Docket: T-1148-01
Citation: 2012 FC 418
BETWEEN:
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UNIVERSAL SALES, LIMITED,
ATLANTIC TOWING LIMITED, J. D. IRVING, LIMITED, IRVING OIL COMPANY, LIMITED
AND
IRVING OIL LIMITED
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|
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Plaintiffs
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and
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EDINBURGH ASSURANCE CO.
LTD., ORION INSURANCE CO. LTD., BRITISH LAW INSURANCE CO. LTD., ENGLISH &
AMERICAN INS. CO. LTD., ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO. LTD., ANDREW WEIR INS. CO.
LTD., INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, LONDON & EDINBURGH GENERAL INS. CO.
LTD., OCEAN MARINE INS. CO. LTD., ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE, SUN INSURANCE
OFFICE LTD., SPHERE INSURANCE CO. LTD., DRAKE INSURANCE CO. LTD., EAGLE STAR
INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND
STEPHEN ROY MERRITT, AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF UNDERWRITERS SUBSCRIBING TO LLOYD’S POLICY NO.
614/B94656-A/1582
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Defendants
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
HARRINGTON J.
[1]
This
is a marine insurance coverage case. The plaintiffs seek indemnity from the
defendant underwriters, on policies written in 1970, for sums paid to the
Canadian government in 2000 in settlement of an action for the cost of
refloating the tank-barge Irving Whale and her cargo in 1996, for the cost of
defending that action, and for sue and labouring expenses allegedly incurred on
underwriters’ behalf. The underwriters deny liability. They say the plaintiffs
were not liable, or, if they were, their liability was not covered by the
policies.
[2]
In
these reasons I shall refer to the plaintiffs as "the Irving Group” (unless
otherwise differentiated) and to the Canadian government as “the Crown”.
[3]
On
7 September 1970, the Irving Whale, under tow of the tug Irving Maple, set sail
from Halifax, Nova
Scotia,
bound for Bathurst,
New Brunswick
where she was to deliver her cargo of 4,270 metric tons of Bunker C fuel oil.
She never arrived. She sank that day in the Gulf of St. Lawrence where she lay
37 fathoms below the surface for 26 years, until the Crown raised her.
[4]
In
the short-term aftermath of her sinking, some of her cargo escaped and fetched
up onto the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and to a lesser extent
onto Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton. The Crown monitored
the situation over the years and, from time to time, took remedial steps such
as blocking vents from which oil was escaping. Nevertheless, seepage was
observed. Come the 1990s, based on in-house advice and outside reports it
commissioned, the Crown finally came to realize that the Irving Whale was a
time bomb. Sooner, rather than later, she would corrode and break up, releasing
well over 3,000 m.t. of oil to the great prejudice of the marine habitat, the
shoreline, and those dependent upon the sea and shore. Although the wisdom of
the Crown’s decision has not been challenged in these proceedings, the timing
has. The defendants argue, and I agree, that the government of the day was
pursuing a political agenda. This was post Exxon Valdez, and the principle of
“polluter pays” was in vogue. However, although the precise timing of the
refloating may have been political, the fact remains that the Irving Whale
would have broken up, probably sooner, rather than later.
[5]
The
Irving Group were put
on notice beforehand that they would be held accountable for the cost of
raising the Irving Whale and neutralizing both her and her cargo. Indeed, they were
provided with copy of reports which indicated that the cost would run into the
millions, certainly far more than $5,000,000, an important figure, as it was
the limit of the liability insurance coverage provided by the defendants.
[6]
The
Irving Group, one or more of whom were the owners, charterers and operators of
the tug and tow, as well as the owners of the oil, offered to co-operate by
providing, at no charge unless there were an actual spill during refloating,
standby assistance during that operation and then by taking the Irving Whale in
hand, cleaning her and disposing of the pollutants being some of the oil cargo,
as well as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) which formed part of the Irving
Whale’s heating system, and asbestos.
[7]
The
refloating was to take place in 1995. It was aborted that year as a result of
an injunction issued by Mr. Justice Richard, as he then was, in Société pour
vaincre la pollution Inc v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 57 ACWS
(3d) 397, [1995] FCJ No 1129
(QL). He ordered a stay of the implementation of the decision pending the
outcome of an application for judicial review. The serious issue to be tried
was whether any substantial release of PCBs could have serious environmental
consequences.
[8]
However,
the operation successfully proceeded in 1996 with no environmental consequences
to speak of. The Irving Group took over the Irving Whale and her cargo at Halifax shipyard,
cleaned her, and arranged for the destruction of the PCBs and oil contaminated
with same. They sold the oil which was not contaminated, the proceeds of which
at first instance were held by the Crown.
RECOVERY ACTION BY THE
CROWN
[9]
As
anticipated, in 1997 the Crown took action against the Irving Group as well as
the Administrator of the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund and the International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund 1971, parties by statute. As against the Irving Group,
the claim was based upon statutory liability arising from the Canada
Shipping Act and the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations
thereunder, as well as common law negligence and nuisance. The amount claimed
was in excess of $42,000,000.
[10]
The
Irving Group were originally
represented by Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt who filed a Statement of Defence
and Counterclaim for a declaration that if liable they were entitled to limit
that liability in accordance with the provisions of the Canada Shipping Act.
However, due to a conflict of interest, they were subsequently replaced by the
firm of Ogilvy Renault. This change of solicitors figures prominently in the
defence costs portion of the present claim.
[11]
The
Irving Group moved to have the action dismissed as against them on the grounds
of time bar. In Canada v J.D. Irving, Ltd, [1999] 2 FC
346, 159 FTR 282, Mr. Justice Hugessen granted their motion in part. He held
that to the extent the claim was based on the pollution provisions of the Canada
Shipping Act and regulations thereunder, it was time-barred. However, he
also held that the necessary facts were not before him which would allow him to
dismiss the action based on the torts of negligence and nuisance, both of which
might be of a continuing nature. The action was also dismissed against the
other defendants.
[12]
During
the course of subsequent proceedings, before the examination for discovery of Crown
representatives was completed and before the examination for discovery of the Irving
Group began, the action was settled for $5,000,000. The Irving Group paid $4,709,501.86
and agreed that the Crown keep the proceeds of the sale of the clean oil
recuperated from the Irving Whale which were $290,498.14. The Irving Group also
got to keep the Irving Whale which is still in operation today as a wood chip
barge.
INSURANCE COVERAGE
[13]
The
relationship between the Irving Group and the defendant underwriters is
somewhat peculiar in that during the time the Group arranged with the Crown to
provide standby services and to remediate the Irving Whale and her cargo, they
had no details of their insurance coverage. In August 1995, Bruce Drost, an
in-house counsel at J.D. Irving, Limited, wrote to Reed Stenhouse Limited to
say that it was his understanding they were the broker who arranged various
insurance coverages including hull & machinery, and third party liability, (primary
and excess). The purpose of the letter was to state that the Crown had awarded
a contract to lift the barge and to provide notice of potential claims.
[14]
Mr.
Drost, who only joined J.D. Irving, Limited, in 1978, testified he could not
find copy of the policies in question, but obtained policy numbers from an
adjustment report prepared following the sinking in 1970. The underwriters had
difficulty retrieving the policies, and it was only in April 1997 that Reed
Stenhouse provided Mr. Drost with copies thereof. Reed Stenhouse also pointed
out that three of the underwriters, Orion Insurance Co. Ltd., Andrew Weir Ins. Co.
Ltd., and English & American Ins. Co. Ltd. were under the control of a
liquidator.
[15]
Although
the underwriters were not only put on notice of a potential claim, but also the
claim as later specifically formulated, the action, and the settlement, they
did not engage in any dialogue as they were under the impression that the Irving
Group had agreed to absorb the legal fees of Ogilvy Renault in any event, and
that it was unlikely that the Crown would succeed in its action.
[16]
At
the time of the casualty in 1970, the Irving Group had various insurance
policies in place. This action is only concerned with excess third party
liability. The primary liability cover was with a mutual protection and
indemnity association (a P&I Club), the London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance
Association Limited, managed by A. Bilbrough & Co., Ltd. Its cover was
limited to Canadian $200,000 for any one accident or occurrence including
pollution. The “Club” originally paid out a few thousand dollars in 1971 and
paid out the balance of the $200,000 in 2001. That decision, for whatever
reason it was made, is not binding on the defendants herein. The failure of the
Irving Group to seek and obtain prior approval of the settlement has not really
been explained. Perhaps they thought, as set out in the Club’s policy, that the
standard P&I Club Oil Pollution Clause was in force. It reads: “Unless
limited herein to a lesser sum, the liability of the Association is limited to
US$14,400,000 in respect to oil pollution claims, other than claims under the
TOVALOP Agreement, (each vessel any one accident or occurrence).” Of course, in
this case the Club’s liability was limited to a lesser sum.
[17]
The
insurance which is in issue is excess third party liability cover which was
split between various Lloyd’s of London syndicates and Institute of London Underwriters companies;
71.36% with Lloyd’s and 28.24% with the companies. Both policies provide that
the underwriters bind themselves each for their own part and not for one
another, that is to say that their liability is several, not joint. This is
relevant in that the defendants Orion Insurance Co. Ltd., English &
American Ins. Co. Ltd., and Andrew Weir Ins. Co. Ltd., who were served, never
filed an appearance. The reason given by counsel for the other underwriters is
that by the time these proceedings were instituted they were in “run-off” or
insolvent. In addition, counsel informed me that one of the companies they do represent,
Economic Insurance Co. Ltd., has apparently now gone into run-off as well.
However, counsel has not moved to cease representing Economic. In any event, all
this information is anecdotal only and has no bearing on these reasons. Under
Federal Courts Rule 184, the Irving Group still have to make their case. To the
extent they obtain judgment, they may have some difficulty enforcing it in England against the
defendants said to be in “run-off”, except to the extent they may have received
dividends.
[18]
The
assureds are “J.D. Irving, Limited et al. and/or subsidiary and/or affiliated
and/or associated companies.” The entire Group fits that description. During
the term of the policy from February 1, 1970 to February 1, 1971, they were all
ultimately 100% owned by K.C. Irving.
[19]
However,
the insurance was:
…to cover the Legal and/or Contractual
Liability of the Assured for all loss or expense resulting from the Legal
and/or Contractual Liability of the Assured and/or their Employees and/or
Agents and/or Vessels owned, chartered, or operated by the Assured for loss,
damage and/or expense to others – arising out of or resulting from the
ownership, use or operation of Vessels owned, chartered, or operated by the
Assured…
[20]
The
tug Irving Maple was owned by Universal Sales, Limited and bareboat chartered to
Atlantic Towing Limited. J.D. Irving, Limited was the owner of the Irving Whale
which was also under bareboat charter to Atlantic Towing. Irving Oil Company,
Limited was the owner of the cargo. Irving Oil Limited is its successor in
corporate interest.
[21]
The
limit on liability coverage was $5,000,000, in excess of the $200,000 covered
by the Club, subject to a $1,000 deductible.
[22]
Although
there was no contractual duty on the part of the underwriters to defend, the
policy contained a sue and labour clause, the relevant portion of which reads:
It shall be lawful for the Assured – to sue,
labor and travel for, in and about the defense of any claim, suit or appeal
from any judgment, it being understood and agreed that the costs and expenses
of minimizing or establishing a liability of the Assured or defending any suit
or suits against the Assured based on any liability or alleged liability of
the Assured as covered by this insurance shall be payable by these Assurers.
[My emphasis.]
[23]
The
policies were subject to English law. However that law has not been pleaded as
a fact to differ from Canadian Maritime Law. Indeed with one minor exception,
the (U.K.) Marine
Insurance Act, 1906, and our Marine Insurance Act, SC 1993, c 22,
are identical. At the time of the sinking in 1970, there was no federal marine
insurance act. Nevertheless, as per Ultramar Canada Inc v Mutual Marine Office
Inc (the Pointe Levy), [1995] 1 FC 341, 1994 AMC 2409, [1994] FCJ No
1306 (QL), the English act formed part of the lex non scripta of
Canadian Maritime Law.
[24]
I
will analyze the claim as broken down by the Irving Group into three components:
sue and labour, liability and defence costs. The sums claimed, as slightly reformulated
at trial, are as follows:
a. Sue and
labour: $3,602,458.83;
b. Liability:
$4,705,792.67; and
c. Defence
costs: $1,800,000 (approximately).
[25]
There
may be an error in the calculation of the liability portion of the claim .The
amount paid in settlement, excluding the net proceeds of the sale of the
recuperated oil belonging to Irving Oil, who, as I will explain, was not
covered, was $4,709,501.86. In addition, however, the underwriters at risk have
to be given credit for the $200,000 paid by the P&I Club, and the $1,000
deductible. Consequently, the liability portion of the claim would appear to be
$4,508,501.86.
[26]
I
say the defence costs are approximately $1,800,000 as a small portion thereof
is expressed in either United States dollars or pounds
sterling, unconverted.
SUE AND LABOUR
[27]
Sections
79 and 80 of our Marine Insurance Act provide that if a marine policy
contains a sue and labour clause, there is in fact supplementary insurance so
that the insured may recover expenses properly incurred even if the underwriter
has paid for a total loss. An insured is duty bound to take “such measures as
are reasonable for the purpose of averting or diminishing a loss under the
marine policy.”
[28]
The
insertion of a sue and labour clause is thus to benefit the underwriters. The quid
pro quo is that the insured will be indemnified for expenses reasonably
incurred which had the potential of benefiting the underwriter: see George R. Strathy
(now Mr. Justice) and George C. Moore, Law & Practice of Marine
Insurance in Canada (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2003) at
179-80.
[29]
The
sue and labour expenses incurred by the Irving Group began in 1995. At that
time, they knew the Crown had let out a contract to Donjon Marine for $12.8
million and had been provided by the Crown with a report prepared in 1992 by
Marex International Limited in which it estimated the combined costs of
preventative measures and cargo extraction as being in excess of $21,000,000.
Consequently, the sue and labour expenses incurred by the Irving Group in 1995
and 1996 could not possibly have benefited the underwriters, as the limit of
their liability, if any, was $5,000,000. This is not to say that the Irving Group were foolhardy
in incurring those expenses. As George Hill, retired vice-president of Atlantic
Towing, testified, the Irving Group were of the opinion that they were the
best. They stood by so as to minimize liability, which, if any, was already way
over $5,000,000, in the event a spill incurred during refloating, and to make
sure the rehabilitation of the Irving Whale and her cargo was done properly.
Undoubtedly, the concept of acting like a good corporate citizen was also not
far from the Group’s mind.
[30]
Consequently,
the sue and labour portion of the claim shall be dismissed in its entirety. The
fact that as part of that arrangement the Irving Group got to keep the Irving
Whale is therefore not relevant.
THE UNDERWRITERS’ CASE
[31]
In
broad strokes, on the liability issue, the underwriters take the position that
the Irving Group were not
liable to the Crown or, if they were, they paid too much. In any event, if they
were liable, such liability is not covered by the policies. More specifically,
the Irving Group were
not liable to the Crown because:
a. there was no
negligence;
i.
it
has never been established that any member of the Irving Group or individuals
for whom they were vicariously liable, was negligent;
b. public
nuisance has no application as steps to abate should have been taken immediately,
certainly not after an interval of 25 years;
c. they made a
gratuitous payment to enhance their public image; and
d. the loss did
not occur during the time frame covered by the policy.
[32]
If
they were liable, they paid too much as they were entitled to limit their
liability as the loss occurred without their “actual fault or privity”.
[33]
If
they were liable, the underwriters also say the Irving Group are not entitled
to indemnity because:
a. claims which
were once covered have become time-barred; or
b. they settled
claims which were covered and claims which were not. As no proper “ascertainment”
was made among the various heads of claim, they are not entitled to recover
anything.
THE SETTLEMENT WITH THE CROWN
[34]
Once
the statutory oil pollution allegations were struck by Mr. Justice Hugessen,
the balance of the claim sounded in negligence and in nuisance. The Crown was
later given leave to amend its claim to also allege that the Irving Group
breached a duty to warn of the presence of PCBs in the Irving Whale’s heating
system.
[35]
Had
the matter gone to trial, I consider it unlikely that any member of the Irving Group
would have been found liable for failing to warn of the presence of PCBs. It is
common ground in the proceedings before me that the Crown, at all relevant
times, had a copy of the Irving Whale’s plans which showed the heating system.
Furthermore, the Marex Report, referred to above, identified the heating fluid
as Monsanto MGS 295S. The Crown knew or should have known, that the prime
ingredient in this brand name was PCBs, commonly used in heating systems at the
time. According to the Crown’s statement of claim, over $18 million of the over
$42 million claimed relates to the aborted attempt to refloat in 1995, aborted
as a result of the injunction. This brings the Crown’s claim down to the $24
million range.
[36]
It
is not necessary to consider negligence, as I am satisfied that one or more of
the Irving Group, with the exception of Irving Oil Company, Limited, and its
successor Irving Oil Limited, would have been found liable in public nuisance
to an amount in excess of $5 million. They may, or may not, have been able to
limit their liability to $2,500,000, or less.
[37]
That
liability is based on public nuisance created by the polluters. There are
common law and statutory nuisances, as well as private and public nuisances.
One could certainly say that the relevant portions of the Canada Shipping
Act and the regulations thereunder, which were held by Mr. Justice Hugessen
to be inapplicable because of time bar, created a statutory nuisance. However,
the Act did not abolish common law nuisance which is one, apart from statute,
which violates principles recognized in the law for the protection of the
public and individuals in the exercise and enjoyment of their rights.
[38]
Then
there is the distinction between public nuisance and private nuisance. This
case deals with public nuisance which is one which inflicts damage, injury or
inconvenience on all Her Majesty’s subjects, or on such members of the class
who come within the neighbourhood of its operation: see Halsbury’s Laws of
England, 5th ed, vol 78 (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) “Nuisance”,
at 99ff.
[39]
The
law of public nuisance was clearly stated by Lord Denning in two cases in the
1950s. In Attorney General v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd, [1957] 1 All ER 894, [1957]
2 QB 169, he said at pages 908 and 191 respectively:
…a public nuisance is a nuisance which is
so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not
be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his own
responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be taken on the
responsibility of the community at large.
In an obiter in Southport
Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co, Ltd, [1954] 2 QB 182 , [1954] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 446, reversed on other grounds by the House of Lords at [1956] AC 218, [1955]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 655, [1955] 3 All ER 864, he dealt with oil pollution as a public
nuisance at page 196: “Suffice it to say that the discharge of a noxious
substance in such a way as to be likely to affect the comfort and safety of Her
Majesty’s subjects generally is a public nuisance.” He continued on the
following page: “Applying the old cases to modern instances, it is, in my
opinion, a public nuisance to discharge oil into the sea in such circumstances
that it is likely to be carried on to the shores and beaches of our land to the
prejudice and discomfort of Her Majesty’s subjects.”
[40]
A
principal difference between an action for public nuisance and an action for
negligence is the burden of proof. In Southport, above, Lord
Denning continued at page 197:
In an action for a public nuisance, once
a nuisance is proved and the defendant is shown to have caused it, then the
legal burden is shifted onto the defendant to justify or excuse himself. If he
fails to do so, he is held liable whereas in an action for negligence the legal
burden in most cases remains throughout on the plaintiff.
In this case no excuse has been made out.
[41]
Although
the underwriters do not appear to object to the Crown having removed the Irving
Whale, and her cargo, at the taxpayers’ expense, they submit that no action lay
against the Irving Group because abatement is an exceptional self-help remedy, available
only in an emergency. According to them, as a condition precedent the Crown
would have had to have called upon the Irving Group to remove the Irving Whale
themselves, that they would have refused, and that there would, at the very
least, have had to have been a motion brought to Court for an order that the
Irving Group remove the source of pollution. I do not see it that way. Although
the Courts discourage self-help remedies, in this case, it was the community at
large, through the Crown, that took the necessary steps to remove the nuisance.
At one point or another, there would have been an emergency, and it was far
better to refloat the Irving Whale before she broke up. Leaving aside the time frame,
this case is not unlike the Queen v The Ship Sun Diamond et al, [1984] 1
FC 3.
[42]
In
my opinion, the underwriters are elevating form over substance. As Lord Denning
said in Letang v Cooper, [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, [1964] 2 All
ER 929 at page 932:
I must decline, therefore, to go back to the
old forms of action in order to construe this statute. I know that in the last
century MAITLAND said “the forms of action we have buried but they still rule
us from their graves”. But we have in this Century shaken off their
trammels. These forms of action have served their day. They did at one time
form a guide to substantive rights; but they do so no longer. Lord Atkin told
us what to do about them:
When these ghosts of the past stand in the path
of justice, clanking their mediaeval chains, the proper course for the judge is
to pass through them undeterred. See United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank,
Ltd. [1940] 4 All E.R. 20 at p. 37.
[43]
Furthermore,
if need be (and I do not see the need), if the claim does not fall within
Canadian Maritime Law as it now is, it would be permissible to incrementally make
a change thereto so as to hold that the Crown may delay in abating a public
nuisance, without calling upon the creator of that nuisance to remove it: see Canadian
National Railway Co v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, [1992]
SCJ No 40 (QL); London Drugs Ltd v Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, [1992] SCJ No 84 (QL); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v
Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210, [1997] SCJ No 111 (QL); Ordon
Estate v Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, [1998] SCJ No 84 (QL); and Fraser
River Pile & Dredge Ltd v Can-Dive Services Ltd, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108,
[1999] SCJ No 48 (QL).
THE LIABILTY CLAIM
AGAINST UNDERWRITERS
[44]
The
underwriters agreed to indemnify the Irving Group with respect to accidents
arising during the period commencing 1 February 1970 and ending 1 February
1971. The long delay between the accident in 1970, and the expenses incurred by
the Crown in 1995 and 1996, obviously gives rise to difficulties. Although the Irving
Group eventually settled, they never admitted any liability, be it in
negligence, nuisance or otherwise.
[45]
The
policies included a claims co-operation clause which provided that underwriters
were not to be called upon to defend but had reserved the right to be given the
opportunity to associate with the insured in the defence and control of any
claim, suit or proceeding, which in the opinion of underwriters was likely to
involve coverage. This clause is not relevant in that the underwriters were
kept informed, never asked for the opportunity to associate with the defence
and control of the proceedings and, in any event, were of the opinion that the
claim was not likely to involve insurance coverage.
[46]
The
Court is called upon to determine if any member of the Irving Group was liable
to the Crown, if that liability was covered by the policies, and whether that
liability would have exceeded $5,000,000. By way of elimination, I am of the
opinion that Irving Oil Company, Limited, and its successor, Irving Oil
Limited, were not covered by the policy. Although they fall within the
definition of insureds, they were not using the Irving Whale or the Irving
Maple. Their cargo was simply onboard. They did not own, charter, operate, or
use either the tug or tow.
[47]
In
my opinion, the $4,709,501.86 paid to the Crown did not cover any liability on
the part of Irving Oil. Irving Oil was not the polluter. Irving Oil did not
create the nuisance. Its potential liability to the Federal Crown is too
remote. If, as and when the Bunker C oil reached shore, its liability would be
engaged under provincial environmental statutes. Its turning over of the
proceeds of the sale of the oil to the Federal Crown more than covers any
liability to the Crown it might have had.
[48]
As
to which members of the Irving Group would have been found liable, one need
only look to Atlantic Towing, the bareboat charterer of the Irving Whale. It
was the polluter. It created the public nuisance.
[49]
On
the premise that the liability, if any, of the Irving Group was much greater
than $5 million, the underwriters submit that the settlement should be
apportioned between the insured and uninsured portion of the claim. On that
basis, if we take as an example a realistic risk of liability of $20 million,
and coverage of $5 million, only 25% of the settlement or $1,250,000 would fall
upon the underwriters.
[50]
This
reasoning is flawed. It is based on the principle of underinsurance which
applies to goods, not to liabilities. Section 88 of the Marine Insurance Act
provides that if the insurance is less than the value of the subject matter
insured, the insured is deemed to be self-insured with respect to the uninsured
portion. Thus, if in a hull policy the cover is for $5 million but the ship is
worth $10 million, in the event of $2 million damage the insured is deemed
to be self-insured for 50%, and the underwriters would only pay out $1 million.
[51]
This
principle does not apply to a third party liability policy. If the liability
were $2.5 million the underwriters would pay in full. If the liability
were $5 million, the underwriters would pay in full. If the liability were $25
million, the underwriters would pay $5 million and the insured the balance: see
Howard Bennett, The Law of Marine Insurance, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006) at 23.51.
[52]
Somewhat
in the alternative, the underwriters argue that the payment in whole or in part
was gratuitous. In my opinion it was not.
[53]
The
nuisance continued, and so the action was not time-barred under that heading.
The six-year limitation under section 39 of the Federal Courts Act has
no application as no part of the Crown’s claim was for damage suffered more
than six years before the refloating (Robert v Portage la Prairie (City),
[1971] S.C.R. 481, [1971] SCJ No 53 (QL)).
[54]
Undoubtedly,
the Irving Group were conscious
of their public image. However, in my opinion no part of the settlement should
be considered as being gratuitous. The Group had earlier made a conditional $10
million settlement offer. At its heart, the Irving Group would have provided
funding or have become involved in various projects in Atlantic Canada with
which their name would have been prominently associated. However, it is not
necessary to consider that offer as it was refused. Following the actual $5
million settlement, both the Crown and the Group issued press releases. The
Group emphasized their cooperation and that both sides thought it appropriate
to bring to an end a long, contentious and expensive piece of litigation, much
at the taxpayers’ expense. Although favourable publicity may have been achieved,
Irving was putting
paid to its liability, no more, no less.
[55]
Settlement
was reached during a meeting at J.D. Irving’s offices in St. John on 7 July
2000. Participants on the Irving side included James Kenneth Irving, the
Chairman of J.D. Irving, Limited, David Jamieson, Executive Vice-President and
Secretary of J.D. Irving, as well as Secretary of Universal Sales and Atlantic
Towing, and legal counsel Johanne Gauthier (currently a sitting judge of the
Federal Court of Appeal). As so often happens during such without prejudice
settlement discussions, no one recalls the precise basis for the $5 million
figure. Mr. Irving recalls that he acted on the recommendation of Mr. Jamieson,
who is himself a lawyer. Mr. Jamieson recalls the genesis was an offer which
was still open when the meeting began. Based on a recommendation by Me Gauthier,
the offer which had been open going into the meeting was for $2.5 million in
principal and interest, plus costs. If not accepted, the offer was to remain
open with interest running on the capital amount compounded semi-annually at
the bank prime rate. Me Gauthier certainly did not have the limit of the
insurance coverage in mind as she had not been provided with any detail of the
policies whatsoever.
[56]
The
rationale of the $2.5 million offer is set forth in a memo from Me Gauthier to
Chris MacDonald, in-house counsel at J.D. Irving, Limited, dated May 23, 2000. As
she explained:
An amount of $2.5 million + costs
calculated in accordance with tariff B of the Federal Court Rules up to the
date of the acceptance of the offer, i.e. let’s say June 30th, 2000.
…
The $2.5 figure is made up of $1,540,000
± in capital plus $660,000 ± in interest (7% compounded for 5 years/because the
first major disbursement was made in the summer of 1995, i.e. $12.8 million to
DonJon). The extra $300,000 is added to cover/protect you against the
fluctuating rate of the SDR.
[57]
During
trial, she said she had calculated the $1,540,000 based both on the general and
pollution limitation fund for the barge and the normal limitation fund for the
tug. She was not cross-examined on the point and so we do not know precisely
what calculations she used. The $660,000 in interest was calculated at 7%
compounded for 5 years. The additional $300,000 was to act as a hedge against
the fluctuating rate of the Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary
Fund. The creation of a limitation fund was considered a matter of procedure,
and special drawing rights were to be converted into Canadian dollars at the
date the fund was established, or ordered to be established. There was a real
risk of a falling Canadian dollar.
[58]
In
her memo, she had roughly estimated the Crown’s costs as being somewhere between
$350,000 and $500,000. During her testimony at trial, she expressed the view it
would have cost the Irving Group another $2 to $3 million to proceed to trial.
[59]
Her
concern was that under the law at the time the burden of establishing
entitlement to limit liability lay with the Irving Group. They had to show that
the accident occurred without “the actual fault or privity” of a directing mind
of the corporations. The basis of the “actual fault or privity” provisions of
the Canada Shipping Act was the 1957 Limitation Convention. Although it
had been replaced in Canada before the settlement by the 1976
Convention and the 1996 Protocol, as a result of transitional provisions the
old law still applied to this case. The jurisprudence was such that it was
fairly easy to break limitation (for a discussion, see Rhône (The) v Peter AB
Widener (The), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 497, 101 DLR (4th) 188 and Société Telus Communications
v Peracomo Inc, 2011 FC 494, [2011] FCJ No 602 (QL), currently in appeal).
[60]
I
find that the settlement was reasonable and made in contemplation of the
likelihood that one or more of Universal Sales, Limited, J.D. Irving, Limited, and
Atlantic Towing Limited would have been found liable in excess of that amount
should the matter have gone to trial.
[61]
A
somewhat problematic issue would have been the award of costs. Although costs
usually follow the event, the Court has wide discretion. The Irving Group had
made an open offer of $2.5 million plus costs. Under the Federal Courts
Rules as they were in the year 2000, had that offer been left open through
trial, and if judgment were for less than that amount, the Irving Group could
have expected to be awarded double costs from the date of the offer. Since in
my opinion they would have been found liable in excess of that amount, the
offer would only have been relevant if they succeeded in their counterclaim for
a declaration of limitation of liability. However, the normal, but not
invariable, rule in limitation actions was that the party seeking to limit had
to pay the other party’s costs, even if successful: see Edward C. Mayers,
Admiralty Law and Practice in Canada, 1st ed (Toronto: The
Carswell Company, Ltd, 1916) at 272-73; and Kenneth C. McGuffie, P. A. Fugeman &
P. V. Gray, British Shipping Laws, vol 1, Admiralty Practice (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1964) at paragraph 1224.
[62]
In
light of this finding, I do not have to consider the proposition advanced by
the underwriters that since the settlement reflected both insured and uninsured
claims, without a division between the two, the Group is not entitled to any
recovery from the underwriters. This proposition is based on the decision of
the English Commercial Court in Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co v Bovis Land
Lease Ltd, [2004] EWHC 2197, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 494. That case held that
as a matter of law an insured who relied on a global settlement had no means of
ascertaining that he was under a liability covered by the policy. I do not
agree with this reasoning. In such a case it falls upon the Court, based on the
evidence, to make the division. The case is, of course, not binding on me, and,
in any event, has fared poorly in England: see Enterprise Oil Ltd v Strand
Insurance Co Ltd, [2006] EWHC 58, [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 186, and Omega
Proteins Ltd v Aspen Insurance U.K. Ltd, [2010] EWHC 2280, [2011] Lloyd’s
Rep IR 183.
[63]
The
underwriters also submit that the claim falls outside the coverage. This
derives from the concept that nuisance can be, and in my opinion in this case was,
a continuing tort. In Portage la Prairie, above, the
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Martland, held that the continuation of a
nuisance created a new cause of action. He said at pages 491-92, speaking of a
private nuisance:
I adopt the proposition of law
stated in Salmond on Torts, 15th ed., at p. 791, as follows:
When the act of the defendant
is a continuing injury, its continuance after the date of the first action is a
new cause of action for which a second action can be brought, and so from time
to time until the injury is discontinued. An injury is said to be a continuing
one so long as it is still in the course of being committed and is not wholly
past. Thus the wrong of false imprisonment continues so long as the plaintiff
is kept in confinement; a nuisance continues so long as the state of things
causing the nuisance is suffered by the defendant to remain upon his land; and
a trespass continues so long as the defendant remains present upon the
plaintiff’s land. In the case of such continuing injury an action may be
brought during its continuance, but damages are recoverable only down to the
time of their assessment in the action.
[64]
It
follows, so the underwriters say, that the Crown is claiming for expenses incurred
in 1995 and 1996, based on a new cause of action, which did not occur within
the time frame of the policies, i.e. 1970.
[65]
However
the policies do not deal with the creation of causes of action, they deal with
accidents or occurrences. The accident or occurrence was the sinking of the
Irving Whale during the policy year. It does not matter that the damage was
only suffered many years later.
[66]
Indeed,
this is the reason why many recent policies are written on a “claims made”
basis rather than on an “occurrence” basis. The rationale was set out by Madam
Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd v Simcoe
& Erie General Insurance Co, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 262, 263, 147 NR 44. Although
“occurrence” liability policies work reasonably well, there are exceptions:
…But
for insureds who are professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.,
damages can result (or be discovered) many years after a negligent act is
committed. This is even more the case for manufacturers and other types
of insureds who can cause damages by producing hazardous products or toxic
waste. Therefore, for each of these types of insureds, insurers are at risk
for an unknown number of claims that may be made many years after the expiry of
a particular policy of "occurrence" liability insurance.
Compounding the uncertainty that these "long-tail"
risks caused to insurers was the evolving nature of law and science. The
potential for future developments such as the increased availability and
quality of scientific proof of causation of harm, expanded legal liability
(e.g., "superfund" environmental legislation), and changes in the law
as to quantum of damages, added to the uncertainty on the part of insurers as
to the likely number of claims that would be made against their insureds in the
future, as well as the likely amount of damages per claim for which individual
insurers would have to provide indemnity.
[67]
This
is exactly what happened in this case.
DEFENCE COSTS
[68]
While
on the one hand there was no contractual duty on the part of the underwriters
to defend, on the other it was agreed that it was lawful for the insured to
sue, labour and defend any claim and that the costs and expenses of minimizing
or establishing a liability of the insured, or defending any suit based upon
any liability, or alleged liability, as covered by the policies, was to be paid
by the underwriters.
[69]
Although
defence costs are mentioned in the same breath as sue and labouring costs,
there is a distinction in that in my opinion the expenses claimed as sue and
labouring could not possibly have benefited the underwriters, while the cost of
defending, as long as the claim fell under the policy, is recoverable. Since I
am of the view that the Irving Group were liable to the Crown, and covered to a
contractual limit of $5 million, the issue is whether the defence costs should
be apportioned, and if so, how.
[70]
The
total amount claimed is Canadian $1,691,427.07, US$42,835.78 and 11,165.30
pounds sterling, which I have rounded out to $1,800,000. Of this amount,
$1,681,959.67 relates to legal fees. The balance is for transcripts of examinations
for discovery and opinions obtained from experts.
[71]
The
underwriters admit that all these accounts have been paid, but do not admit
that the fees were reasonable. However, they have offered no evidence to show
that they were unreasonable. They have made a case, however, that some of the
expenses were unnecessarily incurred, or should not be attributable to them. Following
Mr. Justice Létourneau’s lead in Remo Imports Ltd v Jaguar Cars Ltd,
2007 FCA 258, 367 NR 177, at paragraph 20, I am not prepared to act as a ferret
and embark on an analysis of lawyers’ time sheets which might support the non-admission
by the underwriters.
[72]
The
major item in defence costs is the legal fees and disbursements paid to Ogilvy
Renault in the amount of $1,168,242.67. The underwriters submit that the Irving
Group agreed to absorb these fees no matter what. I disagree. It came about
this way.
[73]
When
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt had to withdraw from the record because of a
conflict of interest, they recommended Ogilvy Renault, more particularly Yves
Fortier, Q.C., an extremely well-known Canadian litigator who had been, among
other things, a past-president of the Canadian Bar Association and Canada’s Ambassador
to the United Nations. The Crown was being extremely aggressive and the Irving
Group wanted a “big gun”. However, at the time Mr. Fortier was approached, one
of his partners, Pierre Côté, had a watching brief on behalf of the
underwriters, defendants in this action. Discussions ensued as to whether this
potential conflict could be accommodated. Mr. Côté wrote to the underwriters to
suggest that it might be advantageous for them to agree that Mr. Fortier defend
the interests of the Irving Group. The rationale was that Mr. Fortier was
a formidable trial lawyer and Mr. Côté was confident he would defeat the
Crown’s claim and, as a result, the issue of insurance cover would never come
up, particularly as it would have to be agreed that all fees, costs and
expenses in defending the Crown’s claim would be for Irving’s account
only. However if the Crown were to succeed, and if Irving were to seek
indemnity on the liability issue, they would instruct other counsel, leaving
Mr. Côté “and Ogilvy Renault total freedom in ferociously defending the claim
against Excess Underwriters…” Naturally, a Chinese or ethical wall would be
established.
[74]
The
lead underwriters agreed. Alan Cairns, who testified at trial, and who at the
time was with Equitas, which was dealing with all Lloyd’s premium and risk
claims for the 1992 and previous years, wrote to say that written confirmation
from the Irving Group was needed.
[75]
At
this point, the Chinese wall had been established. The prime lawyers on the
underwriters’ side were Pierre Côté and Richard Desgagnés, and on the Irving
Group’s side Yves Fortier and Johanne Gauthier. Unfortunately, for various
reasons, both Mr. Fortier and Mr. Côté were constantly in and out of Ogilvy
Renault’s Montreal Office, and communications broke down.
[76]
On
15 January 1998, Mr. Côté dictated a memorandum to Mr. Fortier setting out,
among other things, that the underwriters would be agreeable as long as Ogilvy
Renault’s fees would be assumed by the Irving Group, to the exclusion of any
contribution by them. Mr. Fortier does not specifically recall receiving that
memo.
[77]
Richard
Desgagnés, who signed the memo on Mr. Côté’s behalf, recalls following up by
later speaking by telephone with Mr. Fortier, who apparently was at an airport
somewhere. Mr. Fortier told him all was well. Mr. Fortier has no
recollection of that conversation. I find there was such a conversation. Although
there has been some controversy over the tendency to prefer the evidence of one
who has a positive recollection over one who has a negative one (Lefeunteum
v Beaudoin (1897), 28 SCR 89, [1897] SCJ No 68 (QL), World Marine &
General Insurance Co v Leger, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1951] SCJ No 46 (QL), Borthwick
v Johnson, [1997] BCJ No 652 (QL)), in this case, there is no
contradiction. Mr. Fortier does not deny that the conversation took place. He
simply does not recall it. In any event, this particular conversation is not
determinative.
[78]
A
number of conversations took place between Mr. Fortier and David Jamieson. Both
are adamant that the Irving Group were never asked to renounce such right as they
may have had to seek indemnity under the insurance policies with respect to
Ogilvy Renault’s fees. Johanne Gauthier, who sat in on one telephone
conversation, recalls that fees were mentioned in the sense that Ogilvy Renault
wanted to be paid directly by the Irving Group, rather than to have their bills
passed on via the brokers to underwriters. On subscription policies, Me
Gauthier’s experience was that in such event they would be paid in dribs and
drabs over a long period of time. Certainly no indemnity waiver was discussed.
[79]
I
accept this evidence. What is even more telling is that Mr. Jamieson, as
requested, did write on 29 January 1998. He confirmed to Mr. Fortier that if
Irving’s defence was unsuccessful and they sought indemnity from the
underwriters, they agreed to waive conflict of interest and would instruct
counsel other than Ogilvy Renault, who through Mr. Côté and others at the firm,
apart from those working on the Irving matter, could represent
the underwriters. He also asked for confirmation that a Chinese or ethical wall
had been established. Not a word was said about absorbing legal fees.
[80]
This
letter was passed on to Mr. Côté, who in turn sent it to underwriters. He said:
We refer to our recent discussions and to
Mr. Roland Birch’s letter of January 14, 1995, and attach hereto copy of a
letter emanating from Irving confirming that in the event that the Canadian
Government’s claim is successful and that Irving elects to seek indemnity under
the relevant insurance coverage, Ogilvy Renault and Pierre G. Côté will be free
to continue to act for the excess insurers and defend Irving’s claim
vigorously.
The letter was not shown to Mr. Desgagnés. Neither
Mr. Côté nor the underwriters ever came back to complain that Irving had not
expressly agreed to one of the conditions they had imposed. They have only
themselves to blame. The Irving Group did not waive such right as they might
have to claim Ogilvy Renault’s fees and disbursements as defence costs under
the policies.
[81]
There
should be some minor adjustments on the legal fees and other expenses. There
was some overlap when Ogilvy Renault took over the file. None of the defence
costs have been claimed against the primary underwriters, the P&I Club,
with its $200,000 limit. However, I take solace in the words of Lord Justice
Winn in Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd, [1969] EWCA Civ 2, [1969] 2 All
ER 119 at page 124:
I think myself with
confidence that there is already sufficient evidentiary material available to
enable this court to make a jury assessment in round figures. It would be wrong
and indeed an intolerable expenditure of judicial time and money of the parties
to embark on any detailed consideration of isolated items in the account on
which a balance must be struck.
Roughly speaking, I consider it appropriate
that $50,000 be deducted from the defence costs, and so fix that figure at
$1,750,000.
[82]
The
more vexing issue is that the Irving Group were defending an action for more
than $42 million. Is it reasonable that the underwriters bear the entire
cost thereof? The parties have not provided me with a case precisely on point. I
am of the opinion that a division should be made, and it matters not whether it
is based on an analogy to underinsurance or to defence of both insured and
uninsured claims, the excess over $5 million being uninsured. The decision of the
English Court of Appeal in Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain, [1997]
EWCA Civ 1140, [1997] 2 All ER 929, is instructive. The plaintiffs were
operating a dredging fleet in Iraq. Their assets were seized following Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait. At a time
when there was danger both to their personnel and their fleet, they negotiated,
under duress, a single price for the safety of both. They had property cover.
In first instance, Mr. Justice Rix, while noting that it was impossible to put
a financial value on the safety of the personnel, apportioned an equal amount to
the insured and uninsured interests. His decision was reversed in appeal
because, since no price could be put on the lives of personnel, the full cost
of entering into the agreement should have been recovered as sue and labour. In
this case, safety of life is not at issue, only the allocation of money.
[83]
As
stated earlier in these reasons, in my opinion the Crown would not have
succeeded in its action for the costs it incurred in 1995. This left a claim of
about $24 million. The quantum has not been analyzed in this action. If there
were skeletons in the Irving Group’s closet, i.e. the risk of actual
fault or privity, I assume there were some skeletons in the Crown’s as well. It
was refusing to produce some documents, relying on section 39 of the Canada
Evidence Act (confidences of the Privy Council), and had waited 25 years
before taking full remedial action.
[84]
Somewhat
arbitrarily, I fix the claim at $20 million for defence purposes. It follows
that the underwriters should pay 25%, and the Irving Group absorb
75%. On that basis, allowing a little liberty with exchange rates, I fix the
underwriters’ liability for defence cost at $437,500 (25% of $1,750,000). It
would have been helpful to the Court to have had the opinion of an average
adjuster. These professionals deal on a daily basis with such matters as losses
spread over several years and several policies, general average, particular
average, particular charges, deductibles, sue and labour, underinsurance, excess
insurance, double insurance, and reinsurance. In the Pointe Levy, above,
seven average adjustors testified. In this case, however, as Mr. Jamieson
testified, no adjustment was done.
[85]
In
summation, the principal amount of the liability of the excess underwriters to Universal
Sales, Limited, Atlantic Towing Limited and J.D. Irving, Limited is $4,946,001.86
($4,508,501.86 in principal plus $437,500 in defence costs), on a several, but
not joint, basis.
[86]
The
liability of the companies which did not defend is as follows:
Companies
|
Percentage
|
Orion
Insurance Co. Ltd.
|
3.49
|
English
& American Ins. Co. Ltd.
|
2.055
|
Andrew
Weir Ins. Co. Ltd.
|
2.05
|
TOTAL
|
7.595
|
In other words: 7.595% of $4,946,001.86, or
$375,648.84.
[87]
The
liability of the defending underwriters is as follows:
Companies
|
Percentage
|
Edinburgh
Assurance Co. Ltd.
|
6.57
|
British
Law Insurance Co. Ltd.
|
2.67
|
Economic
Insurance Co. Ltd.
|
2.055
|
Insurance
Co. of North America
|
1.54
|
London
& Edinburgh General Ins. Co. Ltd.
|
0.62
|
Ocean
Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. 33 1/3 % of
|
3.08
|
Royal
Exchange Assurance 33 1/3% of
|
Sun
Insurance Office Ltd. 33 1/3% of
|
Sphere
Insurance Co. Ltd. 60% of
|
2.46
|
Drake
Insurance Co. Ltd. 40% of
|
Eagle
Star Insurance Co. Ltd.
|
2.05
|
Subtotal
– Companies
|
21.045%
|
Lloyd’s
Syndicate No.
|
Percentage
|
Lloyd’s
Syndicate No.
|
Percentage
|
615
|
15.40
|
573
|
1.13
|
616
|
1.03
|
128
|
3.08
|
617
|
4.52
|
368
|
2.05
|
277
|
9.85
|
483
|
0.82
|
418
|
9.45
|
274
|
0.62
|
65
|
4.11
|
590
|
0.41
|
108
|
0.62
|
299
|
3.08
|
764
|
2.05
|
206
|
3.08
|
720
|
1.24
|
632
|
0.74
|
335
|
0.82
|
633
|
0.90
|
406
|
5.54
|
114
|
0.82
|
Subtotal
– Lloyd’s Syndicates
|
71.36%
|
In other words: the defendants who appeared
are liable for 92.405% (21.045% plus 71.36%) of $4,946.001.86, or $4,570,353.02.
INTEREST AND COSTS
[88]
The
parties have asked that a decision on interest and the costs of this action be
deferred until after the issuance of these reasons. So it shall be. The action
was instituted in 2001. The Court will need to know why it took 11 years to get
to trial.
“Sean
Harrington”
Montreal, Quebec
April 12, 2012