Date: 20090204
Docket: IMM-4749-07
Citation: 2009
FC 119
OTTAWA, ONTARIO,
FEBRUARY
4, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
RAVEENDRAN
RAJADURAI
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The applicant
is a 45-year-old Tamil from Jaffna, Sri Lanka. He is married
and has two 12-year-old twin boys. His wife and children claimed refugee
status in Canada in October of 1999, and their
claims were accepted on June
7th, 2000.
They subsequently applied for landing from within Canada, and the applicant was included in his
wife’s application for simultaneous processing through the Canadian Visa Post
in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The applicant’s
wife and children were landed in Canada
in April of 2004, and they became Canadian citizens in February 2007. As for
the applicant, he was interviewed at the Canadian High Commission in Colombo on three separate occasions
during the processing of his application. He was ultimately found to be
inadmissible to Canada on security grounds by visa
Officer Robert Stevenson on July
24, 2007. It is
of that decision that Mr. Rajadurai is now seeking judicial review.
[2]
Prior to
the hearing of the judicial review application, the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (the “Minister”) applied under s. 87 of Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “IRPA”) for the non-disclosure of
information considered and relied upon by the officer in making his
determination. This information was redacted from the Certified Tribunal Record
(“CTR”). The ex parte and in camera hearing of that
motion was held on August 26, 2008; counsel for the applicant and for the
Minister were then invited to make submissions on the motion by way of
teleconference, which took place on September 11, 2008. Having heard all these
oral submissions and considered the records of the parties, I ordered on
September 15, 2008 that the application of the respondent be granted and that
the information redacted from the Certified Tribunal Record not be disclosed to
the applicant and the public. The following reasons deal with both the
Minister’s application for non-disclosure and with the merits of Mr. Rajadurai’s
application for judicial review.
BACKGROUND
[3]
As
previously mentioned, the applicant was interviewed three times during the
processing of his application. The first such interview took place in June
2002. The Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (“CAIPS”) notes
reveal that the officer had some concerns with his story and his various
identity cards. He said that he worked for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (“LTTE”) under duress, which made him suspicious in the eyes of the
army. He claimed to have been arrested and badly beaten by the army in 1999,
and that his father-in-law paid a bribe to secure his release. The officer
also doubted the paternity of the couple’s twin boys, and asked for DNA tests;
these tests eventually established that Mr. Rajadurai was the twins’ biological
father.
[4]
The
applicant was interviewed a second time on November 7, 2008. Notes of this interview
were not entered into CAIPS, and were therefore inaccessible both to the
applicant and to the visa officer who declared him inadmissible. In his
affidavit filed in support of the respondent’s submissions, visa officer Robert
Stevenson declared that the notes taken during the course of that interview
were never disclosed to him and, consequently, were not relied upon in
rendering his decision.
[5]
On
February 14, 2007, visa officer Robert Stevenson received materials which
raised concerns that the applicant may be inadmissible pursuant to s. 34(1) of IRPA.
After reviewing this material and the contents of the applicant’s file, he
decided the applicant should be interviewed further. A third interview was held
on June 5, 2007.
[6]
The
officer questioned the applicant extensively on his business relationship with
the LTTE, what he would sell to them, how often, whether he was paid, where he
would deliver the food, etc. In his affidavit, the officer testified that his
first concern was that the applicant was conducting business with a terrorist
organization from 1994 to 1999, in a manner contrary to the usual forced
approach of the LTTE. The applicant was also asked about the other tasks he
was asked to perform for the LTTE. He mentioned digging bunkers, doing sentry
duty, hanging posters, etc. The applicant claimed that he received no training
from the LTTE, and that every villager was occasionally asked to perform such
duties for the LTTE. When pushed for details, the applicant was apparently
evasive, giving the impression that he wanted to avoid discussing his
interactions with the LTTE further. At one point, the officer expressed his
scepticism that he would not be solicited by the LTTE to provide information
about activities he observed in the town, considering that he was regularly
delivering food and doing sentry duty for the LTTE. The applicant responded
that the LTTE had an “intelligence unit” which did such information collecting.
[7]
According
to the CAIPS notes, the visa officer advised the applicant at the end of the
interview that he was not convinced he had been completely forthright with
him. The visa officer also told the applicant that the work he did for the
LTTE and the business he conducted with them raised concerns. The visa officer
commented that it appeared the applicant was not really under any duress when he
helped the LTTE and did business with them, and that these factors could end up
rendering the applicant inadmissible. In response, the applicant could have
pleaded with the officer to help him as life is difficult in Colombo, but he did not take this
opportunity.
THE IMPUGNED DECISION
[8]
The visa
officer came to the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds to believe
the applicant was a member of the inadmissible class of persons described in s.
34(1)(f) of the IRPA. That subsection reads as follows:
34. (1) A
permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds
for:
(f) being a member of an
organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has
engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a),
(b) or (c).
|
34. (1)
Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits
suivants :
f) être membre d’une organisation
dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle est, a été ou sera
l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
|
[9]
The officer was
satisfied that the applicant had provided the LTTE with the necessary support
to pursue its activities, and that he willingly engaged in conducting business
with that terrorist organization. In the CAIPS notes, he elaborated further on
his finding:
Having further reviewed the file and
interview notes, I am not at all satisfied that the applicant has been straight
forward with me. His explanations frequently lack credibility and there was
definite evasiveness with answers (ex. Not remembering more as his mind was on
business). Of most concern, however, is that the applicant was clearly and
knowingly supplying the LTTE with food stuffs as a commercial venture. I am
satisfied that the applicant was clearly aware of the nature of the armed
struggle which the LTTE pursues, and he chose to enter into business with the
LTTE regardless. Throughout the interview the applicant did not indicate he
was supplying food stuffs under duress. Rather, I am satisfied that the
applicant saw a business opportunity and willingly engaged it regardless of the
fact that the client was the LTTE. In conducting business with the
organization, the applicant provided necessary sustenance to the organization
which enabled them to continue activities and further their cause. As noted
above, credibility was an issue with the PA. I further find it lacking
credibility that the LTTE would assign sentry duty to any person off the street
as the applicant suggests. Rather, I believe it reasonable to assume that such
responsibility would only be given to a person of trust associated with the
organization. That the applicant was aware and casually offered that the LTTE
has an intelligence wing which deals with reconnaissance of the town
demonstrates a deeper knowledge of the LTTE structure than I would expect to
observe in applicant who is a simple businessman with no ties to the LTTE.
In all, I am satisfied that the
definition of membership extends to include the applicant’s willing business
activities with the LTTE, which provided the organization with necessary
assistance for their effective functioning, as well as other assistance he
provided like sentry duty. I believe the above provides reasonable grounds to
believe that the applicant meets the criteria for a determination of
inadmissibility under A34(1)(F). I consequently find the applicant
inadmissible to Canada. Application refused.
THE SECTION 87 APPLICATION
[10]
Section 87 is found
in Division 9 (ss. 76 to 87.1) of IRPA and provides a means by which the
confidentiality of national security issues in immigration matters can be
ensured. It reads as follows:
Application for non-disclosure — judicial review
87. The Minister may, during a judicial review,
apply for the non-disclosure of information or other evidence. Section 83 —
other than the obligations to appoint a special advocate and to provide a
summary — applies to the proceeding with any necessary modifications.
|
Interdiction de divulgation — contrôle
judiciaire
87. Le
ministre peut, dans le cadre d’un contrôle judiciaire, demander
l’interdiction de la divulgation de renseignements et autres éléments de
preuve. L’article 83 s’applique à l’instance, avec les adaptations
nécessaires, sauf quant à l’obligation de nommer un avocat spécial et de
fournir un résumé.
|
[11]
The information
referred to in that section is defined in s. 76 of the Act in the following
way :
“information"
means security or criminal intelligence information and information that is
obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, the government of a foreign state, an
international organization of states or an institution of such a government
or international organization.
|
«renseignements
» Les renseignements en matière de sécurité ou de criminalité et ceux
obtenus, sous le sceau du secret, de source canadienne ou du gouvernement
d’un État étranger, d’une organisation internationale mise sur pied par des
États ou de l’un de leurs organismes.
|
[12]
As for the procedure
to be followed, it is set out in s. 83 of IRPA, with the caveat that subparagraphs
83(1)(b) and (e) are not mandatory in the context of an application for
non-disclosure pursuant to s. 87:
Protection of information
83. (1) The following provisions apply to
proceedings under any of sections 78 and 82 to 82.2:
(a) the judge shall proceed as
informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of
fairness and natural justice permit;
(b) the judge shall appoint a
person from the list referred to in subsection 85(1) to act as a special
advocate in the proceeding after hearing representations from the permanent
resident or foreign national and the Minister and after giving particular
consideration and weight to the preferences of the permanent resident or
foreign national;
(c) at any time during a
proceeding, the judge may, on the judge’s own motion — and shall, on each
request of the Minister — hear information or other evidence in the absence
of the public and of the permanent resident or foreign national and their
counsel if, in the judge’s opinion, its disclosure could be injurious to
national security or endanger the safety of any person;
(d) the judge shall ensure the
confidentiality of information and other evidence provided by the Minister
if, in the judge’s opinion, its disclosure would be injurious to national
security or endanger the safety of any person;
(e) throughout the proceeding,
the judge shall ensure that the permanent resident or foreign national is
provided with a summary of information and other evidence that enables them
to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister in the proceeding
but that does not include anything that, in the judge’s opinion, would be
injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person if
disclosed;
(f) the judge shall ensure the
confidentiality of all information or other evidence that is withdrawn by the
Minister;
(g) the judge shall provide the
permanent resident or foreign national and the Minister with an opportunity
to be heard;
(h) the judge may receive into
evidence anything that, in the judge’s opinion, is reliable and appropriate,
even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and may base a decision on that
evidence;
(i) the judge may base a
decision on information or other evidence even if a summary of that
information or other evidence is not provided to the permanent resident or
foreign national; and
(j) the judge shall not base a
decision on information or other evidence provided by the Minister, and shall
return it to the Minister, if the judge determines that it is not relevant or
if the Minister withdraws it.
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Protection des renseignements
83. (1) Les règles ci-après
s’appliquent aux instances visées aux articles 78 et 82 à 82.2 :
a) le juge procède, dans la mesure où les circonstances et les
considérations d’équité et de justice naturelle le permettent, sans
formalisme et selon la procédure expéditive;
b) il nomme, parmi les personnes figurant sur la liste dressée au
titre du paragraphe 85(1), celle qui agira à titre d’avocat spécial dans le
cadre de l’instance, après avoir entendu l’intéressé et le ministre et
accordé une attention et une importance particulières aux préférences de
l’intéressé;
c) il peut d’office tenir une audience à huis clos et en l’absence
de l’intéressé et de son conseil — et doit le faire à chaque demande du
ministre — si la divulgation des renseignements ou autres éléments de preuve
en cause pourrait porter atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la
sécurité d’autrui;
d) il lui incombe de garantir la confidentialité des renseignements
et autres éléments de preuve que lui fournit le ministre et dont la
divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la
sécurité d’autrui;
e) il veille tout au long de l’instance à ce que soit fourni à
l’intéressé un résumé de la preuve qui ne comporte aucun élément dont la
divulgation porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la
sécurité d’autrui et qui permet à l’intéressé d’être suffisamment informé de
la thèse du ministre à l’égard de l’instance en cause;
f) il lui incombe de garantir la confidentialité des renseignements
et autres éléments de preuve que le ministre retire de l’instance;
g) il donne à l’intéressé et au ministre la possibilité d’être
entendus;
h) il peut recevoir et admettre en preuve tout élément — même
inadmissible en justice — qu’il estime digne de foi et utile et peut fonder
sa décision sur celui-ci;
i) il peut fonder sa décision sur des renseignements et autres
éléments de preuve même si un résumé de ces derniers n’est pas fourni à
l’intéressé;
j) il ne peut fonder sa décision sur les renseignements et autres
éléments de preuve que lui fournit le ministre et les remet à celui-ci s’il
décide qu’ils ne sont pas pertinents ou si le ministre les retire.
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[13]
By Order of this
Court dated April 23, 2008; the CTR was due to be filed with the Court on or
before May 14, 2008. The Minister applied for the non-disclosure of
information, which was redacted from the CTR, and also requested that the Court
hear information or other evidence in support of this application in the
absence of the public and of the applicant and his counsel on May 21, 2008.
The information redacted consists of portions of pages 113, 114 and 116 of the
CTR. In support of that application, the Minister filed on the public record
the motion for non-disclosure of that information, along with a supporting
affidavit confirming that the CTR contains both un-redacted and redacted
information, that the ground for the application for non-disclosure is that
disclosure of the confidential information would be injurious to national
security or endanger the safety of any persons, and that the respondent intends
to rely on the confidential information for the purpose of responding to the
applicant’s application for judicial review. This affidavit also adds that the
application for non-disclosure will be supported by one secret affidavit, which
will contain the confidential information the respondent seeks to protect.
[14]
On June 6, 2008, the
Chief Justice ordered that the hearing of the judicial review application be
re-scheduled to October 28, 2008, to allow for the in camera and ex
parte hearing of the s. 87 application to take place beforehand, on
August 26, 2008. Counsel for the applicant confirmed on June 3, 2008 that he
would not seek to be heard at a public hearing on the s.87 application, but he
sent written representations. Eventually, a teleconference took place on
September 11, 2008 at which counsel for both parties presented arguments on the
basis of the public record.
[15]
The right to know the case to be met is not absolute. The
Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly recognized that national security
considerations can sometimes limit the extent of disclosure of information to
an individual: see Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, at para. 58l; Chiarelli v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 744; Suresh
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1
S.C.R. 3, at para. 122; Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General),
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 38-44.
[16]
The state has a considerable interest in protecting national
security and the security of its intelligence services. Disclosure of confidential
information related to national security or which would endanger the safety of
any person could cause damage to the operations of investigative agencies. In
the hands of an informed reader, seemingly unrelated pieces of information,
which may not in themselves be particularly sensitive, can be used to develop a
more comprehensive picture when compared with information already known by the
recipient or available from another source. In the past, this Court has
consistently relied on the principles articulated in Henrie v. Canada
(Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1989] 2 F.C. 229 (F.C.T.D.),
aff’d (1992), 88 D.L.R.(4th) 575 (F.C.A.). At pages 578 and 579,
Mr. Justice Addy wrote:
[…] in security matters, there is a
requirement to not only protect the identity of human sources of information
but to recognize that the following types of information might require to be
protected with due regard of course to the administration of justice and more
particularly to the openness of its proceedings: information pertaining to the
identity of targets of the surveillance whether they be individuals or groups,
the technical means and sources of surveillance, the methods of operation of
the service, the identity of certain members of the service itself, the
telecommunications and cipher systems and, at times, the very fact that a
surveillance is being or is not being carried out. This means for instance
that evidence, which of itself might not be of any particular use in actually
identifying the threat, might nevertheless require to be protected if the mere
divulging of the fact that C.S.I.S. is in possession of it would alert the
targeted organization to the fact that it is in fact subject to electronic
surveillance or to a wiretap or to a leak from some human source within the
organization.
It is of some importance to realize than
an “informed reader”, that is, a person who is both knowledgeable regarding
security matters and is a member of or associated with a group which
constitutes a threat or a potential threat to the security of Canada, will be
quite familiar with the minute details of its organization and of the
ramifications of its operations regarding which our security service might well
be relatively uninformed. As a result, such an informed reader may at times,
by fitting a piece of apparently innocuous information into the general picture
which he has before him, be in a position to arrive at some damaging deductions
regarding the investigation of a particular threat or of many other threats to
national security. He might, for instance, be in a position to determine one
or more of the following: (1) the duration, scope intensity and degree of
success or of lack of success of an investigation; (2) the investigative
techniques of the Service; (3) the typographic and teleprinter systems employed
by C.S.I.S.; (4) internal security procedures; (5) the nature and content of
other classified documents; (6) the identities of service personnel or of other
persons involved in an investigation.
[17]
In light of the
submissions made by counsel for the respondent, of the testimony of the affiant
who swore the private affidavit, and of the documents that were filed on the
public record and confidentially, I am satisfied that the disclosure of the
redacted information contained in pages 113, 114 and 116 of the CTR would be
injurious to national security or safety. Following the recommendations of my
colleague Mme Justice Dawson in Ugbazghi v. The Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, 2008 FC 694, the secret affidavit was not a
mere assertion of conclusions, but detailed the evidence and the reasoning as
to why, in the opinion of the deponent, each redaction was necessary in order
to protect national security or the safety of any person.
[18]
In his written and oral
submissions conveyed through teleconference, counsel for the applicant argued
that the non-disclosure application should be dismissed because the redacted
portions of the CRT would seriously prejudice the applicant’s ability to know
and comprehend the case that he had to meet in Court. While acknowledging that
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to the
applicant since he is not living on Canadian soil, counsel nevertheless argued
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 demonstrates the seriousness of
the procedural unfairness that results from the operation of the special
security provisions of the IRPA.
[19]
A similar argument
was addressed by Mr. Justice Blais (now on the Court of Appeal) in Segasayo
v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2007 FC
372. In that case, the applicant was in Canada and had been declared inadmissible after
having been granted refugee status. The non-disclosure application had been
made in the context of an application for judicial review challenging the
decision by the Minister to deny the applicant’s request for an exemption
pursuant to s. 35(2) of IRPA. Mr. Justice Blais distinguished the Charkaoui
decision on two grounds: first, the applicant was not detained and his liberty
interest was therefore not at stake, contrary to the person subject to a
security certificate while awaiting a decision on his or her inadmissibility.
Indeed, even the applicant’s security interest was not immediately at stake,
since he could not be deported pursuant to ss. 115(2)(b) of the Act barring a
determination by the Minister that he “should not be allowed to remain in
Canada on the basis of the nature and severity of acts committed or of danger
to the security of Canada”. Second, Mr. Justice Blais was of the view that the
information sought to be kept secret in the context of a security certificate
was much more extensive than was the case under s. 87, where an applicant is
able to determine the exact amount of information that is being excluded by
looking at the redacted CTR.
[20]
These considerations
apply with even more force to the case at bar. Here, the applicant does not
even live in Canada, and as a consequence his liberty and security
interests cannot be threatened by the limiting of the disclosure of
information. Moreover, it is clear from the CTR that only a very small portion
has been redacted; as a result, he is aware of the vast majority of the
information upon which the visa officer relied. Having read the redacted
portions of the CTR, I am not of the view that considerations of fairness and
natural justice required the appointment of a special advocate to protect the
interests of the applicant; indeed, counsel for the applicant did not request
such a measure.
[21]
Consequently, I
determined that the information redacted from the Certified Tribunal Record and
contained in the secret affidavit attachments thereto shall not be disclosed to
the applicant, to his counsel or to any member of the public. I also
determined that the non-disclosed information may be relied on by the Minister
and the Court in the determination of the judicial review application.
THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
[22]
Counsel for the
applicant raises three issues in his oral and written submissions. First, he
submits that the failure to record the details of the applicant’s November 7, 2006 interview before the visa officer constitutes a breach of
natural justice. Second, he argues that the information in the possession of
visa officer Stevenson on or about February 14, 2006 that led him to have
concerns regarding the applicant’s admissibility on security grounds constitute
extrinsic evidence which procedural fairness demands be disclosed to the
applicant. Third, he contends that Officer Stevenson committed an evidentiary
error by failing to have regard to the applicant’s statements to the visa
officer in June 2002 which indicated that any work that he did for the LTTE was
done under threat and not voluntarily.
[23]
Given the highly
factual nature of the questions pertaining to the credibility of the applicant
and to the assessment of the evidence, the applicable standard of review is
clearly that of reasonableness. These are exactly the kinds of issues that
come within the expertise of the visa officers, and their conclusions in that
respect are entitled to a high degree of deference. On the other hand, the
first and second issues raised by the applicant clearly relate to procedural
fairness. These issues are not subject to a standard of review analysis, and
must be assessed against a standard of correctness.
[24]
As a matter of
policy, visa officers are directed to create and maintain detailed notes of all
applicant interviews. This is stated quite clearly in the Overseas Processing
Manual OP1 put out by the respondent (A.R., pp. 44-45). However, the fact that
a visa officer deviated from this policy by failing to record the details of
one of the applicant’s interviews does not necessarily translate into a breach
of procedural fairness. At the end of the day, what matters is that the
applicant be made aware of the reasons as to why he was found inadmissible, so
that he can address the visa officer’s concerns.
[25]
The applicant cannot
claim that, without access to the notes of the second interview, his ability to
challenge the ultimate decision that he worked voluntarily for the LTTE was
prejudiced. First of all, he knew both the questions put to him by the officer
during the interview, and his replies. He could even have filed an affidavit
recounting his recollection of that interview. Moreover, the visa officer
testified that he did not and, in fact, could not rely on the notes from the second
interview. Therefore, these notes played no part in the final decision.
[26]
As for the
information that prompted the visa officer to interview the applicant a third time,
it cannot be equated with extrinsic evidence. The decision of the Federal
Court of Appeal in Muliadi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 2 F.C. 205, upon which the
applicant relies, is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the visa
officer denied the application for permanent residence as “entrepreneur” on the
basis of a provincial government’s negative assessment of his business
proposal. The Court made it clear that the reception of this assessment by the
visa officer was not problematic in and of itself; it was the failure to inform
the applicant of that negative assessment and to give him a fair opportunity to
correct or contradict it before making the decision that was erroneous.
[27]
Here, the visa
officer did not come to his decision on the basis of the information he
received. Instead, he conducted a further interview with the applicant wherein
the applicant had the opportunity to address the visa officer’s concerns. It
is clear from the visa officer’s notes that he conveyed his concerns to the
applicant. His questions were clearly focused on the nature of his business
relationship with the LTTE, on the extent of his cooperation with that
organization, and on the willingness of his participation. It is abundantly
clear from the CAIPS notes of this last interview that the officer had some
doubts with respect to the applicant’s claim that he helped the LTTE under
duress. The applicant cannot credibly claim that he was taken by surprise and had
no opportunity to refute these concerns.
[28]
Finally, I do not
think it can seriously be argued that the visa officer failed to have regard to
the applicant’s previous statements. There is a presumption that a decision
maker has considered all of the evidence before him when he rendered his
decision: see Florea v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 598 (F.C.A.). The
officer states, in the CAIPS notes dated June 20, 2006, that he had reviewed
the file and interview notes before coming to his decision (A.R., p. 15). It
seems to me what the applicant is really taking issue with is how the visa
officer chose to interpret the applicant’s answers at the last interview. On
the basis of the record before the Court, it cannot be said that the visa
officer’s analysis is unreasonable; quite to the contrary, it is consistent
with the concerns arising from the interviews, and which the applicant was unable
to dispel.
[29]
For all the foregoing
reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed. No question for
certification was proposed, and none will be certified.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this application for judicial
review is dismissed. No question is certified.
"Yves
de Montigny"