Docket: T-1485-10
Citation: 2011 FC 893
Montréal,
Quebec, July 18, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington
BETWEEN:
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FRASER SEA FOOD CORP.
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Applicant
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and
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FASKEN MARTINEAU
DUMOULIN LLP
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Fraser
Sea Food Corp., a Massachusetts Corporation, is, or more correctly was, the
registered holder of the Canadian trade-mark Seafood Temptations for use
in association with various frozen and unfrozen seafoods and prepared meals.
The registration was expunged by the Registrar of Trade-Marks on 29 June 2009
“by reason of the failure to file the evidence required”, in accordance with
subsection 45(4) of the Trade‑marks Act. This is an appeal from
that Order. Although the appeal was not taken within the statutory timeframe,
an extension was granted by this Court under Docket No. 10-T-18.
[2]
The
appeal was taken pursuant to Section 56 of the Trade-marks Act. Subsection
5 thereof provides that “evidence in addition to that adduced before the
Registrar may be adduced and the Federal Court may exercise any discretion
vested in the Registrar.” In this case new evidence was filed. If such
evidence would have materially affected the Registrar’s finding, the Court is
required to consider the issue de novo, without owing deference to the
Registrar or having to identify an error which may have been committed (Maison
Cousin (1980) Inc. v Cousins Submarines Inc. 2006 FCA 409, 60 C.P.R. (4th)
369; John Labatt Limited et al v Molson Breweries, a partnership (2000),
5 CPR (4th) 180 and Shell Canada Limited v P.T. Sari Incofood Corporation
2008 FCA 279).
The Evidence Before the
Registrar
[3]
Section
45 of the Trade-marks Act permits any person who pays a prescribed fee to
request the Registrar to give notice to the registered owner of a trade-mark
requiring it to furnish within three months an affidavit or a statutory
declaration showing the use of the trade-mark in Canada at any time during the preceding
three-year period or, if not, the date when last used and the reason for the
absence of such use thereafter. The Registrar gave notice on 13 May 2008.
[4]
Subsection
45(2) states:
(2) The Registrar shall not receive any
evidence other than the affidavit or statutory declaration, but may hear
representations made by or on behalf of the registered owner of the
trade-mark or by or on behalf of the person at whose request the notice was
given.
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(2) Le registraire ne peut recevoir
aucune preuve autre que cet affidavit ou cette déclaration solennelle, mais
il peut entendre des représentations faites par le propriétaire inscrit de la
marque de commerce ou pour celui-ci ou par la personne à la demande de qui
l’avis a été donné ou pour celle-ci.
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[5]
The
applicant made representations, but did not furnish an affidavit or a statutory
declaration within the prescribed timeframe. The trade-mark, TMA 509,174,
registered 12 March 1999 was therefore expunged.
[6]
The
applicant provided examples of packaging on which its trade-mark Seafood
Temptations was displayed as well as an invoice for a single sale. The sale
had not taken place within the required timeframe of 13 May 2005 to 13 May
2008, but rather thereafter. Thus, apart from the lack of form, the evidence
was useless.
A Matter of Timing
[7]
The
new evidence submitted to the Court must be considered in context. The
applicant submits that it has been unable to produce evidence that it could
have produced, such as sales invoices to Canadian customers, because of a flood
that occurred on 2 January 2009 within the building where those records were
kept.
[8]
However,
on 11 August 2008 the law firm which was on file with the Registrar as the
applicant’s representative for service obtained an extension from the Registrar
until 13 November 2008 since “[a]dditional time is necessary to consider all
the issues in order to prepare and file comprehensive evidence. The time
provided to date has not proved sufficient for this purpose.” The only further
evidence filed within that extended delay was a brief note from Alfred Fraser,
a principal of the company, stating that the applicant also had shrimp under
the trade-mark and enclosing some labels used, information which had been sent
previously.
New Evidence
Before the Court
[9]
The
new evidence comprises the affidavits of Paul Fraser, the President of the
appellant corporation, his brother the said Alfred Fraser, the
Secretary-Treasurer, and Donald Lundin, the President of a fish brokerage firm which
arranged some deliveries of the appellant’s product from Boston into Nova Scotia.
[10]
Paul
Fraser essentially deferred to his brother. He said that purchasers, unknown
to him, would place their orders from Canada by telephone. Although
the examples of packaging attached to his affidavit were in English only, and
might very well be in breach of our labelling laws, some product had been
shipped between 2005 and 2008 with bilingual packaging, all of which packaging was
lost in the flood. He produced three invoices of sales that occurred outside
the relevant time period. One such invoice was dated 24 March 2010 to Sambro
Fisheries via Four Seas Inc. for 10 oven-ready haddock at a total cost of
$57.50.
[11]
Apparently
it was Alfred Fraser who dealt with Canadian customers. He is maddeningly
vague. During his cross-examination, the transcript of his previous
cross-examination in a patent infringement case currently pending before this
court under Docket No. T-1583-09 was put to him. He stated that at one point
Sambro Fisheries was its Canadian distributor but conceded that the relationship
had ended well before May 2005.
[12]
Asked
in the cross-examination in this case to identify customers to whom product was
sold between May 2005 and 2008 he said:
“I can give you a name, sure. I sold to
Sambro Fishery, not Sambro Fishery the company, but to Sambro, which was the
individuals at Sambro.
Q: What do you mean, “which was the
individuals at Sambro”?
A: Uh… Office personnel, maybe Doug
himself, some of the people that worked on the premises.
Q: And those people are located where?
A: They’re located in Sambro, up in Nova Scotia.”
[13]
The
evidence of the Fraser brothers is that there would be three or four shipments
a year. Mr. Lundin, the President of Four Seas Inc., a fish brokerage firm
located in Boston, stated in
his affidavit that he brought down fresh seafood annually from Nova Scotia, and
had worked with Fraser Sea food Corp. for at least the past 15
years. He would periodically arrange delivery of Seafood Temptations branded
products to Canadian customers. When trucks arranged by Four Seas were making
trips from Boston to Nova Scotia, Fraser product would
be carried from time to time if there was room in the truck. However, he was
not privy to Fraser’s business.
The Burden of Proof
[14]
This
is not a civil case in which it is incumbent upon Fraser to prove use within Canada within the
three years in question on the balance of probabilities. Section 45 of the Trade-marks
Act provides a quick and ready method to rid the Registry of deadwood, or
to give the registered holder of the trade-mark an opportunity to explain why
it has not been used (Eclipse International Fashions Canada Inc v Shapiro
Cohen, 2005 FCA 64, 48 CPR (4th) 223). Nevertheless, it is not sufficient
to merely state the trade-mark has been used; it has to be shown that it was
used (Mantha & Associes/Associates v Central Transport, Inc (1995),
64 CPR (3d) 354, 59 ACWS (3d) 301). The bar may be low, but it is still a bar.
[15]
As
stated by Chief Justice Thurlow of the Federal Court of Appeal in Plough
(Canada) Ltd v Aerosol Fillers Inc, [1981] 1 FC 679, 53 CPR (2d) 62, in
dealing with what was then section 44 of the Act:
[10] What subsection 44(1) requires is an affidavit or
statutory declaration not merely stating but "showing", that is to
say, describing the use being made of the trade mark within the meaning of the
definition of "trade mark" in section 2 and of use in section 4 of
the Act. The subsection makes this plain by requiring the declaration to show
with respect to each of the wares and services specified in the registration
whether the trade mark is in use in Canada and if not the date when it was last used and the reason for the
absence of such use since that date. The purpose is not merely to tell the
Registrar that the registered owner does not want to give up the registration
but to inform the Registrar in detail of the situation prevailing with respect
to the use of the trade mark so that he, and the Court on appeal, can form an
opinion and apply the substantive rule set out in subsection 44(3). There is no
room for a dog in the manger attitude on the part of registered owners who may
wish to hold on to a registration notwithstanding that the trade mark is no
longer in use at all or not in use with respect to some of the wares in respect
of which the mark is registered.
[16]
In
Meredith & Finlayson v Canada (Registrar of Trade
Marks)
(1991), 40 CPR (3d) 409, 138 NR 379 (FCA), Mr. Justice Hugessen opined:
[4] Subsection 45(2) is clear: the
Registrar may only receive evidence tendered by or on behalf of the registered
owner. Clearly it is not intended that there should be any trial of a contested
issue of fact, but simply an opportunity for the registered owner to show, of
he can, that his mark is in use or if not, why not.
[17]
In
Scott Paper Ltd v Smart & Biggar, 2008 FCA 129, 65 CPR (4th) 303,
Mr. Justice Pelletier noted the Court draws a distinction between explaining
the absence of use and excusing the absence of use.
[18]
Evidence
of use can take the form of a single commercial transaction in the ordinary
course of business (Stikeman Elliott LLP v Les Sols R. Isabelle Inc,
2011 FC 59, 92 CPR (4th) 83). Such transaction, however, must be genuine, bona
fide and not contrived to protect the trade-mark (Philip Morris Inc v
Imperial Tobacco Ltd (1987), 13 CPR (3d) 289, 3 ACWS (3d) 109; Vêtement
Multi-Wear Inc v Riches, McKenzie & Herbert LLP, 2008 FC 1237, 73 CPR
(4th) 3); Jagotec AG v Riches, McKenzie & Herbert LLP, 2006 FC 1468,
153 ACWS (3d) 1222).
[19]
The
Court will resolve any evidentiary ambiguities in favour of the trade-mark
owner, but not if doing so would lower the prima facie standard required
to prove use (Messrs. Bereskin & Parr v Fairweather Ltd, 2006 FC
1248, 58 CPR (4th) 50, aff’d 2007 FCA 376, 62 CPR (4th) 266; Diamant Elinor
Inc v 88766 Canada Inc, 2010 FC 1184, 90 CPR (4th) 428).
[20]
The
appellant had been given six months, from 13 May 2008 to 13 November 2008, to
provide evidence of use. It failed to do so. Absolutely no reason has been
given why it could not come up with a single Canadian invoice during that time.
The flood only occurred in January 2009. In the circumstances, an alleged sale,
maybe to “Doug” or to some of the people in Sambro’s premises, a company which
no longer represents it in Canada, is simply not enough. The sales, if that
is what they were, were not in the ordinary course of business.
[21]
Further
extensions were given by this Court and one could easily have obtained an
affidavit from “Doug” or some of Sambro’s people. Instead, the appellant has
provided unclear evidence surrounding the nature of the business transaction.
Such vague evidence is inadequate even by the generous standards provided by
the jurisprudence (S.C. Johnson & Son Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks
(1981), 55 CPR (2d) 34, 8 ACWS (2d) 71).
[22]
In
light of this finding, it is not necessary to consider other submissions made
by the parties.
JUDGMENT
FOR REASONS
GIVEN:
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that the appeal of Fraser Sea
Food Corp. is dismissed with costs in the amount of $5,000.
“Sean Harrington”