Docket: IMM-3148-11
Citation: 2012 FC 89
Ottawa, Ontario, January 24, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
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TAHIR AHMAD
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
This
is an application by Tahir Ahmad (the applicant) for judicial review of a
decision of the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] officer, Anne Dello, dated April
21, 2011, in which she concluded that the applicant “faces no more than a mere
possibility of persecution as described in section 96” of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. The PRRA officer
also decided that “the applicant would not likely be at risk of torture, or
likely face a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment as described in section 97 of IRPA if returned to Pakistan”.
[2]
For
the reasons that follow, this application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Facts
A. Procedural and
factual background
[3]
The
applicant is a Pakistani of Ahmadi faith.
[4]
He
left Pakistan for Germany when he was
8 years old, accompanied by other members of his family, because his father had
been murdered by anti-Ahmadi fanatics. They filed a claim for asylum in Germany.
[5]
His
mother married a Canadian citizen, who sponsored her for immigration to Canada as a
permanent resident. Unfortunately, the applicant was rejected by his stepfather
and was told to leave the family home.
[6]
The
applicant then lived on the streets. He associated with the wrong individuals and
developed addictions to alcohol and drugs. He was convicted of 31 different
criminal offences between September 2001 and August 2006, and has added further
convictions since then.
[7]
Consequently,
he was found inadmissible to Canada on grounds of serious criminality pursuant
to paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA and ordered to leave the
country on September 7, 2004. An appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD]
resulted in a stay of deportation subject to conditions. However, the applicant
failed to comply with the conditions set out in the IAD’s decision of July 10,
2007. As a result, the matter came back before the IAD for reconsideration of
its decision.
[8]
The
IAD allowed the continuation of the stay and extended it, subject to additional
conditions. The IAD warned the applicant that any further breach of conditions
would immediately result in the cancellation of his stay of removal.
[9]
On
January 14, 2011, the applicant was convicted of breaking and entering and
robbery. His stay of removal was cancelled. On February 10, 2011, the applicant
was arrested while serving his sentence for his robbery conviction and has remained
in immigration detention.
[10]
On
June 23, 2011, Justice Zinn determined that the applicant’s motion for a stay
of removal should be allowed under certain conditions. In paragraph 11 of his
order, Justice Zinn writes:
[11] . . . I will order that the Minister
is at liberty to seek an order of the Court to vacate this Order should the
applicant be charged with any criminal offence prior to the expiry of the Order
or should he fail to comply with any term or condition of his release from
detention. The applicant has been in Canada
sufficient time to understand the saying “Three strikes and you’re out” and it
may well apply to him if he fails again to seize the opportunity presented to
him.
B. PRRA decision
[11]
In
her decision, the PRRA officer found that, while the applicant may face
discrimination because of his religious beliefs, there was insufficient
evidence that he would personally face discrimination that rises to the level
of persecution.
[12]
She
assigned little or no weight to the letters from different human rights organizations
submitted in evidence. She concluded that either they did not explain the risk
the applicant would face upon his return to Pakistan or authors
of the letters did not outline what expertise they possessed as a basis for writing
such letters.
[13]
The
PRRA officer noted that, except for the letter from the Ahmadiya Muslim Jama’at
organization [AMJO], the applicant failed to submit any objective evidence
related to his personal circumstances that would prove his Ahmadi faith to be
such an integral part of his life that it would attract unwanted attention and consequently
put him at risk of persecution in his country of origin.
[14]
The
PRRA officer concluded that the applicant failed to adduce sufficient evidence
to establish that he and his family suffered systematic and severe
discrimination in the past. Also, no evidence regarding the father’s death,
such as police reports, affidavits, or documentation related to their claim for
asylum in Germany, was
provided.
[15]
In
her conclusion, the PRRA officer accepted the fact that Pakistani laws are
discriminatory towards Ahmadis. However, she found that the implementation and
application of these laws are not such as to create a situation where Ahmadis
would face a serious possibility of persecution.
[16]
In
light of that analysis, the PRRA officer rejected the applicant’s PRRA application.
III. Legislation
[17]
Section
96, subsection 97(1) and paragraph 113(b) of the IRPA and section
167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]
provide as follows:
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Convention refugee
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Définition de « réfugié »
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96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by
reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
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96. A qualité de réfugié
au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec
raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
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(a) is outside each of their
countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
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a) soit se trouve hors
de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not having a country of
nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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b) soit, si elle n’a pas
de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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Person in need of protection
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Personne à
protéger
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97. (1) A person in
need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries
of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their
country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
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97. (1) A qualité de
personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a danger,
believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
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a) soit au risque, s’il
y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de
l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
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(b) to
a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
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b) soit à une menace à
sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas
suivant :
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(i) the person is unable or, because of
that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait,
ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by the
person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout
lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui
s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des
normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that
country to provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé
adéquats.
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Consideration
of application
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Examen de
la demande
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113. Consideration
of an application for protection shall be as follows:
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113. Il est disposé de la
demande comme il suit :
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. . .
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[. . . ]
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(b) a hearing may be held if the Minister,
on the basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a hearing is
required;
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b) une audience peut
être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis compte tenu des facteurs
réglementaires;
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. . .
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[. . .]
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Hearing
— prescribed factors
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Facteurs pour la tenue d’une audience
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167. For
the purpose of determining whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b)
of the Act, the factors are the following:
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167. Pour l’application de
l’alinéa 113b) de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à décider si
la tenue d’une audience est requise :
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(a) whether there is evidence that raises a
serious issue of the applicant's credibility and is related to the factors
set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act;
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a) l’existence
d’éléments de preuve relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux articles 96 et 97
de la Loi qui soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la
crédibilité du demandeur;
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(b) whether the evidence is central to the
decision with respect to the application for protection; and
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b) l’importance de ces
éléments de preuve pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande de
protection;
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(c) whether the evidence, if accepted, would
justify allowing the application for protection.
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c) la question de savoir
si ces éléments de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que
soit accordée la protection.
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IV. Issues and standard of review
A. Issues
1. Did
the PRRA officer err in making credibility findings without considering whether
or not to interview the applicant?
2. Are
the PRRA officer’s determinations reasonable?
B. Standard of
review
[18]
The
first issue is a question of procedural fairness and must be determined on a standard
of correctness (see Lai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 361, [2008] 2 FCR 3 at para 55; and Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA
404, [2006] 3 FCR
392).
[19]
As
for the second issue, it is well established by the jurisprudence of this Court
that PRRA officers’ determinations are accorded significant deference and that
their decisions are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (see James
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 318,
[2010] FCJ No 368 (QL) at para 16).
V. Parties’
submissions
A. Applicant’s
submissions
[20]
The
applicant submits that the PRRA officer acknowledged his claim that his father
had been the victim of a religiously motivated murder in Pakistan and that his
family had fled to Germany where they filed an asylum claim. However, the officer
concluded there was insufficient evidence to support these allegations. The applicant
submits that this finding is unreasonable. Furthermore, the officer required corroboration
of the applicant’s statements through documentary evidence. The applicant
underlines that, in Zokai v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1103, [2005] FCJ No 1359 (QL) [Zokai],
Justice Kelen held, in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his decision:
[11] I agree with the applicant that a
breach of procedural fairness arises on the facts of this case. The applicant
made a detailed request in his PRRA application for an oral hearing, with
specific reference to the factors set out in section 167 of the [IRPR].
However, the PRRA officer makes no reference to these factors, or to any
factors that led to the decision not to hold an oral hearing, despite the
written request for one. In fact, there is no evidence that the officer turned his
mind to the appropriateness of holding an oral hearing.
[12] Furthermore, it is clear, despite
the respondent’s submissions to the contrary, that credibility was central to
the negative PRRA decision. In refusing to accord weight to the applicant’s
story without corroborating evidence, the PRRA officer, in effect, concluded
that the applicant was not credible. In my view, given these credibility
concerns, it was incumbent on the officer to consider the request for an oral
hearing and to provide reasons on the officer to consider the request. The officer’s
failure to do so in this case constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.
Moreover, in view of the circumstances of this case with respect to
credibility, the Court is of the view that a hearing is appropriate.
[21]
In
the case at bar, the applicant submits that not being represented by counsel,
he failed to make a request for an oral hearing. He argues that this did not
relieve the PRRA officer of her statutory obligation to consider whether such a
hearing was necessary. Since the PRRA officer based her decision on the absence
of corroborating evidence support to the applicant’s allegations, the applicant
submits that the criteria set by section 167 of the IRPR appear to have
been met. Consequently, it was incumbent on the PRRA officer to consider holding
an oral hearing, and the failure to do so constituted a breach of procedural
fairness, reviewable on a standard of correctness.
[22]
Furthermore,
the PRRA officer made the following findings, at page 11 of the Application record:
. . . With respect to his personal
circumstances the applicant had provided insufficient evidence that his faith
is such that it is an integral part of his life and his lifestyle and that due
to his faith he would face more than a mere possibility of persecution or a
risk to his life… The applicant provided no other documentation that would
indicate his faith as an Ahmadi is such that it would bring him unwanted
attention, such as individuals in a position of leadership, or persons who
speak publicly about their faith . . .
[23]
The
applicant argues that the officer made a reviewable error. There was no
evidence to support the finding that, in order to be persecuted as an Ahmadi, an
individual had to demonstrate publicly his Ahmadi faith. Documentary evidence
showed that Ahmadis, no matter their profiles, were the subject of violence and
persecution by religious fanatics in Pakistan. Counsel for the applicant
drew the Court’s attention to several extracts from the documentary evidence to
substantiate this assertion. According to the applicant, the PRRA officer’s
findings were made without regard to that evidence.
[24]
The
officer also found that the implementation and application of the
discriminating laws were such that the applicant would not be the subject of
persecution by the Pakistani authorities. She determined that although, between
1986 and 2006, 239 Ahmadis had been charged under the blasphemy laws, these
laws were rarely enforced and few cases found their way into the justice system.
[25]
The
applicant submits that the officer erred in failing to consider either the
context or the evidence the documents that were presented to her (see Erdogu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 407,
[2008] FCJ No 546 (QL) at paras 31-32; Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL), 157 FTR
35 at paras 27-28). It is argued that the PRRA officer’s failure to mention the
systematic violence against Ahmadis, including the massacre of 93 adherents
which occurred less than a year prior to the PRRA decision, rendered her findings
unreasonable. The applicant also submits that the officer failed to consider contrary
evidence to the effect that blasphemy laws were widely enforced in Pakistan,
and argues that her failure to explain why she rejected such evidence, constitutes
a reviewable error.
[26]
Finally,
the applicant contends that the PRRA officer should have considered the
treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan as amounting to
persecution.
B. Respondent’s
submissions
[27]
The
respondent submits that the applicant has no right to an oral hearing as the
PRRA officer’s decision was based on the insufficiency of the evidence provided
and not on the applicant’s credibility. Oral hearings, in the context of a PRRA
application, are held only in exceptional cases and only if the criteria
enunciated in section 167 of the IRPR are met. There must be a serious
issue of credibility and this issue must be central to the PRRA application.
[28]
The
respondent submits that the Federal Court has held that a hearing is not
required where the officer denies the PRRA application on the basis of
objective evidence, as that is something distinct from a finding as to
credibility (see Al Mansuri v Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 22, [2007] FCJ No 16 (QL) at
para 43 [Al Mansuri]).
[29]
The
respondent argues that, in considering the evidence, the officer must determine
its probative value. The officer may also assess the weight to be assigned to
that evidence. However, the officer’s analysis of the evidence does not have to
be conducted in any particular order and “is open to the trier of fact, in
considering the evidence, to move immediately to an assessment of weight or
probative value without considering whether it is credible” (see Ferguson
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1067,
[2008] FCJ No 1308 (QL) at para 26 [Ferguson]).
[30]
The
respondent contends that this is precisely what occurred in this instance. The applicant’s
allegations of risk were given little probative value due to the deficiencies
identified in the supporting documentation and the absence of evidence that
connects the applicant to the alleged risk. It was unnecessary for the officer
to assess the applicant’s credibility as the weight assigned to the documents was
such that several of the applicant’s allegations were unproven (see Ferguson,
cited above, at para 26; Iboude v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1316, [2005] FCJ No 1595 (QL) at
paras 5, 12-14; Parchment v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 1140, [2008] FCJ No 1423 (QL) at paras 18-19; and Saadatkhani
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 614,
[2006] FCJ No 769 (QL) at paras 4-8).
[31]
The
respondent argues that here, unlike the Zokai case, there was no
obligation to conduct an oral hearing since the applicant did not make a request
for one in his PRRA application and the officer did not make any finding with
regard to credibility.
[32]
The
respondent further submits that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate
that the discrimination against the Ahmadis in Pakistan would amount
to persecution. The PRRA officer did not deny evidence of general discrimination
against Ahmadis or of discrimination against certain Ahmadis that may amount to
persecution. The officer’s task was to determine whether the applicant
personally faced more than a mere possibility of persecution or risk to his
life. As this Court held in Raza v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1385, [2006] FCJ No 1779 (QL) at
para 29 [Raza]: “Sections 96 and 97 require the risk to be personalized
in that they require the risk to apply to the specific person making the claim.
This is particularly apparent in the context of section 97 which utilizes the
word ‘personally’.” The officer found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate
a personal risk of persecution or a risk to his life.
[33]
The
respondent maintains there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate prospective
risk for the applicant. The officer based her finding on the applicant’s
allegations of past persecution and on the documentary evidence with respect to
the treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan.
[34]
When
an applicant puts forward past incidents as the basis for his claim, the officer
must assess whether such evidence establishes a fear of future persecution (see
Natynczyk v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 914, [2004] FCJ No 1118 (QL) at
paras 69-71).
[35]
The
applicant alleged that his father was killed by fanatics and that he and his
family had fled to Germany to seek asylum. However, the officer reasonably
determined that, according to respondent, there was insufficient documentary
evidence to support these allegations.
[36]
As
noted in Ahmed v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] FCJ No 957 (QL) at para 22, this
Court has acknowledged that claims of this nature require a case-by-case
analysis. The respondent submits that not all Ahmadis are treated the same way or
are similarly situated when it comes to a well-founded fear of persecution. It
was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the applicant had not met his
evidentiary burden of demonstrating that he would face more than a mere
possibility of persecution or of risk to his life if returned to Pakistan.
VI. Analysis
1. Did
the PRRA officer err in making credibility findings without considering whether
or not to interview the applicant?
[37]
The
applicant argues that the PRRA officer made credibility findings when assessing
the evidence that was presented before her. The applicant relies on Zokai
to support this argument. A close review of the disputed decision leads this
Court to find that the evidence adduced was assessed by the officer in a manner
in which it was open to her to do. In Al Mansuri, this Court held that “the officer
did not deny the PRRA application on the basis of Mr. Al Mansuri's credibility.
Rather, the officer found that the objective evidence with respect to country
conditions did not support a finding of a danger of torture, or a risk to life,
or a risk of cruel or unusual treatment or punishment. That finding is a matter
distinct from Mr. Al Mansuri's personal credibility” (see Al Mansuri at
para 43). The officer clearly made findings in regard to the probative value of
the objective evidence adduced and not with regard to its credibility.
[38]
It has been clearly established that, in the context of a PRRA
application, an oral hearing is the exception. Moreover, serious credibility
issues must be central to the PRRA application in order to trigger the holding of
an oral hearing. In reading the officer’s decision, it is clear that no such
serious issue of credibility was found to exist.
[39]
The officer did not breach her duty of procedural fairness. As in Yousef
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2006 FC
864, [2006] FCJ
No 1101 (QL) at para 36, “the PRRA officer’s decision was based on
the insufficiency of the evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his
contention that he faced new or heightened risks if he returned to his country
of nationality]”. Finally, and equally important, it is clear that the criteria
set out in section 167 of the IRPR were not met by the applicant.
2. Are
the PRRA officer’s determinations reasonable?
[40]
The
role of a PRRA officer is to examine, as stated in section 113 of the IRPA,
“only new evidence that arose after the rejection [of the claim to refugee
protection] or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not
reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the
time of the rejection”. Section 113 of the IRPA strictly limits the
scope of a PRRA officer’s intervention. In Kaybaki v Canada (Solicitor
General of Canada), 2004 FC 32, [2004] FCJ
No 27 (QL), Justice Kelen writes, in paragraph 11 of his decision, that “the
PRRA application cannot be allowed to become a second refugee hearing. The PRRA
process is to assess new risk developments between the [IRB] hearing and the
removal date”.
[41]
Justice
Mosley held, in Raza, cited above, at para 10, that:
[10] PRAA officers have a specialized expertise in risk
assessment, and their findings are usually fact driven, and therefore warrant
considerable deference: Selliah v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 872,
256 F.T.R. 53
at para.16 [Selliah]. Considerable deference is owed to
the factual determinations of a PRAA officer including their conclusions with
respect to the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence placed before them:
Yousef v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2006 FC 864,
[2006] F.C.J.
No. 1101 at para. 19 [Yousef]. In the absence
of a failure to consider relevant factors or reliance upon irrelevant ones, the
weighing of the evidence lies within the purview of the officer conducting the
assessment and does not normally give rise to judicial review: Augusto v Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 673,
[2005] F.C.J.
No 850, at para. 9 . . .
[42]
The
applicant claims the officer erred in finding that he did not provide
sufficient evidence to prove that his faith was an integral part of his life
and his lifestyle. He argues that the officer did not rely on any documentary
evidence or reference to support her conclusion.
[43]
The
officer’s conclusion rests on her finding that there was insufficient evidence
to show that the applicant’s faith was part of his lifestyle. In reading the officer’s
decision, it is clear that she weighed the evidence adduced by the applicant
and found it did not establish that his faith was such an integral part of his
lifestyle that it could bring about more than a mere possibility of persecution
in Pakistan. The PRRA officer is limited to considering solely new evidence
presented.
[44]
The
applicant further argues that the PRRA officer erred in determining that, in
order to face persecution, an Ahmadi needs to be in a position of leadership or
has to publicly speak out about his faith. On reading the decision as a whole, the
Court cannot accept the applicant’s argument. The officer noted the fact that
the applicant failed to provide any document or evidence to establish that he
would bring unwanted attention to himself in Pakistan because of
his religious beliefs. Upon concluding that the applicant’s evidence was
insufficient, the officer provided examples of people who would draw this kind
of unwanted attention namely, people “such as individuals in a position of
leadership, or persons who speak publicly about their faith” (see PRRA officer’s
decision, page 6 of the Tribunal Record). The PRRA officer did not commit a
reviewable error.
[45]
The
officer found that the discriminatory laws against Ahmadis in Pakistan were not strictly
implemented by the Pakistani authorities. It is the applicant’s argument that
the PRRA officer committed several significant errors as she only considered
part of the evidence he adduced, omitting to take into consideration several
incidents showing discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community. Counsel for
the applicant presented examples of such incidents at the hearing.
[46]
The
officer’s analysis of the evidence regarding discrimination against the Ahmadiyya
community is reasonable. She admitted that the Ahmadi population was subject to
systematic and, more importantly, legal discrimination. She underlined the fact
that Ahmadis suffered educational, employment and economic discrimination. The
Court acknowledges that the officer did not explicitly refer in her decision to
several of the incidents described by the applicant at page 139 of his
Application Record. Nonetheless, this omission by the officer does not amount
to a reviewable error since the PRRA officer’s role is to weigh the evidence
presented by a claimant. In this instance, the officer acknowledged the
existence of a risk but concluded that, with respect to the applicant, no
credible link between the incidents and the applicant’s fear of persecution had
been established.
[47]
In
addition, the applicant alleges that the officer erred in concluding that
blasphemy laws in Pakistan are rarely enforced by the Pakistani
authorities. Again, the PRRA officer did not err since she considered specific
information in concluding that the discriminatory laws are not strictly
enforced by the Pakistani authorities. The officer recognized that these laws
are discriminatory. However, the officer’s assessment of the evidence presented
led her to conclude that the application of that legislation in Pakistan is such that
it would not amount to persecution of all Ahmadis. This finding supports the officer’s
conclusion that the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that all Ahmadis, including him, are subject to persecution and
harsh treatment. She reasonably concluded that the applicant would face no more
than a mere possibility of the persecution referred to in section 96 of the IRPA
and upon his return to Pakistan, would not likely be at risk of torture or risk
of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment as contemplated in section 97 of
the IRPA.
[48]
In a PRRA, the officer is required to
conduct an individualized analysis such as that which was correctly performed
in the present case (see Kovacs v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1003, [2010] FCJ No 1241 (QL)). The
Court has no valid reason to intervene, even though it may have reached a
different conclusion; ours is not to reweigh the evidence presented but to
ensure that the outcome falls within a range of possible acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in light of the facts and the law.
VII. Conclusion
[49]
The
PRRA officer reasonably concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate that
there is more than a mere possibility that he would personally face persecution
or risk to his life if returned to Pakistan. She also determined
that he would not likely be at risk of torture or of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment.
[50]
This
application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
1. This application for judicial
review is dismissed; and
2. There is no question of general
importance to certify.
"André
F.J. Scott"
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