Date:
20121129
Docket:
T-2102-10
Citation: 2012 FC 1393
Ottawa,
Ontario, November 29, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Gagné
BETWEEN:
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VLASTA STUBICAR
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Plaintiff
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
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Defendant
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
By
motion to the Court, the defendant seeks summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s
Amended Statement of Claim on the grounds that it is statute-barred pursuant to
section 106 of the Customs Act, RSC
1985, c 1 (2nd Supp) [Act] and that it otherwise raises no genuine issue
for trial.
[2]
In
order to succeed, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff’s case, as it
stands, “is
so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact at a
future trial.” However, before reaching such a conclusion, this Court “must
proceed with care, as the effect of the granting of summary judgment will
preclude [the plaintiff] from presenting any evidence at trial with respect to
the issues in dispute. In other words, [the plaintiff would] lose [her] “day
in Court”” (see Source
Enterprises Ltd v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 966 at paras 20-21,
[2012] FCJ No 1032).
[3]
The
relevant provisions of the Federal Courts Rules (SOR/98-106) in the case at bar read
as follows:
213. (1) A party may bring a motion for summary judgment or
summary trial on all or some of the issues raised in the pleadings at any
time after the defendant has filed a defence but before the time and place
for trial have been fixed.
(2) If a party brings a motion for
summary judgment or summary trial, the party may not bring a further motion
for either summary judgment or summary trial except with leave of the Court.
(3) A motion for summary judgment or
summary trial in an action may be brought by serving and filing a notice of
motion and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the
notice for the hearing of the motion.
(4) A party served with a motion for
summary judgment or summary trial shall serve and file a respondent’s motion
record not later than 10 days before the day set out in the notice of motion
for the hearing of the motion.
[…]
215. (1) If on a motion for summary judgment the Court is
satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or
defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
(2) If the Court is satisfied that the
only genuine issue is
(a) the amount to which the
moving party is entitled, the Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary
judgment with a reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or
(b) a question of law, the Court may determine the
question and grant summary judgment accordingly.
(3) If the Court is satisfied that there
is a genuine issue of fact or law for trial with respect to a claim or a
defence, the Court may
(a) nevertheless determine that issue by way of summary
trial and make any order necessary for the conduct of the summary trial; or
(b) dismiss the motion in whole or in part and order
that the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary
judgment, proceed to trial or that the action be conducted as a specially
managed proceeding.
216. (1) The motion record for a summary trial shall contain
all of the evidence on which a party seeks to rely, including
(a) affidavits;
(b) admissions under rule 256;
(c) affidavits or statements of an expert witness
prepared in accordance with subsection 258(5); and
(d) any part of the evidence that would be admissible
under rules 288 and 289.
(2) No further affidavits or statements
may be served, except
(a) in the case of the moving party, if their content
is limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial as rebuttal evidence
and they are served and filed at least 5 days before the day set out in the
notice of motion for the hearing of the summary trial; or
(b) with leave of the Court.
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213. (1) Une partie peut présenter une requête en jugement
sommaire ou en procès sommaire à l’égard de toutes ou d’une partie des
questions que soulèvent les actes de procédure. Le cas échéant, elle la
présente après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur et avant que les heures,
date et lieu de l’instruction soient fixés.
(2) Si une partie présente l’une de ces
requêtes en jugement sommaire ou en procès sommaire, elle ne peut présenter
de nouveau l’une ou l’autre de ces requêtes à moins d’obtenir l’autorisation
de la Cour.
(3) La requête en jugement sommaire ou
en procès sommaire dans une action est présentée par signification et dépôt
d’un avis de requête et d’un dossier de requête au moins vingt jours avant la
date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis.
(4) La partie qui reçoit signification
de la requête signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse au moins dix jours
avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis de requête.
[…]
215. (1) Si, par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la
Cour est convaincue qu’il n’existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant
à une déclaration ou à une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en
conséquence.
(2) Si la Cour est convaincue que la
seule véritable question litigieuse est :
a) la somme à laquelle le requérant a
droit, elle peut ordonner l’instruction de cette question ou rendre un
jugement sommaire assorti d’un renvoi pour détermination de la somme
conformément à la règle 153;
b) un point de droit, elle peut
statuer sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(3) Si la Cour est convaincue qu’il
existe une véritable question de fait ou de droit litigieuse à l’égard d’une
déclaration ou d’une défense, elle peut :
a) néanmoins trancher cette question
par voie de procès sommaire et rendre toute ordonnance nécessaire pour le
déroulement de ce procès;
b) rejeter la requête en tout ou en
partie et ordonner que l’action ou toute question litigieuse non tranchée par
jugement sommaire soit instruite ou que l’action se poursuive à titre
d’instance à gestion spéciale.
216. (1) Le dossier de requête en procès sommaire contient la
totalité des éléments de preuve sur lesquels une partie compte se fonder,
notamment :
a) les affidavits;
b) les aveux visés à la règle 256;
c) les affidavits et les déclarations
des témoins experts établis conformément au paragraphe 258(5);
d) les éléments de preuve admissibles
en vertu des règles 288 et 289.
(2) Des affidavits ou déclarations
supplémentaires ne peuvent être signifiés que si, selon le cas :
a) s’agissant du requérant, ces
affidavits ou déclarations seraient admissibles en contre-preuve à
l’instruction et leurs signification et dépôt sont faits au moins cinq jours
avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis de requête;
b) la Cour l’autorise.
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[4]
As
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada and applied by this Court, while the
moving party has the onus of establishing that there is no genuine issue for
trial, the responding party (the plaintiff in this case), must “put her best
foot forward” in order to show that her claim has “a real chance of success” (see
Hercules
Managements Ltd v Ernst & Young,
[1997] SCJ No 51 at para 15 and Baron
v Canada, [2000]
FCJ No 263 at para 24). As will be discussed below, the
plaintiff has attempted to achieve this through her detailed affidavit of
September 17, 2012, and the many exhibits filed in support thereof.
The summary of facts
as they appear from the plaintiff’s Amended statement of claim, affidavit and
exhibits
[5]
The
plaintiff has dual citizenship, Croatian by birth and Canadian by
naturalization.
[6]
On
December 24, 2008, at 2:30 p.m., the plaintiff arrived at the Calgary International Airport from Croatia, through London Heathrow Airport. She was then in
possession of both her Canadian and Croatian passports. In her Croatian
passport, she had inserted her Croatian Identity Card and two photographs.
[7]
She
presented herself to the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] primary line
Border Services Officer BXS010 [primary line BSO] (see plaintiff’s exhibit C).
A few questions were asked and answered, her E311 declaration card was stamped
and she was directed towards the Border Services Officer stationed at point
[point officer], who let her go through and wished her happy holidays. She was
neither directed to the immigration secondary area, nor to the customs
secondary area (see plaintiff’s exhibit N, page 6).
[8]
On
December 27, 2008, the plaintiff realized that her Croatian passport, along
with her Croatian Identity card and photographs [missing documents] were
missing. She initially thought she had inadvertently lost them and went to the
Air Canada lost and found office at the Calgary International Airport. She was told that they were not there and was given a printout of the search. The Air
Canada employee suggested that she check with the Calgary police and the CBSA
office at the Calgary International Airport, which she did. The CBSA officer
looked in a drawer but did not find the missing documents (see plaintiff's
exhibit L).
[9]
On
December 30, 2008, she went to the Croatian Embassy in Ottawa and reported having
lost her Croatian passport (see plaintiff’s exhibit L).
[10]
On
October 31, 2009 (i.e. over ten months after having noticed that her Croatian
passport was missing) the plaintiff claims to have recalled, at the occurrence of
an event which will be more fully discussed below, that the missing documents
were seized on December 24, 2008, by the CBSA at her arrival at the Calgary International
Airport. According to the plaintiff, she then recalled that both her passports
were handed over to the primary line BSO, but that only her Canadian passport,
along with her E311 declaration card, were handed back to her.
[11]
On
March 16, 2010, the plaintiff wrote to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness [Minister] to request an extension of time, pursuant to sections
129 and 129.1 of the Act, in order to seek the Minister’s intervention in
accordance with section 131 of the Act (exhibit L). The plaintiff’s request was
reiterated through her Member of Parliament, Mr. Bernard Bigras on June 10,
2010.
[12]
On
September 8, 2010, the Minister wrote to the plaintiff (her exhibit M). His
answer will be reproduced at length:
Dear Ms. Stubicar:
You Member of
Parliament, Mr. Bernard Bigras, wrote to me on your behalf on June 14, 2010,
concerning your border clearance at Calgary International Airport on December
24, 2008. I also want to acknowledge your correspondence to me on this issue
and apologize for the delay in responding.
The Canada Border
Services Agency (CBSA) border services offers are positioned to interview
travellers and importers and to examine personal and commercial goods entering
and leaving Canada. The agency's mandate is to ensure that only admissible
people and goods have access to Canada. The CBSA takes seriously its commitment
to provide high-quality service to travellers while ensuring that Canadian society
is protected through the responsible enforcement of Canada’s laws.
Upon receipt of your
correspondences, I requested that CBSA officials investigate and provide a
report. Their findings indicate that no seizure or detention actions were
taken against you on December 24, 2008.
I am also advised that
the CBSA and the Calgary Airport Authority have undertaken an exhaustive search
of items brought to the Lost and Found areas at Calgary International Airport
and that, unfortunately, your missing documents were not found. I regret that
there is no action that the agency is able to take that may assist you in this
matter.
Thank you for writing.
Yours sincerely,
Vic Toews, P.C., Q.C.,
M.P.
c.c.: Mr. Bernard
Bigras, M.P.
Rosemont-La
Petite-Patrie
[13]
In
addition to her fifteen requests to the CBSA pursuant to the Privacy Act
and the Access to Information Act (which will be discussed below), the
plaintiff brought the within action against her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada on December 20, 2010, seeking:
i.
“An
order declaring
that Defendant and her officers and agents have violated the plaintiff’s rights
under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom…;
ii.
An
order granting the following remedy pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter: that
the Defendant and her officers and agents shall, without delay, return to the Plaintiff
all personal documents, including copies thereof, that were seized, on December
24, 2008, at port of entry Calgary International Airport by Defendant’s
officer, Border Services Officer (BSO), Bethany Haeckel;
iii.
Costs;
and,
iv.
Such
further and other relief as this Honourable Court deems just.”
Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment
Is plaintiff’s claim
time-barred?
[14]
According
to the defendant, since the plaintiff claims that the defendant is vicariously
liable for the action of the primary line BSO, pursuant to sections 32 of the Crown
Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC, 1985, c C-50 [CLPA], the
limitation period to be applied is the one set forth in section 106 of the Act,
which reads as follows:
106. (1) No action or judicial proceeding shall be commenced
against an officer for anything done in the performance of his duties under
this or any other Act of Parliament or a person called on to assist an
officer in the performance of such duties more than three months after the
time when the cause of action or the subject-matter of the proceeding arose.
(2) No action or judicial proceeding
shall be commenced against the Crown, an officer or any person in possession
of goods under the authority of an officer for the recovery of anything
seized, detained or held in custody or safe-keeping under this Act more than
three months after the later of
(a) the time when the cause of action or the
subject-matter of the proceeding arose, and
(b) the final determination of the outcome of any
action or proceeding taken under this Act in respect of the thing seized,
detained or held in custody or safe-keeping.
[…]
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106. (1) Les actions contre l’agent, pour tout acte accompli
dans l’exercice des fonctions que lui confère la présente loi ou toute autre
loi fédérale, ou contre une personne requise de l’assister dans l’exercice de
ces fonctions, se prescrivent par trois mois à compter du fait générateur du
litige.
(2) Les actions en recouvrement de biens
saisis, retenus ou placés sous garde ou en dépôt conformément à la présente
loi, contre la Couronne, l’agent ou le détenteur de marchandises que l’agent
lui a confiées, se prescrivent par trois mois à compter de celle des dates
suivantes qui est postérieure à l’autre :
a) la date du fait générateur du
litige;
b) la date du règlement définitif de
toute instance introduite en vertu de la présente loi au sujet des biens en
cause.
[…]
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[15]
As to section 32 of the CLPA, it provides
that where the relevant time-bar is found “in any other Act of Parliament”,
those provisions shall apply:
32. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act or in any other Act of Parliament, the laws relating to
prescription and the limitation of actions in force in a province between
subject and subject apply to any proceedings by or against the Crown in
respect of any cause of action arising in that province, and proceedings by
or against the Crown in respect of a cause of action arising otherwise than
in a province shall be taken within six years after the cause of action
arose.
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32. Sauf disposition
contraire de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale, les règles de
droit en matière de prescription qui, dans une province, régissent les
rapports entre particuliers s’appliquent lors des poursuites auxquelles
l’État est partie pour tout fait générateur survenu dans la province. Lorsque
ce dernier survient ailleurs que dans une province, la procédure se prescrit
par six ans.
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[16]
The
following dates are to be considered in determining at what point in time the plaintiff’s
cause of action might have arisen: the missing documents were allegedly seized
on December 24, 2008; the plaintiff noticed they were missing on December 27,
2008; she made a link between their loss and the defendant on October 31, 2009;
and the Minister replied to her request on September 8, 2010. The defendant
argues that at best, the plaintiff’s cause of action arose on September 8,
2010, so that her claim issued on December 20, 2010 (i.e. three months and 12
days later) is statute-barred.
[17]
The
plaintiff replies that section 106 of the Act does not apply to her claim since
the primary line BSO did not act in pursuance of her duties under the Act. If
she had, says the plaintiff, she would have notified her and issued the
“seizure receipt” requested by section 110(4) of the Act.
[18]
The
plaintiff further argues that when the primary line BSO illegally seized her
missing documents, she acted under the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. To reach this last conclusion, she relies on the
defendant’s affidavit sworn by Ralph Lombardo (which, according to plaintiff, should
be given little to no weight), which states:
“had a seizure been made, Ms.
Stubicar would have received a IMM 5265 “Seizure Form” stating that date, the
items that were seized and signed by both the seizing Officer and Ms.
Stubicar. There is no such document”
[19]
The
statutory authority for the IMM 5265 “Seizure Form” being the IRPA, says the
plaintiff, the primary line BSO would have acted outside the scope of the Act.
[20]
I
disagree with plaintiff for several reasons.
[21]
First,
it is uncontested that neither the Seizure Receipt provided for in section
110(4) of the Act, nor the Seizure Form provided for by the IRPA, were filled and
issued to the plaintiff. It is also uncontested that the primary line BSO did
not refer the plaintiff to the immigration secondary area, but that she was
referred to the point officer who simply let her go through.
[22]
Furthermore,
section 106 of the Act is found in its part VI entitled ENFORCEMENT (sections
98 to 163). This part begins with subtitle POWERS OF OFFICERS, and gives the “officers”,
as defined in section 2, broad powers to ensure the effective enforcement of
the Act. Section 106 of the Act is broad enough to cover any act performed by the
primary line BSO on December 24, 2008, namely “anything done in the performance
of [her] duties under this or any other Act of Parliament”. The primary line
BSO was on duty at the Calgary International Airport on December 24, 2008, and
the defendant is being held vicariously liable for an alleged fault or tort by
her in her capacity of servant of the Crown, within the meaning of paragraph 3
b)(i) of the CLPA.
[23]
Finally,
the plaintiff has taken the following steps and made the following arguments based
on part VI of the Act:
a. In
one of her requests under the Access to Information Act (exhibit D), the
plaintiff was asking for “the name of officer BXS010 to whom [she] presented
herself… on returning to Canada… on December 24, 2008, as that name appears on
documents… prepared by officer BXS010 in the performance of her duties under
the Customs Act (notably s. 11 (1)) or under any other Act of Parliament…)”. Plaintiff
is using the exact language found in section 106 of the Act;
b. In
her letter of March 16, 2010, to the Minister (exhibit L), plaintiff made an
“Application pursuant to s. 129.1 of the Customs Act for
extension of time (limited by s. 129 of the Customs Act) to apply
for ministerial review under s. 131 of the Customs Act regarding
specific seizure of “goods” as defined under s. 2(1) of the Customs Act
including “any document in any form.”” (The emphasis are in her original
letter) Sections 129, 129.1 and 131, as section 106, are all found in part VI
of the Act;
c. The
plaintiff blames the primary line BSO and other CBSA officers for having
queried her name in the Integrated Customs Enforcement System (ICES), which
contains “information […] used by the Agency for the enforcement of the Customs
Act” (see plaintiff’s exhibit R).
[24]
I
therefore conclude that section 106 of the Act applies to the plaintiff’s claim
and that her action against the defendant, for any act allegedly
performed on December 24, 2008, by the primary line BSO in the performance of
her duties, is statute-barred. In so finding, I am
following the approach favored by the Federal Court of Appeal in Ingredia
SA v Produits Laitiers Advidia Inc, 2010 FCA 176 at paras 31-41, [2010] FCJ
No 893.
Does plaintiff's claim
disclose a genuine issue for trial?
[25]
In
her Amended Statement of Claim and in her September 17, 2012 affidavit, the plaintiff
enumerates a number of verifications made under her name by the CBSA officers
in different systems available to them. The plaintiff is essentially seeking
from this Court i) a declaration that her “right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure”, as provided under section 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter] has been violated, and ii) an order
enjoining the defendant to return her missing documents to her.
[26]
The
plaintiff admits not having noticed the loss of the missing documents until three
days after she arrived at the Calgary International Airport. She further admits
having first thought that she had lost them, hence the fact that that the first
step she took was to visit the Air Canada lost and found office. She finally
states that her memory of the December 24, 2008 incident was triggered over ten
months later, on October 31, 2009, when she once again visited the Calgary International Airport. It is worth elaborating on the circumstances of that event,
which is described in some details in the letter that the plaintiff wrote to
the Senior Vice-President/Customer Service of Air Canada, on behalf of her
mother (her exhibit H). The most relevant excerpts of the letter are reproduced
below:
Dear…,
RE: Harassment of
Air Canada Passenger with Dual Citizenship by Air Canada Ticketing Staff at
Calgary International Airport
Please allow me to
bring to your attention the following account of my experience, on October 31,
2009, at the Calgary International Airport Air Canada ticketing counter.
With a confirmed
reservation (MK562Z) and the applicable rebooking already paid, on my behalf,
by my sister in Zagreb, Croatia, I arrived at the Calgary International
Airport Air Canada ticketing area to get my ETKT printout and to
check-in, around 17:00 (copies attached). Accompanying me was my daughter,
Vlasta Stubicar.
The first in line, I
expected to be called to proceed to the closest available counter (closer to
the east side window), staffed by a young male with fair coloured hair. A tall
South Asian Air Canada staff member arrived from behind, however, to direct me
to the counter furthest removed from the said window. Waiting there for me was
a tall young to middle-aged Caucasian female which naturally frizzy hair, sandy
coloured, neatly pulled back, who was wearing the Air Canada uniform, but
without a name tag. She would identify herself as “Susanna”….
I handed “Susanna” my
old ticket (copy attached), with a handwritten notation on the rebooking code
(MK562Z), along with my passport, and asked her to check whether I could get on
an earlier connecting flight to Zagreb. “Susanna” seemed to be taking longer
than usual, as if she were not perfectly familiar with Air Canada's reservation
system. Relying on TIAC rules, she eventually pulled up on her computer
screen, “Susanna” asked to see proof of Croatian citizenship (“a
residence card or passport”) before she could check me in. As I did not yet
have a return ticket for Canada, and had no other proof that I would not be
staying more than 90 days, except (as I would later point out) for my travel
insurance policy, Croatian authorities would require proof of citizenship,
claimed “Susanna”. In vain, my daughter and I protested that:
1)
my
Croatian nationality by birth (as documented in my Canadian passport-“HRV”)
gave me the right to return to my native land without a visa and that,
therefore, Air Canada had no right to demand further identification; and
2)
based
on past travel experience with the Lufthansia and British Airways, for
instance, this was not standard procedure.
Before long, arrived a
somewhat older Caucasian male colleague with auburn hair that seemed dyed and a
matching moustache, also in the Air Canada uniform, but without a name tag to
match the name given, “Terry”. In a very authoritarian manner, “Terry”
asserted the right to decide whether or not I would get on the plane, and with
my passport in hand, disappeared to a room in the back, along the north wall in
the terminal. A couple of times, at intervals of approximately 10 minutes, he
came out, with my passport still in his hand, only to add to an already tense
atmosphere.
[…]
Hallowe’en night at
Calgary International, with “Sneaky Susanna” and “Tricky Terry” may be a
fitting title for this strange check-in tail that raises many a question [sic]
in my mind.
1. under
whose authority were “Susanna” and “Terry” working?
2. How
does their conduct, as described above, reflect on Air Canada’s reputation for customer service?
3. More
importantly, under what authority were they allowed to demand further proof of
my Croatian nationality, under threat of denying me the right to travel?
4. If
not authorized to demand further proof of Croatian nationality, in addition to
the clear annotation in my passport, were “Susanna” and “Terry” acting on
improper, because unlawful and discriminatory, considerations?
5. Are
other holders of dual citizenship routinely subject to such harassment?
(emphasis are in the letter)
[…]
[27]
As
indicated in a facsimile that was sent to the plaintiff on October, 31, 2009,
and as it is clearly explained in Air Canada’s reply letter (exhibit H), the plaintiff’s
mother was asked to present proof of her Croatian citizenship for the sole
reason that she was flying on a one way ticket and did not have a visa
delivered by the Croatian authorities. Commercial carriers are required to
ensure that their passengers have the necessary visa or passport before they
board a flight.
[28]
That
said, this was the event that allegedly triggered the plaintiff’s memory of her
experience at the Calgary International Airport on December 24, 2008. When she
was told that Terry would not keep her mother’s Croatian passport, she replied
“Not as you sometimes do.” The Air Canada employee’s “spontaneous facial
expression (a known [sic] smile)…confirmed for [her] the inference [she] had
drawn in the course of [that] occurrence” (para 14 of plaintiff’s September 17,
2012 affidavit), that it must be what had happened to her missing documents on
December 24, 2008.
[29]
The
Court is of the opinion that there is no need to consider the defendant’s
affidavit, sworn by Ralph Lombardo, to conclude that the plaintiff’s claim
raises no genuine issue for trial. There will therefore be no need to consider the
plaintiff’s argument that, since it is chiefly based on a firm belief rather
than being confined to facts within the deponent’s personal knowledge, it shall
be given little weight by the Court for the purpose of the present motion.
[30]
Having
“put her best foot forward”, the plaintiff has neither direct nor
circumstantial evidence that a seizure of her missing documents occurred on
December 24, 2008, and it is steadily denied by the defendant in its Amended
statement of defence and by the CBSA in all the exhibits filed by the plaintiff
in support of her affidavit. As indicated above, plaintiff has made fifteen
requests to the CBSA pursuant to the Privacy Act and the Access to
Information Act and filed, in support of her affidavit, all the information
she received in response thereof. The plaintiff is thereby attempting to infer
from the several verifications made under her name by the primary line BSO and
other CBSA officers in the different systems available to them, that they had
to have her Croatian passport on hand when they queried the systems. The Court
has therefore thoroughly reviewed all the documents emanating from the CBSA, as
well as all the other exhibits filed by the plaintiff. Her numerous requests
to the CBSA are chronologically listed hereinafter and identified by the dates
at which the CBSA replied to the plaintiff:
April
1, 2010
(exhibit C) “A copy of
Traveler’s API from London LHR to Calgary on December 24, 2008, time 14:30 P.M.
Air Canada Flight #AC851, Booking #8312100 144 093 for STUBICAR, Vlasta.”
August
24, 2010
(exhibit Z) “The internal
intelligence report prepared for the CBSA and already released to the Canadian
Press under the Access to Information Act, as per the 2-page Canadian Press
article by Jennifer Ditchburn, titled “Visa exemption for Croatians could bring
war criminals: border agency and dated 15 July 2009.”
August
26, 2010
(exhibit D) “The name of
officer BXS010 to whom the undersigned presented herself and whose questions
she answered, on returning to Canada, via Calgary International Airport, on
December 24, 2008, as that name appears on documents, electronic or hard
(paper) copy prepared by officer BXS010 in the performance of her duties under
the Customs Act (notably s. 11(1)) or under any other Act of Parliament.
Attachment: 1-page ICES TRAVELLER HISTORY – TRAVELLER PASSAGE REPORT March 11,
2010.”
September
15, 2010
(exhibit F) “1. Customs
declaration card E311 filled out by STUBICAR, Vlasta on 24-12-2008.
2.
All reports prepared by CBSA Officer BXS010 at Calgary International Airport,
on 24-12-2008 as regards to STUBICAR, Vlasta.”
3.
All notes made by CBSA Officer BXS010 at Calgary Int. Airport on 24-12-2008 as
regards to STUBICAR, Vlasta.”
October
4, 2010
(exhibit S) “All personal
information and/or data retrievable by my name, Vlasta Stubicar (original
spelling Vlasta Stubicar) or by passport number […] issued to the holder, Vlasta
Stubicar, […], in Croatia and by Croatian Identity Card number [….], issued to
the same holder as found in PIB Travel and Identity Document System (TIDS)-CBSA
PPU 036.” (Passport
and identity card numbers, as well as date of birth intentionally withdrew)
October
12, 2010
(exhibit V) “The name of
the supervisor that was on duty on 24/12/08, 14:34 at Calgary International
Airport for BSO (CBSA Officer) BXS010 Bethany Haeckal.”
October
15, 2010
(exhibit U) “All personal
information retrievable by the undersigned’s name VLASTA STUBICAR (original
spelling: Stubicar), DOB: […], Croatia, in the CBSA – specific Personal
Information Bank MWCS-C, “Modern War Crimes System – Classified”, CBSA PPU
028.”
(Date of birth intentionally
withdrew)
November
22, 2010
(exhibit
R) “CBSA Manuals (electronic versions):
1.
Inland
Services Procedures Manual
2.
Recorded
Information Management Policy and Procedures Manual
3.
Traveller
Processing;”
November
29, 2010
(exhibit W) “I. Officer ID
numbers, respectively, for Murray EDWORTHY and Mike GERENCIR.
II.
Customs Notebooks used on 24/12/2008, at Calgaryy International Airport, by the
following officers: 1) BSO BXSO10, Bethany HAECKEL. 2) Supervisor Murray
EDWORTHY. 3) Supervisor Mike GERENCIR.
III.
Record Number: CBSA ADM132 (1-page copy of relevant Info Source excerpt
attached) The Information Sharing Agreement between the CBSA and Statistics
Canada, relating to E311 Traveller Declaration Cards.”
October
13, 2011
(exhibit I) “The name and
identifying (badge) number of the “point” officer on duty on 12-20-2008 [sic]
at Calgary International Airport (Point of entry) to whom the undersigned
handed her E311 card immediately following POE examination starting 14:34.”
December
15, 2011
(exhibit K) “The name and
identifying badge number of the male CBSA officer on duty at the Canada Customs
(Douanes Canada) office, at the arrivals level of Calgary International
Airport, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., on Saturday, December 27, 2008.
The said Canada Customs office is accessible to the public at the arrivals
level of Calgary International Airport.”
March
28, 2012
(exhibit BB) “The audit
records generated the storage and access in PAXIS, and other CBSA databanks, of
API/PNR data matching the undersigned’s name, Vlasta STUBICAR, and record
locator number PKD MSV.”
July
20, 2012
(exhibit DD) “The work
location (City, Department, Unit, Station, etc…) and job title, effective
24/12/2008, 15:00 00:00 (midnight), of respectively, Chris SOWDEN CXS 766 and
June DUTHIE JCD 127.”
[31]
After
careful consideration of all the exhibits filed by plaintiff, I am of the
opinion that her view is neither supported by the evidence nor by her reasons. Nowhere
in the documents issued by the BCSA do we see the plaintiff’s Croatian passport
number appear, nor do we see any indication that the CBSA would have in its
possession plaintiff’s missing documents. In all the systems queried under her
name, the plaintiff is referred to by her birth date and her Canadian passport
number.
[32]
The
plaintiff is unable to support her claim, and her allegations do not support
the remedies sought. In that sense, the plaintiff’s claim is more of a massive
investigation (that so far did not lead her anywhere) than a genuine claim and
allowing it to move forward would unduly use valuable Court time and resources.
[33]
For
these reasons, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s claim is time-barred and
that it raises no genuine issue for trial and accordingly allows the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Costs shall follow the event.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
The
defendant’s motion for summary judgement is hereby granted and the plaintiff’s
action against the defendant is dismissed, with costs.
"Jocelyne
Gagné"