Date: 20071126
Docket: IMM-1902-07
Citation: 2007 FC 1220
Ottawa, Ontario, the
26th day of November 2007
Present:
the Honourable Mr. Justice Blais
BETWEEN:
ADRIAN EDROSO
MORALES
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Protection
Division (the Division) of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) on
April 4, 2007 by which the Division concluded that the applicant was neither a
Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 1996, c. 27 (the Act).
RELEVANT
FACTS
[2]
The
applicant Adrian Edroso Morales is a citizen of Mexico and of Spain. He arrived in Canada on December 8, 2005 and applied for
refugee status on that day.
[3]
The
applicant lost everything in hurricane Wilma and considered that his life was
threatened in Mexico because of his inability to
adapt to the corruption and the exploitation prevailing in the workplace.
[4]
As his
parents were Basques, he said he could not return to Spain for fear of being persecuted as his
parents were before leaving Spain to take refuge in Mexico.
IMPUGNED DECISION
[5]
Donald
Archambault (the member) rendered an oral decision on April 3, 2007 by which he denied the
applicant refugee status on the ground that the real reason for his refugee
status application was economic and the applicant had even admitted he wanted
to go back to Mexico so he could see his family once
he was working in Canada.
ISSUE
[6]
Did the
persuasive decisions published by the Board interfere with the member in the
exercise of his discretion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[7]
As John M.
Evans J.A. recently noted for the Federal Court of Appeal in Kozak v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124, at paragraph
44, the standard of review applicable to questions of procedural fairness
is that of correctness:
Whether a tribunal's decision was made in
breach of the duty of procedural fairness, including the requirement of
impartiality, is determined by a reviewing court on a standard of correctness.
ANALYSIS
[8]
It
appeared from the record under review that the member dismissed the refugee
status claim based on the oral evidence submitted to him. The member said the
following:
In his
testimony, the claimant stated that he came to Canada for economic reasons and, therefore, to
find a job.
Counsel stated that it was not up to the
claimant to decide on matters of law, but one thing is certain: all the
evidence before the panel shows that this really is the case with respect to
the claimant.
The claimant even stated that if his shop
had not been destroyed by Hurricane Wilma, he most probably would not be in Canada.
The claimant came to Canada in 2004, and he did not make
a claim for refugee protection at that time. In the panel’s view, however, he
could have done so.
. . . Not only would the claimant not be subjected
to a specific threat if he were to return to his country, but he also admits
that he intends to return. He adds, however, that he would not return to work,
but to see his family.
[9]
Further,
the immigration officer’s notes made on December 8, 2005, indicate as the
answer to question 18 titled “Any other information provided by the claimant”,
the following: “no fear to return to Mexico or to go to Spain”, and “does not
want to go to Spain because he does not know anyone there”. This evidence supports
the decision made by the member.
[10]
Although
I do not think it is necessary to dwell at length on the fact that the member
exercised his discretion based on the evidence put before him, I have to
distinguish the facts in the case at bar from the decision relied on by the
applicant in support of this application for judicial review.
[11]
The
applicant cited a passage which I was unable to find in the judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Kozak, supra. The end of paragraph 61 is
however identical to the passage cited:
Reading the
e-mails exchanged among members of the senior management in the early stages, a person could reasonably conclude that the lead case strategy was
not only designed to bring consistency to future decisions and to increase
their accuracy, but also to reduce the number of positive decisions that
otherwise might be rendered in favour of the 15,000 Hungarian Roma claimants
expected to arrive in 1998, and to reduce the number of potential claimants.
(Emphasis added.)
[12]
The
emphasized part of the quotation is the part unfortunately omitted by counsel
for the applicant, who gave an overview of the major distinctions between the
Federal Court of Appeal’s judgment and the case now before the Court. In that
judgment, very special facts were entered in the evidence regarding the lead
cases created for Hungarian Roma claimants.
[13]
First, the
e-mails exchanged among members of senior management of the Board in the early
stages were entered in evidence. Some of these e-mails indicated a concern
regarding the extreme number of decisions made in favour of Hungarian Roma
claimants and a forecast of an increase in applications from Hungary.
[14]
Second,
the evidence was that the Board had not consulted the legal community
specializing in immigration and refugee law before issuing lead cases that
would guide members in dealing with the increasing number of applications from
Hungarian Roma claimants. At the time, the lead cases represented an
unannounced initiative by the Board. Further, it did not publicly explain this
new departure until after the applications for leave to make applications for
judicial review in cases to which the lead cases had been applied.
[15]
Third, the
final but not the least important distinction is the following: one of the
members of the panel hearing the applications had also participated in creating
the said lead cases.
[16]
It should
be noted that the Federal Court of Appeal was careful to point out the
following in the final paragraph of Kosak, supra:
I would only note that the decision in the
present appeals does not necessarily mean that the factual conclusions in the
lead cases are unreliable, or that subsequent decisions which have relied, to
any extent, on the findings in the lead cases are thereby vitiated.
[17]
As none of
these facts was proven or alleged in the case at bar, I cannot rely on this
decision as a basis for concluding that the member waived the exercise of his
discretion in favour of the persuasive decisions published by the Board.
[18]
The
applicant directed the Court’s attention to the fact that in his decisions the
member mentioned that President Fox made and is still making efforts to resolve
the problems of corruption in Mexico, though he has not held the
presidency of that country since January 2006.
[19]
It is
worth citing in full the member’s decision in response to this argument:
The panel acknowledges that there is
corruption, but since President Fox was elected, Mexico has been and is still making major
efforts to solve this problem. It has instituted a number of reforms and
mechanisms to fight corruption. With all due respect, it is false to claim or
to state that there is full-blown corruption in Mexico.
[20]
It is
clear from reading this passage that the member did not say that President Fox
is still making efforts, but rather that Mexico is making efforts to resolve the
corruption problem and has been doing this since President Fox was elected.
Further, the transcript of the hearing of April 3, 2007, at page 16, is even
clearer in this regard, and I quote: [TRANSLATION] “there is corruption in the
police, but the government since – since the election of Fox – and since the
new president also, has made great efforts to deal with internal corruption . .
.”.
[21]
Consequently,
there is no indication that the member did not assess the evidence on Mexico.
[22]
It was up
to the applicant to show how the lead cases had interfered with his right to
procedural fairness. In my opinion, it is clear that the member relied on the
evidence presented to him in dismissing the applicant’s refugee status
application, and only mentioned the persuasive decisions of the Board at the
very end of his decision as examples, as he in fact said himself, since his
decision had already been fully supported by reasons.
[23]
For these
reasons, I dismiss the application for judicial review at bar.
[24]
The
parties submitted no question for certification.
JUDGMENT
- The application for judicial review
is dismissed.
- No question will be certified.
“Pierre
Blais”
Certified
true translation
Brian
McCordick, Translator
APPENDIX
APLICABLE LEGISLATION
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if
they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual
residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a
risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
if
(i) the person
is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
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97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace
ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins
médicaux ou de santé adéquats
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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