Date: 20071212
Docket: IMM-1446-07
Citation: 2007 FC 1303
Ottawa, Ontario, the 12th day of December 2007
Present: the Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard
BETWEEN:
IONITA TIMIS
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review from a decision by the Immigration Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board (the panel) on March 21, 2007 by which it
ordered that the applicant be deported as a person covered by paragraph 36(1)(c)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the IRPA) and under
paragraph 229(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations (IRPR).
II. Factual background
[2]
The applicant was
born in Romania on May 2, 1973 and is a citizen of that country. He is of the Pentecostal faith and
comes from a family of nine brothers and sisters.
[3]
The applicant
maintained that he and his family could not practise their religion in peace,
had difficulties finding work and were underpaid and insulted. For these
reasons, he left Romania in 1994 to go and work in Yugoslavia. Three years later, when his visa expired, he
was arrested and deported to Romania.
[4]
The applicant
explained that his family owned property that was returned to them following
the 1989 revolution. This property was also claimed by two police officers,
Groza and Mignea. These individuals harassed the applicant and his family.
[5]
On his return to Romania the two police officers stopped the applicant,
asked to see his identity card and ordered him to go with them to the police
station. The applicant said he followed the instructions of the officers and
was held for several days, beaten and sexually abused.
[6]
The applicant was
then convicted of acts that he did not commit. He was imprisoned from October
1997 to May 1999. However, his parents appealed the conviction and the
applicant was acquitted by the Court of Appeal.
[7]
Following his
release, the two police officers harassed the applicant several times and
threatened that they were going to [TRANSLATION] “put him in prison and [he
would not be] able to get out”.
[8]
On the night of
August 15 to 16, 2002, the applicant’s brother Ilie and his cousin Danici Danut
took part in a brawl outside a bar: they were convicted of criminal offences in
Romania. Accordingly to his testimony, the
applicant arrived on the scene of the brawl after it had begun and never took
part in the attack. He said that after watching the brawl for about 15 minutes
he grabbed his brother and cousin and got them into his car, and they left the
scene.
[9]
In August 2002,
the applicant left Romania, travelling on an Italian work
permit. In December 2002, he arrived in Canada and filed a protection application.
[10]
On March 11, 2004,
the applicant was sentenced in absentia in Romania to nine years in
prison for an offence, namely [TRANSLATION] “attempted homicide in a public
place”, as stipulated in sections 20 and 175(1)(i) of the Romanian Penal
Code (RPC), committed in the same incident which allegedly involved his
brother and cousin on August 15-16, 2002. The applicant maintained that the
conviction was trumped up by the police officers Groza and Mignea and was the
result of their claim to the family property.
[11]
Following the
filing of a report (the report) pursuant to subsection 44(1) of the IRPA, the
applicant was ruled inadmissible for serious criminality. The following
information is contained in that report:
THIS REPORT IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:
THAT IONITA
TIMIS
-SUBJECT IS NOT A CANADIAN CITIZEN.
-SUBJECT IS NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF CANADA.
CASE NO: 4131/ 2003
WARRANT NO: 57/ 2004
IN THE COURT HOUSE OF MARAMURES, IN ROMANIA, ON JUNE 30TH 2004 A WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR THE SUBJECT
IN REGARDS TO HIS
DOCUMENT NO: N907808650 NAME:
IONITA TIMIS
INVOLVEMENT IN CHARGES OF ATTEMPTING TO
PERPETRATE THE CRIME OF HOMOCIDE
IN A PUBLIC PLACE. THIS
OFFENCE IS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS S.20 AND S.175(2)(I) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF
ROMANIA.
THIS OFFENCE IS THE EQUIVALENT TO AN INDICTABLE
OFFENCE IN CANADA AS DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 239 OF THE CCC FOR ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MURDER, AND FOR WHICH A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT FOR
LIFE MAY BE IMPOSED.
[12]
The panel’s record
contains a translation of the said warrant No. 57/2004 (Warrant of Execution of
the Term of Imprisonment No: 57/2004) (the warrant) issued by the Romanian court.
This document, which is the basis of the report, sets out the convictions and
the penalty imposed. I set out certain relevant passages from the warrant here:
Was sentenced to (sentence and the applicable
sections of legislation):
-
S. 180 par. 2 of
the penal Code, pursuant to S. 75 par. 1, letter a of the Criminal Code, the
criminal proceedings were stayed
pursuant to S. 11 par. 2 letter b, 20
letter h of the Code of penal procedure and S. 284 of the Code of penal
procedure.
-
S. 26 of the Penal
Code, referenced to S. 20 of the penal Code (S. 175 par. 1 letter I of the
Penal Code pursuant to S. 75 letter a of the Penal Code, following the change
of legal applicability, according to S.334 of the Code of penal procedure, by
adding these last legal provisions – a term of imprisonment of 9 years
and the prohibition of rights under S. 64 letter a, b of the Code of penal
procedure for 4 years.
Pursuant to S. 37 letter b of the Penal Code.
It was noted that:
During the night of 15/16 August 2002, together
with the offenders Danci Danut and Timis Ilie, in the Borsa Complex, they
attached the guard Ciherean George, causing a head trauma with concussion
requiring 50-55 days of medical care to heal. The same night, they hit the
guard Scuturici Paramon, causing lesions that healed after 8-9 days of medical
care. (Emphasis in
translation of warrant.)
[13]
The said report
was referred to the panel for a hearing pursuant to subsection 44(2) of the
IRPA. Following the hearing, the panel ordered the removal of the applicant
pursuant to paragraph 229(1)(e) of the IRPR. The panel’s decision
is the subject of this judicial review.
III. Impugned decision
[14]
The panel found that the applicant’s testimony
regarding his involvement with the police officers Grozia and Mignea was not
credible. His testimony was described as [TRANSLATION] “hesitant” and he was
said to have an [TRANSLATION] “evasive” look and seemed to be [TRANSLATION]
“improvising”. The panel also noted certain inconsistencies between the
applicant’s testimony and the evidence in the record, characterizing this
evidence as inconsistent with the Romanian judgment and the applicant’s
testimony at the hearing. The panel concluded that the applicant’s story had no
evidentiary value and there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
applicant was present at the scene of the attack and took part, thus committing
“an offence . . . that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence
under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least ten years”.
[15]
Based on the warrant, which the panel considered
to be “persuasive and clear”, it found that the applicant had been convicted of
bodily harm pursuant to section 75(1)(a) and 180 of the RPC and of
involvement in attempted homicide in public under sections 20, 26 and 175(1)(i)
of the RPC. I note that according to the warrant the offence pursuant to
sections 75(1)(a) and 180 of the RPC was stayed and no conviction registered
under those sections.
[16]
As to the equivalency between the offences in
question in the RPC and the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, the
panel had this to say:
[TRANSLATION]
As to
equivalency, I feel that section 180(2) of the Romanian Penal Code is
equivalent to sections 265(1)(a), assault, and 267(b), causing bodily
harm. The components in Romanian law, as in Canadian, are the use of force and
violence and the existence of bodily injury or lesions. In the Canadian Criminal
Code, there is no mention of the number of attackers, which implies
inclusion of attacks committed by more than three attackers (75(1) Romanian
Penal Code). Now, section 175(1)(i) of the Romanian Penal Code and section
222(1) Cr. C. are in my opinion equivalent. Although unlike the Canadian Criminal
Code (s. 222(1)) the Romanian Penal Code contains no definition of
homicide, the term is quite clear. In his arguments on mens rea in
Canadian law, Mr. Cristinariu said nothing about the Romanian counterpart,
which is to be found in sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Romanian Penal Code, the
question of intent is also an essential of Romanian criminal law. (Emphasis by
member.)
IV. Issue
[17]
The issue to be
resolved in the case at bar may be summarized as follows:
A. Did the panel err in its
analysis of equivalency between the applicable sections of the Romanian
Penal Code and the Criminal Code?
V. Standard of review
[18]
A finding of
inadmissibility for serious criminality depends on the findings of fact made by
the panel. The panel must determine the facts giving rise to an offence
committed abroad which, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years. The analysis required
certain conclusions regarding the foreign law, which the courts have
consistently held have always been regarded as questions of fact. The point at
issue, namely the equivalency of the offences in question, thus is a question
of fact. The Federal Court of Appeal has indicated, in Thanaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 122, that a decision of the
panel on a question of equivalency should be considered in terms of patent
unreasonableness. In Lakhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 674, at paragraphs 20 and
23, my colleague Michel Beaudry J. adopted this same standard of review in
assessing a question of inadmissibility under section 36(1)(c) of the
IRPA.
[19]
In the case at
bar, I will apply the standard of review of patent unreasonableness to the
point at issue.
VI. Analysis
[20]
The relevant
sections of the legislative and regulatory provisions are set out in an
appendix to these reasons.
[21]
The applicant was
found inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(c) of the IRPA. That
provision requires that it be shown that an offence was committed outside Canada which, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years.
[22]
The Act requires
the Court to determine whether the two offences are equivalent. To do this, the
essentials of each provision must be compared to see if they correspond.
Although differences are to be expected in the language used to define offences
in different countries, it is important to ensure that the essentials are the
same.
[23]
The judgments of
the Federal Court of Appeal have established that equivalency may be determined
in three ways:
(1) by comparing the exact
content of each statute both through the documents and, if possible, through
the testimony of experts in the foreign law so as to identify the components of
each offence;
(2)
by examining the evidence, both oral and written, to decide whether it is
sufficient to establish that the components of the offence in Canada were proven in the foreign
proceedings, whether in detail and in the same terms in the originating
documents or in the legislative provisions;
(3) by a combination of the
two.
See: Brannson v. Minister
of Employment and Immigration, [1981] 2 FC 141; (1980), 34 N.R. 411
(C.A.); Hill v. Minister of Employment
and Immigration (1987), 73 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.); Steward
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 3 FC 487;
(1988), 84 N.R. 236 (C.A.).
[24]
In the case at
bar, the applicant was ruled inadmissible for serious criminality following the
filing of the report and based on the information contained in it. The report
explained that the applicant was charged with attempted homicide in a public
place contrary to sections 20 and 175 of the RPC and that this offence was
equivalent to the offence mentioned at section 239 of the Criminal Code,
namely attempted murder, which carried a penalty of life imprisonment.
[25]
In its reasons for
decision the panel cited the provisions on these two offences, but undertook no
analysis of the specific language used in framing them. Additionally, the
essentials of the offences in question were not identified by the panel and so
were not compared to determine whether they were the same. The panel’s analysis
of the question of equivalency was limited essentially to a statement by the
panel that section 175(1)(i) of the RPC and section 222(1) of the Criminal
Code were equivalent and [TRANSLATION] “that the element of intent was also
an essential part of the Roumanian criminal law”. Section 222 of the Criminal
Code is the provision dealing with homicide. Subsection 222(1) provides
that “a person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he
causes the death of a human being”. Section 222(4) of the Criminal Code
states: “culpable homicide is murder or manslaughter or infanticide”. The panel
did not undertake any discussion of section 239 of the Criminal Code in
its analysis. That provision states:
|
Every person who attempts by any means to
commit murder is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) where a firearm is used in the
commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life, and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment
for life.
|
Quiconque, par quelque moyen, tente de
commettre un meurtre est coupable d’un acte criminel passible :
a) s’il y a usage d’une arme à feu lors de la perpétration de
l’infraction, de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, la peine minimale étant de
quatre ans;
b) dans les autres cas, de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.
|
[26]
The offence stated in section 239 was that used
by the panel to justify its conclusion that the applicant was inadmissible, not
section 222. In any event, the essential components of murder in the Romanian
and Canadian offences were not identified and compared to determine whether
they were the same. Further, the panel undertook no assessment of the evidence
to decide whether it showed that the essential components of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign
proceedings. There is no evidence in the record to show that the applicant
intended to commit murder in Romania, and mens rea is an essential component of the offence
described in section 239 of the Criminal Code.
[27]
In the case at bar, I conclude that the panel
did not make an adequate review of equivalency as required by the case law
cited above. The review of equivalency by the panel was incomplete and clearly
insufficient. Consequently, its decision on inadmissibility for serious
criminality must be set aside, as in the circumstances it is a reviewable
error.
[28]
I note that the panel undertook a more
comprehensive review of the offences contained in sections 75(a) and 180
of the RPC and sections 265(1)(a) and 267(b) of the Criminal Code.
Those offences deal with the infliction of bodily harm. I find that it
undertook an adequate review of the equivalency of the offences, but those are
not the offences which led to the applicant being inadmissible. The report
based its conclusion on offences dealing with attempted homicide in Romania and the equivalent offence in the Criminal
Code. The report is clear and specific on this point, despite the fact that
warrant No. 57/2004 noted in the report mentions the offences set out in
sections 75 and 180 of the RPC.
[29]
A report pursuant to subsection 44(1) of the
IRPA must necessarily specify the offence committed outside Canada and the
equivalent offence under an Act of Parliament so that the person who is the
subject of the inadmissibility order may be informed and may be able to present
his arguments at the hearing. In the case at bar, the offence in question under
the RPC is that dealing with attempted homicide. For that offence the panel’s
analysis of the question of equivalency, as indicated earlier in these reasons,
is deficient.
VII. Conclusion
[30]
I consider that the panel’s decision ordering removal of the applicant
on account of inadmissibility for serious criminality must be set aside. The
review of equivalency by the panel is incomplete and clearly insufficient,
which in the circumstances justifies the Court’s intervention.
[31]
For the reasons stated above, the application
for judicial review will be allowed. The matter will be referred back for
reconsideration by a panel of different members in accordance with these
reasons.
[32]
The parties did
not suggest certification of any serious questions of general importance as
contemplated by paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA. I am satisfied that no such
question arises in the case at bar.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND RULES
that:
1. The application for judicial review is
allowed;
2. The matter will be referred back for
reconsideration by a panel of different members in accordance with these
reasons;
3. No question is certified.
“Edmond P. Blanchard”
Certified true translation
Brian McCordick, Translator
APPENDIX
The
Romanian Criminal Code
20. An attempt constitutes initiation
of the execution decision to perpetrate the crime, execution which was
interrupted or which did not produce any damage.
Attempt exists also in the case
in which completion of the crime was not possible due to the insufficiency or
failure of the means used, or due to the fact that the action was perpetrated
without the presence of the object as expected by the perpetrator.
It is not attempt the case in
which the impossibility of crime’s completion is due to the manner in which the
execution was conceived.
…
26. An accomplice is the person who
deliberately facilitates or assists in any way in the perpetration of the
action provided by the criminal law. Also, an accomplice is the person who
promises, before or during the perpetration of the action, not to reveal the
assets resulted from the crime or that this person will favor the criminal,
even if after perpetration of the crime the promise is not fulfilled.
…
75. The following situations
constitute aggravating circumstances:
a) perpetration of the crime by
threr or more persons together;
b) perpetration of the crime through cruel actions or
through means and methods which present public threat;
c) perpetration of the crime by an adult, if this crime was
committed together with a juvenile;
d) perpetration of the crime with mean purpose;
e) perpetration of the crime under deliberate state of
drunkenness in order to commit the crime;
f) perpetration of the crime by a person who took advantage
by the situation resulted after a calamity.
The court can retain as
aggravating circumstances other situations, too, which give the action a
serious character.
…
175. Homicide perpetrated under one of
the following circumstances:
a) with premeditation;
b) out of financial interest
c) against the husband/wife or a close relative;
d) advantage over the incapacity of the victim to defence;
e) by means which endanger more persons ‘ lives;
f) related to the victim’s accomplishment of work or public
duties;
g) in order to abscond or to abscond other person from
investigation or arrest, or from the penalty’s execution;
h) in order to facilitate or conceal the perpetration of
another crime;
i) in public;
is subject to imprisonment between 15 and 25 years and interdiction
of certain rights.
The attempt is subject to penalty.
…
180. Injures or any other violent actions which cause physical
pain are subject to imprisonment between one month and 3 months or with fine.
Injures or violent actions which caused medical care for
recovery up to 20 days are punished with imprisonment between 3 months and 2
years or with fine.
The criminal action is initiated upon the prior complaint
of the injured party.
The parties’ reconciliation removes the criminal
responsibility.
…
182. Any action which resulted into
injures against the health and physical integrity which need more than 60 days
of medical care for recovery, or which produced one of the following
consequences: loss of a feeling or organ, cease of functioning of these, a
permanent physical or mental infirmity, mutilation, abortion, or endanger of
the person’s life, is punished with imprisonment between 2 and 7 years.
When the action was perpetrated
in order to produce the consequences mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
penalty consists in imprisonment between 3 and 10 years.
The attempt to the action
mentioned in paragraph 2 is subject to penalty.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act/
Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés
|
36.(1) A permanent resident or a foreign
national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for
(a)
having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum
term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of
Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been
imposed;
(b)
having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in
Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or
(c)
committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that,
if committed in Canada, would
constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of at least 10 years.
. . . . .
44.(1)An officer who is of the opinion
that a permanent resident or a foreign national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a
report setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to
the Minister.
(2) If the Minister is of the
opinion that the report is well-founded, the Minister may refer the report to
the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing, except in the case of
a permanent resident who is inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have
failed to comply with the residency obligation under section 28 except, in
the circumstances prescribed by the regulations, in the case of a foreign
national. In those cases, the Minister may make a removal order;
(3) An officer or the Immigration
Division may impose any conditions, including the payment of a deposit or the
posting of a guarantee for compliance with the conditions, that the officer
or the Division considers necessary on a permanent resident or a foreign
national who is the subject of a report, an admissibility hearing or, being
in Canada, a removal order.
|
36.(1) Emportent interdiction de
territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants :
a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou d’une infraction à une loi
fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est infligé;
b) être déclaré coupable, à l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans;
c) commettre, à l’extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un
emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans.
.
. . . .
44.(1) S’il estime que le résident
permanent ou l’étranger qui se trouve au Canada est interdit de territoire, l’agent peut établir un rapport
circonstancié, qu’il transmet au ministre.
(2) S’il estime le rapport bien
fondé, le ministre peut déférer l’affaire à la Section de l’immigration pour
enquête, sauf s’il s’agit d’un résident permanent interdit de territoire pour
le seul motif qu’il n’a pas respecté l’obligation de résidence ou, dans les
circonstances visées par les règlements, d’un étranger; il peut alors prendre
une mesure de renvoi.
(3) L’agent ou la Section de
l’immigration peut imposer les conditions qu’il estime nécessaires, notamment
la remise d’une garantie d’exécution, au résident permanent ou à l’étranger
qui fait l’objet d’un rapport ou d’une enquête ou, étant au Canada, d’une mesure de renvoi.
|
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations/
Règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés
|
229.(1) For the purposes of paragraph
45(d) of the Act, the applicable removal order to be made by the
Immigration Division against a person is
.
. . . .
(c) a
deportation order, in the case of a permanent resident inadmissible under
subsection 36(1) of the Act on grounds of serious criminality or a foreign
national inadmissible under paragraph 36(1)(b) or (c) of the
Act on grounds of serious criminality;
. . . . .
(e) a
deportation order, if they are inadmissible under subsection 37(1) of the Act
on grounds of organized criminality . . .
|
229.(1) Pour l’application de l’alinéa 45d)
de la Loi, la Section de l’immigration prend contre la personne la mesure de
renvoi indiquée en regard du motif en cause :
.
. . . .
c) en cas d’interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité du
résident permanent au titre du paragraphe 36(1) de la Loi ou de l’étranger au
titre des alinéas 36(1)b) ou c) de la Loi, l’expulsion
. . . . .
e) en cas d’interdiction de territoire pour criminalité organisée
au titre du paragraphe 37(1) de la Loi, l’expulsion . . .
|
Criminal Code / Code criminel
|
222.(1) A person commits homicide when,
directly or indirectly, by any means, he causes the death of a human being.
(2) Homicide is culpable or not culpable.
(3) Homicide that is not culpable is not
an offence.
(4) Culpable homicide is murder or
manslaughter or infanticide.
(5) A person commits culpable homicide
when he causes the death of a human being,
(a) by
means of an unlawful act,
(b) by
criminal negligence,
(c) by
causing that human being, by threats or fear of violence or by deception, to
do anything that causes his death, or
(d) by
willfully frightening that human being, in the case of a child or sick
person.
(6)
Notwithstanding anything in this section, a person does not commit homicide
within the meaning of this Act by reason only that he causes the death of a
human being by procuring, by false evidence, the conviction and death of that
human being by sentence of the law.
224. Where a
person, by an act or omission, does any thing that results in the death of a
human being, he causes the death of that human being notwithstanding that
death from that cause might have been prevented by resorting to proper means.
239. Every person who attempts by any means to
commit murder is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) where a firearm is used in the
commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life, and to a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment
for life.
. . . . .
265. A
person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another
person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or
indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act
or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that
other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to
effect his purpose; or
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a
weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs.
267. Every one who, in committing an assault,
(a) carries, uses or threatens to use a
weapon or an imitation thereof, or
(b) causes bodily harm to the
complainant,
is guilty
of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
ten years or an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months.
|
222.(1) Commet un homicide quiconque,
directement ou indirectement, par quelque moyen, cause la mort d’un être
humain.
(2) L’homicide est coupable ou non
coupable.
(3) L’homicide non coupable ne constitue
pas une infraction.
(4) L’homicide coupable est le meurtre,
l’homicide involontaire coupable ou l’infanticide.
(5) Une personne commet un homicide
coupable lorsqu’elle cause la mort d’un être humain :
a) soit au moyen d’un acte illégal;
b) soit par négligence criminelle;
c) soit en portant cet être humain, par des menaces ou la crainte
de quelque chose qui cause sa mort;
d) soit en effrayant volontairement cet être humain, dans le cas
d’un enfant ou d’une personne malade.
(6) Nonobstant les autres disposition du
présent article, une personne ne commet pas un homicide au sens de la
présente loi, du seul fait qu’elle cause la mort d’un être humain en amenant,
par de faux témoignages, la condamnation et la mort de cet être humain par
sentence de la loi.
224. Lorsque, par un acte ou une
omission, une personne fait une chose qui entraîne la mort d’un être humain,
elle cause la mort de cet être humain, bien que la mort produite par cette
cause eût pu être empêchée en recourant à des moyens appropriés.
239. Quiconque, par quelque moyen, tente de
commettre un meurtre est coupable d’un acte criminel passible :
a) s’il y a usage d’une arme à feu lors de la perpétration de
l’infraction, de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, la peine minimale étant de
quatre ans;
b) dans les autres cas, de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.
. . . . .
265. Commet
des voies de fait, ou se livre à une attaque ou une agression, quiconque,
selon le cas :
a) d’une manière intentionnelle, emploie la force, directement ou
indirectement, contre une autre personne sans son consentement;
b) tente ou menace, par un acte ou un; geste, d’employer la force
contre une autre personne, s’il est en mesure actuelle, ou s’il porte cette
personne à Croire, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu’il est alors en mesure
actuelle d’accomplir son dessein;
c) en portant ostensiblement une arme ou une imitation, aborde ou
importune une autre personne ou mendie.
267. Est coupable soit d’un acte criminel
et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, soit d’une infraction
punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire et passible
d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix-huit mois quiconque, en se livrant à des
voies de fait, selon le cas :
a) porte, utilise ou menace d’utiliser une arme ou une imitation
d’arme;
b) inflige des lésions corporelles au plaignant.
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