Date: 20090127
Docket: IMM-4838-07
Citation: 2009 FC 86
Ottawa, Ontario, January 27, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
YONG
GANG LIANG
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to s. 72 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial review of a decision of
a Board of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration Refugee Board
(Board), dated October 26, 2007 (Decision) refusing the Applicant’s application
to be deemed a Convention refugee or person in need of protection under sections
96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a 36-year-old refugee claimant who is a citizen of the People’s
Republic of China. He
currently resides in Scarborough, Ontario. He claims
to be wanted by Chinese authorities for having violated the one-child birth
control policy in China.
[3]
He
married his wife, Dai Xue Zhen, in 1995. They have one son who was born on
September 17, 1998. After the birth of their son, an IUD was inserted into the
Applicant’s wife in November 1998 and she was forced to attend quarterly
checkups. In September 2004, despite the IUD, the Applicant’s wife became
pregnant with their second child.
[4]
Since
the second child was in violation of China’s one-child policy, the
Applicant and his wife separately went into hiding at the homes of relatives
before his wife’s scheduled IUD check-up on October 29, 2004. The local birth
control officers began to look for the Applicant and his wife after the wife
missed her scheduled IUD check-up.
[5]
The
officers threatened the Applicant’s parents and indicated that either the
Applicant or his wife would be sterilized if the wife was found to be pregnant.
On November 1, 2004, a notice was left by officials ordering the Applicant’s
wife to report for her IUD check-up within 15 days. On November 16, 2004, the
birth control officers returned and left a second note, ordering either the
Applicant or his wife be sterilized.
[6]
On
November 28, 2004, the wife’s whereabouts were discovered by the birth control
officers and she was taken to a hospital for an abortion. Since the wife was
haemorrhaging, she could not be sterilized. The birth control officers decided
to sterilize the Applicant. A notice for the Applicant’s sterilization was
issued on November 29, 2004. In order to avoid sterilization and other
punishment, the Applicant changed his hiding place and went to a distant
cousin’s home in a very remote area in Guangzhou. He remained
in hiding until his family found a smuggler to help him flee to Canada. He
arrived in Canada by air at Toronto Pearson International Airport on
January 12, 2005.
[7]
The
Applicant made a refugee claim in Canada at the Etobicoke Canadian
Immigration Commission (CIC) on January 18, 2005. He was interviewed at the
Etobicoke CIC on January 24, 2005.
[8]
His
original refugee claim was heard on November 2, 2005 and a negative decision
was rendered on November 23, 2005. The Applicant sought a judicial review of
this decision before the Federal Court. The Court set aside the November 2005
negative decision on October 31, 2006 on the basis that the Board had engaged
in an overly critical assessment of the evidence before it.
[9]
Following
his successful judicial review application, the Sing Tao Daily newspaper in Toronto publicized
the Applicant’s name and indicated that he had sought refugee protection
because of his fear of forced sterilization in China. The Toronto Sun also
published his name and the basis of his claim. This was done without the consent
or knowledge of the Applicant or his counsel. The Applicant only became aware
of the publication after he read the article himself. When the Applicant’s
lawyer was contacted by the Toronto Sun, he refused to
discuss the case as it was still pending.
[10]
The
Applicant feels that the publicity surrounding his claim for refugee protection
is an additional risk factor, as country condition documentation concerning the
one-child policy in China indicates that Chinese authorities are trying
to conceal the continuing practice of forced sterilization and abortion.
[11]
The
Applicant raised this sur place matter of the extra publicity as an
additional basis to his claim at the second refugee hearing which took place on
October 15, 2007. At this second hearing, the Applicant filed additional
documentary evidence, including newspaper articles which connected him to the issue
of forced sterilization in China, and documents about Chinese spies in Canada. The
Applicant gave oral testimony in connection with his fear of forced
sterilization in China. The Board reached a negative decision on the
re-determination of the refugee claim, which was received by the Applicant on
November 5, 2007.
[12]
The
Applicant is distressed by the negative decision and takes the position that
the Board again engaged in an improper, overly critical assessment of the
evidence before it. He also takes particular objection to the Board’s view that
he contacted the newspapers and initiated the sur place basis of his claim.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[13]
The
Board found that the Applicant was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in
need of protection. On a balance of probabilities, the Board concluded that the
Applicant was not a credible witness in relation to his fear of forced
sterilization.
[14]
The
Applicant also did not disclose any medical documentation for his wife after
December 2004. The Board found this significant because the Applicant alleges
that his wife would have been sterilized if her medical condition had allowed
the surgery to take place. The Applicant’s alleged jeopardy is related to his
wife’s alleged inability to undergo the sterilization surgery. The Board found,
on a balance of probabilities, that the Applicant’s explanation for not
disclosing these documents was not credible. The lack of this medical documentation
concerning his wife called into question the alleged inability of his wife to
have the sterilization surgery as well as the jeopardy that he claimed to face
upon return.
[15]
The
Board found, based on the documentary evidence, that although there were “mixed
messages,” the “thrust of both policy and practice in recent years was toward
the payment of fines and the elimination of coercion,” instead of forced
sterilization for unauthorized births in China. The Board found that the
Applicant’s testimony concerning enforced sterilization contradicted the
documentary evidence from both official government documents and independent
sources. The Applicant could not provide supporting documentary evidence for
his statement that compulsory sterilization took place in his area.
[16]
The
Board also found unconvincing the Applicant’s evidence as to why he and his
wife hid separately. Nor could it accept his alleged fear of sterilization from
the start of the second pregnancy. The Board found the three birth control
notices supplied by the Applicant were not authentic documents and gave them no
evidentiary weight.
[17]
The
Board rejected the sur place basis of the claim as not being credible. In
addition, the Board found that the press stories alone would not lead to a
persecution risk.
[18]
The
Board concluded by finding that the Applicant had not satisfied the burden of
establishing a serious possibility that he would be persecuted, or that he
would be personally subjected to a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment, or a risk of torture by any authority in the
People’s Republic of China. The Applicant’s claim was rejected.
ISSUES
[19]
The
Applicant raises the following issues:
1.
Did
the Board commit a reviewable error in its assessment of his claim for refugee
protection based on his fear of forced sterilization?
2.
Did
the Board commit a reviewable error in its assessment of the sur place
basis of the claim?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[20]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of
nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is
outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada
whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not
have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence,
would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds
to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention
Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part
of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from
that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that
country to provide adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of
a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of
protection is also a person in need of protection.
|
Définition de
« réfugié »
96. A qualité
de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors
du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le
croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la
Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements
ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
|
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[21]
In Dunsmuir v.
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that, although the reasonableness simpliciter
and patent unreasonableness standards are theoretically different, “the analytical
problems that arise in trying to apply the different standards undercut any
conceptual usefulness created by the inherently greater flexibility of having
multiple standards of review” (Dunsmuir at paragraph 44).
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the two reasonableness
standards should be collapsed into a single form of “reasonableness” review.
[22]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir also held that a
standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead,
where the standard of review applicable to the particular question before the
court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that
standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing
court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of
review analysis.
[23]
Prior to Dunsmuir, the standard of review for the issues
raised by the Applicant has been patent unreasonableness: See Kovacs v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] 2 F.C.R. 455
(F.C.) which cites Harb v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), 238
F.T.R. 194 at paragraph 14.
[24]
Thus, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir and
the previous jurisprudence of this Court, I find the standard of review
applicable to the issues raised in this case is reasonableness. When reviewing
a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be concerned
with “the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within
the decision-making process [and also with] whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law” (Dunsmuir at
paragraph 47). Put another way, the Court should only intervene if the Decision
was
unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the “range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The
Applicant
Credibility
[25]
The
Applicant submits that the Board made several reviewable errors in its negative
assessment of his credibility. When a refugee claimant swears to the truth of
certain allegations, a presumption of truthfulness is created unless there are
valid reasons for rebuttal: Permaul
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1983] F.C.J. No. 1082 (F.C.A.) and Armson v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. No. 800 (F.C.A.).
[26]
The
Applicant takes issue with the Board’s conclusion that “the determinative issue
with regard to this claim is the credibility of the claimant’s Personal
Information Form narrative and oral testimony concerning his pursuit by family
planning officials in order to perform a forced abortion. I find, on a balance
of probabilities that the claimant is not a credible witness in this regard.”
The Applicant submits that there are no material inconsistencies or contradictions
cited by the Board in its reasons to support such a negative credibility
assessment. The Applicant’s evidence was consistent from his first statement in
January 2005 through to his re-determination hearing in October 2007.
[27]
The
Applicant cites Justice Gibson of this Court, who overturned the Board’s original
decision against the Applicant. He notes that Justice Gibson did not find his allegations
to be implausible or inconsistent with evidence relating to the coercive
enforcement of the one-child policy by local Chinese authorities. Justice
Gibson found that the Board had been over-vigilant and had engaged in a
microscopic examination of the evidence.
[28]
The
Applicant submits that the negative Decision on the re-determination of his
claim is again based on an over-vigilant and hypercritical examination of his
evidence. The Board selectively relied upon an unbalanced review of the country
condition evidence in order to find the Applicant’s story not to be credible.
Documentary
Evidence
[29]
The
Applicant submits that the Board also committed a reviewable error in failing
to properly address the documentary evidence. The Board was dismissive of the
country condition documents which indicated that local officials in China still
resort to the practice of forced abortion and forced sterilization in order to
meet China’s one-child policy. The Applicant goes on to rely on several
passages from the documentary evidence that he says support his position.
[30]
The
Applicant notes that the Board acknowledged “mixed messages” from the
documentary evidence. He argues, however, that the Board brushed aside the
material supporting his claim of fear of forced sterilization in China. He submits
that the Board’s reasons indicate that it engaged in a selective review of the
documentary evidence before it, which is unfair and improper: Yu v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005
FC 794 (Yu).
[31]
The Applicant argues that there was credible documentary evidence
before the Board to support his claim. Prior to the end of the hearing, Applicant’s
counsel also asked for an opportunity to provide additional documentation on
the subject of forced sterilization and abortion in Guangdong
province, but the Board stated that it was not necessary. The Applicant submits
that he was mislead by the Board into believing that the Board was satisfied,
on a balance of probabilities, that the country condition evidence did not
undermine his credibility. As a result of the Board saying it was not
necessary, the Applicant did not produce further evidence to corroborate the
ongoing practice of forced sterilization and abortion by local family planning
authorities throughout China.
[32]
The Applicant submits that the Board has no specialized knowledge
regarding country condition documents. The Board simply engaged in speculation
about what should or should not have been within the content of the
sterilization notices presented by the Applicant. Given the lack of specialized
knowledge, and the fact that there was no comparable evidence before the Board,
its assessment of the sterilization notices was flawed.
[33]
The Board stated that “[c]ountry documents note
that fraudulent documents are easily obtained in China. I give
these documents no evidentiary weight.” The Applicant
points out that this Court has held that the Board should not speculate on the
mental processes and efficiency of the Chinese authorities: Chen v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993]
F.C.J. No. 996 (F.C.A.). Jiang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 499 is instructive on this point:
11
Because counterfeit documents were readily
available, one may speculate that the documents in question were counterfeit,
but that is not enough to serve as an evidentiary basis for a proper inference.
As Mr. Justice von Finckenstein said in Chima v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004]
F.C.J. No. 255, 2004 FC
224:
The documents may well be forgeries,
however evidence of widespread forgery in a country is not, by itself,
sufficient to reject foreign documents as forgeries. As the Respondent noted
evidence of widespread forgery merely demonstrates that false documentation could be available to the Applicant.
Sur Place Part of
Claim
[34]
The
Applicant submits that the Board also committed reviewable errors with respect
to its handling of the sur place aspects of his claim. The publication
in the Sing Tao Daily Newspaper of the Applicant’s name puts him at risk of
punishment and mistreatment by the Chinese authorities. Country condition
evidence indicates that abortion and sterilization remain forced practices in China even though
the government tries to conceal this fact. There was also evidence before the
Board that Chinese citizens have been severely punished and mistreated for
exposing or resisting these practices.
[35]
The
Applicant says that the distinction made by the Board between people who have
exposed or resisted the one-child policy practices in China and the
Applicant, who is not a well-known dissident and who made statements only in
Canada, is unfair.
[36]
He
submits that the Board ignored the relevant and credible evidence before it
that there are Chinese spies in Canada who monitor the
activities of Chinese citizens living here. Therefore, there is an increased
likelihood that the publication of the Applicant’s name and his claim of being
threatened with forced sterilization would come to the attention of the Chinese
authorities.
[37]
The
Applicant says that the Board did not fairly or carefully assess his claim because
of its suspicion that the Applicant contacted the Sing Tao Daily Newspaper. The
Applicant submits that there was no evidence before the Board to support that suspicion.
The sur place claim was in no way designed to bolster the Applicant’s original
claim. The Applicant had no idea that a sur place claim would be raised
by his counsel because of the publication of the Applicant’s claim for refugee
protection by the Sing Tao Daily newspaper.
[38]
The
Applicant submits that the Board’s unsupported suspicion that he may have
reported his story to the newspaper in an effort to bolster his claim taints
and undermines the Board’s assessment of the sur place basis of his
claim.
Conclusions
[39]
The
Applicant concludes by stating that the Board committed several reviewable
errors in its assessment of his claim for refugee protection and that, for a
second time, the Board engaged in an overly critical assessment of the
evidence.
[40]
He
further submits that, since there was documentary evidence before the Board
that was consistent with his allegations, the Board should not have found his
allegations implausible or inconsistent with country conditions in China. The
Applicant points out that his complaint is not about the weighing of the
country evidence; it is about the Board’s handling of the “mixed messages” in
the country documentation.
[41]
The
Applicant cites and relies upon Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 for the proposition that where country
documents conflict, the Board ought to give the benefit of the doubt to the
Applicant. The Applicant states that the Board’s selective use of the
conflicting country documentation to discredit him was improper, particularly
in light of the principle of the presumption of truthfulness.
[42]
The
Applicant claims that the Board dealt with the credible information he presented
in its reasons by acknowledging there were “mixed messages,” from the
documentary evidence and brushing the Applicant’s supporting material aside. A
selective review and analysis of the country documentation is unfair and
improper: Yu. The more evidence is not mentioned specifically or
analyzed in a Board’s reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from
the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact without regard to
the evidence.: Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1993]
F.C.J. No. 497.
The
Respondent
Credibility
[43]
The
Respondent points out that this claim was de novo.
[44]
The
Respondent cites and relies upon Shen v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 FC 1001 (Shen) at paragraphs
1-14 to rebut the Applicant’s position that the Board should have believed him
because there were no material inconsistencies in his testimony.
Documentary
Evidence
[45]
The
Respondent submits that the Board weighed the evidence before it and
acknowledged the use of coercive tactics by birth control officials in parts of
China. However,
the documents did not support the Applicant’s allegation that someone from
outside of Beijing would be
subjected to forced sterilization as a punishment for his wife’s second
pregnancy, even if his wife had undergone a forced abortion and her health
condition would not allow her to be sterilized.
[46]
The
Respondent states that, when assessing evidence, Board members are “masters in
their own house” and it is open to them to decide what weight to give. As well,
the Board is entitled to rely on and prefer documentary evidence to that of a
claimant: Zvonov v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994]
F.C.J. No. 1089 (F.C.T.D.) and Zhou v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1087 (F.C.A.).
[47]
The Respondent says that the Applicant’s position amounts to
a disagreement with the Board’s conclusion. This conclusion, however, was open
to the Board to make on the evidence before it, and as such it is not a basis
for this Court’s intervention: Brar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1986] F.C.J. No. 346 (F.C.A.).
[48]
The Respondent points out that the Applicant presented three
letters, purportedly from the family planning authorities. The Board noted a
number of concerns regarding the letters, including the dates and the
addressees. The Board concluded that these letters were not authentic, which
conclusion was open to the Board.
[49]
The
Respondent says that the Applicant did not present evidence to corroborate his
wife’s health condition. The Board did not suggest that corroborative evidence
was required, or that the Applicant’s evidence had been rejected for lack of corroboration.
However, the Board found it would have been reasonable to expect corroboration in
a situation where corroboration was available. This does not raise a reviewable
error: Ortiz Juarez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 288 and Uppal v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 1142.
Sur
Place Part of Claim
[50]
The
Respondent submits that the documents relied upon by the Applicant in relation
to the severe punishment of those who oppose the birth control policy in China both
refer to the same individual (Chen Guanchen,) who publicly exposed a campaign
of forced abortions in Shandong. The treatment of one man in a different region
of China who publicly
opposed the enforcement of the policy within his region is not necessarily
relevant to the Applicant’s situation. The Board relied on documentation
regarding the return of failed asylum seekers to China and
organizations designed to assist them in this regard.
[51]
The
Respondent points out that while the Applicant suggests the Board made a veiled
negative credibility finding regarding whether he notified the press himself,
the identity of the person who notified the press was not important to the Decision.
The Board relied on the information in the country documentation regarding what
happens to those in the Applicant’s circumstances. The Respondent notes that
one of the documents the Applicant relies upon speaks of a couple in China who are
appealing a decision of a local court absolving the local planning authorities
of wrongdoing in a forced abortion. The couple has made their case known to the
public in China, but there
is no suggestion that they are experiencing problems as a result. Therefore,
the Applicant has failed to identify any error in this regard.
ANALYSIS
[52]
As
the Decision makes clear, the determinative issue in this case was credibility.
The Applicant alleged that he would be subject to forced sterilization in China simply
because his wife had become pregnant with a second child and she could not be
sterilized, even though the child had been aborted.
[53]
The
Applicant faults the Board for not specifically referring to documents and
information that gave credibility to his account of what he faces if returned
to China.
[54]
As
the Board noted, the documentary evidence on forced sterilization contains
“mixed messages.” Hence, the Board had to weigh that evidence and reach a conclusion.
It also had to take into account the Applicant’s account of what he knew
personally about forced sterilization for men in his area. Based upon the
documentation before it, I cannot say that the Board was unreasonable in its
conclusion that the Applicant would not face sterilization if returned to China.
[55]
Of
course, it is possible to disagree with the conclusions that the Board reached
on these issues, but I cannot say that the Decision was unreasonable and fell
outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes that are defensible on the
facts and the law regarding the Board’s credibility findings. A decision in
favour of the Applicant would, in my view, also have been reasonable. But that
does not make the Board’s Decision unreasonable.
[56]
The
Applicant also failed to provide a convincing explanation for the lack of
documentation related to his wife’s condition. The Board found the letters
produced by the Applicant to be inauthentic because of anomalies and
inconsistencies, not simply because fraudulent documents are easily obtained in
China. In my view,
the Board’s reasons for rejecting the Applicant’s documentation, particularly
the chronological inconsistency, did not involve an overly microscopic
examination and cannot be said to be unreasonable.
[57]
In
the end, the Applicant’s allegations that there were no inconsistencies in his
claim and that the Board made a selective use of the documentation are not
borne out by the facts; the Applicant is asking the Court to re-weigh the
evidence and come to a different conclusion from the one reached by the Board.
However, the role of the Court is not to determine whether or not it agrees
with the Board’s assessment, but rather to determine whether its Decision is
reasonable. See Shen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) 2007 FC 1001 at paragraph 8.
[58]
My
review of the Decision discloses that the Board considered the Applicant’s
evidence and the country documentation and concluded that it could not accept
his allegations that he would face forced sterilization if returned to China. The Board
was entitled to come to this conclusion. It was not an unreasonable conclusion
and the Court cannot interfere with it.
[59]
As
regards the Applicant’s sur place claim, because the Board could not
accept his allegations concerning forced sterilization, it could not accept
that he was being pursued by Chinese authorities. The publications referred to
were local in nature, and the Applicant just did not have the profile to
attract attention if he returned to China.
[60]
Once
again, it is possible to disagree with the Board’s conclusions on this issue,
but they were not unreasonable and fall within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes that are defensible on the facts of this case and the law.
[61]
The
Board’s comment that “it is reasonable to have some doubt regarding whether the
claimant contacted the Singtao paper and initiate the sur place
issue” is not the basis for the Board’s rejection of the sur place
claim. The Board relied upon the country documentation and the Applicant’s lack
of profile. The Court cannot interfere with the Board’s conclusions on this
point.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
1. This
Application is dismissed.
2. There is no
question for certification.
“James Russell”
Judge