Date: 20110727
Docket: IMM-7022-10
[UNREVISED
ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION] Citation: 2011 FC 938
Ottawa, Ontario, July 27,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington
BETWEEN:
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HENRY PRÉVIL
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Mr.
Prévil, a citizen of Haiti, claims to have fled to Canada because his
life would be at risk following an incident in April 2008. While he was
embarking on a motorcycle taxi, he was attacked, assaulted and beaten by some members
of a crowd that was demonstrating against hunger. During this assault, he was
robbed of $600 as well as his address book. Later, the applicant and members of
his family began receiving threatening phone calls. He sought refugee
protection in Canada.
[2]
On
November 8, 2010, the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada rejected his claim for refugee protection on the ground
that the applicant’s credibility [translation]
“is undermined by inconsistencies”. It did not consider him to be a Convention
refugee or a person in need of protection. This is the judicial review of that
decision.
Issues
[3]
Mr.
Prévil alleges that the panel breached the principles of procedural fairness
and natural justice and that its decision was unreasonable.
[4]
The
applicant argues that a breach of procedural fairness occurred from the fact
that the panel refused to allow him an extension of time in order for him to
file a certificate of employment from the U.S. Embassy. However, the panel did note
that [translation] “the evidence
in the record established that [the applicant had] worked at the U.S. Embassy”.
[5]
It
appears to the Court that there was no breach of natural justice resulting from
the panel’s decision. The principles of natural justice dictate that Mr. Prévil
be provided with a fair opportunity to make his case. He was provided with such
an opportunity and the proof of his employment was accepted.
[6]
The
applicant insists that the decision issued by the panel was unreasonable.
However, it appears to this Court that the panel’s findings were reasonably
based on the evidence. For example, if the applicant and his spouse had been
receiving threatening phone calls from thieves who had obtained their cell
phone numbers, then why did they not simply change their numbers?
[7]
Above
all, the alleged incident happened simply because the driver of the motorcycle
taxi taken by Mr. Prévil failed to stop during the demonstration. It seems that
the applicant was in the wrong place at the wrong time. In his police report
filed three days later, he made no mention of being robbed of $600 and his address
book. This contradiction with the facts put forward by the applicant provides
ample justification for the panel’s determination that the other facts alleged
by the applicant were pure and simple fabrications.
[8]
Moreover,
the panel rightly found that the applicant’s subjective fear of persecution was
unfounded. While he was in Haiti, he had a U.S. visa in his
possession. He preferred to wait until [translation]
“his papers were in order and immigrate” to Canada. His fear
could not have been that crushing if he took his time choosing his country of
refuge.
[9]
Counsel
for the applicant argues that there are errors in the panel’s findings of fact.
If such is the case, these errors are not central to the decision. As Justice
Joyal noted in Miranda v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No. 437:
5 It is true that artful pleaders can
find any number of errors when dealing with decisions of administrative
tribunals. Yet we must always remind ourselves of what the Supreme Court of
Canada said on a criminal appeal where the grounds for appeal were some 12
errors in the judge’s charge to the jury. In rendering judgment, the Court
stated that it had found 18 errors in the judge’s charge, but that in the
absence of any miscarriage of justice, the appeal could not succeed.
6 This
is the point I am trying to establish here. One may look at the decision of the
Board, then one may balance it off against the evidence found in the transcript
and the evidence of the claimant himself in trying to justify his objective as
well as subjective fears of persecution.
7 On
the basis of that analysis, I find that the conclusions reached by the Refugee Board
are well-founded on the evidence. There can always be conflict on the evidence.
There is always the possibility of an opposite decision from a differently
constituted Board. Anyone might have reached a different conclusion. Different
conclusions may often be reached if one perhaps subscribes to different value
systems. But in spite of counsel for the applicant’s thorough exposition, I
have failed to grasp forcefully the kind of error in the Board’s decision which
would justify my intervention. The Board’s decision, in my view, is fully
consistent with the evidence.
ORDER
FOR THE
FOREGOING REASONS;
THE COURT
ORDERS that the application for judicial review be dismissed. There is
no serious question of general importance to certify.
"Sean Harrington"
Certified true
translation
Sebastian Desbarats,
Translator
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