Date:
20110818
Docket: T-68-09
Citation: 2011 FC 1003
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, August 18, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
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NICOLE (NORA) HÉROLD
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Plaintiff
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and
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HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA ET AL
CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (CRA) AND
THE PARTIES TO THE OFFENCES:
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (EI),
HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CANADA (HRSDC)
SUDBURY TAXATION CENTRE
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Defendants
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
Nicole (Nora) Hérold (the
plaintiff) claims that the defendants have been making unlawful deductions from
her wages, pension and unemployment benefits since 1999. She seeks $600,000 for
injury and punitive damages. The defendants submit that they are entitled to
deduct these amounts because the plaintiff defaulted on her student loans.
Accordingly, they ask the Court to order the plaintiff to pay them $9,509.28, which
amount represents the balance of the student loans in principal and interest.
[2]
For the reasons that
follow, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s main action and allows the
defendants’ counterclaim.
[3]
This case raises three
issues:
a)
Did the
plaintiff repay the student loans made to her under the Canada Student Loan
Act?
b)
Could the
defendants recover the monies owing to them by way of set-off against the
wages, pension and other amounts due to the plaintiff?
c)
Is the
defendants’ counterclaim statute barred?
II.
Factual
background
[4]
The chronology of
events is as follows:
·
Between the months of
May and November 1987, the plaintiff entered into a certain number of
guaranteed Canada Student Loan agreements with the Bank of Montréal in Vancouver, for an amount totalling $5,355.
·
On June 4, 1989, the
guaranteed student loans were transferred to the Bank of Nova Scotia, in Burnaby, British Columbia.
·
On August 31, 1989, the
plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student at Simon Fraser University. The interest on her student loans became
payable on the first day of the seventh month following the month in which she
lost her full-time student status (March 1, 1990), at a fixed rate of
10.5% per annum, or $82.68 per month (see subsection 10(1) of the Canada
Student Loan Regulations, in the Appendix).
·
On February 10, 1990, the plaintiff signed an agreement with the Bank of
Nova Scotia consolidating all of her loans. Among other things, this agreement
set the repayment terms.
·
On March 1, 1990, the
plaintiff began making the required monthly payments, which reduced the balance
owing on her consolidated loan to $4,665 in principal and interest.
·
On September 5, 1991, the plaintiff went back to school full time and sent
the Bank a confirmation of registration, which entitled her to interest-free
periods. At that time, the balance owing on the loan was $4,665.
·
On October 18, 1991,
the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loans with the Bank,
this time for $3,000.
·
On September 8, 1992, the plaintiff signed another confirmation of
registration as a full-time student.
·
On November 2, 1992,
the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank,
this time for $1,785.
·
On January 4, 1993, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada
Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
·
On May 3, 1993, the plaintiff
took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for
$1,785.
·
On September 8, 1993, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada
Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
·
On January 4, 1994, the
plaintiff signed another confirmation of registration as a full-time student
·
On January 31, 1994, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada
Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
·
At the end of April
1994, the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student. The total amount of her
new loans was $11,925.
·
Under the Canada
Student Loans Act, RSC 1985, c S-3 (the Act), subsection 4(3) applies
to the consolidated loans from her first period of studies, from 1987 to 1990. Subsection 4(1)
applies to the loans made between October 18, 1991, and May 3, 1993. Subsection 4(2)
applies to the loans made between September 8, 1993,
and January 31, 1994.
·
Under section 14 of the
Canada Student Loans Regulations (the Regulations), interest at the
fixed rate of 9.375% began accruing on the first day of the seventh month
following the month in which the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student
(see the Appendix). On the date the loans were consolidated, the plaintiff
could either pay this interest or add it to the balance of her loan. Since she
failed to pay the interest accrued during that period, the Bank added it to the
balance of her loan as of November 1,
1994.
·
The Bank also prepared
a consolidation agreement in accordance with the Act, which requires that all
student loans be consolidated within six months from the date the plaintiff
ceased to be a full-time student. Despite having undertaken to sign this
consolidation agreement under section 9 of the Regulations, the plaintiff
did not sign it.
·
The plaintiff was
required to start repaying her loan as of November 1, 1994.
·
Between November 1, 1994, and October 31, 1996, the plaintiff applied for
and was granted six special interest-free periods, except for the period from February 1, 1996, to July 31, 1996.
·
On March 10, 1997, the applicant had still not repaid her loan or the
accrued interest. The Bank sent her a formal demand for repayment of all
amounts owed to it in principal and interest. The plaintiff did not respond to
this demand.
·
On May 28, 1997, under
sections 7 and 7.1 of the Act and section 28 of the Regulations, the Bank made
a claim for loss to the Canadian government.
·
On February 25, 1998, the Crown paid the Bank the a total amount of $18,306.58,
comprising $16,742.50 in unpaid principal, $1,556.68 in accrued interest and $7.70
in fees. Under section 30 of the Regulations, the Crown then became
subrogated in and to all rights of the Bank, and the outstanding guaranteed
loan thereby became a debt owed to the Crown. This debt was then managed by the
federal Department of Human Resources and Social Development (the Department).
·
The Department retained
the services of a collections agency. Between May 26, 1998, and July 27, 1998, the plaintiff made three voluntary payments of
$10.00 each. The defendants credited $30.00 against the interest owed by the
plaintiff.
·
Between April 9, 1999,
and August 14, 2008, under subsection 164(2) of the Income
Tax Act (see Appendix), the Canada Revenue Agency effected a set-off and
deducted $8,149 in principal and interest from the plaintiff’s guaranteed
Canada Student Loan debt.
·
A note in the
Department’s accounting system states that between May 15, 2000, and October 15, 2000, a total of $984.00 was credited to the plaintiff’s
account (type 140 – non-voluntary payments).
·
In June 2004, it was
found that the plaintiff had received an Employment Insurance overpayment of
approximately $1,991.00. The plaintiff did not appeal that decision and
voluntarily repaid the overpayment by cheque payable to the order of the
Receiver General for Canada dated July 9, 2004.
·
Over the course of the
years 2004 and 2005, the plaintiff received several letters regarding her debt
from the defendants, more specifically, from the Department. These letters
refer alternately to a student loan debt and an Employment Insurance
overpayment debt but consistently demand repayment of an amount then totalling
$21,118.34. Three different seizure codes appear on the plaintiff’s pay stubs, although
all of these are in fact set-off transactions under subsection 155(1) of
the Financial Administration Act.
·
Between April 6, 2005, and September 30, 2008, the accounting system
(DARS) of the Department, one of the defendants, shows that a total amount of $16,343.46
was credited to the plaintiff’s account (type 190 – payments from other sources).
·
In June 2008, it was
discovered that the plaintiff had received an Employment Insurance overpayment
of $383.00. The plaintiff did not appeal that decision and repaid the
overpayment on August 19,
2008, by cheque payable to
the order of the Receiver General for Canada.
·
On January 14, 2009,
the plaintiff brought her action in this Court. According to the defendants,
the plaintiff still owes $9,182.45 in principal plus $326.83 in interest at a
fixed rate of 9.375% per annum, which explains the total of $9,509.28 sought in
the counterclaim filed on February 13,
2009. Interest continues to
accrue at $2.36 a day.
III.
RELEVANT
LEGISLATION
[5]
The statutory
provisions applicable in this case are reproduced in the Appendix to this
judgment.
IV. Analysis
a) Does
the plaintiff owe the Crown the sums claimed?
[6]
The plaintiff testified
at the hearing. She stated that she had repaid in full all of her loan, as
evidenced by three documents she filed, namely, three excerpts from her Bank of
Nova Scotia account statements: one partial statement dated December 30; a
second one dated February 1, 1994; and a third covering the period from
January 1 to December 9, 1994, at Appendix 5, Appendix 3
and Appendix 4, respectively, of her affidavit dated April 21, 2011.
[7]
The plaintiff submits
that these documents prove that the student loans made by the Government of
Canada and the Government of British Columbia have been repaid in full. She
relies on the remark “new” appearing immediately next to two entries: one for $16,742.30
and another for $12,108.00. The same remark “new” appears dated November 1,
1994. The plaintiff submits that these are two sham loans that she never agreed
to (Hearing Transcript, page 56).
[8]
Furthermore, on the
same statement, there are two entries showing balances of zero, one next to an
amount of $12,108.00 on November 1,
1994, and another next to an
amount of $13,020.35 on the same date. According to the plaintiff, these last
two entries support her position to the effect that all her student loans, be
they loans from the province of British Columbia or loans entered into under
the Government of Canada’s guaranteed student loan program, have been paid
back.
[9]
She also relies on two
monthly statements from her account at the Bank of Nova Scotia. Balances of
zero appear on these statements, again with the remark “new”, next an amount of
$12,108.00, which according to the plaintiff establishes once again that she
paid back the student loans taken out with the province.
[10]
The plaintiff also
called as a witness a Bank of Nova Scotia representative, Ms. Kennedy, who
contradicted the plaintiff’s statements (Hearing Transcript, pages 19, 23,
26, 30 and 35). Ms. Kennedy explained that the remark “new” was in fact
simply due to the consolidation of the plaintiff’s loans. According to this
witness, the Bank had to consolidate the loans when the plaintiff ceased to be
a full-time student.
[11]
Furthermore, Mr. Vananburg,
witness for the defendants, stated that the Department conducts a detailed
audit of all student loans before reimbursing the Bank, and the plaintiff’s
case was no exception. According to him, the plaintiff still owed a total of $16,742.50
in 1998, when the Government of Canada became subrogated in the Bank’s rights.
[12]
On a balance of
probabilities, the evidence in the record favours the defendants’ version,
since two witnesses clearly stated that the student loans entered into by the
plaintiff under the federal program had not been repaid in 1997 (Hearing Transcript,
page 186).
[13]
Moreover, as Ms. Kennedy,
representative of the Bank of Nova Scotia, explained, the entries on which the
plaintiff relies to assert that she no longer owed the Bank anything are clear.
These entries in fact prove that the student loans were consolidated in
accordance with the terms of the guaranteed loan program and that on November 1
they were consolidated, not paid back (Hearing Transcript, page 18). As
for the plaintiff’s claim that the subrogation could not be valid because she
had not signed the consolidation agreements, the Court rejects this argument,
considering the testimony of Mr. Vananburg. (see Hearing Transcript, pages 182
to 184 and 192 to 194). Moreover, there is evidence in the record, namely
section 9 of the Regulations made pursuant to the Act, which provides that
a consolidation agreement is valid even if the borrower refuses to sign it.
[14]
Considering these
testimonies, the Court finds that the plaintiff did not repay the student loans
entered into under the Canada Student Loans Program.
b) Could the defendants recover the monies
owing to them by way of set-off against the wages and other amounts due to the
plaintiff?
[15]
The legislation is
clear on this: subsection 155(1) of the Financial Administration Act
provides that the appropriate Minister responsible for collecting a debt may
effect a set-off against any sum of money that may be due or payable to the
debtor by Her Majesty in right of Canada. Subsection 164(2)
of the Income Tax Act also allows set-offs against any tax refund or
repayment payable to a taxpayer.
[16]
In the plaintiff’s
case, the two provisions referred to above allow the defendants to recover the
monies owed to them directly from amounts owing to the plaintiff, be they
wages, income tax refunds or benefits under the plaintiff’s pension plan, which
plan is related to wages.
[17]
In the circumstances,
the Crown may effect a set-off against any amount it owes to the plaintiff.
[18]
In the case at bar, the
defendants have relied on these statutory provisions repeatedly over the years.
The evidence in the record shows that the defendants have indeed deducted
several sums owed to the plaintiff.
[19]
Of course the plaintiff
claims that these amounts were withheld unlawfully. She refers the Court to
section 12.2 of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s policy on the
recovery of amounts due to the Crown.
[20]
This policy does not
apply here because the case at bar deals with a liquid and payable claim, an
unpaid student loan, not a claim for damage to Crown property for which an
employee is liable. Section 12.2 covers the latter case, not the plaintiff’s
situation.
c) Is the defendants’ counterclaim statute barred ?
[21]
For the reasons that
follow, the Court finds that the defendants’ counterclaim is not statute barred.
[22]
The defendants rely on Ontario’s Limitations Act. This is incorrect. It is,
rather, British Columbia’s legislation that applies in the case at
bar because it governs student loans entered into in British Columbia. The agreement giving rise to this dispute was in
fact entered into in British
Columbia.
[23]
The applicable
limitation period derives from section 19.2 of the Canada Student Loans
Act, RSC 1985, c S-23, in force December 31, 2002. It provides that no action or proceedings
shall be taken to recover money owing under a guaranteed student loan more than
six years after the limitation period that applied before the coming into force
of this section started to run.
[24]
The subrogated party
cannot enjoy more rights than the original holder, in this case, the Bank. The
Bank’s claim has been due and payable since November 1, 1994, the date the
loans were consolidated. In this case, the interest-free periods between
November 1, 1994, and the date of subrogation did not interrupt the
limitation period, which in this case began running the moment the plaintiff
lost her full-time student status (see Canada (Attorney General) v Simpson,
26 OR (3d) 317 at para 6 [Simpson]).
[25]
However,
subsection 3 of section 19.2 states that the day of the most recent
acknowledgment of a borrower’s liability in respect of the debt is deemed to be
the day on which the limitation period started to run if the acknowledgment was
made before the coming into force of this section.
[26]
Over the years, the
plaintiff made several written requests to the defendants, as well as to
ministers and members of Parliament. Counsel for the defendants submits that
some of those requests constitute acknowledgements of debt that interrupt the
limitation period and that, in any event, subsection 4 still allows the
Crown to effect a set-off.
[27]
The rule is clear:
set-off cannot be effected against a debt after the limitation period has
expired.
[28]
What, then, is the day
of the most recent acknowledgment of the debt by the plaintiff? In Simpson,
cited above, Justice Charron reminds us that the case law has clearly
defined what constitutes an acknowledgment of debt. She relied on the decision
of the House of Lords in Spencer v Hemmerle, 1922 2 AC 507. In that
decision, it is stated that where an acknowledgment of debt is “coupled with
other expressions, such as a promise to pay at a future time or on condition or
an absolute refusal to pay, it is for the Court to say whether those other
expressions are sufficient to qualify or negative the implied promise to pay”.
[29]
The defendants filed
more than 267 documents to establish the existence, subrogation and
acknowledgment of the debt.
[30]
In the Court’s opinion,
the correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendants regarding the
amounts deducted from her wages and, subsequently, her pension cannot
constitute valid acknowledgments of debt since the plaintiff did not consent to
these deductions. Therefore, even though she filed budgets to reduce the
percentage of the deductions from 30 to 15%, in our view, those documents
cannot be used against her. Clearly, the plaintiff found herself in a position
which, on its face, left her with no choice. Moreover, on several occasions,
she reasserted her position that she did not owe this money.
[31]
And what of this ample
correspondence between her and the ministers and members of Parliament? Until
2002, the plaintiff acknowledged her student loan debt but asked the government
to forgive the accrued interest. Indeed, the Minister of Finance announced
changes to the Canada Student Loans Program in 1999. Under this program, the
federal government may forgive the interest accrued on certain student loans,
under certain conditions. However, since the plaintiff was in default on her
loan, she was not eligible for this new program. All of her numerous requests
to ministers Martin, Stewart, Volpe, Graham, Marchesi and Stronach were turned down
(see Defendants’ Record, tabs 79, 87, 88, 95, 114, 121, 164, 174, 178, 180,
183, 189, 205, 207 and 216).
[32]
It is clear that in all
of her correspondence from 2004 on, the plaintiff refused to acknowledge the
validity of the defendants’ claim (see Defendants’ Record, tabs 191,204,
215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221 and 230).
[33]
The defendants’
counterclaim is dated February 13,
2009. The time to recover the
plaintiff’s debt is limited to six years under section 19.2 of the Act,
which in the present case refers us to British Columbia’s Limitation Act, since that is where the
student loan was entered into.
[34]
The cause of action,
namely, the loan and the plaintiff’s failure to begin making repayments to the
Bank, took place in British
Columbia. Therefore, British Columbia’s Limitations Act applies in this case,
pursuant to subsection 19.2(3) of the Act.. According to subsection 3(5)
of the Limitation Act (see Appendix), the applicable limitation period
in this case expires six years after the date on which the cause of action
arose.
[35]
The validity of the
defendants’ counterclaim in this case directly depends on the date of the
plaintiff’s most recent acknowledgment of the debt. Thus, February 13,
2003, becomes a pivotal date.
[36]
The Court notes that in
all of the documents filed by the defendants, the plaintiff denies the existence
of her debt from 2004. However, there are four written documents in the record
that warrant closer scrutiny:
a) The letter dated April 21, 2003, from the plaintiff to one of the defendants, namely,
the Department (Defendants’ Record, Tab 149). The plaintiff writes, at the
beginning of the second paragraph, [translation]
“It is true that I borrowed money for my post-secondary education. I do not
deny that”. Further on in that same letter, she offers to pay back her debt, at
$50.00 per month.
b) Two
other written documents, dated June 8, 2003, and November 6, 2003, respectively:
One letter to the Department’s Chief,
Revenue Accounting, and another to the Minister responsible for the Department,
in which the plaintiff acknowledges her debt. In the letter dated June 8,
2003, however, she states, [translation]
“I disagree with the amounts owed” (see Defendants’ Record, Tab 155).
c) In the letter dated November 6, 2003, to the Honourable Jane Stewart, Minister of Human
Resources Development, she repeats her offer under the same conditions she made
on April 21, 2003. She also asks the Minister to reduce her debt to zero (see
Defendants’ Record, Tab 164).
d)
Finally, in a letter
dated June 17, 2004, to an assistant of MP Bill Graham, the
plaintiff repeats her request: “I see no other solution but to be forgiven”.
However, she again insists that the Bank’s transfer of her file in 1997 was
contrary to the regulations then in force (see Defendants’ Record,
Tab 204).
[37]
Nevertheless,
paragraph 19.2(6)(b) clearly states that for the purposes of
subsections (5) and (7), acknowledgment of liability means acknowledgment
of the debt after the coming into force of the 2003 amendments: “a written
acknowledgment of the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent
or other representative, whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it
and whether or not it contains a refusal to pay”.
[38]
Considering the wording
of paragraph (b), above, there can be no doubt that the written
documents in question acknowledge that the debt is due and payable, regardless
of whether or not those documents set conditions. The Act is clear, and the
evidence in the record, particularly the written documents referred to above,
lead us to conclude that the defendants’ counterclaim is not statute barred.
[39]
The evidence in the
record (see Hearing Transcript, testimony of Ms. Persaud, page 277), establishes
that the plaintiff is still indebted to the defendants for a total of $9,500.17
with interest since June 21, 2011. In the circumstances, the Court notes
that the plaintiff still owes the amount claimed by the defendants.
[40]
The plaintiff also
referred us to case law in support of her position. A close reading of those
decisions persuades us that those cases do not apply in the case at bar because
the facts and the timeline of events are considerably different. The Court
therefore cannot consider this case law.
[41]
“An award of costs is
not an exact science and is rather a matter of discretion based on good
judgment and common sense” (see Canada (Attorney
General) v Chrétien, 2011 FCA 53 at para 3). Considering the respective
means of the parties in this case, the Court finds that each party should pay
its own costs.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT IS that
1.
It dismisses the main
action of the plaintiff.
2.
It allows the
defendants’ counterclaim and orders the plaintiff to pay the defendants the
amount of $9,500.17, with interest at the rate of 9.75%.
3.
Each party pays its own
costs.
“André F.J. Scott”
Certified true
translation
Michael Palles