Date: 20110321
Docket: T-1591-09
Citation: 2011
FC 348
Ottawa, Ontario, March 21,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
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PERFECT 10, INC.
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Plaintiff
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and
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GOOGLE, INC. and GOOGLE CANADA CORPORATION
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Defendants
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
This
is an appeal by Google Inc. (Google US) and Google Canada Corp. (Google CA),
the Defendants in the action, from a decision of the Learned Prothonotary dismissing
the Defendants’ motion for an order striking out the Statement of Claim,
dismissing the action or otherwise for an order staying the action.
[2]
This
appeal was principally focused on the issue of whether or not a stay should be
granted because the Plaintiff was pursuing the Google group of companies
(including Google US and Google CA) in an action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California.
II. FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
[3]
The
Plaintiff, Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10), is a California corporation
conducting business out of California. Its business consists
mainly of selling, on its website, “adult” images of mostly naked women. It
does not have an office or any employees in Canada. It had 13
Canadian customers out of 600 worldwide at the time of this initial litigation.
[4]
The
Defendant Google US is a Delaware company with its head
office in California. It operates
its web and image search services from outside Canada but such
services are available through the domain name – www.google.ca. It is the
registrant of the domain name and is the trade-mark owner in Canada of the mark
“GOOGLE”.
[5]
The
Defendant Google CA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Google US, is a Nova Scotia
corporation (an unlimited liability corporation) with offices in Canada
consisting of a sales team targeting certain Canadian advertisers, publishers
and enterprise customers as well as conducting research and development
activities unrelated to its web and image search activities. Google US
exercises executive level control over Google CA.
[6]
In
2004, the Plaintiff commenced the U.S. action alleging
copyright and trade-mark infringement, trade-mark dilution, unfair competition,
violation of publicity rights, unjust enrichment and misappropriation.
[7]
The
gravamen of the U.S. action is that Google US (a term which draws no
distinction between the various Google companies) copies Perfect 10’s works
from third party websites and then displays them on Google US’s site either as
thumbnails or full size images without requiring a searcher to go through
Perfect 10’s website or subscribe to Perfect 10’s services.
[8]
Not
only does the U.S. action not distinguish as to activities between Google US
and its subsidiaries but it names Google CA as a
defendant. Perfect 10 alleges that the Google group operates the internet
website google.com, along with multiple foreign versions of that website that
are accessible in the United States and throughout the
world.
[9]
Perfect
10 has been unsuccessful in two injunction applications including one that sought
a worldwide injunction. The U.S. action is well advanced, discoveries have
occurred and summary judgment motions were pending.
[10]
In
the U.S. action, the Defendants have pleaded the territorial limitation of the U.S. court and
subject matter jurisdiction. Google CA is in the U.S. action
principally for purposes of injunctive relief.
[11]
In
the Canadian action in this Court, Perfect 10 alleges copyright infringement
against Google US and Google CA related to their actions and service in
Canada. The
allegation is that Google US offers search functions through its sites which
directly and/or indirectly reproduce infringing copies of the images in which
Perfect 10 claims copyright. Perfect 10 alleges that Google CA sells
advertising in Canada on the Google US site and both Google companies
reproduce, distribute and communicate copies of Perfect 10’s materials in Canada.
[12]
The
infringing conduct is alleged to occur in Canada and
constitutes breaches of s. 27(1), (2) (b)-(e), and 3(1)(a), (b)
of the Canadian Copyright Act.
[13]
On
July 15, 2010, the Learned Prothonotary dismissed the Defendants’ motion, the
critical findings being:
·
the
copyright infringement claims in either jurisdiction are in respect of rights
under separate national legislative schemes;
·
it
is not for this Court, at this time, to decide the potential for
extra-territorial enforcement or other practical effects of a decision;
·
separate
copyright infringement actions alone are not abuse of process;
·
while
the evidence and impugned conduct may be the same before the U.S. and Canadian
courts, the legal meaning and the rights invoked may be different;
·
on
the matter of forum non conveniens, the Learned Prothonotary based her
conclusion in part on the absence of geographical overlap of the Plaintiff’s
two actions, the availability of different defences and the absence of a
request to the U.S. court for relief in respect of activities in Canada;
·
pursuant
to s. 50(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Act, neither the claims nor
the parties are the same and therefore it was unnecessary to address the next
step – an analysis of prejudice – in concluding that the Defendants failed to
meet the requirements of s. 50(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Act.
[14]
The
Defendants have appealed the Learned Prothonotary’s decision.
III. LEGAL
ANALYSIS
[15]
The
Defendants argue that the issues in this appeal are: (1) Did the Learned
Prothonotary err by elevating certain of the forum non conveniens
factors to be threshold conditions; and (2) Is there any reason to have two
parallel cases proceeding at the same time.
The
Defendants frame the issues in this manner because they contend that the standard
of review is correctness because the decision is one of law.
[16]
The
Plaintiff frames the issues as (1) Was the Learned Prothonotary clearly wrong
in concluding that the claims are not the same; and (2) Was the Learned
Prothonotary clearly wrong when she concluded that this action was not an abuse
of process.
A. Standard
of Review
[17]
The
applicable test is set forth in Canada v Aqua-Gem Investments Ltd. (C.A.),
[1993] 2 FC 425, and referred in Merck & Co., Inc. v Apotex Inc.
(F.C.A.), [2004] 2 FCR 459, in respect of discretionary orders. Such orders
are not to be disturbed as de novo review unless:
(a) the
questions raised are vital to the final issue in the case or
(b) the
decision is clearly wrong in that it was based upon a wrong principle or
misapprehension of facts.
[18]
There
are two aspects of the Learned Prothonotary’s decision at issue: (a) the
decision not to strike a claim for abuse of process and (b) a decision not to
stay the proceedings. Both decisions are discretionary and the Court should
respect (defer to) the authority of the Learned Prothonotary except in limited
circumstances.
[19]
The
arguments before the Court, and perhaps before the Learned Prothonotary, tended
to conflate the abuse of process issue, with s. 50(1)(a) and (b)
issues, with the forum non conveniens considerations. While there is
some overlap, it is important to keep the separate issues in mind.
B. Abuse
of Process
[20]
The
Learned Prothonotary’s conclusion on this issue is not a matter which this
Court should review. Rule 221 is a discretionary matter based principally on
mixed fact and law appropriately within the purview of the Learned Prothonotary.
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221.
(1) On motion, the Court may, at any time, order that a pleading, or anything
contained therein, be struck out, with or without leave to amend, on the
ground that it
(a) discloses no
reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be,
(b) is immaterial or
redundant,
(c) is scandalous,
frivolous or vexatious,
(d) may prejudice or
delay the fair trial of the action,
(e) constitutes a
departure from a previous pleading, or
(f) is otherwise an
abuse of the process of the Court,
and may order the action be
dismissed or judgment entered accordingly.
(2) No evidence shall be
heard on a motion for an order under paragraph (1)(a).
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221.
(1) À tout moment, la Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner la radiation de tout
ou partie d’un acte de procédure, avec ou sans autorisation de le modifier,
au motif, selon le cas :
a)
qu’il ne révèle aucune cause d’action ou de défense valable;
b)
qu’il n’est pas pertinent ou qu’il est redondant;
c)
qu’il est scandaleux, frivole ou vexatoire;
d)
qu’il risque de nuire à l’instruction équitable de l’action ou de la
retarder;
e)
qu’il diverge d’un acte de procédure antérieur;
f)
qu’il constitue autrement un abus de procédure.
Elle peut aussi ordonner
que l’action soit rejetée ou qu’un jugement soit enregistré en conséquence.
(2) Aucune preuve n’est
admissible dans le cadre d’une requête invoquant le motif visé à l’alinéa (1)a).
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[21]
The
effect of a finding of abuse of process would have been to strike the claim in
its entirety. It would mean that, at this early stage, the Court would have to
conclude that the U.S. and Canadian cases are so similar in fact, law
and scope or reach that to allow the Canadian claim to proceed would be
abusive.
[22]
The
Learned Prothonotary examined the pleadings, noted the difference in
legislative regimes between the U.S. and Canada, the
different rights which potentially flow therefrom, the differences in parties
and the potential scope and limitation of jurisdiction and enforcement.
[23]
The
Learned Prothonotary is entitled to deference in respect of these conclusions.
I see no error in principle or misapprehension of fact at this early stage.
[24]
As
noted in Ridgeview Restaurant Ltd. v Canada (Attorney
General),
2010 FC 506, the Court is not always consistent on the question of whether a
refusal to strike a pleadings is “vital to the final issues of the case”. This
is not surprising because what is “vital” depends on the particular case. Rigid
categorization is not helpful; the conclusion of what is vital must depend on
the circumstances of each case. Modern tort law arose from a motion to strike (Donoghue
v. Stevenson, [1932] AC 562 (HL)) and given the circumstances, regardless
of the result, it is arguable that the issue of “duty of care” at that time in
legal developments was vital.
[25]
No
such parallel exists on these facts. The Learned Prothonotary’s determination
not to strike was based on accepted legal principles and did not strike at the
core of the action.
C. Section
50/Forum Non Conveniens
[26]
Section
50(1) requires the Court to consider two matters in exercising its discretion
to stay a proceeding: (1) that the claim is before another court or
jurisdiction; (2) for other reasons it is in the interests of justice to grant
a stay.
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50.
(1) The Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court may,
in its discretion, stay proceedings in any cause or matter
(a) on the ground
that the claim is being proceeded with in another court or jurisdiction; or
(b) where for any
other reason it is in the interest of justice that the proceedings be stayed.
(2) The
Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court shall, on application of the
Attorney General of Canada, stay proceedings in any cause or matter in
respect of a claim against the Crown if it appears that the claimant has an
action or a proceeding in respect of the same claim pending in another court against
a person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in the action or
proceeding arose, was, in respect of that matter, acting so as to engage the
liability of the Crown.
(3) A
court that orders a stay under this section may subsequently, in its
discretion, lift the stay.
(Underlining
by Court)
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50.
(1) La Cour d’appel fédérale et la Cour fédérale ont le
pouvoir discrétionnaire de suspendre les procédures dans toute affaire :
a)
au motif que la demande est en instance devant un autre tribunal;
b)
lorsque, pour quelque autre raison, l’intérêt de la justice l’exige.
(2) Sur
demande du procureur général du Canada, la Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour
fédérale, selon le cas, suspend les procédures dans toute affaire relative à
une demande contre la Couronne s’il apparaît que le demandeur a intenté,
devant un autre tribunal, une procédure relative à la même demande contre une
personne qui, à la survenance du fait générateur allégué dans la procédure,
agissait en l’occurrence de telle façon qu’elle engageait la responsabilité
de la Couronne.
(3) Le
tribunal qui a ordonné la suspension peut, à son appréciation, ultérieurement
la lever.
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[27]
The
matter of “forum non conveniens” falls within the 2nd branch
of the s. 50(1) analysis, as potentially do a number of other legal principles
directed at interest of justice generally. Section 50(1)(b) is a broad
provision to give the Court the jurisdiction to control its process. The
principle of forum non conveniens principally engages an analysis of
prejudice to one or more parties or to the administration of justice.
[28]
The
Court has developed a number of factors which the Court will consider under the
“interests of justice” test. It has further refined the factors to consider in
the context of specifically forum non conveniens arguments.
[29]
The
Learned Prothonotary’s decision in respect of these issues and particularly s.
50(1) becomes problematic when the Learned Prothonotary concludes that having
decided that the Defendants have not met the test of s. 50(1)(a) (claim
proceeding in another jurisdiction), she held that she did not have to engage in
an “interest of justice” analysis. In this regard, with great respect, I cannot
concur.
[30]
Section
50(1) interposes “or” between the distinctly different concepts of “same claim”
and “interests of justice”. To give effect to Parliament’s intent, the Court is
to consider both concepts or branches in the exercise of discretion whether to
stay a proceeding.
[31]
In
respect of stays, the Federal Court of Appeal, in confirming the decision in Tractor
Supply Co. of Texas, LP v TSC Stores L.P,, 2010 FC 883, reinforced the
applicability to stays generally of White v E.B.F. Manufacturing Ltd.,
2001 FCT 713, paragraph 5:
5 Paragraph
50(1)(a) of the Act provides that the Court may in its discretion stay
proceedings in any cause or matter on the ground that the claim is being
proceeded within another Court or jurisdiction. The jurisprudence in the matter
has established several useful criteria to determine whether such a stay should
be granted. (Discreet Logic Inc. v. Canada (Registrar of Copyrights) 1993 CarswellNat 1930, 51 C.P.R. (3d) 191, affirmed
(1994), 55 C.P.R. (3d) 167 (Fed. C.A.); Plibrico (Canada) Limited v.
Combustion Engineering Canada Inc., 30 C.P.R. (3d) 312 at page 315; Ass'n
of Parents Support Groups v. York, 14 C.P.R. (3d) 263; Compulife
Software Inc. v. Compuoffice Software Inc., 1997 CarswellNat 2482, 77
C.P.R. (3d) 451, 143 F.T.R. 19; 94272 Canada Ltd. v. Moffatt, 31 C.P.R.
(3d) 95 and General Foods v. Struthers, [1974] S.C.R. 98). They are
abridged and assembled as follows for convenience.
1. Would the continuation
of the action cause prejudice or injustice (not merely inconvenience or extra
expense) to the defendant?
2. Would the stay work an
injustice to the plaintiff?
3. The onus is on the party
which seeks a stay to establish that these two conditions are met;
4. The grant or refusal of
the stay is within the discretionary power of the judge;
5. The power to grant a
stay may only be exercised sparingly and in the clearest of cases;
6. Are the facts alleged,
the legal issues involved and the relief sought similar in both actions?
7. What are the
possibilities of inconsistent findings in both Courts?
8. Until there is a risk of
imminent adjudication in the two different forums, the Court should be very
reluctant to interfere with any litigant's right of access to another
jurisdiction;
9. Priority ought not
necessarily be given to the first proceeding over the second one or, vice
versa.
[32]
The
Federal Court had noted the potentially limited relevance of the RJR-MacDonald
(RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311)
analytical framework. The parties in this case agree that RJR-MacDonald
is not helpful here and I concur.
[33]
As
to the Learned Prothonotary’s conclusions on the first branch of s. 50(1) – the
same claim proceeding in another court or jurisdiction – I see no reviewable
error in the Learned Prothonotary’s consideration. For much the same reasons as
reached in respect of abuse of process, the conclusion that the U.S. and Canadian
actions are not the same is reasonable.
[34]
In
the exercise of discretion, it is reasonable to conclude that this Court (which
has jurisdiction over the claim) ought not to defer to a foreign court in
respect to matters arising in Canada. Google US, by
operating in Canada, directly
and/or through a subsidiary subjected itself to Canadian law.
[35]
With
respect to the 2nd branch of the s. 50(1) test, given the Learned
Prothonotary’s decision not to consider it, the Court ought to de novo
address that issue by addressing the nine factors listed in White,
above.
[36]
The
Court concludes as follows:
1. While
there may be inconvenience and extra expense, there is no prejudice or
injustice to either party.
2. A
stay could well prejudice the Plaintiff by delaying or preventing Canadian
based claims.
3. The
Defendant had the burden on these two matters which it failed to satisfy.
4. The
Court is in a position to properly deal with the stay motion.
5. This
is not a clear case where a stay should be granted because of real prejudice.
6. For
reasons given earlier and found by the Learned Prothonotary, the two actions
are not sufficiently similar.
7. Because
of the differences in legal regimes, there is a real possibility of
inconsistent findings.
8. The
two actions are at different stages.
9. Neither
party enjoys a priority of filing date.
[37]
As
to the issue of forum non conveniens, the doctrine is not strictly
applicable because neither the U.S. nor Canadian courts can necessarily assume
or exercise jurisdiction over the actions in the other country. Justice Lemieux
in Ford Aquitaine Industries SAS v Canmar Pride (The), 2005 FC 431, set
out the basic tenet of the doctrine that each forum must be able to exercise
the necessary jurisdiction.
56 As
pointed out by Mr. Justice Sharpe for the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt
et al. v. Courcelles et al., [2002] O.J. No. 2128, 60 O.R. (3d) 20, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens does not speak to the issue whether a
forum has jurisdiction or should assume jurisdiction but rather is a
discretionary doctrine which recognizes that there may be more than one forum
capable of assuming or exercising jurisdiction and may decline to exercise that
jurisdiction on the grounds there is a more appropriate forum to entertain (or
try) the action. In Muscutt, supra, Mr. Justice Sharpe was
dealing with a case where Ontario assumed jurisdiction and not either a presence-based
jurisdiction or a consent-based jurisdiction.
(Underlining by Court)
[38]
Justice
Lemieux also endorsed the 10 factors noted in Spar Aerospace Ltd. v American
Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205. There is no suggestion that the
list is exhaustive but they provide a useful guideline. They are:
1. The
parties’ residence, that of witnesses and experts;
2. The
location of the material evidence;
3. The
place where the contract was negotiated and executed;
4. The
existence of proceedings pending between the parties in another jurisdiction;
5. The
location of Defendant’s assets;
6. The
applicable law;
7. Advantages
conferred upon Plaintiff by its choice of forum, if any;
8. The
interest of justice;
9. The
interest of the parties; and
10. The
need to have the judgment recognized in another jurisdiction.
[39]
Applying
those factors, I conclude:
1. The
issue of residence of Defendants, witnesses and experts favours the U.S.
although Google CA is
resident in Canada.
2. Location
of material evidence would again, on balance, favour the U.S. although
evidence of actions in Canada would be highly relevant.
3. The
place of contract is not as relevant as the place of infringement. As the
infringement on the internet potentially occurs in a number of places,
including on the server, on the customers’ screen and in the marketing in Canada, the matter
is balanced.
4. The
existence of proceedings between the parties in the U.S. has been
addressed including the differences between the actions.
5. The
evidence on the Defendants’ assets is limited but the U.S. would appear to
dominate both Google US and Google CA. Clearly the
assets of significance are in the U.S.
6. The
applicable law is a critical matter as Canadian law clearly applies to the
Federal Court action. It is this law which the Plaintiff wishes to assert as a
central legal basis for its claim.
7. The
advantage to the Plaintiff by its choice of this forum is the benefit of
Canadian law and its enforcement in Canada – as the choice of the U.S. court
accords similar benefits of U.S. law and enforcement in that jurisdiction.
8. As
to the interests of justice, there is significant force to the contention that
the interests of justice in Canada favour Canadian proceedings. Foreign
owners of intellectual property are recognized as having the right to commence
actions in Canada for
infringements occurring here under Canadian law. The Defendants accepted that
possibility in doing business here and ought not to be able to shield
themselves from Canadian legal process.
9. The
interests of the parties are clearly split.
10. The
potential problem of recognition of a foreign judgment is a substantive concern
in both countries given the legal regimes, different defences and potential
outcomes. The absence of proven foreign law in this instance is not fatal as it
is not necessary to know as a fact what the U.S. law may be.
The Court can take judicial notice that the laws are neither identical nor
applied in the same way – the precise details of those differences are not
critical at this juncture.
[40]
In
my view, weighing all these factors together, I cannot see that the U.S. court
is more convenient and appropriate for dealing with rights under Canadian law –
even assuming a U.S. court could or would make such a determination.
The situation is analogous to other instances of actions based on intellectual
property rights proceeding in two or more national courts at the same time. It
is not forum shopping to assert Canadian rights in Canadian courts and U.S. rights in U.S. courts.
[41]
Therefore,
the Defendants have not satisfied me that this Court should exercise its
discretion to stay this Federal Court action on the grounds of non forum conveniens.
IV. CONCLUSION
[42]
I
come to the same result as the Learned Prothonotary from a similar perspective
and also on the basis of grounds which she did not consider. As such, the order
dismissing the Defendants’ motion is upheld and this appeal will be dismissed.
[43]
While
the Plaintiff is entitled to its costs, the parties indicated that they wished
to address costs separately. The Plaintiff shall file its costs submissions
within twenty-one (21) days of this decision and the Defendants may respond
fourteen (14) days thereafter with five (5) days for reply.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
the order dismissing the Defendants’ motion is
upheld and this appeal is dismissed.
“Michael
L. Phelan”