Date:
20120731
Docket:
T-1463-10
Citation: 2012
FC 940
Ottawa, Ontario,
July 31, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
|
|
CHIMEN MIKAIL
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
|
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
and
|
|
|
|
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
COMMITTEE
|
|
|
|
|
Intervener
|
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
Ms.
Chimen Mikail laid a complaint against the Canadian Security and Intelligence
Service [CSIS] alleging that CSIS agents had intimidated, harassed and threatened
her at her home and workplace in the course of questioning her about her
background in Turkey. She also alleged that CSIS interfered with her security
status. The Security Intelligence Review Committee [SIRC] considered her
complaint and dismissed it. SIRC found that, while Ms. Mikail was justifiably
alarmed about the way she was questioned, CSIS agents had not acted improperly
in the circumstances.
[2]
Ms.
Mikail argues that SIRC’s decision failed to recognize the legal parameters
that govern the conduct of CSIS agents, particularly the provisions of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 [CSIS Act]. She maintains that CSIS agents had no
lawful authority to question her repeatedly and, in particular, no business
confronting her at her place of work. She also contends that SIRC made an
unreasonable finding of fact about whether CSIS violated its own policy on
workplace visits. She asks me to quash SIRC’s decision and order it to
reconsider her complaint.
[3]
I
can find no legal or factual grounds for overturning SIRC’s decision and must,
therefore, dismiss this application for judicial review. SIRC had no obligation
to deal with the legal questions Ms. Mikail has presented in this application –
she did not raise them before SIRC, and SIRC could not, therefore, have been
expected to address them. Further, while SIRC made a clear error about when the
CSIS policy on workplace visits came into effect, the error was inconsequential
in the circumstances.
[4]
Most
of the substantive submissions by the parties were made before me in a public
hearing. However, in an ex parte hearing in the presence of counsel for
the Attorney General of Canada and counsel for SIRC, I reviewed some of the
evidence that had been heard by SIRC in the absence of Ms. Mikail and her
counsel in order to protect information whose disclosure would affect national
security. This evidence was relevant only to the question of whether the CSIS
agents had a valid reason for wishing to question Ms. Mikail. Ms. Mikail has
not argued that CSIS had no reason to interview her. Therefore, it is
unnecessary for me to say anything further about the basis on which CSIS agents
decided to question Ms. Mikail about her past.
[5]
There
are two issues:
1. Did
SIRC err by failing to consider the legal parameters that govern CSIS
investigations, most notably the rights guaranteed by the Charter?
2. Did
SIRC err by failing to recognize that the CSIS policy respecting workplace
visits was in effect at the time Ms. Mikail was interviewed?
II. Factual Background
[6]
Ms.
Mikail is a Canadian citizen of Kurdish-Iraqi origin who arrived here in 1987.
After she married Mr. Shapour Badoshiveh in 1993, she travelled with him to Germany and then was taken against her will to a village in the mountains bordering Iran and Turkey. She escaped and returned to Canada in 2001. She found a job, remarried, and began a
family in Gatineau. In 2004, she secured a term position at the Department of
National Defence. The following year, she began looking for other public
service jobs, but was unable to obtain the necessary “reliability status” that
many positions required. She was able to acquire the necessary status in 2007
and has been employed full-time in the public service since then.
[7]
During
2005 and 2006, CSIS agents interviewed Ms. Mikail four times. The first three
interviews took place at her home. The fourth transpired near her workplace on
a street where she had parked her car.
[8]
The
first interview took place in May 2005 after an unannounced visit by CSIS
agents at Ms. Mikail’s apartment. The discussion centered on Ms. Mikail’s
former husband, who was by then deceased. Ms. Mikail shared her experience of
living in Turkey involuntarily from 1994 to 2001. She also explained that she
had not seen her ex-husband for many years. Ms. Mikail’s current husband
arrived home during the interview. He made it plain he did not appreciate the
spontaneous visit from CSIS agents. He asked that, in the future, they call
ahead of time.
[9]
The
second interview took place in February 2006. The agents again arrived
unannounced.
[10]
The
third interview took place in April 2006. This time, the agents called ahead of
time. The interview started out on friendly terms, but deteriorated when the agents
mentioned that security forces in other countries could arrest persons of
interest (and explained that CSIS had no arrest powers), and referred to potential
problems with Ms. Mikail’s ability to acquire her reliability status.
[11]
The
latter two interviews focussed on Ms. Mikail’s involvement with Kurdish or
Islamic extremists while she was living in Turkey. Ms. Mikail denied any such
association. The agents were not satisfied with her answers, and wished to
speak to her again, preferably in the absence of her husband.
[12]
After
the third interview, a CSIS agent called Ms. Mikail at work and invited her for
coffee. Ms. Mikail declined. In August 2006, an agent waited for Ms. Mikail
beside her car, which was parked on a street near her workplace. The agent asked
Ms. Mikail more questions about her background, but Ms. Mikail did not provide
any further information. The purpose of this interview was to clarify some
information Ms. Mikail had provided in previous interviews. The subject of Ms.
Mikail’s security status came up again.
III. SIRC’s Decision
[13]
Hearings
took place over several days before the Honourable Gary Filmon. He heard
evidence from Ms. Mikail and the CSIS agents involved, and considered a large
volume of documentation from government departments. Where necessary for
purposes of national security, some of the evidence was heard without Ms.
Mikail or her counsel being present. That evidence, however, was summarized and
provided to Ms. Mikail.
[14]
SIRC
began by acknowledging that Ms. Mikail’s concerns were understandable in the
circumstances, particularly her belief that CSIS had interfered with her
efforts to obtain the security status she required. However, it concluded that
there was no such interference. In fact, there was no communication between CSIS
and the department responsible for her security status (Public Works and
Government Services Canada [PWGSC]) until June 2007, when PWGSC requested
information from CSIS. The Government Security Policy at the time required that
such requests be approved by Treasury Board, yet there was no approval in Ms.
Mikail’s case. However, SIRC concluded that this oversight was inconsequential
in the circumstances because PWGSC withdrew its request before CSIS responded
to it. Further, it found that the problems with Ms. Mikail’s security status
were caused by PWGSC, not CSIS. In any event, Ms. Mikail eventually received
the necessary clearance and obtained a permanent public service position.
[15]
SIRC
went on to consider Ms. Mikail’s complaints about the conduct of CSIS agents
during the interviews. She raised concerns about their aggressive questioning,
and their suggestion that there was a connection between her responses and her
ability to acquire a security clearance.
[16]
SIRC
noted that questioning by CSIS personnel can be aggressive without being
improper. Here, the interviews raised questions that were difficult for Ms.
Mikail to answer and caused her to become emotional. This led to her to misread
the intentions and conduct of the agents.
[17]
With
respect to the visit of a CSIS agent near her workplace, SIRC concluded that
this type of visit was discouraged by a policy that was implemented subsequent
to that event. Still, the interview might have been justified, even in the face
of that policy, given that the agent felt it was important to question Ms.
Mikail in the absence of her husband.
[18]
As
for the suggestion that CSIS agents made a connection between Ms. Mikail’s
cooperation and her ability to obtain security status, SIRC found that the
agents’ statements were factually accurate. If Ms. Mikail had been dishonest in
her answers, her ability to obtain a security clearance would be impaired.
However, SIRC also noted that statements along those lines could be interpreted
by some interviewees as threats, especially by persons who, like Ms. Mikail,
had experiences in other countries that would naturally make them suspicious of
the agents’ motives. Here, SIRC concluded that it was important for the agents
to advise Ms. Mikail of the potential consequences of any lack of candour on
her part. This information was provided in her best interests, not as an
improper inducement for her to cooperate.
[19]
Therefore,
SIRC dismissed Ms. Mikail’s complaint entirely. It recommended, however, that
steps be taken to ensure that the Government Security Policy, described above, was
observed.
IV. Issue One – Did SIRC
err by failing to consider the legal parameters that govern CSIS
investigations, most notably the rights guaranteed by the Charter?
[20]
Ms.
Mikail argues that CSIS agents harassed her by making repeated, unannounced
visits, questioning her in an aggressive fashion, and stalking her at work. She
maintains that this conduct offends legal standards that apply to CSIS,
including those guaranteed by the Charter.
[21]
In
particular, Ms. Mikail points to s 12 of the CSIS Act, which states that the
service can collect information relating to the security of Canada only “to the
extent that it is strictly necessary” (enactments cited are set out in Annex
A). Agents have no common law powers and no authority to harass or intimidate
sources. The agents’ behaviour, she maintains, was akin to criminal harassment.
[22]
In
addition, CSIS agents are bound by ss 8 and 9 of the Charter. Section 8
protects against unreasonable invasions of privacy. Ms. Mikail contends that
CSIS agents violated s 8 in the manner of their interrogations and by tracking her
to her workplace. The agents should have left her alone when she made clear she
would not answer any further questions.
[23]
Section
9 of the Charter prohibits arbitrary detention. Ms. Mikail suggests that the
agent who met her outside her workplace prevented her from leaving and,
therefore, detained her without any justification. She did not believe she had
any choice but to stay and listen to the officer’s questions, even though she
was in a hurry to pick up her son at day care. Her perception was reasonable,
she says, in light of her experience with security agencies in the Middle East, such as the Mukhabarat, who operate without any legal constraints.
[24]
In
sum, Ms. Mikail maintains that SIRC did not give any consideration to the legal
parameters that govern the conduct of CSIS agents and, therefore, its decision
dismissing her claim should be quashed because it was based on errors of law.
[25]
I
cannot agree with Ms. Mikail’s submissions.
[26]
Generally
speaking, SIRC’s mandate is to investigate complaints, review the manner in
which CSIS performs its functions and direct CSIS, or its Inspector General, to
conduct a review of specific activities of CSIS (CSIS Act, ss 38, 40). While
the CSIS Act does not specifically grant SIRC the power to decide legal
questions, it must, in order to carry out its mandate, have jurisdiction to
apply prevailing laws, including the Charter (Procureur général du Canada c Hani
Al Telbani, 2012 CF 474, at para 105). In particular, SIRC has
jurisdiction to determine whether CSIS agents have complied with the law.
[27]
However,
while SIRC can decide legal issues, its mandate is broader than that. Any
person can complain to SIRC about any “act or thing” done by CSIS (CSIS Act, s
41). SIRC must investigate all complaints that are not “trivial, frivolous,
vexatious or made in bad faith” (CSIS Act, s 41(1)(b)). It must then
report its findings and make any recommendations it considers appropriate in
the circumstances (CSIS Act, s 52(1)).
[28]
Accordingly,
SIRC’s powers include deciding questions of law, but are not confined to legal
issues. If a complainant maintains, for example, that CSIS has acted
unlawfully, SIRC no doubt must decide the legal questions that arise out of
that complaint. Failure to do so would give rise to a valid basis for judicial
review of SIRC’s decision. On the other hand, where a person complains about
some “act or thing” CSIS has done, but does not allege a violation of the law,
SIRC must respond to the substance of the complaint. It would not necessarily
have to consider whether CSIS’s conduct was unlawful. CSIS could be acting
improperly even though it was within the bounds of the law.
[29]
Here,
Ms. Mikail complained to SIRC that CSIS agents had interfered with her security
status and had behaved in a coercive, harassing and intimidating manner. She
did not suggest that the agents had violated s 12 of the CSIS Act, or that they
had infringed her Charter rights. Ms. Mikail alluded to the possibility that
the agents had engaged in criminal harassment, but acknowledged that they may
have been acting within their lawful authority. She argued that,
notwithstanding that authority, the agents had acted improperly.
[30]
SIRC
reviewed a substantial body of evidence relating to the circumstances
surrounding the encounters between Ms. Mikail and CSIS agents, including her
testimony, the agents’ testimony, written reports of the various interviews,
and documentary evidence from a variety of sources. It concluded that the
agents had not acted inappropriately. None having been specifically raised, it
did not decide any questions of law.
[31]
Therefore,
I cannot agree with Ms. Mikail’s contention that SIRC was obliged to determine
the legal parameters that define the proper scope of CSIS’s agents’ conduct in
response to her complaint. Nor is that a valid basis on which to seek to
overturn SIRC’s decision. The power to decide legal issues does not create an
obligation to do so when none have been raised.
[32]
In
addition, applicants for judicial review cannot, generally speaking, raise
issues that were not put before the tribunal whose decision is under review,
particularly constitutional questions. Ms. Mikail points to an oblique
reference to the Constitution in her counsel’s closing arguments to SIRC and
suggests that that was sufficient to create a duty on SIRC to decide whether
her Charter rights had been violated. To my mind, this general submission was
not a sufficient foundation for a Charter argument. SIRC could not have been
expected to imagine what provisions of the Constitution Ms. Mikail was
purporting to rely on, anticipate the submissions that might have been made in
respect of those provisions, and provide a detailed constitutional analysis in
its reasons, without full argument on the point.
[33]
Further,
the necessary factual foundation for the alleged Charter breaches had not been
laid. For example, there was no evidence before SIRC to support a claim that
CSIS agents had intruded on Ms. Mikail’s reasonable expectations of privacy by
tracking her to her place of employment. Nor was there evidence that Ms.
Mikail, psychologically speaking, was detained when a CSIS agent met her by her
car and posed a few questions. Accordingly, the necessary factual foundation
for Ms. Mikail’s Charter arguments was not established before SIRC. In the
circumstances, SIRC could not respond meaningfully to any constitutional issues
rising from Ms. Mikail’s complaint, even if Ms. Mikail had urged it to do so,
which she did not. Further, the lack of a factual record also prevents me from
addressing those issues. (Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 29, at
para 15; AA v BB (2007), 83 OR (3d) 561 (ONCA).
[34]
In
effect, therefore, Ms. Mikail is raising her legal and constitutional arguments
for the first time before me. With rare exceptions, it is not the role of the
Court on judicial review to address issues that were not before the tribunal
whose decision is contested (Toussaint v Canada (Labour Relations
Board), [1993] FCJ No 616, at para 6; Poirier v Canada (Minister
of Veterans Affairs), [1989] 3 FC 233, at para 16). Since SIRC does have
jurisdiction to decide legal issues, including Charter arguments, Ms. Mikail
should have raised her legal arguments before SIRC. It could then have ensured
that the necessary evidence was presented and that full submissions on them
were heard. Only then could it have responded to them in a meaningful way.
[35]
Therefore,
I need not deal with the substance of Ms. Mikail’s arguments in respect of alleged
breaches of the CSIS Act and the Charter. Those arguments were not presented in
the hearing before SIRC. SIRC did not, therefore, have a proper opportunity to
consider them. Accordingly, Ms. Mikail’s legal arguments before me do not
present valid grounds for allowing her application for judicial review.
V.
Issue
Two – Did SIRC err by failing to recognize that the CSIS policy respecting
workplace visits was in effect at the time Ms. Mikail was interviewed?
[36]
Ms.
Mikail argues that SIRC made a critical error of fact when it found that the
CSIS policy on workplace visits was not in effect at the time when the CSIS
agent confronted her outside her office building. In fact, the policy was
adopted in November 2005, more than eight months before that interview. This
evidence actually came out in cross-examination of the agent involved, while Ms.
Mikail and her counsel were excluded from the hearing. Therefore, not only did
SIRC make an error of fact, it treated her unfairly by precluding her from
making submissions to SIRC on the application of the policy to her
circumstances.
[37]
Clearly,
SIRC made an error. The workplace policy set out in a November 2005 memo was in
effect in August 2006 when a CSIS agent met Ms. Mikail next to her car.
However, in my view, that error was inconsequential.
[38]
The
workplace policy was put in place after concerns had been expressed about
CSIS’s practices at a hearing before the Senate Special Committee on the Anti-Terrorism
Act on October 31, 2005. Then Director of CSIS, Mr. Jim Judd, explained to
Senators why CSIS agents sometimes interview individuals in the workplace:
Normally we try to conduct these
interviews where we are most likely to find the people. For many people, that
is during normal business hours and that is usually at their place of
employment. However, in the event that they prefer the interview to take place
in another location we will accommodate their preference. (Minutes of
Proceedings, 31-10-2005, 18:12)
Senator Fraser asked Mr. Judd why
CSIS would normally visit people at work when this could be disruptive:
It seems to me that for many
people, and not only for people belonging to certain minority communities but
also for many people the mere arrival at their place of work of a CSIS agent
would be a disruptive element. You have to stop doing your work, find a private
place to talk and explain to your boss why you are finding a private place to
talk. It would have a daunting effect on many, many people, and quite possibly
affect the atmosphere of their workplace. (18:14)
Mr. Judd undertook to address this
concern:
[P]eople are quite free to tell
our investigators that they prefer to meet elsewhere, at home, a restaurant, a
café, or in a park. That is a point we will make better known within the
service. We will encourage our investigators to give people the option of
picking a venue for investigations. There was nothing ill-intentioned about it.
I noted that several witnesses have said that it has had a negative impact,
which is not at all the kind of outcome we want. (18:14)
[39]
A
memorandum dated November 23, 2005, signed by W.J. Hooper, Deputy Director of
Operations, referred to Mr. Judd’s appearance before the Senate Committee and
stated that, while unannounced workplace visits were a “legitimate
investigative strategy”, they raised “potential controversy features”.
Accordingly, CSIS employees should “exercise good judgment in using this
technique and … consider alternative interview venues.”
[40]
Clearly,
this policy did not apply in the circumstances. Ms. Mikail was not disturbed at
her workplace. She was met on a public street. The concern that gave rise to
the policy was the embarrassment and inconvenience associated with CSIS agents
appearing unannounced at the workplaces of interview subjects. That concern
simply did not arise in the circumstances of this case.
[41]
Further,
even if the policy had applied, the interview did not offend it. The policy
recognized that unannounced workplace visits were a “legitimate investigative
strategy” and that CSIS employees should use “good judgment” in deciding
whether to conduct a workplace interview. Here, the CSIS agent gave a valid
reason for wishing to speak to Ms. Mikail in the absence of her husband, and
for choosing to do so as Ms. Mikail left work for the day. In the
circumstances, this was a “legitimate investigative strategy”, permitted by the
workplace interview policy.
[42]
Accordingly,
while SIRC erred in finding that the workplace policy was not in effect at the
relevant time, that error had no effect on its conclusion. Ms. Mikail was not
interviewed in her workplace. Even if she had been, the interview would have
amounted to a legitimate investigative strategy in the circumstances.
Therefore, the fact that Ms. Mikail did not have an opportunity to make
submissions to SIRC on the scope and application of the workplace policy did
not result in any unfairness to her.
VI.
Conclusion
and Disposition
[43]
I
cannot conclude that SIRC erred when it dismissed Ms. Mikail’s complaint. The
legal issues put forward by Ms. Mikail on this application for judicial review
were not raised before SIRC and, therefore, do not constitute valid grounds for
overturning SIRC’s decision. Further, SIRC’s factual error regarding CSIS’s
workplace interview policy was, in the circumstances, inconsequential.
Therefore, I must dismiss Ms. Mikail’s application for judicial review with
costs.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
The
application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.
“James W. O’Reilly”
Annex “A”
|
Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, RS 1982, c C-00
Search
or seizure
8.
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
Detention
or imprisonment
9.
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.
Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC, 1985, c C-23
Collection,
analysis and retention
12. The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the
extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and
intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.
Functions
of Review Committee
38.
The functions of the Review Committee are
(a) to review generally
the performance by the Service of its duties and functions and, in connection
therewith,
(i) to review the reports of
the Director and certificates of the Inspector General transmitted to it
pursuant to subsection 33(3),
(ii) to review directions
issued by the Minister under subsection 6(2),
(iii) to review arrangements
entered into by the Service pursuant to subsections 13(2) and (3) and 17(1)
and to monitor the provision of information and intelligence pursuant to
those arrangements,
(iv) to review any report or
comment given to it pursuant to subsection 20(4),
(v) to monitor any request
referred to in paragraph 16(3)(a) made to the Service,
(vi) to review the regulations,
and
(vii) to compile and analyse
statistics on the operational activities of the Service;
(b) to arrange for
reviews to be conducted, or to conduct reviews, pursuant to section 40; and
(c) to conduct
investigations in relation to
(i) complaints made to the
Committee under sections 41 and 42,
(ii) reports made to the
Committee pursuant to section 19 of the Citizenship Act, and
(iii) matters referred to the
Committee pursuant to section 45 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Review
40. For the purpose of ensuring that the activities of the Service are
carried out in accordance with this Act, the regulations and directions
issued by the Minister under subsection 6(2) and that the activities do not
involve any unreasonable or unnecessary exercise by the Service of any of its
powers, the Review Committee may
(a) direct the Service or
Inspector General to conduct a review of specific activities of the Service
and provide the Committee with a report of the review; or
(b) where it considers
that a review by the Service or the Inspector General would be inappropriate,
conduct such a review itself.
Complaints
41. (1) Any person may make a complaint to the Review Committee with
respect to any act or thing done by the Service and the Committee shall,
subject to subsection (2), investigate the complaint if
(a) the complainant has
made a complaint to the Director with respect to that act or thing and the
complainant has not received a response within such period of time as the
Committee considers reasonable or is dissatisfied with the response given;
and
(b) the Committee is
satisfied that the complaint is not trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in
bad faith.
Other
redress available
(2) The Review Committee shall not investigate a complaint in respect of
which the complainant is entitled to seek redress by means of a grievance
procedure established pursuant to this Act or the Public Service Labour
Relations Act.
Report
of findings
52.
(1) The Review Committee shall,
(a) on completion of an
investigation in relation to a complaint under section 41, provide the
Minister and the Director with a report containing the findings of the
investigation and any recommendations that the Committee considers
appropriate; and
(b) at the same time as
or after a report is provided pursuant to paragraph (a), report the
findings of the investigation to the complainant and may, if it thinks fit,
report to the complainant any recommendations referred to in that paragraph.
|
Charte
canadienne des droits et libertés, LR 1982, ch C-00
Fouilles,
perquisitions ou saisies
8.
Chacun a droit à la protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les
saisies abusives.
Détention
ou emprisonnement
9.
Chacun a droit à la protection contre la détention ou l'emprisonnement
arbitraire.
Loi
sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, LRC, 1985, ch
C-23)
Informations
et renseignements
12. Le Service recueille, au moyen d’enquêtes ou autrement, dans la
mesure strictement nécessaire, et analyse et conserve les informations et
renseignements sur les activités dont il existe des motifs raisonnables de
soupçonner qu’elles constituent des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada; il
en fait rapport au gouvernement du Canada et le conseille à cet égard.
Fonctions
du comité de surveillance
38. Le comité de surveillance a les fonctions suivantes :
a) surveiller la façon dont le
Service exerce ses fonctions et, à cet égard :
(i) examiner les rapports du
directeur et les certificats de l’inspecteur général qui lui sont transmis en
conformité avec le paragraphe 33(3),
(ii) examiner les instructions
que donne le ministre en vertu du paragraphe 6(2),
(iii) examiner les ententes
conclues par le Service en vertu des paragraphes 13(2) et (3) et 17(1), et
surveiller les informations ou renseignements qui sont transmis en vertu de
celles-ci,
(iv) examiner les rapports et
commentaires qui lui sont transmis en conformité avec le paragraphe 20(4),
(v) surveiller les demandes qui
sont présentées au Service en vertu de l’alinéa 16(3)a),
(vi) examiner les règlements,
(vii) réunir et analyser des
statistiques sur les activités opérationnelles du Service;
b) effectuer ou faire effectuer
des recherches en vertu de l’article 40;
c) faire enquête sur :
(i) les plaintes qu’il reçoit
en vertu des articles 41 et 42,
(ii) les rapports qui lui sont
transmis en vertu de l’article 19 de la Loi sur la citoyenneté,
(iii) les affaires qui lui sont
transmises en vertu de l’article 45 de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de
la personne.
Recherches
40.
Afin de veiller à ce que les activités du Service soient conduites conformément
à la présente loi, à ses règlements et aux instructions du ministre visées au
paragraphe 6(2), et qu’elles ne donnent pas lieu à l’exercice par le Service
de ses pouvoirs d’une façon abusive ou inutile, le comité de surveillance
peut :
a) soit faire effectuer par le
Service ou l’inspecteur général des recherches sur certaines activités du
Service et exiger d’eux qu’ils lui en fassent rapport;
b) soit effectuer ces recherches
lui-même s’il juge qu’il serait contre-indiqué de les faire effectuer par le
Service ou l’inspecteur général.
Plaintes
41.
(1) Toute personne peut porter plainte contre des activités du Service auprès
du comité de surveillance; celui-ci, sous réserve du paragraphe (2), fait
enquête à la condition de s’assurer au préalable de ce qui suit :
a) d’une part, la plainte a été
présentée au directeur sans que ce dernier ait répondu dans un délai jugé
normal par le comité ou ait fourni une réponse qui satisfasse le plaignant;
b) d’autre part, la plainte
n’est pas frivole, vexatoire, sans objet ou entachée de mauvaise foi.
Restriction
(2) Le comité de surveillance ne peut enquêter sur une plainte qui constitue
un grief susceptible d’être réglé par la procédure de griefs établie en vertu
de la présente loi ou de la Loi sur les relations de travail dans la
fonction publique.
Rapport
et recommandation
52.
(1) Le comité de surveillance :
a) à l’issue d’une enquête sur
une plainte présentée en vertu de l’article 41, envoie au ministre et au
directeur un rapport contenant ses conclusions et les recommandations qu’il
juge indiquées;
b) en même temps ou plus tard,
fait parvenir au plaignant les conclusions de son enquête; s’il le juge à
propos, il peut y joindre tout ou partie des recommandations mentionnées à
l’alinéa a).
|
Email this Content