Date: 20091216
Docket: IMM-2166-09
Citation: 2009 FC 1279
Ottawa, Ontario, December 16,
2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
ALI
REZA ZAVALAT
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72 (1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial review
of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (Board), dated March 3, 2009 (Decision), which refused the Applicant’s
application to be deemed a Convention refugee or person in need of protection
under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of Iran
who joined with a group of students to discuss issues pertaining to Iran, such as freedom of
speech and freedom of the media. The Applicant alleges that after attending a
demonstration in Iran he was detained for six
days, interrogated and assaulted, which resulted in a broken nose. The Applicant
was then made to sign an undertaking not to participate in similar future
activities and was expelled from the University.
[3]
The
Applicant participated again in meetings with like-minded people and was again arrested,
interrogated and beaten. He suffered a broken leg. Along with friends, the
Applicant then distributed anti-government leaflets. In February of 2006, while
the Applicant was in another city, his father was detained and interrogated.
His father was told that the Applicant was morally corrupt and should report to
the authorities. The Applicant fled Iran for Canada.
[4]
The
Applicant made a claim for refugee protection which was denied by the Refugee
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (RPD). The RPD
determined that the Applicant was not a credible witness.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[5]
The
decision of the Board turned on credibility. Notably, the Board asked the Applicant
on which day his father was arrested. The Applicant’s response was March 13,
2006; however, the Applicant had given the date of February 21, 2006 on his Personal
Information Form (PIF). The Applicant explained that this error was made
because of a miscalculation in the Iranian calendar. The Board did not accept
this explanation because the Applicant had committed no other errors with
regard to dates in his PIF. Moreover, the Board found that this was an
important date since it was the date of the incident that led to the
Applicant’s flight from Iran. The Board determined that, on a balance
of probabilities, the Applicant was not a credible or trustworthy witness.
[6]
The
Applicant presented a Notification Paper and a Writ of Summons to the Board.
However, country documents indicate that in serious issues a defendant is never
given a copy of the warrant. Furthermore, the Board noted that although by law
a defendant must be informed of the charges within 24 hours, this requirement is
often not adhered to. The Board found that “[s]ince I do not believe the Applicant,
I prefer the information in the country documents to that of the Applicant’s.” The
Board found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Applicant had tendered
false documents to the Board.
[7]
The
Board cited the Federal Court in Osayande v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 368, [2002] F.C.J. No. 511 for
the proposition that where an applicant adduces false documents to the Board,
it impacts the Board’s entire finding of the applicant’s credibility. Consequently,
the Board found that it had the right to disbelieve the entirety of the Applicant’s
evidence. It determined that “on a balance of probabilities, I find the Applicant
not to be a credible or trustworthy witness and that he did not suffer the
alleged harm.” Moreover, the member found that “[s]ince I have found the Applicant
to have tendered false documents to the Board, on a balance of probabilities, I
reject all of the documents tendered from Iran and give no weight to the
findings of physical examination conducted in Canada.”
[8]
The
Board also found that counsel had led the Applicant on his answers in numerous
occasions during the hearing. For instance, counsel prompted the Applicant on
whether he had to sign anything upon his release. The Board found, however,
that “[i]f, as the Applicant alleged, he was required to sign an undertaking,
he would have stated this spontaneously when describing what happened on his
release. Therefore, [on] a balance of probabilities, I find the Applicant was
not detained in 1999 and did not suffer the harm alleged.”
[9]
The
Board found that there was no evidence that the Applicant had been in Iran during the time
of the incidents he alleged because he had no documentation to corroborate this
claim, and because his sister had not testified or sworn an affidavit.
[10]
The
Applicant expressed a fear of returning to Iran because he
believed that Iranian authorities would have knowledge of his refugee claim.
The Board noted that Canada does not provide information to any country with
regard to refugee claims made in Canada.
[11]
The
Board also noted that the Applicant had produced a psychological report as well
as a report from the Canadian Center for Victims of
Torture. The member found that “while I accept the diagnosis arising from the
consultation, the Applicant has post-traumatic stress disorder and, most
likely, depression, as well as being a vulnerable person; since I do not
believe the Applicant, I give these documents no weight with respect to the
claim.”
[12]
In
summary, the Board concluded that “I have found the Applicant not to be
credible and to have tendered false documents to the Board. Therefore, I find
there is not a serious possibility or reasonable chance that the Applicant
would face persecution for a Convention ground, if he returns to Iran.”
[13]
Moreover,
in consideration of whether the Applicant would be subject to a risk of his
life or to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or torture, The Board
determined that “[b]ased on the above analysis, on a balance of probabilities,
I find there are no such risks.”
ISSUES
[14]
The
Applicant submits the following issues on this application:
1.
Did
the Board act without jurisdiction, act beyond its jurisdiction or refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction?
2.
Did
the Board fail to observe principles of natural justice, procedural fairness or
other procedures that it was required by law to observe?
3.
Did
the Board err in law in making the Decision, whether or not the error appears
on the face of the record?
4.
Did
the Board base its Decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact, made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before it?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[15]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need
of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country
and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless
imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
|
Définition de
« réfugié »
96. A qualité
de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors
du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le
croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la
Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements
ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2)
A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le
besoin de protection.
|
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[16]
In Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9, [2008]
1 S.C.R. 190, the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized that, although the reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness standards
are theoretically different, “the analytical problems that arise in trying to
apply the different standards undercut any conceptual usefulness created by the
inherently greater flexibility of having multiple standards of review” (Dunsmuir at paragraph 44). Consequently, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the two reasonableness standards should be
collapsed into a single form of “reasonableness” review.
[17]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir also held that
the standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance.
Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the particular question
before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may
adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the
reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the
standard of review analysis.
[18]
Reasonableness
is the appropriate standard of review with regard to findings of fact. See Dunsmuir,
supra and Golesorkhi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 511, [2008] F.C.J. No. 637 at
paragraph 8. Accordingly, when considering whether the tribunal based its
decision on erroneous finding of facts, or without regard to the evidence
before it, reasonableness is the appropriate standard.
[19]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir at
paragraph 47. Put another way, the Court should only intervene if the Decision was unreasonable in the
sense that it falls outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which
are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
[20]
The
Applicant had also raised procedural fairness issues which are reviewed on a
standard of correctness. See Dunsmuir, supra, and Golesorkhi, supra.
Correctness is also the appropriate standard when considering whether or not
the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. See Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Hua, 2001 FCT 722.
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
Factual error
[21]
The
Applicant submits that the Board erred when stating that his submissions were
received and considered. The Applicant contends that no submissions were
received; nor was his counsel given the opportunity to provide them. Rather, the
oral hearing concluded without submissions and observations, and was adjourned
pending the Board’s request for additional documents.
[22]
The
Applicant submitted documents prior to the deadline for document submission. At
the end of the oral hearing, the Applicant’s counsel was advised that a
decision would be made with regard to the Applicant’s further attendance
regarding questions that might arise from post-oral hearing documents. Counsel
was also told that a decision would be made with regard to submissions and the format
thereof. However, no further contact took place until the Applicant received
the negative decision.
[23]
The
Applicant is entitled to make representations pursuant to section 107(c) of the
Act. The Applicant submits that denying his counsel this opportunity is a
breach of procedural fairness, since the Applicant was unable to address the
concerns stated by the Board.
Inconsistent
Dates
[24]
The
Applicant contends that the Board erred further when it alleged that the
Applicant was mistaken with regard to the date of his father’s arrest. The
Applicant used a Farsi interpreter at the oral hearing and provided his
interpreter with the same day that was stated in his PIF. Accordingly, the
Applicant explained that if an error had been made, it was an error of
interpretation in converting Farsi dates to English.
[25]
The
Applicant submits that the Iranian calendar is difficult to convert for Farsi
interpreters. Accordingly, a date in February, 2006 could be calculated with
reference to both January and March, 2006. Furthermore, the Applicant contends
that no other date in either the PIF or with regard to the Applicant’s
testimony was compromised with the result of either date being used.
[26]
In
the alternative, even if the Applicant did make an error with regard to the
date given, he submits that the Board erred in failing to consider the relevant
evidence regarding his diagnoses of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and of being
a vulnerable person. These diagnoses were accepted by the Board. However, the
member failed to consider other relevant evidence because of the one allegedly
inconsistent statement on which she based her entire finding of credibility.
False
Documents
[27]
The
Board erred in both fact and law when it rejected all of the documents from
Iran as being false and gave no weight to the physical examination that took
place in Canada.
[28]
The
Board determined that the Notification Paper and Writ of Summons that were
issued by the Iranian Justice Department were false since, according to
documentary evidence, defendants are never given such documentation. However,
the Applicant submits that the Board itself spoke to the unpredictability of
the Iranian authorities in not always obeying their own laws.
[29]
The
Board erred in its assessment of the Notification Paper and Writ of Summons,
and accordingly rejected all of the documents tendered from Iran, as well as
the results of the Applicant’s physical examination in Canada. The
Applicant submits that there is no connection between the documents from Iran
and the findings of the medical examination in Canada.
Consequently, the Board erred in failing to consider relevant post-hearing
medical evidence that was submitted at the request of the Board itself.
Leading
questions
[30]
The
Applicant contends that the Board also erred in finding that counsel had led
the Applicant during the hearing. Moreover, contrary to the conclusion of the Board,
a finding that the Applicant was not detained in 1999 and did not suffer the
harm alleged does not automatically flow from the Applicant’s failing to
volunteer information regarding his release.
[31]
At
the beginning of the hearing, the Applicant was advised by the Board that he
did not have to repeat matters found in his PIF. The Applicant discussed signing
the undertaking in his PIF. The Applicant submits that he misunderstood his
counsel’s question and that, based on his response, his misunderstanding was clear.
Accordingly, counsel used another method to clarify the question at issue. The Applicant
argues that counsel did not ask whether the Applicant had signed an undertaking
upon his release; he simply asked whether or not the Applicant had signed
anything upon his release.
Failure to
provide witness
[32]
The
Applicant contends that the Board made unsupported conclusions based on
speculation when it drew a negative inference regarding the Applicant’s
residence in Iran. The member
said her negative inference was based on the fact that no evidence was received
from the Applicant’s sister with regard to picking him up at the airport. The
Applicant submits that this is irrelevant, since such evidence does not impact
whether or not the Applicant was in Iran at the time of the alleged
incidents. Rather, the Applicant’s sister would only be able to provide
evidence with regard to her attendance at the airport and their travels
thereafter.
[33]
The
Applicant submits that the Board ignored relevant evidence in the post-hearing
documents that corroborates the Applicant’s presence in Iran at the time
of the incidents. Such evidence includes medical records with regard to the
Applicant’s broken leg (dated 2003) and a computer course certificate (dated
September 2005). Had the Board considered these documents, it would not have
concluded that “the panel has no evidence that the Applicant was in Iran during the
time of the alleged incidents.”
[34]
Moreover,
since it was the member herself who requested these documents, if she had no
questions with regard to them, then presumably she accepted their validity. Accordingly,
the Board had unchallenged and corroborated evidence before it that the
Applicant was indeed in Iran at the time of the alleged incidents
occurred.
Fear
of disclosure
[35]
The
Board erred in finding the Applicant’s fears with regard to the disclosure of
his refugee claim to be baseless. While the Applicant concedes that such
information is protected by the Canadian government, the Board failed to
consider that disclosure could occur within the Iranian Community. Moreover,
the Applicant has been in Canada for an extended period of time and fled Iran without an
exit visa, an Iranian passport, or a Canadian visa. Thus, the state of Iran
could logically conclude that a refugee claim was being made in Canada, or else the
Applicant would have been refused entry and deported shortly thereafter.
No
weight to medial reports
[36]
The
Board also erred in law by accepting the Applicant’s diagnoses of PTSD,
depression and being a vulnerable person, but then refusing to give the medical
reports any weight. The medical specialists made their diagnoses based on
interviews with the Applicant and symptoms they observed which corroborated substantive
aspects of the Applicant’s evidence. Thus, it is unreasonable to accept the
diagnoses while disregarding the evidence which would corroborate the
Applicant’s claim.
Risk
assessment under section 97
[37]
Finally,
the Applicant submits that the Board erred when it failed to conduct an assessment
of the risk categories listed under section 97. The Board simply relied on its
analysis for section 96 and found that “[b]ased on the above analysis, on a
balance of probabilities, I find there are no such risks.”
The
Respondent
[38]
The
Respondent submits that by referencing Post Hearing Applicant Document 1 in its
Decision, the Board clearly demonstrated that the post-hearing documentary
evidence adduced by the Applicant was considered.
[39]
Moreover,
the hearing transcript makes it clear that the Board asked the Applicant if he
would like to make submissions but that he declined this opportunity. The
Applicant then acknowledged that submissions may not be required if the Board
had no additional questions with regard to the post-hearing documents. The Board
clearly had no additional questions which required the re-attendance of, and additional
submissions by, the Applicant.
[40]
The
Respondent contends that the pursuant to section 170(e) of the Act, the Board
afforded the Applicant an opportunity to present evidence, make
representations, and question witnesses.
[41]
Moreover,
all of the evidence was thoroughly considered by the Board in its rejection of
the Applicant’s claim, including the post-hearing documents.
No error in
finding of credibility
[42]
The
Court should not interfere with the Board’s assessment of credibility when it
is based on an oral hearing because the Board has had the advantage of seeing
and hearing the witness. On the other hand, the Court may interfere if it is
satisfied that the Board based its conclusion on irrelevant considerations, or
ignored evidence; however, the Respondent submits that this did not occur in
the present case.
[43]
Furthermore,
the Court should not interfere where the Board’s inferences and conclusions are
reasonable. It is not the Court’s role to re-weigh the evidence, even if it
disagrees with the inferences and findings of the Board.
[44]
The
Board found the Applicant was not credible. The Respondent submits that this
finding was open to the Board because of the Applicant’s inconsistency in
testimony on a key issue and the tendering of false documents to the Board. The
Applicant cast doubt on the totality of his testimony. As stated by the Federal
Court in Sheikh v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 238, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 604 at 244:
[E]ven without disbelieving every word an
applicant has uttered, a…panel may reasonably find him so lacking in
credibility that it concludes there is no credible evidence relevant to his
claim….In other words, a general finding of a lack of credibility on the part
of the applicant may conceivably extend to all relevant evidence emanating from
his testimony.
Date
inconsistency
[45]
Although
the Applicant attempted to explain his inconsistency with regard to the date of
his father’s arrest as being an error in calendar interpretation, the
Respondent contends that the Board refuted this argument in finding that the
date of his father’s arrest was the only inconsistent date given by the
Applicant. Accordingly, had an interpretation error existed, the Respondent
submits that it would have been a consistent error over the interpretation of
the Iranian calendar.
[46]
The
Respondent points out that no single error was responsible for the Board’s
finding that the Applicant was not credible. Rather, it was the totality of the
evidence which included inconsistencies and implausibilities that led to the
Board’s negative finding on credibility.
No error in
weighing medical evidence
[47]
The
Board concluded that, while the diagnoses were accurate, the doctors’ reports
should be given no weight since they had no probative value in connection with
the Applicant’s treatment in Iran. The Respondent contends that there is no
automatic correlation between the diagnosis of psychological problems and the
cause of psychological problems. Accordingly, the Board did not err in accepting
the diagnoses as legitimate while also rejecting the Applicant’s claim that his
psychological problems had been caused by mistreatment in Iran.
[48]
The
Respondent submits that, based on the Board’s negative credibility finding, it
was open to the Board to find that the Applicant’s medical evidence did not
relate to incidents of persecution. A similar situation occurred in the case of
Boateng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995]
F.C.J. No. 517, where the following determination was made at paragraph 5:
Where, as in this case, the Board did not
find the applicant to be credible, the medical evidence did not persuade the
Board that the scars which were present on the applicant necessarily stemmed
from persecution…It is not necessary for the Board to speculate as to the origin
of the scars but rather it must determine whether the scars and bumps found on
the body of the applicant resulted from persecution… .
[49]
Accordingly,
the Respondent contends that the weight given to medical reports depends on
their relevancy and consistency with the totality of the evidence. In this
case, documentary evidence shows that an accused in Iran is not given
a copy of arrest warrants when charged with a serious crime, and that forged
official Iranian documents are common. As a result, it was not unreasonable for
the Board to find it implausible that the Applicant would be given a Writ of
Summons and a Notification Paper after having been detained.
[50]
The
Applicant’s contention that, because the Board accepted that the Iranian
authorities do not always follow their own laws it should, therefore, have
inferred that the documents adduced were authentic, is not persuasive.
[51]
The
Respondent submits that the existence of an alternative inference does not make
the Board’s inference erroneous, as long as the Board’s initial inference was
reasonable on the facts. The country conditions supported the Board’s inference
that the Applicant would not have been given a Writ of Summons or a
Notification Paper because his alleged crimes were serious in nature.
[52]
The
Respondent points to the Board’s reference to Osyande in making its
determination of the Applicant’s credibility. Indeed, according to Osyande,
an applicant who tenders false documents with regard to a certain instance
damages his or her credibility with regard to not only that instance, but also
to the totality of the evidence.
[53]
The
Respondent contends that, based on the logic of Osyande, because the
Board determined that the Applicant’s documents were false, it was reasonable
for the Board to make an adverse inference with regard to the Applicant’s
overall credibility.
Fear
of Iranian knowledge of refugee claim
[54]
The
Respondent submits that in order for the Applicant to be a refugee sur place,
there is an onus on him to show an objective basis for his subjectively held,
prospective fear of persecution. The Board determined that no objective basis
existed in this instance because all Canadian refugee claims are kept
confidential. As such, the Board committed no error in finding that the
Applicant’s fear of persecution upon his return was not objectively
substantiated.
Separate
section 97 analysis not required
[55]
The
Respondent contends that the Board conducted a section 97 analysis, despite the
fact that it did not use the specific words “section 97.” The Respondent says
this conclusion is obvious based on the wording of the Decision which contains
language that mirrors the language of section 97.
[56]
The
Respondent acknowledges Kule, but finds this case to be
distinguishable on its facts because the testimony of the applicant in Kule was
considered credible. In the case at hand, however, the Applicant’s testimony
and evidence were not considered credible. Moreover, the Respondent notes that
the applicant in Kule had different grounds for his sections 96 and 97
refugee claims while, in the case at hand, the grounds for each of the section 96
and 97 claims were the same. Consequently, the Respondent submits that the
inconsistencies and the implausibilities that were the basis for the rejection
of the Applicant’s application under section 96 apply equally to his section 97
claim.
ANALYSIS
[57]
At
the heart of the Decision are two general negative credibility findings from
which everything else flows.
[58]
The
first one involves the discrepancy in dates over the father’s arrest. As a
result of this discrepancy the Board finds “the claimant not to be a credible
or trustworthy witness.”
[59]
The
second negative finding results from the Board’s reading of the country
documents to indicate that “in serious issues the defendant is never provided
with a copy of the warrant.” This leads to a conclusion with regards to the
Writ of Summons and Notification that, because official documents are often
forged in Iran, “I find the
claimant tendered false documents to the Board with the intention of misleading
the Board.”
[60]
These
two findings are not independent because the Board says “[s]ince I do not
believe the claimant, I prefer the information in the country documents to that
of the claimant’s.”
[61]
In
the end, everything can be related back to the negative credibility finding
based upon the discrepancy in dates regarding the father’s arrest.
[62]
In
written argument, the Respondent says that “no single factor determined the
adverse credibility finding. Instead, the totality of the evidence, with its
inconsistencies and implausibilities mutually as opposed to individually
considered, led to the finding that the Applicant was not a credible witness.”
This is not the case.
[63]
The
Decision is, in fact, an inverted pyramid. In the end, everything can be traced
back to one discrepancy in dates over the father’s arrest. The balance of the
Decision dealing with documentation, the medical evidence from both Iran and Canada,
and the sister’s failure to testify all relate back in one way or another to
the one inconsistency in dates. Take, for example, the medical evidence:
Since I have found the claimant to have
tendered false documents to the Board, on a balance of probabilities, I reject
all of the documents tendered from Iran
and give no weight to the findings of the physical examination conducted in
Canada.
The finding on false
documents arises because “[s]ince I do not believe the claimant, I prefer the
information in the country documents to that of the claimants.” And the reason
why the Board does not believe the Applicant is because of the inconsistency
over the date of the father’s arrest.
[64]
As
a result, if the Board’s conclusion with regard to the date discrepancy is
unreasonable, the whole inverted pyramid comes tumbling down.
[65]
In
his PIF the Applicant said that his father was arrested on February 21, 2006.
However, he testified through a Farsi interpreter. At the hearing he again
testified through a Farsi interpreter and this time the interpretation came out
as March 13, 2006.
[66]
The
transcript shows that in order to provide the March 13, 2006 date, the
Applicant had to convert from the Iranian to the western calendar:
So it’s on the 22nd of month of
Islam of 84 which is the Iranian calendar and if I may I will just convert it.
That would be 13th of March, 2006.
[67]
When
the discrepancy with dates was raised with the Applicant, he gave the following
answers:
1.
“So
22nd of month of 1384 of the Iranian calendar”;
2.
“The
date is exactly on that 22nd of month of Estan(ph) and Madam Member,
22nd of that month is 13th of March of 2006”;
3.
“I
don’t know exactly because it should be that month of Estan(ph), because that
was the date. Madam Member, month of Estan runs between 20th of
February to 20th of March”;
4.
“So
when I said 22nd of 12, which is Estan of Iranian Calendar, I meant
to say 22nd of February, because Estan is 12 in Farsi and then 2 in
February 2006, but that’s where I made the mistake.”
[68]
It
is clear from the relevant passages in the transcript that the inconsistency
arose because of a mistake in converting from the Iranian to the western
calendar.
[69]
The
Board rejects the Applicant’s explanation for the mistake in conversion and, on
the basis of this mistake, eventually goes on to reject everything else he says
and all of the documents he tenders. A similar error occurred in Bahdanava
c. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1365, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1727 at
paragraphs 12-13.
[70]
The
Board does not check to see if the date from the Iranian calendar is
consistent. Instead, it faults the Applicant entirely for his attempts at
conversion and refuses to believe anything he says.
[71]
At
the hearing, the Board appeared to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt.
At page 182 of the transcript the Board leaves the matter thus:
Claimant: I
don’t know exactly because it should be that month of Estan(ph), because that
was the date. Madam Member, month of Estan runs between 20th of
February to 20th of March.
Member: Okay,
so it could have been. I’ll leave you to make submissions on that.
No further submissions were made on the
point because the Board did not provide the opportunity for submissions that it
said it would provide.
[72]
It
is important to put this issue in perspective. The Applicant later produced
Canadian medical evidence of severe physical and psychological trauma. The
Applicant says that if he is sent back to Iran he will be
tortured and killed. Notwithstanding these dire consequences, the Board, in
effect, chose to reject all of the verbal testimony and written evidence of the
Applicant on the basis of a single inconsistency in dates which the Board
indicates it will allow submissions on, but then rendered a negative decision
without allowing submissions. See, for example, Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Dhaliwal-Williams, 131 F.T.R. 19, [1997]
F.C.J. No. 567 at paragraph 9.
[73]
As
regards the issue of submissions, it is worth pointing out that, at the
beginning of the Decision the Board says “Submissions received and considered.”
However, the record is clear that no submissions were made. The reason why is a
little complex but my review of the transcript leads me to conclude that they
were not made because counsel was never allowed an opportunity to make them.
This is contrary to section 170 of the Act. See section 170 of the Act which
provides that the RPD must give the Applicant “a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence, question witnesses and make representations.
[74]
The
following appear in the transcript:
1.
Page
185
Member: Before
we start, sir, I’m going to give you time to get the medical report and the
original summons. Counsel you have the option of giving me your submissions now
or waiting until we see if we can get those documents?
Counsel
for Applicant: Maybe I could do both. Assuming I get an opportunity to
comment on the documents when they come in as we all will. I don’t know if
you’re planning on reconvening.
2.
Page
186:
Member: Well
if the claimant provides credible hospital documents for example, that shows he
was there at the time, at least 2003 I guess, and we don’t know what Iranian X-rays
look like. But I know that in Canada they usually have the date at the bottom
of them.
Counsel
for the Claimant: I’ll wait for the documents. I dearly wanted the
opportunity to respond to his prosecution versus persecution.
Refugee
Protection Officer: I know
Counsel
for the Claimant: But I’ll wait for the documents.
Member: Okay
sir, how long do you think you will need to get the documents over here?
[75]
Under
covering letter on October 22, 2008, counsel for the Applicant provided the
post-hearing documents that the Applicant had been able to obtain and said “I
await the Board’s instructions.”
[76]
Counsel
needed the Board’s instructions because, at the hearing, the transcript discussion
shows that he needed to know whether the Board had any problems with the
post-hearing documents.
[77]
No
instructions came from the Board. The Board simply issued a negative decision
in which it said “Submissions received and considered.”
[78]
This
amounts to a breach of procedural fairness. Section 170 of the Act says that
the Board “must” give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence, question witnesses and “make representation.” That did not
occur in this case with the result that the Applicant was deprived of a
significant right that the Board indicated he would have. See, for example, Dhaliwal-Williams,
supra.
[79]
There
are various other problems with the Decision. However, the foregoing are
sufficient to render it procedurally unfair and unreasonable. It must be
returned for reconsideration.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
1.
The
application is allowed. The Decision is quashed and the matter is returned for
reconsideration.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James
Russell”