Date: 20071221
Docket: T-461-07
Citation: 2007 FC 1361
Ottawa, Ontario, December 21, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Orville Frenette
BETWEEN:
CAROLYN
BREDIN
APPLICANT
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human
Rights Commission dated February 17, 2007 wherein the Commission decided not to
deal with the applicant’s complaint because the complaint was out of time as it
was based on acts that occurred more than one year prior to the date on which
it was filed and because the reasons for the delay were insufficient for the
Commission to exercise its discretion to accept the complaint.
[2]
The
applicant argues that the Commission erred by refusing to exercise its
discretion by relying on incomplete evidence because of the investigator’s
failure to provide the parties with an opportunity to make submissions prior to
making its recommendation. Furthermore, the applicant submits that the
Commission did not assess its duty to consider and accommodate her disability
when determining whether it should exercise its discretion.
THE FACTS
[3]
A
comprehensive review of the facts that give rise to this application are
provided in the applicant’s first application for judicial review: see Bredin
v. Canada (Attorney
Genera),
2006 FC 1178. Facts central to this application are reviewed here.
[4]
The applicant
began her career in 1979 as an employee of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. She subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice effective
April 30, 2001. In 1992, she was diagnosed with major depression and took
disability leave. In October 1993, the applicant returned to work on a
graduated basis and returned full time in November 1995.
[5]
The
applicant was informed by her compensation and benefits advisor in October 1993
that a delay in her pay would result if she was listed as a full-time employee,
but that, at the time, she was listed as a part-time employee. The applicant
also states that she was told that being listed as a part-time employee would
not negatively affect her ability to buy back her pension during the time she
was on leave without pay.
[6]
Prior
to July 4, 1994, the Public Service Superannuation Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1358 did not
allow employees to be contributors to the pension plan if their assigned hours
of work were less than 30 hours per week. However, an amendment to these
Regulations subsequently allowed part-time employees before that date to become
contributors to the Superannuation Pension Plan. Contributors on that date
could elect to buy back any or all prior part-time service that occurred after
December 31, 1980.
[7]
The
applicant applied to buy back pension time, but her application was denied on
December 18, 2001 by the Superannuation Directorate. She was informed that she
was not eligible to buy back her pension entitlements for those periods of
leave without pay because of her part-time employment status. The applicant
made further submissions to the Directorate and requested that it treat her
employment from October 4, 1993 to November 29, 1995 as full time. Her request
was denied on March 6, 2002.
[8]
On
April 10, 2003, Françoise Girard, the Acting Director General of the Human
Resources Directorate at the Department of Justice wrote to her counterpart at
CIC to request that the applicant’s employment status be amended from part-time
to full-time for the period of October 4, 1993 to November 29, 1995 so that
this period could be considered for pension purposes.
[9]
In
May 2003, the applicant became ill and took a period of disability leave.
[10]
On
July 11, 2003, Ms. Gravel refused the request to change the applicant’s
employment status because she did not believe that the circumstances supported
the applicant’s allegation that she had been misinformed by her compensation
and benefits advisor at the time as to the impact of her being listed as a
part-time employee. Ms. Girard was invited to contact the Director of Workplace
Effectiveness of CIC, Anne Wallis, on behalf of the applicant, which she did, seeking
a detailed explanation from Ms. Wallis before Ms. Girard rendered her final
decision. The applicant alleges that as a result, Ms. Wallis contacted her
personally and suggested that she would personally review her case. She also
indicated that that CIC was seeking a legal opinion as to whether it could
consider additional information submitted by the applicant in 2003 in respect
of her 1993 employment status. She attempted to remedy what she perceived as an
administrative error, through an internal process.
[11]
These
investigations culminated with a letter sent to the applicant on June 14, 2005,
wherein Ms. Gravel confirmed that she believed CIC had correctly concluded that
the applicant was working part-time and that her request to change her employment
status had been rightly refused.
[12]
On
May 10, 2005, the applicant filed a human rights complaint with the Commission
alleging that by refusing to amend her employment status, CIC and the Treasury
Board of Canada treated her in an adverse and discriminatory manner, contrary
to sections 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S., 1985, c. H-6 (the
“Act”).
[13]
An
investigator was appointed by the Commission who conducted an inquiry into the
applicant’s complaint. After receiving submissions from both parties and
examining the medical reports and documents, the investigator recommended to
the Commission that it not deal with the complaint because it was filed out of
time. On November 18, 2005, the Commission informed the applicant that it had
decided not to deal with her complaint because it was filed outside the
one-year limitation period prescribed under paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act.
[14]
The
applicant sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision. On October 4,
2006, Justice Blanchard granted the application and referred the matter back to
the Commission. He held that the applicant had filed her complaint beyond the
one year limitation period and confirmed that it was on July 11, 2003 when the
applicant’s alleged adverse differential treatment crystallized. However,
Justice Blanchard determined that the Commission’s reasons for its decision
were inadequate and insufficient to establish whether it had turned its mind to
the exercise of its discretion to refer the complaint despite the fact that it was
filed out of time.
THE COMMISSION’S
DECISION
[15]
On
November 5, 2006, an investigator completed a section 41 analysis report and
recommended that the Commission not deal with the applicant’s complaint because
it was out of time and because the reasons for the applicant’s delay did not
appear to be sufficient justification for the Commission to exercise its
discretion to accept the complaint.
[16]
The
investigator found that the one-year time limitation period began with the
respondent’s letter to the applicant dated July 11, 2003 in which she was
informed that her request to amend her employment status from part-time to full
time had been dismissed. Therefore, the applicant, who only contacted the
Commission in April 2005 (ie. 21 months later), was well beyond the time
limitation period.
[17]
The
investigator rejected the respondent’s submission that it would be prejudiced
if the complaint were to proceed because the events underlying the complaint
dated back to October 1993. The respondent suggested that some witnesses would
either be unavailable or unable to recall important details. However, the
investigator noted that the complaint was not witness-driven and it appeared
that the respondent possessed the necessary documentary evidence to establish
her disability mount a defence.
[18]
On
this point, the important evidence was the medical evidence and two medial
reports were filed by the applicant relating to her state in 2003-2005.
[19]
However,
the investigator also rejected the applicant’s explanation as to why she had not
filed her complaint in time. Although it was acknowledged that she had been
suffering from major depression since May 2003, she had maintained contact with
her current employer during this time and pursued an informal review process.
This suggested that the applicant could have filed a complaint with the
Commission within the one-year time frame.
[20]
The
investigator concluded that although the delay was incurred in good faith,
there is no requirement in the Act that a complainant exhaust an
alternate redress before filing a complaint. Therefore, there was nothing
preventing the applicant from submitting a complaint to the Commission at any
time immediately after being informed of the respondent’s decision.
[21]
Finally,
the investigator recommended that, pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act,
the Commission not deal with the complaint because it was out of time, as it
was based on acts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the
complaint and because the reasons for the delay did not appear to be sufficient
justification for the Commission to exercise its discretion and bring the
complaint into time.
[22]
By
a letter dated February 12, 2007, addressed to the applicant, the Commission
examined the file and adopted the investigator’s recommendation and informed
her that the Commission would not deal with her complaint.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[23]
The
Commission can refuse to deal with a complaint where it is filed more than one
year after the last incident of alleged discrimination, unless the Commission exercises
its discretion to allow for a longer filing period.
41.
(1) Subject to section 40, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed
with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that
(a)
the alleged victim of the discriminatory practice to which the complaint
relates ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably
available;
(b)
the complaint is one that could more appropriately be dealt with, initially
or completely, according to a procedure provided for under an Act of
Parliament other than this Act;
(c)
the complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission;
(d)
the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or
(e)
the complaint is based on acts or omissions the last of which occurred more
than one year, or such longer period of time as the Commission considers
appropriate in the circumstances, before receipt of the complaint.
|
41.
(1) Sous réserve de l’article 40, la Commission statue sur toute plainte dont
elle est saisie à moins qu’elle estime celle-ci irrecevable pour un des
motifs suivants :
a) la
victime présumée de l’acte discriminatoire devrait épuiser d’abord les
recours internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui
sont normalement ouverts;
b) la
plainte pourrait avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à
toutes les étapes, selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale;
c) la
plainte n’est pas de sa compétence;
d) la
plainte est frivole, vexatoire ou entachée de mauvaise foi;
e) la
plainte a été déposée après l’expiration d’un délai d’un an après le dernier
des faits sur lesquels elle est fondée, ou de tout délai supérieur que la
Commission estime indiqué dans les circonstances.
|
[24]
The
Federal Court of Appeal has held that in exercising this preliminary screening
function, the Commission should only dismiss a complaint in plain and obvious
cases, since this determination will summarily end the matter: Canada Post
Corp. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1997] F.C.J. No. 578 (QL),
aff’d [1999] F.C.J. No. 705.
ISSUES
[25]
The
applicant submits the following two issues:
1. What
is the standard of review of the Commission’s exercise of its discretion
pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act?
2. Did
the Commission commit a patently unreasonable error when it decided not to
exercise its discretion to accept her complaint?
THE PROCESS BY WHICH A COMPLAINT IS FILED
WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
[26]
I
believe it is useful to scrutinize section 41 of the Act which sets out the
process through which a complaint proceeds before the Human Rights Commission.
The Commission must first perform a preliminary screening of the complaint by
determining if prima facie, it falls within the exclusionary subsections
of article 41. The Commission does not review the merits if the complaint at
this stage.
[27]
Once
the Commission determines that one of the subsections of section 41(1) applies,
such as the one year time limit, it must then decide if it will exercise its
discretion under section 41(1)(e) to, in the circumstances, grant or refuse a
longer period of time to file the complaint.
[28]
In
Price v. Concord Transportation Inc., 2003 FC 946, [2003] F.C.J. No.
1202, it was stated:
Further, section 41(1)(e) recognizes that a
black-and-white time bar would not be appropriate. The Commission's fact
finding expertise is fairly and appropriately put to work by the added
discretion to extend such time limitation if the Commission considers it
"appropriate in the circumstances".
[29]
In
principle, the Commission must consider if the delay was incurred in good faith
and it must weigh any unfairness or prejudice caused by the delay. It must also
consider the objective of the Act and the effect upon the complainant if the
complaint is dismissed, see Larsh v. Canada (Attorney
General),
[1999] F.C.J. No. 508, at para. 36.
[30]
If
there is no valid reason justifying the delay, the Commission will dismiss
the complaint at the preliminary screening stage.
Price, supra;
Good v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 1276, [2005] F.C.J.
No. 1556;
Davey v. Canada, 2004 FC 1496, [2004] F.C.J.
No. 1840;
Tse v. Federal Express Canada
Ltd., 2005 FC
598, [2005] F.C.J. No. 740.
THE
DISABILITY FACTOR
[31]
Among
the circumstances to be considered by the Commission, is the disability factor.
If this disability has hindered the filing of the complaint motion, the
prescribed delay. The Commission must take it into account to reach a decision,
see Lukian v. Canada National Railway Co. (CNR), [1994] F.C.J. No. 727.
THE DISABILITY FACTOR
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS
[32]
It
seems that there is no case reported relating to a psychological disability in
determining any extension of a time. In principle, I see no logical basis for
not considering such a disability if it is established that it rendered the
complainant unable to file a complaint within the year limit set by law.
[33]
The
question then becomes one of deciding if the facts alleged and substantiated,
establish such an inability. This flows from a simple reading of section 2 of
the Canadian Human Rights Act, where the main purpose of the Act is to provide
equality and non-discrimination for all individuals, including “disabled” ones,
see Besner v. Canada (Correctional Service), 2007 FC 1076, [2007] F.C.J.
No. 1391.
ISSUES
[34]
The
applicant submits the following two issues:
1. What
is the standard of review of the Commission’s exercise of its discretion
pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act?
2. Did
the Commission commit a patently unreasonable error when it decided not to
exercise its discretion to accept her complaint?
ANALYSIS
Standard of
Review
[35]
Both
parties agree that the question of whether or not the Commission properly
exercised its discretion in not allowing the applicant’s out-of-time complaint
to nevertheless proceed is to be considered on the standard of patent
unreasonableness.
[36]
On
this same question in the applicant’s first judicial review application,
Justice Blanchard conducted a complete pragmatic and functional analysis and
concluded that the matter should be reviewed on the patent unreasonableness
standard, see Bredin v. Canada, previously cited. As he noted, this is
in line with previous decisions of this Court, see Cape Breton Development
Corp. v. Hynes, [1999] F.C.J. No. 340 (QL), Price v. Concord
Transport Inc., 2003 FC 946, Johnston v. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp., [2004]
F.C.J. No. 1121 (QL) and Davey v. Canada (2004), 257 F.T.R. 316 and Zavery
v. Canada (Human Resources Development), 2004 FC 929, [2004] F.C.J. No.
1122. Consequently, I will review this question on the patent unreasonableness
standard.
[37]
However,
the applicant also suggests that the Commission failed to provide the parties
with an opportunity to make submissions before the section 41 report was
completed. Properly framed, this is an issue of procedural fairness, and consequently
it should be reviewed as a question of law. That is, either the Commission
complied with the content of the duty of fairness or it has not: Sketchley
v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2005 FCA 404.
Exercise of the
Commission’s discretion
[38]
The
applicant submits that the serious consequences of this decision require the
investigator to seek submissions from the parties on the reasons for the delay
and whether there would be any prejudice to the respondent to extending the one
year time limit. Furthermore, these submissions must be solicited prior to completing
the section 41 report. Instead, the investigator relied on the submissions of
the parties that formed the basis of the original flawed decision.
Consequently, the applicant submits that she was restricted to making reply
submissions which themselves were subject to significant restrictions in length
and content.
[39]
As
a result, the applicant submits that the investigator failed to interview Ms.
Wallis, and to inquire into the nature and extent of their correspondence, the
delays caused by the CIC in responding to her request for reconsideration and
the CIC’s stated concerns about its failure to consider evidence submitted by
the applicant. The applicant also submits that the investigator erred by concluding
that she could have filed a complaint in a timely manner because she assumed
that the applicant’s disability had no impact on her ability to file a
complaint. She argues that there was no evidence to support this conclusion,
particularly troublesome because the investigator never interviewed the
applicant’s doctor, employer or CIC management to test this assumption. In
fact, the applicant’s psychiatrist provided contrary information which
demonstrated that during the delay period the applicant was diagnosed with
major depression and unable to focus and concentrate, complete tasks in a
timely manner, and lost interest in matters.
[40]
The
respondent contends, however, that there was sufficient evidence already before
the Commission, including medical evidence. Furthermore, the applicant chose to
pursue her complaint in an informal manner by communicating with her employer.
There is nothing that negates a complainant’s obligation to contact the
Commission within the one year time frame where he or she seeks to pursue
alternate avenues of redress. Although this Court may not have reached a
similar conclusion, the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission’s
finding and no intervention is warranted.
[41]
In
the applicant’s first judicial review application, Justice Blanchard noted that
there were “[c]omprehnsive submissions” from the applicant in respect of
the Commission’s exercise of discretion under paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act (at
¶ 58). These submissions were made only after the Director of the Investigation
Branch had recommended to the Commission not to deal with the complaint. Given
that the record before Justice Blanchard was incomplete and the investigation
report notably absent, he could not ascertain whether the Commission had ever
considered these submissions and the factors that would allow it to exercise
its discretion.
[42]
According
to the second extensive investigation report, it appears that the
“comprehensive submissions” referred to by Justice Blanchard in the first
judicial review application were reviewed by the second investigator. The
second investigator states in her section 41 report that she considered
submissions made by both parties to the first referral decision that was
subsequently overturned by Justice Blanchard.
[43]
Once
the second investigator completed her report, she invited further submissions
from the parties. Both the applicant’s union, the Public Service Alliance of
Canada and CIC replied to the Commission’s invitation. Craig Spencer, legal
counsel for PSAC presented his submissions for the applicant in the form of a
ten page letter in which he addressed the main issues including the Commissions
treatment of the ground of “disability” and the discretion to extend the time
limit to lodge a complaint to the Commission.
[44]
In
Slattery, the Court considered the degree of thoroughness of
investigation required to satisfy the rules of procedural fairness:
In contexts where parties have the legal
right to make submissions in response to an investigator’s report, such as in
the case at bar, parties may be able to compensate for more minor omissions by
bringing such omissions to the attention of the decision-maker. Therefore, it
should be only where complaints are unable to rectify such omissions that
judicial review would be warranted. Although this is by no means an exhaustive
list, it would seem to me that circumstances where further submissions cannot
compensate for an investigator’s omissions would include: (1) where the
omissions is of such a fundamental nature that merely drawing the decision-maker’s
attention to the omission cannot compensate for it; or (2) where the
fundamental evidence is inaccessible to the decision-maker by virtue of the
protected nature of the information or where the decision-maker explicitly
disregards it.
[45]
In
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Kollar, 2003 FC 985, Justice Kelen
was presented with a motion for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal from proceeding with an inquiry into a complaint
pending a judicial review application. The investigator had relied
solely on information contained in a report completed by another investigator
which had been successfully challenged by judicial review. Although in obiter,
Justice Kelen noted:
I note that it is the Commission's decision,
not the investigator's report, which is the proper subject of the judicial
review application.
The applicant was afforded the opportunity to submit new evidence to the
Commission after the investigator circulated her report. It failed to take
advantage of that opportunity and cannot now claim it as a ground for judicial
review.
[emphasis added]
[46]
The
applicant submits that it was denied the opportunity to make any submissions to
the second investigator prior to the completion of her report. Further, she was
limited to a maximum of ten pages in reply to that report.
[47]
The
second investigation report indicates that it is based on the parties’
submissions submitted to the first investigator, Justice Blanchard’s decision,
and the parties’ responses to the second investigation report.
[48]
The
applicant submits that the second investigator should have also solicited
submissions from the parties and conducted a more thorough investigation prior
to issuing her report. Specifically, the applicant argues that she has been denied
an opportunity to provide evidence as to the reasons for her delay in filing
her complaint, notably evidence of her interaction with Ms. Wallis and senior
management at CIC as well as medical evidence addressing the applicant’s
medical state and ability to file a human rights complaint.
[49]
However,
it is clear from the record that the applicant was able to put forward this
very evidence to the investigator.
[50]
First,
the applicant’s complaint provides a comprehensive review of her communication
with human resource employees and senior management of DOJ and CIC. In fact, a
significant part of the applicant’s complaint form reviews her lengthy
exchanges with Ms. Wallis.
[51]
Insofar
as the applicant suggests that the investigator failed to conduct a complete
investigation by not interviewing Ms. Wallis or her psychiatrist, I note that
an investigator need not interview every witness proposed by the complaint: Slattery at ¶ 68. Furthermore,
it is evident that the applicant presented two medical reports and a letter
from Dr. D.J. Vervaeke outlining the psychiatrist’s diagnosis and her symptoms.
A letter from PSAC in the period involved, confirmed the depressed state of the
applicant. The near totality of the arguments advanced by the applicant here,
were extensively analyzed by Justice Blanchard in the decision of October 4,
2006.
[52]
Therefore,
I am satisfied that the applicant was able to disabuse herself of any concerns
raised by the second investigation report and had an adequate opportunity to
present the Commission with evidence she believed was relevant to its decision.
[53]
The
applicant also suggests that in administering her complaint, the Commission
failed to accommodate her disability. That is, she submits that the Commission
must consider whether the reasons for the delay were incurred in good faith and
whether any prejudice would be suffered by the respondent when deciding whether
to exercise its discretion under paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act. This includes
whether the complainant had a disability and if so, whether that disability may
have contributed to the delay, see Besner, supra. When this is the case,
the Commission may be required to accommodate the complainant by extending the
delay.
[54]
The
applicant submits that in this case, the Commission’s conclusion that there was
no reason to extend the time for filing was inconsistent with the medical
evidence. Instead, the evidence demonstrated that the applicant’s disability
was a significant factor in the delay in filing her complaint. Therefore, the Commission
was required to consider whether it would cause undue hardship to the
respondent to accommodate the applicant by exercising its discretion to extend
the time for filing the complaint. Having already concluded that extending the
time would cause no prejudice to the respondent, the Commission should have
done so.
[55]
No
doubt the Commission, or the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, as the principal
administrators of the Act, would be required to respect the principle of
equality would not or be permitted to discriminate in the execution of their
functions.
[56]
However,
I do not need to decide in what circumstances the Commission would be required
to accommodate a claimant in all cases and to the point of undue hardship
because it is clear that in the circumstances the investigator was reasonably
satisfied that her disability had no impact on her ability to make a complaint.
[57]
The
investigator acknowledged that the applicant had been diagnosed with severe
depression in May 2003 and that she submitted that her disability rendered her
incapable of making a formal human rights complaint. However, Dr. Vervaeke’s letter does
not specifically state that the applicant’s condition was such that she would
be unable to participate in the Commission’s complaint process.
[58]
The
investigator also noted that the applicant continued to pursue the matter of
her employment status informally. She received a letter and had two telephone
conversations during this period of time. Moreover, I would note that the
applicant was diagnosed with severe depression in May 2003; she has
subsequently returned to work in June 2005. She was able to file her complaint
on May 10, 2005 but she did not establish when she was well enough to be able
to file her complaint. In the meantime, she was communicating with her employee
in an informal way.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS IN THIS CASE
[59]
It
seems to me crucial to briefly review all the episodes and facts in this case
to grasp a complete picture.
[60]
The
applicant suffered a major depression illness which caused her to be absent
from work from May 2003 to June 2005. During that time, she communicated with
her employer for other issues, such as part-time work and pension benefits; in
2003, 2004 and 2005.
[61]
She
filed her complaint on May 18th 2005 and on September 4th
2005, she was advised that the time limit was expired and she was invited to
submit her comments or representations. A decision to reject her complaint was
issued by the Commission on November 18th 2005. She then applied for
a judicial review which she successfully obtained in a decision by Justice
Blanchard, on October 4th 2006.
[62]
Justice
Blanchard, with his usual thoroughness analyzed al the components of the case
and granted the review solely because of the insufficiency of its reasons of
the Commission’s decision.
[63]
The
Commission’s decision of November 15th 2005 was based upon the file
but particularly upon the investigator’s report of Jennifer Marakam, November 5th
2006 recommending the dismissal of the complaint due to expiry of the time
limit.
[64]
Following
Justice Blanchard’s decision, after representation of the parties or their
counsels, a new investigator’s report was prepared, wherein the entire file was
reviewed in conjunction with Justice Blanchard’s decision.
[65]
The
applicant’s complaint was thoroughly re-examined with much emphasis upon her
disability and her communication with her employer pursuing an informed form of
redress of her complaint.
[66]
I
also must repeat that the Commission also had the applicant’s counsel’s then
page letter of December 5th 2006 elaborating all the issues and the
arguments favorable to the applicant. The Commission reviewed and analyzed all
of the materials of the file including the representations of the parties and
Justice Blanchard’s decision of October 4th 2006. The Commission had
the two investigators’ reports and the applicant’s reply to the second report. It
is after considering all of this material that the Commission rendered its
decision of February 17th 2007.
[67]
In
my opinion, the applicant received a complete and fair hearing of the issues
raised by her complaint. The Commission was entitled to rely on the
investigator’s report but they did more, in that they considered other material
as related previously.
[68]
In
these circumstances, can one conclude that the Commission’s decision was
patently unreasonable? That is, made on bad faith or capriciously or cannot be
sustained by a reasonable analysis of the facts. It is trite law to repeat that
the role of the court is not re-assess the evidence, or to substitute its
opinion to the one which is the object of the judicial review. Its role is to
decide whether the Commission’s decision is or is not patently unreasonable in
the circumstances. In this case, I cannot reach that conclusion.
[69]
Therefore,
the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THEREFORE, THIS
COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the
application for judicial review is dismissed without costs.
"Orville
Frenette"