Date: 20090304
Docket: T-627-08
Citation: 2009 FC 217
Ottawa, Ontario, this 4th day of March
2009
Present: The Honourable Orville
Frenette
BETWEEN:
MATHIORO
DIENG
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an appeal pursuant to subsection 14(5) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-29, (the “Act”) from the decision of Citizenship Judge George
Springate who, on February 27, 2008, dismissed the applicant’s citizenship
application on the ground that he did not meet the residence requirements
contained in paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act.
Background
[2]
The
applicant is a citizen of Senegal who came to Canada on August 8, 2002. Prior to
this date he was employed in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
[3]
As
some of the facts
are disputed, I believe it is necessary to review them in some detail.
[4]
The
applicant applied for Canadian citizenship on September 8, 2005 and it became
necessary to establish the material time of his residence in Canada from August
8, 2002 to September 8, 2005 in order for him to qualify under the physical
test chosen by the Citizenship Judge under subparagraphs 5(1)(c)(i) and
(ii) of the Act.
[5]
After
the application for citizenship was filed, the applicant left Canada “to pursue employment
opportunities” in the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom.
[6]
On
April 17, 2006, after flying from London, U.K. to Chicago, U.S.A., he was
questioned by U.S. Immigration Officers at O’Hare Airport whose observations
were contained in the Field Operations Support System (“FOSS”).
[7]
Entries
in the FOSS notes reveal that the applicant was in possession of U.S. tax forms
(W‑2), indicating he had worked in the U.S.A. in 2000,
2004 and 2005 for TEKsystems, Inc., and EMC Corporation.
[8]
An
entry also shows that the applicant did not deny he had been employed and
stayed illegally in the U.S.A. He had been spending
more time in the U.S.A. than in Canada. On August 15,
2006, the applicant was questioned at Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau Airport in
Montréal by an Immigration Officer and the latter noted in his FOSS notes that the
applicant did not deny his above declaration to the U.S. Officer.
[9]
The
applicant denies that between August 8, 2002 and September 8, 2005, a time
period of 1126 material days, he was out of the country on 15 occasions, for a
total of 57 days (or 53 days depending on the version accepted) i.e. either
1059 or1073 days of physical presence in Canada out of 1095 days, i.e.
short of the time required by law to qualify.
[10]
Furthermore,
the Citizenship Judge did not believe the applicant’s version, on a balance of
probabilities, because he noted the obvious contradictions and inconsistencies,
contrary to the circumstances and the FOSS notes, in his testimony and his
cross-examination on his affidavit.
[11]
The
applicant and his extended cousin, Mostoupha Mbengue, claimed, in regards to
the tax forms and U.S.A. employment records for 2004 and 2005, from two
American companies, that Mr. Mbengue used the applicant’s name and
documents fraudulently in order to work in the U.S.A. during the material time
of residence considered by the Citizenship Judge.
[12]
The
applicant declared having filed U.S. tax declarations in
order to obtain the benefits generated by Mr. Mbengue’s labour performed
under the applicant’s name.
[13]
He
also declared that his statements made to U.S. Officers at
O’Hare Airport, on April 17, 2006 were not true and did so for Mr. Mbengue’s
advantage.
[14]
The
latter does not, in his affidavit, indicate his current address or in what city
the deposition was made.
The decision under
review
[15]
By
letter dated February 7, 2008 the applicant was informed that his application
for Canadian citizenship was refused essentially because his physical presence
or residence in Canada did not meet the legal requirement of 1095 days during
the relevant time period, and because of the contradictions and the
deficiencies found in the file, such as lack of receipts, bills or documents.
[16]
The
Citizenship Judge found the most damaging aspect of the evidence as to
credibility was the possession of 2004-2005 U.S. tax forms and of wages
received from U.S.A. companies, TEKsystems and EMC Corporation, when questioned
at O’Hare Airport, on April 17, 2006. The FOSS notes of both the U.S. and Canadian
Immigration Officers corroborate this declaration.
The relevant legislation
[17]
Paragraph
5(1)(c) of the Act reads as follows:
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5.
(1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who
[. . .]
(c) is
a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, and has, within the four years immediately
preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at least three
years of residence in Canada calculated in the following manner:
(i)
for every day during which the person was resident in Canada before his
lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed
to have accumulated one-half of a day of residence, and
(ii)
for every day during which the person was resident in Canada after his lawful
admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to
have accumulated one day of residence;
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5. (1) Le ministre attribue la
citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois :
[.
. .]
c) est un résident permanent
au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection
des réfugiés et a, dans les quatre ans qui ont précédé la date de sa
demande, résidé au Canada pendant au moins trois ans en tout, la durée de sa
résidence étant calculée de la manière suivante :
(i)
un demi-jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada avant son admission à
titre de résident permanent;
(ii)
un jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada après son admission à titre
de résident permanent;
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Analysis
The
standard of review
[18]
With
respect to the analysis of the residence requirements of the Act, the Court’s
jurisprudence reveals that the appropriate standard of review is that of
reasonableness simpliciter (Chen v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1693, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2069
(QL); Paez v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 204, paragraph
11). Questions of law or procedural fairness are subject to a standard of
review of correctness (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190).
Preliminary
question – Objection to some evidence
[19]
The
applicant’s counsel submitted that the Citizenship Judge violated the Canada
Evidence Act and the rules of evidence in admitting hearsay evidence
resulting from the FOSS notes made by U.S.A. and Canadian
Immigration Officers. The respondent answers that the Canada Evidence
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, subsections 30(1), 30(12) and 31(2), permits such
evidence:
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30. (1)
Where oral evidence in respect of a matter would be
admissible in a legal proceeding, a record made in the usual and ordinary
course of business that contains information in respect of that matter is
admissible in evidence under this section in the legal proceeding on
production of the record.
|
30. (1) Lorsqu’une preuve orale concernant une chose serait
admissible dans une procédure judiciaire, une pièce établie dans le cours
ordinaire des affaires et qui contient des renseignements sur cette chose
est, en vertu du présent article, admissible en preuve dans la procédure
judiciaire sur production de la pièce.
|
|
[.
. .]
(12)
In this section, "business"
« affaires »
"business" means any business, profession, trade, calling,
manufacture or undertaking of any kind carried on in Canada or elsewhere
whether for profit or otherwise, including any activity or operation carried
on or performed in Canada or elsewhere by any government, by any department,
branch, board, commission or agency of any government, by any court or other
tribunal or by any other body or authority performing a function of
government;
"copy" and "photographic
film"
« copie » et
« pellicule photographique »
"copy" , in relation to any record, includes a print, whether
enlarged or not, from a photographic film of the record, and
"photographic film" includes a photographic plate,
microphotographic film or photostatic negative;
"court"
« tribunal »
"court" means the court, judge, arbitrator or person before
whom a legal proceeding is held or taken;
"legal proceeding"
« procédure judiciaire »
"legal proceeding" means any civil or criminal proceeding or
inquiry in which evidence is or may be given, and includes an arbitration;
"record"
« pièce »
"record" includes the whole or any part of any book, document,
paper, card, tape or other thing on or in which information is written,
recorded, stored or reproduced, and, except for the purposes of subsections
(3) and (4), any copy or transcript admitted in evidence under this section
pursuant to subsection (3) or (4).
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[.
. .]
(12)
Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent
article. « affaires »
"business"
« affaires » Tout commerce ou métier ou toute affaire,
profession, industrie ou entreprise de quelque nature que ce soit exploités
ou exercés au Canada ou à l’étranger, soit en vue d’un profit, soit à
d’autres fins, y compris toute activité exercée ou opération effectuée, au
Canada ou à l’étranger, par un gouvernement, par un ministère, une direction,
un conseil, une commission ou un organisme d’un gouvernement, par un tribunal
ou par un autre organisme ou une autre autorité exerçant une fonction
gouvernementale.
« copie » et « pellicule photographique »
"copy" and
"photographic film"
« copie » Relativement à une pièce, est assimilée à une
copie une épreuve, agrandie ou non, tirée d’une pellicule photographique
représentant cette pièce, et « pellicule photographique » s’entend notamment
d’une plaque photographique, d’une pellicule microphotographique et d’un
cliché au photostat.
« pièce »
"record"
« pièce » Sont assimilés à une pièce l’ensemble ou tout
fragment d’un livre, d’un document, d’un écrit, d’une fiche, d’une carte,
d’un ruban ou d’une autre chose sur ou dans lesquels des renseignements sont
écrits, enregistrés, conservés ou reproduits, et, sauf pour l’application des
paragraphes (3) et (4), toute copie ou transcription admise en preuve en
vertu du présent article en conformité avec le paragraphe (3) ou (4).
« procédure judiciaire »
"legal proceeding"
« procédure judiciaire » Toute procédure ou enquête, en
matière civile ou pénale, dans laquelle une preuve est ou peut être faite, y
compris l’arbitrage.
« tribunal »
"court"
«tribunal » Le tribunal, le juge, l’arbitre
ou la personne devant qui une procédure judiciaire est exercée ou intentée.
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31.
(2) A print, whether enlarged or not, from any photographic
film of
(a)
an entry in any book or record kept by any government or corporation and
destroyed, lost or delivered to a customer after the film was taken,
(b)
any bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque, receipt, instrument or
document held by any government or corporation and destroyed, lost or
delivered to a customer after the film was taken, or
(c)
any record, document, plan, book or paper belonging to or deposited with any
government or corporation,
is admissible in evidence in all cases in which and for
all purposes for which the object photographed would have been admitted on
proof that
(d)
while the book, record, bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque, receipt,
instrument or document, plan, book or paper was in the custody or control of
the government or corporation, the photographic film was taken thereof in
order to keep a permanent record thereof, and
(e)
the object photographed was subsequently destroyed by or in the presence of
one or more of the employees of the government or corporation, or was lost or
was delivered to a customer.
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31. (2) Une épreuve, agrandie ou non, tirée d’une pellicule photographique :
a) d’une inscription dans un livre ou registre
tenu par un gouvernement ou une personne morale et détruite, perdue ou remise
à un client après la prise de la pellicule;
b) d’une lettre de change, d’un billet à
ordre, d’un chèque, d’un récépissé, d’un instrument ou document détenu par un
gouvernement ou une personne morale et détruit, perdu ou remis à un client
après la prise de la pellicule;
c) d’un dossier, document, plan, livre ou
papier appartenant ou confié à un gouvernement ou une personne morale,
est admissible en preuve dans tous les cas et pour toutes les fins où l’objet
photographié aurait été admis s’il est établi que :
d) d’une part, lorsque ce livre, registre,
lettre de change, billet à ordre, chèque, récépissé, instrument ou document,
dossier, plan, livre ou papier était sous la garde ou l’autorité du
gouvernement ou de la personne morale, la pellicule photographique en a été
prise afin d’en garder une preuve permanente;
e) d’autre part, l’objet
photographié a été subséquemment détruit par un ou plusieurs employés du
gouvernement ou de la personne morale, ou en leur présence, ou a été perdu ou
remis à un client.
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[20]
Furthermore
this objection is not well founded because the transcript was submitted by the respondent
in the context of his cross-examination of the applicant on his affidavit in
support of his application and which could have shown he had perjured himself.
[21]
Also
as Justice François Lemieux pointed out in Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration v. Toth, 2006 FC 1221, at paragraph 30, “[j]ustice requires
that a document showing the falsity of a refugee claimant's testimony to the
panel be admissible on judicial review, as this is a ground for vacation of
refugee protection under section 109 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act.”
[22]
FOSS
notes are admissible as information appearing in a file which the judge can take
cognizance of: Ally v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC
445, at paragraph 20, where Justice James Russell wrote: “The Officer was
entitled to rely upon information that appeared in the file even though it was
information provided by the Applicant to another officer.”
[23]
The
Citizenship Judge was entitled to consider this type of evidence.
Analysis of the decision
[24]
First,
the applicant submits that the Citizenship Judge did not provide adequate
reasons in his decision or ignored or misapprehended evidence and the time the
applicant physically spent in Canada in the four years preceding his
application for citizenship.
[25]
A
reading of the letter of the decision together with the Judge’s notes,
contained at pages 14 and following of the Certified Record, gives further
details as to why the purported evidence submitted by the applicant did not
satisfy him. It is well accepted that Judge’s notes form an integral part of
his reasons (see, for example, Paez v. Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2008 FC 204, at paragraph 10). In visa cases, see: da Silva
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2007 FC 1138, at paragraphs 18
and 19; Wang v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2006 FC
1298, at paragraphs 22 to 26.
[26]
The
applicant submits that the Citizenship Judge did not ask him to provide further
documents required and that the U.S. Immigration Officers’ notes, that the
applicant is in possession of evidence he worked in the U.S. in 2000, 2004 and
2005, were erroneous.
[27]
In
my view, his explanations and his allegations of fraudulent use of his
personally named documents by his extended cousin are so incredible in the
circumstances that a judge could not possibly believe that they were true.
[28]
Therefore,
I must conclude that the Citizenship Judge gave valid reasons to support his
decision and a contrary one would have been illogical and contrary to the
facts.
[29]
Secondly,
the applicant alleges the Citizenship Judge did not advise him of his concerns
before rendering his decision. This is inexact since the Citizenship Judge
asked for further evidence of his residence and documents or receipts to
support his residence claim. Documents or receipts were not produced.
[30]
Thirdly,
the applicant alleges that the Citizenship Judge violated the principle that
the swearing to the truth of certain allegations creates a presumption that
they are true (Maldonado v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1980]
2 F.C. 302 (F.C.A.), at page 305; Anthonimuthu v. Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration, 2005 FC 141). This principle is based upon the absence of
contradictory evidence, which in the case at bar does exist.
[31]
Fourthly,
the applicant submits the Citizenship Judge failed to assess whether he had
centralized his mode of living in Canada. The Citizenship Judge
chose the test of physical presence in Canada, not “a mode
of living test”. Case law confirms that the Judge is free to choose one test or
another if it is justified on the facts (Chen v. Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2008 FC 763, at paragraph 3).
[32]
The
Citizenship Judge’s decision stands on contradictions, omissions, and the
implausibility of the evidence and insufficient physical presence in Canada of the
applicant during the relevant time frame.
[33]
In
conclusion, his decision falls within the range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and cannot, in my
opinion, be said to be unreasonable (Dunsmuir, above).
[34]
Therefore,
the appeal will be dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS that the appeal, pursuant to subsection 14(5) of the Citizenship
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, (the “Act”) from the decision of Citizenship
Judge George Springate who, on February 27, 2008, dismissed the applicant’s
citizenship application on the ground that he did not meet the residence
requirements contained in paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act, is dismissed.
“Orville Frenette”
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