Date: 20090727
Docket:
T-457-08
Citation: 2009 FC 758
Ottawa, Ontario, July 27, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan
BETWEEN:
THOMAS BROWN, GLORIA FRY,
TOBY LYNNE
MEADE AND JOY HUBLEY
Applicants
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1]
Mr.
Thomas Brown, Ms. Gloria Fry, Ms. Toby Lynne Meade and Ms. Joy Hubley (the
“Applicants”) seek judicial review of a decision made by Ms. Sonia Gaal,
Vice-Chair of the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated
February 26, 2008. In that decision, the Tribunal dismissed complaints of abuse
of authority that had been filed by the Applicants pursuant to section 77 of the
Public Service Employment Act (the “PSEA” or the “Act”), which is Part 3
of the Public Service Modernization Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, alleging,
among other things, that the Deputy Minister of National Defence abused its
authority in choosing a non-advertised over an advertised process in extending
the acting appointment of Ms. Anne McGuiness.
Background
[2]
The
Applicants work in the Formation Logistics Branch of the Department of National
Defence (“DND”) in Halifax. At the time of their hearing before the
Tribunal, the Applicants each held a position at the PG-02 level.
[3]
In
June 2005, DND held an open competition for a Senior Contracts Officer position
at the PG-04 level. Ms. McGuiness, Ms. Meade and Ms. Fry all applied for the
position. Ms. McGuiness and Ms. Fry were unsuccessful in the knowledge
examination and Ms. Meade withdrew for personal reasons. The position was never
filled.
[4]
Competitions
were also held for a PG-03 position. Ms. Meade and Ms. Fry applied in August
2004 and June 2005, but were unsuccessful.
[5]
Upon
the basis that the PG-04 position had yet to be filled and due to operational
requirements, Ms. Lila Zwicker, the Contracts Coordination Manager of the
branch, announced at a meeting on January 26, 2006 that Ms. McGuiness would be
placed as an acting appointee in that position. At this time, Ms. McGuiness
occupied an AS-04 level position in Internal Audit at DND. Ms. Zwicker has
stated in her testimony before the Tribunal that she chose Ms. McGuiness upon
the basis that Ms. McGuiness had received the highest, although failing, mark
on the knowledge exam.
[6]
Ms.
Zwicker and Ms. McGuiness’ then supervisor could not determine when Ms.
McGuiness could begin in the new position. Accordingly, Ms. Zwicker announced
at the January meeting that Ms. McGuiness would instead be deployed into a
PG-03 Senior Contracts Officer position on February 13, 2006 and then on the
same day, was to commence acting in the PG-04 Senior Contracts Officer
position. This is what happened and Ms. McGuiness did not actually serve in the
PG-03 position.
[7]
Ms.
McGuiness’ acting appointment was for less than four months and was due to
expire on May 31, 2006. During this period, arrangements were made to complete
the appointment process to fill that position. The new staffing process was commenced
on March 31, 2006.
[8]
Ms.
Fry’s supervisor, Ms. Christine Lynds, was a PG-03 Senior Contracts Officer.
She also applied for the PG-04 position. She had applied for this position in
June 2005 but withdrew her application three months later. When she learned
that Ms. McGuiness would be receiving the initial acting appointment, she again
requested the position but was refused. In April 2006, Ms. Lynds was offered
the acting appointment at the PG-04 level. She was told that she would have to
first take an introductory contracts course and receive some on the job
training. However, at the end of May 2006, Ms. Lynds informed Ms. Zwicker that
she was no longer interested in the position.
[9]
Following
this, Ms. Zwicker extended Ms. McGuiness’ acting position for another four
months through a non-advertised process.
[10]
In
July 2006, Ms. Zwicker met with Ms. Fry, who had expressed an interest in the
PG-04 acting position. Ms. Zwicker informed Ms. Fry that only those candidates
ranked at the PG-03 level would be considered for the acting position.
[11]
On
August 16, 2006, the Applicants filed their complaints alleging that Ms.
Zwicker had abused her authority. They argued that Ms. Zwicker had failed to
give reasonable consideration to the appointment of qualified PG-02 candidates
on an acting basis, in the interim period prior to the conclusion of the second
staffing process that commenced in March 2006.
[12]
In
its decision, the Tribunal identified three issues as follows:
a. Did the
Respondent abuse its authority when it deployed Ms. McGuiness to the PG-03
position and then placed her in an acting appointment of less than four months
as a PG-04;
b. Did the
Respondent abuse its authority in selecting Ms. McGuiness for the acting
appointment as a PG-04 when it extended her appointment for more than four
months;
c. Did the
Respondent abuse its authority when it chose a non-advertised process for the
acting appointment of June 1, 2006.
[13]
Upon
the first issue, the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
consider the deployment or initial acting appointment. With regards to the
question of deployment, the Tribunal noted that Czarnecki v. Deputy Head of
Service Canada et al., 2007 PSST 001 had previously found that in order to
succeed on a claim made under section 77 of the Act, there must have been an
appointment or proposed appointment. However, pursuant to subsection 53(1), a
deployment is not the same thing as an appointment and so the Tribunal
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a complaint under section 77 upon
the basis of a deployment.
[14]
The
Tribunal likewise determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
initial acting appointment since pursuant to subsection 14(1) of the Public
Service Employment Regulations, S.O.R./2005-334 (the “Regulations”), an acting
appointment of less than four months may not be challenged by way of a
complaint alleging abuse of authority under section 77.
[15]
With
respect to the second issue, the Tribunal found that there was no abuse of
authority shown in the appointment of Ms. McGuiness in the acting position once
it exceeded four months.
[16]
Finally,
with respect to the third issue, the Tribunal found that despite the fact that Ms. McGuiness did not
qualify for the position, Ms. Zwicker had acted appropriately in selecting her,
given the branch’s past practice of offering an acting assignment to
individuals one level below the level of the new position, given Ms. McGuiness’
past experience and in light of the fact that Ms. McGuiness had ranked first
amongst those candidates vying for the position.
Issues
[17]
The
following issues arise in this application:
a. What is the
appropriate standard of review;
b. Did the
Tribunal err in excluding relevant evidence, by assessing the issue of abuse of
authority on the basis of isolated events rather than from a global
perspective;
c. Did the
Tribunal err in rejecting evidence concerning the treatment of Ms. Lynds in
comparison with Ms. McGuiness.
Discussion and
Disposition
[18]
Both
the Applicants and the Respondents argued that the standard of review is to be
identified upon a pragmatic and functional analysis, having regard to four
factors; that is the presence of a privative clause, the expertise of the
decision-maker, the purpose of the legislation and the nature of the issue.
[19]
The
pragmatic and functional analysis is to be approached in the context of the
decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
[20]
The
Act contains a privative clause in section 102 which provides as follows:
Decisions final
102. (1) Every
decision of the Tribunal is final and may not be questioned or reviewed in
any court.
No review by certiorari, etc.
(2) No order may be made, process
entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to question, review,
prohibit or restrain the Tribunal in relation to a complaint.
|
Caractère définitif
de la décision
102. (1) La
décision du Tribunal est définitive et n’est pas susceptible d’examen ou de
révision devant un autre tribunal.
Interdiction de
recours extraordinaires
(2) Il n’est admis aucun recours ni
aucune décision judiciaire — notamment par voie d’injonction, de certiorari,
de prohibition ou de quo warranto — visant à contester, réviser, empêcher ou
limiter l’action du Tribunal en ce qui touche une plainte.
|
[21]
The
Tribunal is a specialized body that exists for the purpose of adjudicating
complaints made under section 77 in accordance with its statutory mandate as
set out in subsection 88(2).
[22]
The
broad purpose of the Act is to govern employment in the federal public service.
The purpose of section 77 is to allow for complaints, on specified grounds,
about the internal appointment process to employment in the public service.
[23]
The
nature of the question, that is whether an abuse of authority occurred, is
essentially a factual question that requires a weighing of the evidence
presented.
[24]
In Dunsmuir,
the Supreme Court of Canada said that decisions of administrative
decision-makers are to be reviewed upon either the standard of correctness or
of reasonableness. Questions of fact will generally attract review on the
standard of reasonableness, in other words, on a standard of deference.
[25]
I am
satisfied that upon balancing the four elements of the pragmatic and functional
analysis here, the appropriate standard is reasonableness.
[26]
The
Applicants argue that in its treatment of their arguments about the deployment
of Ms. McGuiness to the PG-03 position, the Tribunal mischaracterized the
issue. The Applicants say that they were not alleging that the deployment per
se constituted an abuse of authority under section 77 and acknowledge that
neither a deployment nor an acting appointment of less than four months can be
the basis for a complaint alleging abuse of authority, having regard to the Act
and the Regulations.
[27]
Rather,
they argue that the conduct of DND in respect of the deployment and initial
acting appointment of Ms. McGuiness provide a context within which to evaluate
whether the extension of her acting appointment constituted an abuse of
authority. In this regard, the Applicants rely on the Treasury Board’s
Deployment Policy to show that even before the extension of Ms. McGuiness’
acting appointment, the Respondents were prepared to disregard that policy in
order to ensure that Ms. McGuiness would occupy the PG-04 position. A copy of
the policy is attached as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Alan Phillips, filed
as part of the Applicants’ Application Record.
[28]
The
Respondents submit that the threshold to find abuse of authority in the choice
of the hiring process and in the establishment and assessment of essential
qualifications is high. The hiring processes should not be the object of a
complaint about abuse of authority, in the absence of evidence that the
decisions in question were made in bad faith, were based upon personal
favouritism or were otherwise affected by similar considerations. The
Respondents submit that the Deputy Head’s decision did not rise to this level
and the Tribunal has not committed a reviewable error in its decision.
[29]
The
Respondents argue that the Tribunal did not exclude relevant evidence and did
not ignore the totality of the evidence, in its consideration of the deployment
of Ms. McGuiness to the PG-03 position. They note that the Tribunal detailed
the events that had taken place, beginning with the deployment of Ms. McGuiness
to the PG-03 position and her acting appointment to act in the PG-04 position
on the same day. They point out that the Tribunal found that DND had been
candid about its reasons for the deployment of Ms. McGuiness and that Ms.
Zwicker had valid and legitimate reasons for offering the acting appointment to
only two PG-03 level candidates, that is to Ms. McGuiness and Ms. Lynds.
[30]
Relying
on the decision in Laidlaw et al. v. Canada (Attorney General et
al.)
(1999), 166 F.T.R. 217, the Applicants argue that it is an abuse of authority
to deploy an employee for the sole purpose of assigning that person to a
different position than that to which he or she had been deployed. In this
case, they submit that the deployment of Ms. McGuiness to the PG-03 position,
immediately followed by her acting appointment to the PG-04 position, was an
abuse of authority since Ms. McGuiness never worked in the PG-03 position and
arguably, was deployed to the PG-03 position simply as a means to facilitate
her acting appointment to the PG-04 position.
[31]
The
Respondents submit that the decision in Laidlaw can be distinguished
since it was made pursuant to the former Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-33 and
the former Public Service Employment Regulations, 2000 S.O.R./2000-80 both
of which have been repealed. In light of the current Act’s departure from the
former legislative scheme and its different approach to the merit principle,
the Respondents submit that Laidlaw is of limited relevance.
[32]
The
Applicants made their complaints pursuant to paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act
which provides as follows:
Grounds of complaint
77. (1) When
the Commission has made or proposed an appointment in an internal appointment
process, a person in the area of recourse referred to in subsection (2) may —
in the manner and within the period provided by the Tribunal’s regulations —
make a complaint to the Tribunal that he or she was not appointed or proposed
for appointment by reason of
…
b) an abuse of authority by the
Commission in choosing between an advertised and a non-advertised internal
appointment process; or
…
|
Motifs des plaintes
77. (1)
Lorsque la Commission a fait une proposition de nomination ou une nomination
dans le cadre d’un processus de nomination interne, la personne qui est dans
la zone de recours visée au paragraphe (2) peut, selon les modalités et dans
le délai fixés par règlement du Tribunal, présenter à celui-ci une plainte
selon laquelle elle n’a pas été nommée ou fait l’objet d’une proposition de
nomination pour l’une ou l’autre des raisons suivantes :
…
b) abus de pouvoir de la part de la
Commission du fait qu’elle a choisi un processus de nomination interne
annoncé ou non annoncé, selon le cas;
…
|
[33]
Paragraph
77(1)(b) does not refer to any other provision of the Act and “abuse of
authority” is not defined in the Act. It is, however referred to in subsection
2(4) as follows:
References to
abuse of authority
(4) For
greater certainty, a reference in this Act to abuse of authority shall be
construed as including bad faith and personal favouritism.
|
Abus
de pouvoir
(4)
Il est entendu que, pour l’application de la présente loi, on entend
notamment par « abus de pouvoir » la mauvaise foi et le favoritisme
personnel.
|
[34]
The
subject is discussed by David Phillip Jones & Ann S. de Villars in Principles
of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2004). The learned authors
discuss abuse of authority at p. 154 as follows:
Nevertheless,
unlimited discretion cannot exist. The courts have continuously asserted their
right to review a delegate’s exercise of discretion for a wide range of abuses.
It is possible to identify at least five generic types of abuses, which can be
described as follows. The first category occurs when a delegate exercises his
discretion with an improper intention in mind, which subsumes acting for an
unauthorized purpose, in bad faith, or on irrelevant considerations. The second
type of abuse arises when the delegate acts on inadequate material, including
where there is no evidence or without considering relevant matters. Thirdly,
the courts sometimes hold that an abuse of discretion has been committed where
there is an improper result, including unreasonable, discriminatory or
retroactive administrative actions. A fourth type of abuse arises when the
delegate exercises his discretion on an erroneous view of the law. Finally, it
is an abuse for a delegate to refuse to exercise his discretion by adopting a
policy which fetters his ability to consider individual cases with an open
mind.
[35]
I
agree with the submissions of the Applicants that the Tribunal erred by failing
to look at the totality of the evidence regarding the employment of Ms.
McGuiness in the PG-04 position, even on an acting basis.
[36]
The
Book of Documents that was prepared on behalf of the Applicants in support of
their complaint contains materials about the circumstances relating to the
PG-04 position, that is the position of Senior Contracts Officer, classified as
PG-04. The selection process number for this position was 05-CC-DND-HALFX-033098.
According to the Notice of Open Competition, the closing date for this
competition was June 30, 2004.
[37]
Process
notes, prepared by Mr. Anton Topilnyckyj, HRO, dated October 21, 2005, record
that the process was deemed unsuccessful because there had been no successful
candidates found.
[38]
Notes
taken in respect of a CCD Section Heads meeting on November 2, 2005 indicate
that general human resources issues were discussed and under that heading, the
following appears:
PG
2, 3, 4 -No successful candidates in PG competitions
-PG
Development programme will be used to staff the vacant PG2 positions.
Candidates will be hired at the PG1 level and undergo a 12 to 14 month training
program.
-Other
staffing avenues to be explored for PG3/4
[39]
Curiously,
there are two versions of notes taken at the CCD Section Heads meeting of
November 2, 2005. The second set of notes, contained the following entry:
PG
2, 3, 4 -No competition for PG2 position anymore
-Instead
PG Development programme will used (trainees will be at PG1 level during
training)
-There
will be another run of exams for the PG3 and PG4 positions [sic]
[40]
There
are notes of another meeting of the CCD Section Heads, which are dated
January 25, 2006. Under the heading “General HR Issues”, it is observed that
Ms. McGuiness would arrive on February 13.
[41]
Notes
of a CCD Section Heads meeting dated February 8, 2006, include the following
under the heading “General HR Issues”:
General HR Issues:
…
Anne McGuiness -Anne will here
on 13 Feb in the PG03 position.
-Will
be on assignment in the PG04 position.
[42]
As
well, there is a handwritten page of notes also dated February 8, 2006,
referring to another Section Heads meeting. Included under “HR issues” is the
following:
Anne-deployment
accepted PG03 vacant – flipping into PG04 –(?) After three years of arm
twisting.
[Emphasis added]
This
statement is attributed to Ms. Lila Zwicker.
[43]
The
Applicants’ Book of Documents also includes a document entitled “FLOG Staffing
Action/Casual Pay Request”, dated January 30, 2006. This records the deployment
of Anne McGuiness, as a PG-03, to position number 144139, that is Senior
Contracts Officer.
[44]
The
reverse of that document, with the same title, records the appointment of Ms.
Anne McGuiness to acting position 144134, at level PG-04. The document provides
the following rationale for her appointment to the acting position:
Although
there were no successful candidates, this employee placed first on a PG-4
competition that was run in order to staff this position on a permanent basis.
[45]
This
document indicates that the term for the acting position is until June 26,
2006.
[46]
The
Book of Documents also includes a form, entitled Recommendation and Approval of
Acting Situation, approving the appointment of Ms. McGuiness from position
144139, level PG-03, to position 144134 at group level PG-04, effective for the
period February 13, 2006 to May 31, 2006. This document is dated February 29,
2006.
[47]
By
letter dated March 29, 2006, Ms. McGuiness was formally offered a deployment to
position number 144139, level PG-03, effective February 13, 2006. She accepted
the offer by signing the letter on April 13, 2006.
[48]
There
is another form entitled “Recommendation and Approval of Acting Situation”,
dated June 23, 2006. This is an extension of Ms. McGuiness’ acting position,
but the reference here is to position 304047 at group level PG-04. The acting
period is from June 1, 2006 to September 30, 2006. The document is signed by
Ms. Zwicker and dated June 23, 2006. Ms. McGuiness signed her acceptance of
this acting position on June 28, 2006.
[49]
The
materials also include another FLOG Staffing Action/Casual Pay Request form,
referring to the extension of Ms. McGuiness’ acting status with reference to
position number 304047, with a start date of February 13, 2006 and with an end
date of September 30, 2006. The position is referenced as PG-04.
[50]
There
is another document which provides the rationale for the extension of the
acting position beyond four months. According to this document, the extension
was required from June 1 to September 30, 2006 “since staffing action was
delayed beyond [the] original four-month acting appointment.” As well, this
form records that a competition was underway and would be finalized in
September, 2006, but that in the meantime, the position had to be filled.
[51]
The
materials also include a form entitled “Information Regarding Acting
Appointment” with reference to the appointment of Ms. Anne McGuiness as Senior
Contracts Officer, classification PG-04. The date of notification was August
15, 2006 and the closing period for filing complaints was noted as August 20,
2006. Before the Tribunal, Ms. Zwicker explained that there had been a
previous version of this document but that it was lost. As a result, the
second version contained within the record was created on June 23 and signed by
Mr. Topilnyckyj on August 15.
[52]
The
posting of the original version of this notice led to the filing of the
complaints by the Applicants. In an email dated July 26, 2006, Ms. Gloria Fry,
one of the Applicants, indicates that the “initial acting position and
subsequent extension was staffed through a non-advertised process with no
posting on the Public Service Staffing Advertisements and Notifications…”.
[53]
It
is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to make a finding as to the
occurrence of any abuse of authority, in the manner in which the Tribunal dealt
with the Applicants’ complaint. It is noteworthy, however, that a failure to
consider all relevant evidence may constitute an abuse of authority, according
to the factors discussed by Jones and de Villars referred to above. The
question before me is whether the Tribunal’s decision meets the standard of
reasonableness. In my opinion, it does not.
[54]
In
my view, the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence before it, from a global
perspective. It improperly focused on isolated events, rather than looking at
the overall picture as to what transpired from the time that Ms. McGuiness was
placed in an acting position as a PG-04, immediately after her deployment in
the PG-03 position. Without status as a PG-03, it appears that Ms. McGuiness
would not have been eligible for the PG-04 position. The core of the
Applicants’ complaint does not relate to the deployment of Ms. McGuiness, but
rather to what happened subsequently.
[55]
In
the result, this application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of
the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to a differently
constituted panel for determination in accordance with these Reasons. The
Applicants shall have their costs to be taxed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the
application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the Tribunal is set
aside and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel for
determination. The Applicants shall have their costs to be taxed.
“E.
Heneghan”