Date:
20090520
Docket: IMM-4493-08
Citation: 2009 FC 503
Ottawa, Ontario, this 20th
day of May 2009
Before: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
BETWEEN:
Seyed
Amin HOSEYNI BOB ANARI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “Act”), of the decision
of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA”) officer, dated September 4, 2008.
[2]
The
applicant, Seyed Amin Hoseyni Bob Anari, is a citizen of Iran who fears
returning to his country of origin because of his former membership in the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“Revolutionary Guard” or Sepah-e or
Pasdaran). He alleges that upon return to Iran, he will be
immediately arrested, interrogated, tortured and possibly executed.
[3]
In
a decision dated June 27, 2007, the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Refugee
Protection Division (“RPD”) rejected the applicant’s claim on the basis of
section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, finding that as a member of
the Revolutionary Guard he was complicit in crimes against humanity and thus
ineligible for refugee protection under section 98 of the Act. The applicant
applied for leave and judicial review of the RPD’s decision, but his
application was denied on December 17, 2007.
[4]
The
applicant attended a hearing with the PRRA officer on August 26, 2008. He was
informed on October 9, 2008 that his PRRA application had been refused. The
PRRA officer concluded that, while it was possible the applicant would face
mistreatment upon return to Iran, he was not likely to face a risk of
torture, risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment. It is this decision that
is the subject of the present review.
[5]
The
applicant alleges that
the PRRA officer made several errors, all of which relate to findings of fact.
They should not, therefore, be disturbed unless they are unreasonable, in
respect of the facts and the law (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, at
paragraph 46; Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraph 74; Kandiah v. Solicitor General, 2005 FC 1057, at paragraph 6).
[6]
First, the applicant submits that the PRRA
officer erred in her assessment of his credibility by relying on unsupported
plausibility findings.
[7]
A decision-maker’s conclusions regarding
credibility are generally accorded a high level of deference. This is so even
where the question is one of plausibility, although “in the area
of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and
so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the
record”
(Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.), (1993), 160 N.R. 315
(F.C.A.), at paragraphs 2 to 4).
[8]
In
this case, the PRRA officer based her negative credibility assessment on a
contradiction she identified in the applicant’s testimony, and on two separate
plausibility findings, as well as on the absence of corroborating evidence.
[9]
Upon
reviewing the evidence, it appears that the PRRA officer’s credibility findings
are not without flaws. However, given the high degree of deference afforded to
decision-makers on matters of credibility and the dearth of evidence
corroborating the applicant’s statements, I am not satisfied that this aspect
of the decision, when viewed as a whole, is unreasonable.
[10]
Second,
the applicant contends that the PRRA officer erred in failing to decide whether
he would be viewed as a political dissident due to his desertion from the
Revolutionary Guard Corps. For the following reasons, I find that there was no
error on the part of the PRRA officer in this regard.
[11]
Indeed,
the reasons disclose detailed consideration of the documentary evidence as to
what ramifications the applicant might face upon his return to Iran and how he
is likely to be perceived by the Iranian authorities. After canvassing the
documentary evidence, the officer writes, at page 12 of the decision:
I note that the evidence does not support
that the applicant is suspected by the security services of being involved in
serious crimes or high level anti-regime political activity. I also note that
there is little evidence that the Iranian authorities are aware that the
applicant made a refugee claim in Belgium
and/or that he made a refugee claim in Canada. I also find that, even if the Iranian
authorities were to somehow find out that the applicant applied for protection
abroad, the preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that they
would link this to reasons other then [sic] socio-economic. . . .
[12]
The
PRRA officer goes on to note that the applicant was not a high-ranking member
of the Revolutionary Guard, but rather a “part-time member” while studying at
the University. I am satisfied that she duly considered the question of whether
the applicant would be perceived as a political dissident.
[13]
Moreover,
the news articles included in the Application Record do not appear to have been
before the PRRA officer. At the hearing before me, counsel acknowledged that
the articles were not before the PRRA officer. The latter was not, therefore,
in a position to evaluate their impact on the Iranian authorities’ view of the
applicant and cannot, then, be said to have erred in failing to take them into
consideration in her decision.
[14]
Third,
the applicant argues that the PRRA officer’s finding that he would not be
tortured or subject to cruel and unusual punishment as a political criminal in Iran is
unreasonable. To the extent that the PRRA officer dealt with the manner in
which the applicant is likely to be viewed (and, consequently, treated) as a
political dissident in Iran, she dealt with the possibility that he
would face torture or cruel and unusual punishment on this basis. I find no
error in this portion of her analysis.
[15]
Finally,
relying on Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] 3 F.C. 540, the
applicant argues that the PRRA officer erred by failing to consider whether
being compelled to “re-join” the Revolutionary Guard, which has been accused of
committing crimes against humanity, would in itself constitute cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment. I do not agree. The case at bar must be
distinguished from Zolfagharkhani, supra, which dealt with a
refugee application made by a conscientious objector. Here, the applicant is
not a conscientious objector and prior to his hearing with the PRRA officer,
had been found, as a member of the Revolutionary Guard, to be complicit in
crimes against humanity and thus ineligible for refugee protection under
section 98 of the Act.
[16]
For
all the above reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
The application for judicial
review of the decision of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment officer, dated
September 4, 2008, is dismissed.
“Yvon
Pinard”
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