Date:
20120620
Docket:
IMM-8876-11
Citation:
2012 FC 785
[UNREVISED
ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Montréal, Quebec, June 20, 2012
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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J JESUS HERNANDEZ
GUTIERREZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
The
burden of demonstrating the non-viability of an internal flight alternative (IFA)
is on the applicant. In this case, it has not been demonstrated that the
evidence not referred to by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) was relevant
to the viability of the proposed IFAs.
II. Judicial
procedure
[2]
This
is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA), of a decision by the RPD
dated November 10, 2011, determining that the applicant is not a Convention
refugee within the meaning of section 96 of the IRPA or a person in need of
protection under section 97 of the IRPA.
III. Facts
[3]
J
Jesus Hernandez Gutierrez is a Mexican citizen.
[4]
The
applicant alleges that he was persecuted in Querétaro, in the State of Querétaro, by Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia, an entrepreneur by whom he was employed as a taxi
driver for two years.
[5]
In
November 2008, the applicant purportedly signed a contract to purchase a taxi with
Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia, the terms of which provided for a six-month warranty
for the vehicle. Under the terms of this purchase contract, the applicant was
to comply with a payment schedule.
[6]
In
March 2009, after having mechanical problems with the vehicle, the applicant
met with Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia to avail himself of the warranty. A quarrel
between the two men ensued.
[7]
On
March 16, 2009, the applicant retained the services of a lawyer and commenced
legal proceedings against Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia. The applicant claims that
the authorities refused to take any action due to Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia’s
influence.
[8]
On
March 19, 2009, the applicant alleges that he was physically assaulted at his
home by Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia and the latter’s bodyguards, who demanded the
balance of payment or they would kill him. The applicant was apparently
hospitalized.
[9]
The
applicant took refuge at his mother’s in Salamanca, an hour away from
Querétaro, where he claims to have been tracked down by Jose Luis Alvarado
Tapia. In fact, he purports to have seen a vehicle driving slowly by the house
on March 30, 2009.
[10]
On
May 3, 2009, the applicant took refuge at his in-laws’ home in Caderyta, in the
State of Querétaro.
[11]
On
May 14, 2009, the applicant flew to Canada, without his wife and child, where
he claimed refugee protection.
IV. Decision under review
[12]
The
RPD determined that the applicant had an IFA in cities that were further afield,
such as Monterrey, Oaxaca or Veracruz.
[13]
The
RPD came to this conclusion because it felt that his persecutor had no
motivation to track him down. It noted that the occupants of the vehicle that
had driven by his mother’s house had not seen him.
[14]
Relying
on the documentary evidence, the RPD was of the view that it was unlikely that
the persecutor would be able to locate the applicant using his personal
information because Mexico has taken measures to combat corruption.
[15]
The
RPD further noted that the applicant’s wife and child had remained in Mexico, with his in-laws, and had not been harassed by the persecutor.
V. Issue
[16]
Did
the RPD err in finding that there was a viable IFA?
VI. Relevant statutory
provisions
[17]
The
following provisions of the IRPA are relevant in this case:
Convention
refugee
96. A Convention
refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of
their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country
of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
Person
in need of protection
97. (1) A person
in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger,
believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their
life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or,
because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that
country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by
the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent
or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
Person
in need of protection
(2)
A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
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Définition
de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de
réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout
pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de
nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne
à protéger
97. (1) A qualité
de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des
motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article
premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou
au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce
fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout
lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui
s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des
normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne
résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé
adéquats.
Personne
à protéger
(2)
A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection
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VII. Parties’ positions
[18]
The
applicant contends that the RPD did not take into account the documentary
evidence that was before it and the fact that the agent of persecution was his
employer. Thus, the latter had access to all of his personal information, which
would allow him to locate the applicant anywhere in Mexico. The applicant would
therefore have been forced to live in hiding. The applicant argues that the RPD
ought to have discussed the evidence that was contrary to its findings.
[19]
The
respondent maintains that the RPD reasonably found that there was an IFA given
that it did not think that the applicant would have been located. The
respondent also submits that the RPD took into consideration all of the
evidence to which it was not required to refer. Furthermore, the respondent
argues that the evidence that was not cited does not challenge the IFA or the
persecutor’s motivation to locate the applicant.
VIII. Analysis
[20]
In
this case, the applicable standard of review is that of reasonableness. A
significant degree of deference is owed to the RPD’s assessment of the evidence
(Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708); Hernandez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 703).
[21]
The
Court, in Kumar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004
FC 601, summed up the applicable test for the finding of an IFA as follows:
[20] In order for the Board to find that a
viable and safe IFA exists for the applicant, the following two-pronged test,
as established and applied in Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), and Thirunavukkarasu, supra,
must be applied:
(1) the Board must be satisfied, on a balance of
probabilities, that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being
persecuted in the proposed IFA; and
(2) conditions in the proposed IFA must be such that
it would not be unreasonable, upon consideration of all the
circumstances, including consideration of a claimant’s personal circumstances, for
the claimant to seek refuge there. [Emphasis added.]
[22]
The
RPD applied the aforementioned test taking into account the circumstances of
the case, including the fact that the persecutor, Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia, the
applicant’s employer, had access to his personal information (RPD’s decision at
paragraph 25).
[23]
First
of all, with regard to the applicant’s fear of being located, which relates to
the first prong of the test, the RPD referred to the documentary evidence,
specifically, Tab 2.4 of the National Documentation Package from April 20,
2011, entitled: “Mexico: Situation of Witnesses to Crime and Corruption, Women
Victims of Violence and Victims of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation”
dated February 2007. This document states the following:
3.3 Traceability of individuals
fleeing violent situations
Of all the
interlocutors interviewed, none was aware of incidents in which witnesses to
crime and corruption were located by their aggressors through the use of
government databases or registries (CDHFFV 28 Nov. 2006; PGR 21 Nov. 2006; ibid. 22 Nov.
2006a; ibid. 24 Nov. 2006). In particular, SIEDO's
Rosas Garcia, the AFI's Gonzalez
Dominguez and the SDHAVSC's Garduno were unaware of any cases in which national
registries, such as the Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal
Electoral, IFE) database, had been used to track individuals who had relocated
to avoid detection by criminal groups (ibid. 21 Nov. 2006; ibid.
22 Nov. 2006a; ibid. 24 Nov. 2006). According to the SFP's
Diaz Garcia, although much work has been done to improve the level of content
within national registries such as the IFE, a comprehensive personal
identification database is still lacking in Mexico (21 Nov. 2006). The two
most important national registries are the IFE database, which contains, among
other things, the addresses of individuals, and the Population Registry's
Single Code (Clave Unica de Registro de Poblacion, CURP) database, which
features individuals' dates of birth (SFP 21 Nov.
2006).
Public access to
national registries, including the IFE database, is prohibited by law (PGR 21 Nov. 2006; ibid. 22 Nov.
2006a). Furthermore, federal police officers can only gain access to the IFE database with a court order and the written permission of the public prosecutor's
office (ibid. 21 Nov. 2006). In the case of the government's
passport database, federal law enforcement agencies such as the AFI can gain access to
it, although they must first submit a request in writing to the corresponding
public prosecutor's office (ibid. 22 Nov. 2006a).
According to SIEDO's Rosas Garcia, it is much easier to
locate individuals by seeking information from family members or friends than
through government registries (PGR 24 Nov. 2006). In
addition, Rosas Garcia and the CDHFFV's Castillo Garcia both noted that the
publicly accessible national housing registry may provide another means of
tracking individuals, although neither was aware of cases in which the registry
had been used in this way (ibid.; CDHFFV 28 Nov. 2006). Rosas Garcia noted
that it would only be a feasible method if the targeted individual had
registered a property in it (PGR 24 Nov. 2006).[Emphasis added.]
[24]
The
documentary evidence therefore supports the RPD’s reasoning that the applicant
would not be located in Mexico by means of his personal information. The RPD
did not expect the applicant to live in hiding in the proposed IFAs.
[25]
The
applicant further submits that the RPD overlooked some of the evidence. The
reasoning set out in Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(1998), 157 FTR 35 applies to the present case:
[15] The Court may infer that the
administrative agency under review made the erroneous finding of fact
"without regard to the evidence" from the agency’s failure to mention
in its reasons some evidence before it that was relevant to its finding,
and pointed to a different conclusion from that reached by the agency. Just as
a court will only defer to an agency’s interpretation of its constituent
statute if it provides reasons for its conclusion, so a court will be reluctant
to defer to an agency’s factual determinations in the absence of express
findings, and an analysis of the evidence that shows how the agency reached its
result. [Emphasis added.]
[26]
The
Court notes that the following evidence was not mentioned by the RPD:
(a) Lawyer’s
letter attesting to the efforts undertaken to file a complaint against Jose
Luis Alvarado Tapia;
(b) Medical
evidence attesting to the applicant’s injuries;
(c) Testimonial
letters from the applicant’s family and from a third party witness of the assault;
(d) Sales
contract and other evidence linking Jose Luis Alvarado Tapia to the applicant.
[27]
In
order for his application for judicial review to succeed, the applicant must
not only point out the adduced evidence that was not referred to by the panel,
this evidence must be relevant to the findings, which is not the case here. In
fact, a careful review of this evidence shows that it is not contrary to the RPD’s
findings regarding the viability of an IFA. At most, the evidence corroborates those
parts of the applicant’s narrative that the RPD had not called into question.
In fact, it had not doubted the existence of the persecutor or the assault of
the applicant.
[28]
Moreover,
upon reading the decision and the transcript of the hearing, this Court is
satisfied that the RPD did not unduly discount the testimonial evidence. The RPD
did, among other things, take into consideration the applicant’s attempts to
hide from his persecutor in Mexico before he came to Canada. The applicant has
not shown that the RPD made findings without regard to the evidence in the record
that would affect the viability of the proposed IFAs.
[29]
Lastly,
the second prong of the IFA test applied by the RPD was reasonable. Moreover,
the RPD did not err by finding that it would not be unreasonable for the
applicant to seek refuge in one of the proposed cities.
[30]
Consequently,
the finding of an IFA was reasonable.
IX. Conclusion
[31]
For
the reasons set out above, the Court’s intervention is not warranted. The
applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT
ORDERS that the applicant’s
application for judicial review be dismissed. There is no question of general
importance to certify.
“Michel M.J. Shore”
Certified true translation
Sebastian Desbarats, Translator