Docket: T-1289-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1525
Ottawa, Ontario, December 28,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
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MICHAEL AARON SPIDEL
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Plaintiff
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AND HER SERVANT
MR. MIKE COTE
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Defendants
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
I. Overview
[1]
Mr.
Spidel commenced a defamation claim against the defendants. The defendants have
requested an order granting summary judgment in their favour, the effect of
which would be to dismiss Mr. Spidel’s action.
[2]
The
defendants rely primarily on the doctrines of absolute and qualified privilege,
arguing that the remarks underlying Mr. Spidel’s action are protected speech
and, therefore, immune from an action in defamation. I am satisfied that the
remarks fall under an absolute privilege and, therefore, that there is no
action in defamation available in the circumstances. I must, therefore, allow
this motion for summary judgment.
II. Factual Background
[3]
In
2009, Mr. Spidel, who is imprisoned, filed a human rights complaint against the
Correctional Service of Canada [CSC] in which he contended that he had been
discriminated against on the basis of sex. He argued that female inmates have
more private and unaccompanied visits with their children than male inmates.
[4]
At
various stages of the complaint, Mr. Spidel and CSC made written submissions to
the Canadian Human Rights Commission. In his, Mr. Spidel mentioned his concern
that he had been involuntarily transferred from a minimum to a medium security
institution because of his frequent resort to grievance procedures. In turn,
CSC informed the Commission that there was “no information that supports Mr.
Spidel’s allegations indicating that he received consequences after using the
various internal and external redress mechanisms”. This remark gave rise to Mr.
Spidel’s defamation action.
[5]
After
considering all of the submissions before it, the Commission decided to refer
Mr. Spidel’s complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal for a hearing.
III. Is There a Genuine Issue for
Trial?
[6]
The
Federal Courts Rules, 1998, SOR 98/106 (Rules 213 and 214) permit the
Court to grant a motion for summary judgment where there is no genuine issue
for trial. The defendants argue that the doctrine of absolute privilege makes
clear that there is no legal foundation for Mr. Spidel’s defamation claim and,
therefore, that there is no genuine issue to be tried. I agree.
[7]
The
comment about which Mr. Spidel complains was made in the course of a
quasi-judicial proceeding. This type of comment falls within the doctrine of
absolute privilege and cannot form the subject of a defamation action. In
addition, I do not believe the comment was actually defamatory.
[8]
The
Commission performs a quasi-judicial role in the handling of human rights
complaints. Accordingly, comments made in the course of the Commission’s
investigation into a complaint fall within the doctrine of absolute privilege: Ayangma
v NAV Canada, 2001 PESCAD
1, at para 41. The comment in issue was made by a CSC official who was a
potential witness at the hearing into Mr. Spidel’s complaint.
[9]
Mr.
Spidel points out that CSC’s comment was not relevant to the complaint under
investigation. However, CSC’s comment was made in response to a submission by
Mr. Spidel. In that sense, it was not totally extraneous to the complaint and
not beyond the reach of the privilege.
[10]
In
any case, I cannot see anything defamatory about CSC’s statement. It is not
reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning; it would not injure Mr.
Spidel’s reputation in the mind of a reasonable or ordinary member of society (Ayangma,
above, at paras 25-27). It merely related to an ancillary factual dispute
between the parties (and the subject of separate legal proceedings). Further, the
Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal based on its merits. There is
no evidence that CSC’s comment had any adverse effect on Mr. Spidel’s complaint.
[11]
In
my view, therefore, the allegedly defamatory comment was made in a context
where absolute privilege applies, and it was not, in any case, capable of being
characterized as defamatory. I see no genuine issue to be tried.
IV. Conclusion and Disposition
[12]
There
being no genuine issue for trial, I must allow the repondents’ motion for
summary judgement, with costs.
ORDER
THIS COURT
ORDERS that the motion for summary judgment is allowed, with costs.
“James
W. O’Reilly”
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