaining comments from the judge or his or her chief justice, the Chair can:
(i) close the file after concluding that
the matter is without merit or does not warrant further consideration or where
the judge acknowledges that his or her conduct was inappropriate and the Chair
is of the view that no further inquiries need to be taken in relation to the
complaint; or
(ii)hold the file in abeyance pending
pursuit of remedial measures pursuant to section 5.3; or
(iii)ask Counsel to make further inquires
and prepare a report, if the Chair is of the view that such report would assist
in considering the complaint; or
(iv)refer the file to a Panel.
[17]
Where the
Chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee has asked Counsel to make further
inquiries and prepare a report, the Executive Director of the CJC shall inform
the judge that is the subject of the complaint, and his or her chief justice. Counsel
shall also provide to the judge, sufficient information about the allegations
and the material evidence to permit the judge to make a full response and any
such response shall be included in the Counsel’s report (ss.7.1-7.2 of the
Complaints Procedures). Following receipt and review of Counsel’s report, the
Chair may (i) close the file, (ii) hold the file in abeyance pending pursuit of
remedial measure or (iii) refer the file to a Panel.
Status and Role of “Counsel”
[18]
The CJC
Complaints Procedures define “Counsel” as “a lawyer who is not an employee” of
the CJC. The CJC has adopted a policy with respect to Counsel retained in
judicial conduct matters, that sets out the role of Counsel in conducting the
“further inquiries” contemplated by the Procedures. That policy states:
“The role of Counsel in conducting
further inquires is, essentially, to gather further information. Persons
familiar with the circumstances surrounding the complaint, including the judge
who is the subject of the complaint, will be interviewed. Documentation may be
collected and analyzed. It is not the role of Counsel conducting further
inquires to weigh the merits of a complaint or to make any recommendation as to
the determination that a Chairperson or a Panel should make. Such Counsel acts
on the instructions of the Chairperson or the Panel.
This role is sometimes referred to as
that of a “fact-finder”. This description is accurate if it is limited to the
gathering or clarification of facts. It would not be accurate if it were
intended to encompass adjudicative fact-finding in the sense of making
determinations based on the relative credibility of witnesses or the
persuasiveness of one fact over another. The role of Counsel conducting
further inquires is simply to attempt to clarify the allegations against the
judge and gather evidence, which, if established, would support or refute those
allegations. The Counsel must obtain the judge’s response to these allegations
and evidence, and present all of this information to the Chairperson or Panel.
The role of Counsel undertaking further
inquiries is to focus on the allegations made. However, if any additional,
credible and serious allegations of inappropriate conduct or incapacity on the
part of the judge come to the Counsel’s attention, Counsel is not precluded
from inquiry into those matters as well.”
[19]
Professor
Friedland was engaged as “Counsel” to conduct further inquiries in the matter
of Mr. Slansky’s complaint and that defined “fact-gathering” role was
communicated him, together with the policy for “Counsel conducting further
inquiries”. The policy formed the basis of his engagement letter, along with
the CJC’s Complaints Procedures.
[20]
In that
respect, the terms of Professor Friedland’s engagement and the description of
the role and function of “Counsel making further inquiries” is critical for the
disposition of this motion. The terms of the engagement letter indicate the
relationship between CJC and “Counsel undertaking further inquiries” is not
intended to create a solicitor-client relationship and the stated purpose of
the engagement is not to provide legal advice. The role of Counsel is that of a
skilled investigator and fact-gatherer, similar to the role of an investigator
engaged to conduct interviews and make inquiries into complaints of human
rights violations, or in the workplace where policies and protocols may exist
to deal with complaints, to investigate sexual harassment or other allegations
in a manner that is fair to all concerned.
[21]
The CJC
submits that in the course of this investigation by Counsel, issues of a
personal nature may arise, including sensitivities and concerns on the part of
persons being interviewed that must be taken into account. Persons interviewed
may include court staff, fellow judges, supervisory judges, counsel who appear
before the judge and/or work together. The CJC notes that in each of these
cases, persons with knowledge about the complaint are often likely to feel
vulnerable to the adverse opinions of the judge or of each other, or may feel
that a proper working professional or supervisory relationship would be
compromised if their views on the complaint were made known to their colleagues
or to the public. The CJC asserts that if assurances of confidentiality are not
given to persons being interviewed, it is probable that the investigation would
not produce the same quality of information as can be obtained when such
assurance is given, which would lead to more formal hearings in which evidence
under oath is compelled.
[22]
In
addition, as the CJC submits, the role of “Counsel making further inquiries” is
also important to allow the CJC to obtain the facts - reliable and candid
information concerning a complaint, without going the route of an investigation
by way of a Panel. Indeed, for the CJC, the role of Counsel arises and is
important for the initial purposes of deciding whether a full inquiry or Panel
is warranted at all, without having to resort to the formality of a proceeding
in which evidence is obtained under oath. The CJC seeks to protect this summary
route of investigation, wherein after investigation and reporting by Counsel, a
complaint may be determined not to warrant further inquiry or, conversely, to
require hearing by a Panel.
[23]
These are
understandable practical considerations given the constraints of the Judges Act
as to how the CJC receives and investigates complaints, and how it has
developed this “middle ground” between closing a file and referring a complaint
to a Panel. The issue on this motion, however, is whether as the CJC submits,
the engagement of Professor Friedland gave rise to a solicitor-client
relationship, and/or the information sought to be produced is protected by public
interest privilege.
Solicitor-Client Privilege
[24]
Whether or
not the relationship between Professor Friedland and the CJC can be
characterized as benefiting from solicitor-client privilege must be determined
by reference to the fundamental principles underlying the privilege, which
include the following essential features that indicate whether solicitor-client
privilege is established.
[25]
Solicitor-client
privilege attaches to communications between a lawyer and his or her client
where: (i) the client seeks legal advice from a lawyer; (ii) where the lawyer
provides this legal advice in his or her professional capacity; (iii) where the
communication between the lawyer and the client relates to legal advice; and
(iv) where the communication between the lawyer and client is made in
confidence. In order to qualify for solicitor-client privilege, the
communication must thus be in relation to legal advice sought from a legal
advisor in his or her capacity as a legal advisor. (Solosky v. The Queen (1979)
[1980] 1. S.C.R. 821; The Law of Privilege in Canada, Hubbard,
Magotiaux, Duncan; Canada Law Book, November, 2010).
[26]
It is the
CJC’s evidence on this motion that in addition to “fact-gathering”, Professor
Friedland was instructed to “provide a lawyer’s analysis and recommendations”
in respect of the allegations. The CJC states that it was its expectation that
the report prepared by Counsel was confidential and that it constitutes legal
advice. These expectations are set out in the affidavit of the Norman Sabourin,
the CJC’s Executive Director and General counsel, but are not expressly
reflected in either Professor Friedland’s engagement letter, or in Professor
Friedland’s own comments in his report regarding his mandate.
[27]
Professor
Friedland notes that he is to act as a “fact-finder”, and that his role is to
clarify the allegations and gather evidence. He expressly acknowledges that it
is not his role to weigh the merits of the complaint or make any recommendation
as to the determination that a Chairperson or a Panel would make.
[28]
In his
report, Professor Friedland describes what he did. He conducted numerous
interviews; he listened to tapes and reviewed transcripts from parts of the
trial and the minutes of the proceedings prepared by the registrars of the
courts. Professor Friedland goes into great detail describing what happened at
the trial. He also identifies a number of issues for the CJC and frames the
questions to be determined by the CJC in its determination of how to proceed
with Mr. Slansky’s complaint. In that assessment, he does appear to provide
more than the facts, and indeed offers some legal analysis and advice. For
example, Professor Friedland identifies as an issue for the CJC to determine,
whether the judge maintained an appearance of impartiality. He also reviews
Justice Thompson’s legal decisions made during the course of the trial, in
particular evidentiary rulings made during the trial. On both of these matters,
Professor Friedland offers his professional opinion about them.
[29]
This
analysis and advice goes beyond the mandate for Counsel as stated in the CJC’s
Complaints Procedures and the Policy for “Counsel conducting further
inquiries”, but I cannot conclude that they were gratuitous comments or constitute
unsolicited legal advice. Mr. Sabourin made clear in his affidavit that persons
engaged as Counsel are instructed to provide a lawyer’s analysis and
recommendations in respect of the allegations of judicial misconduct, for
consideration by the Chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee.
[30]
However,
that part of the Friedland Report attracts solicitor-client privilege does not
mean that the entirety of the report should be withheld on the grounds of
privilege. As noted in Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice) (2007),
280 DLR (4th) 540 (FCA), it is possible to sever the
“fact-gathering” investigative work product prepared by “Counsel”, where Professor
Friedland sets out the facts of what happened at the trial and his interviews
with individuals with knowledge for the purposes of clarifying the allegations.
These facts are separate and distinct from the advice given on legal issues
that is privileged. In this regard, at the hearing of the motion the matter of
possible redaction was discussed (to the extent solicitor-client privilege was
not found to have been waived). The report could have those portions redacted,
a suggestion that was, however, rejected by the CJC. Nonetheless, this manner
of proceeding is appropriate in the circumstances. The facts gathered by
Professor Friedland in his role as “Counsel” regarding the trial and for
clarification of the allegations cannot be withheld simply because another part
of the report deals with legal issues and advice about them. It is appropriate
instead to redact the legal advice in the report, and by way of example, such
redaction would include the portion of the report from the middle of page 23 to
the end of page 30.
No Waiver – Common Interest Privilege
Applies
[31]
Professor
Friedland’s report was provided to the CJC on or about October 27, 2005. The
Court was advised at the hearing of the motion that the CJC subsequently
provided a copy of the Friedland Report to the Law Society of Upper Canada to
be included in its investigation of the complaint filed by Justice Thompson
against Mr. Slansky, and that a further copy was sent to the Deputy Attorney
General at the request of Justice Thompson for this purpose. The Applicant
submits that to the extent all or part of the Friedland Report was protected by
solicitor-client privilege, it was waived by the CJC by this disclosure to
third parties.
[32]
As noted
in The Law of Privilege in Canada (at p.11-54.1), for common interest to
exist, the parties must share a common goal, seek a common outcome or have a
selfsame interest. Here, there is an affinity between the CJC and the Law
Society of Upper Canada in investigating complaints of misconduct, particularly
in those cases where complaints are filed against both judge and counsel in the
same proceeding. The legal advice and opinions that may be shared between them are
to ensure a complete investigation into the allegations of judicial and/or
professional misconduct and to ensure, from the perspective of the public, that
justice was done in the proceeding that has attracted scrutiny. Such exchange
in such circumstances is to be encouraged and it was done in this case. I am
satisfied that as between the CJC and Law Society, they have a common interest
in the matter of the proper disposition of the complaints of misconduct made by
each of Mr. Slansky and Justice Thompson.
Public Interest Privilege
[33]
What is
not protected by solicitor-client privilege, the CJC claims public interest
privilege to prevent production and disclosure in the record. Public interest
privilege protects information that should not be disclosed on the grounds that
its disclosure would be contrary to the “public interest”. To determine
whether information should be so protected, requires a balancing of interests,
often competing “public interests” – one to disclose the information, and the
other to preserve its confidentiality. These determinations can only be made
on a “case-by-case” basis.
[34]
The public
interest identified by the CJC on this motion concerns the functioning of the
CJC’s complaints process and the initial determination it must make regarding
whether or not a complaint should proceed to inquiry. The CJC has developed its
process of investigation relying upon Counsel to gather facts and to clarify
allegations, and submits that without assurances of confidentiality, it could
be difficult to speak to witnesses and obtain complete, reliable and candid
information about a judge against whom a complaint as been filed. These
persons might feel vulnerable or concerned about working relationships which
would prevent them from speaking freely if they knew their comments could find
their way into the public record, notwithstanding the fact that in the event of
a hearing, these individuals could be called to give their testimony under
oath. The CJC expresses its concern for the judge who is the subject of the
complaint, who may be interviewed by Counsel regarding his or her health or
other personal information. In a single sentence, the CJC also notes that
judicial independence could be compromised if a judge’s state of mind during
the deliberative or decision-making process were to be made public.
[35]
The
Applicant notes that this case raises concerns about how the CJC deals with
complaints against fellow judges. The public must in this regard, have
confidence in the integrity of this process, and confidence generally in the
judicial process and administration of justice. When we speak of judicial
independence, it is the public interest in judicial independence that is
paramount. It is in the public interest to ensure that decisions are made
independently, free from political interference and with impartiality and
fairness. To the extent the decision of the CJC to close the file on Mr.
Slansky’s complaint is subject to judicial review, there may be an additional
concern by the public as to how the reviewing Court can fulfill its role on the
application for judicial review without the facts on which the CJC made its
decision being in the record, particularly the facts that are contained in the
Friedland Report, which the CJC has stated was key to its decision. It is in
the public interest to ensure that a meaningful and effective judicial review
can be conducted.
[36]
The CJC
did not point to any case where the facts gathered in an investigation were
found to be protected by public interest privilege, absent risk to the safety
of an informant, or serious risk to the investigation itself (usually the case
in criminal or administrative investigations). In the matter at hand, whether
the CJC’s process would be hampered in future is the subject of speculation. There
is no evidence that people who were interviewed for the Friedland Report would
not have been as forthcoming, had they knowledge that their information might
become public, and there is nothing in the Friedland Report or motion material
that would warrant such inference being made. There is also the added
consideration that under the Judges Act and the CJC’s Complaints
Procedures, the CJC has the ability to conduct an inquiry and investigation
into a complaint, with power to compel witnesses under oath – the CJC will
thus always have the ability to gather facts and obtain reliable evidence, even
if its preferred approach at the initial stage of a complaint, is to conduct
the more informal investigation through Counsel.
[37]
The issue
is thus whether there is a public interest in the disclosure of the facts
gathered in Professor Friedland’s investigation and whether another public
interest would be compromised or damaged by the disclosure.
[38]
I am
satisfied that there is a public interest in knowing how the CJC deals with
complaints against judges to ensure the public has confidence in the integrity
of the process, and to also ensure that the application for judicial review can
be conducted in a meaningful way. I cannot conclude that disclosure of the
facts would so impair this or future investigations of complaints against
members of the judiciary. The fact that a complaint had been made was not in
and of itself secret, and it would be no secret necessarily as to who would be
sought out by Counsel for information. In any event, to the extent there is
such concern, counsel for the Applicant made a suggestion at the hearing of the
motion that names might be redacted or to the extent it was applicable, Rule
151 of the Federal Courts Rules might be engaged on a further motion to
seal any particularly sensitive information. This suggestion was also rejected
by the CJC at the hearing, but remains an option that may be pursued on further
motion if necessary, at a later date.
[39]
Accordingly,
I find that no public interest privilege attaches to those parts of the
Friedland Report that are not legal advice and protected by solicitor-client
privilege, and that those parts of the report should be produced. In that
respect, as part of the order below, counsel for the CJC shall review the
Friedland Report and highlight for the Court, those portions that the CJC
submits constitute legal advice. A final redacted version of the Friedland
Report shall then be produced to form part of the record for the purposes of
Rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules.
ORDER
1.
The CJC
shall, within twenty days of the date of this Order, file a copy of the Friedland
Report, indicating on the copy, those portions that are to be redacted,
consistent with these reasons.
2.
Upon the
Court finalizing the redacted version of the Friedland Report, the redacted
Friedland Report shall be produced and form part of the record for the purposes
of Rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules.
3.
To the
extent the parties do not agree on the costs of this motion, written submissions
no longer than three pages in length may be filed within twenty days of the
date of this Order.
“Martha Milczynski”
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