Docket: T-2037-11
Citation: 2012 FC 146
BETWEEN:
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ATTAWAPISKAT FIRST NATION
AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF AND COUNCIL
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Applicant
(Moving Party)
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA, AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF
ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA
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Respondent
(Respondent)
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REASONS FOR ORDER
PHELAN J.
I. PRELIMINARY
[1]
This
is a motion by the Applicant, Attawapiskat First Nation (AFN), for several
forms of interlocutory relief:
(a) a
declaration that the Chief and Council continue to have the authority conferred
on them through election and by statute, including the authority to manage and
direct the emergency measures necessary to ensure the health, safety and
well-being of the members of AFN.
(b) an
order enjoining the Minister from imposing third party management on the AFN
pending hearing of AFN’s judicial review application.
(c) alternatively,
an order generally confining the third party manager’s (TPM) authority over
funds provided under the Comprehensive Funding Agreement (CFA), requiring Canada to fulfil
its obligations under the CFA and to prevent the TPM from directing funds
available under the CFA to pay the TPM.
[2]
The
AFN has filed a judicial review application to quash the appointment of the TPM.
That application will be heard on April 24, 2012.
[3]
The
facts and circumstances of this case appear to be developing as time moves
along which has made it difficult for both parties to identify the critical
facts governing this dispute. The day-to-day situation apparently continues to
evolve.
[4]
As
this is an interlocutory motion with a final hearing on the full merits to be
heard by the same judge, the Court will restrict its comments and findings to
those that are absolutely necessary to deal with this motion and the immediate
exigencies of the situation at Attawapiskat.
[5]
From
the argument before the Court, the Applicant is not pushing for an
interlocutory declaration. That is just as well as there is ample precedent
that interlocutory declarations either cannot or ought not to be given.
[6]
The
real relief sought is an injunction against the Minister from imposing third
party management or to otherwise restrict the TPM in certain ways.
[7]
The
Court is indebted to all counsel for trying to bring some clarity to a murky
situation. As indicated at the hearing, there is an urgent need to move 22
housing trailers over the winter road that is created when the water and land
freezes sufficiently to allow for the movement of heavy loads. That could be
any time now with the window of opportunity open until melting begins in, at
best, six weeks. This issue will be addressed more fully in the reasons and
order.
II. FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
[8]
Many
of the core facts are not disputed. However, the meaning, interpretation,
motives, responsibilities and the like related to these undisputed facts are
very much in issue.
[9]
There
is a serious and unprecedented housing crisis on the Attawapiskat Reserve. Many
members of the AFN are now living in overcrowded, unsafe conditions, in
uninsulated and unserviced dwellings or in tents where sanitation is a bucket
which is emptied into a ditch. Many existing houses were mold infested; other
dwellings were trailers in which excessive numbers of people are cramped
together.
[10]
The
Applicant filed numerous letters from medical professionals which address the
types of diseases and other conditions rampant in the Reserve due to the
inadequacy of housing.
[11]
How
conditions such as these could occur in a country as rich, as strong and as
generous as Canada has yet to
be determined. That issue is for another day.
[12]
The
plight of the community has garnered significant political and media attention.
The record before the Court makes some reference to the media attention and
very specific reference to questions and answers in the House of Commons.
[13]
The
AFN entered into the CFA with the Minister effective April 1, 2011 until March
31, 2013. The CFA provides for the payment of amounts to the AFN to carry out
various programs and services. The characterization of the CFA, as a commercial
type contract, is in dispute. The Applicant considers it to be a contract of
adhesion imposed on it by the federal government and subject to departmental
policies and the executive discretion of the Minister.
[14]
CFA
Section 9.0 defines the circumstances under which the AFN will be considered in
default. Subparagraph (d) is the operative provision in this instance.
9.0 DEFAULT
9.1 The Council will be in default
of this Agreement in the event:
(a) the Council defaults on any of
its obligations set out in this Agreement or any other agreement through which
a Federal Department provides funding to the Council;
(b) the auditor of the Council
gives a denial of opinion or adverse opinion on the Consolidated Audited
Financial Statements of the Council in the course of conducting an audit under
section 4.4 (Reporting) or section 10.3 (Where Financial Statements Not
Provided) of this Agreement or the corresponding clauses in its predecessor;
(c) in the opinion of the Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development or any other Minister that
represents Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada in this Agreement, having
regard to Council’s financial statements and any other financial information
relating to the Council reviewed by the Minister, the financial position of the
Council is such that the delivery of any program, service or activity for which
funding is provided under this Agreement is at risk;
(d) in the opinion of the
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development or any other Minister
that represents Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada in this Agreement, the
health, safety or welfare of Members or Recipients is at risk of being
compromised.
(Court’s underlining)
[15]
In
the event of default the Minister has a number of remedies from which to choose
as set forth in Section 10.0:
10.0 REMEDIES ON DEFAULT
10.1 Parties Will Meet
10.1.1 Without limiting any remedy or
other action Canada may take under this
Agreement, in the event the Council is in default, the parties will communicate
or meet to review the situation.
10.2 Actions Canada May Take
10.2.1 In the event the Council is in
default under this Agreement, Canada may take one or more of the following
actions as may reasonably be necessary, having regard to the nature and extent
of the default:
(a) require the Council to develop
and implement a Management Action Plan within sixty (60) calendar days, or at
such other time as the parties may agree upon and set out in writing;
(b) require the Council to seek
advisory support acceptable to Canada;
(c) appoint, upon providing notice
to the Council, a Third Party Funding Agreement Manager;
(d) withhold any funds otherwise
payable under this Agreement;
(e) require the Council to take any
other reasonable action necessary to remedy the default;
(f) take such other reasonable
action as Canada deems necessary, including
any remedies which may be set out in any Schedule;
(g) terminate the Agreement.
[16]
A
Third Party Funding Agreement Manager (generally referred to as a Third Party
Manager or TPM) is defined in the CFA as follows: a third party, appointed by
Canada, that administers funding otherwise payable to the Council (a reference
to the Band Council) and the Council’s obligations under this Agreement, in
whole or in part, and that may assist the Council to remedy default under this
Agreement. The definition is somewhat awkwardly phrased.
[17]
In
August, the AFN’s Housing Manager expressed concern that there were
insufficient funds to deal with repairs to the homes (including shacks and
tents). The AFN receives approximately $580,000 per year to deal with housing
issues (debt serving, repairs and new construction) for the population of
approximately 1,900 inhabitants.
[18]
On
October 28, 2011, the Grand Chief of the Mushkegowuk Council (the regional
council which embraces Attawapiskat) declared a state of
emergency due to the developing housing crisis.
[19]
Initially
the crisis related to five families who lived in tents.
[20]
The
Minister’s department agreed, on November 8, 2011, to advance $500,000 in
response to a plan developed by the AFN to safely house these families for the
2011-12 winter.
[21]
On
November 12, 2011, the Chief issued a declaration of emergency with respect to
the housing crisis.
[22]
The
AFN’s plans and identified needs continued to change over the period to the end
of 2011 as new requirements arose or various assumptions proved incomplete or
in error. By November 21, 2011, the Chief advised departmental officials that
there was an additional 17 families living in sheds whose needs had become
urgent and requested a further $1.5 million.
[23]
On
November 25, 2011, the Chief informed departmental officials that the Chief and
Council lacked the resources and capacity to address the situation.
[24]
After
the announced emergency and advance of extra funds, departmental officials
visited Attawapiskat on November 28, 2011 to assess the community’s housing
needs. They concluded that immediate action was required.
[25]
The
Applicant places considerable reliance on the fact that, over a two-week period
in November, there was considerable political attention on the plight of the
community culminating in statements made by the Prime Minister in the House of
Commons on November 30, 2011.
[26]
That
same day the Chief was notified that the AFN was in default under s. 9.1(d) of
the CFA and that a TPM had been appointed.
[27]
The
AFN immediately objected to the appointment of a TPM. That opposition appeared
to strengthen when the AFN was informed that the TPM was the same firm that the
AFN had terminated as their co-manager two years earlier.
[28]
It
is not necessary at this stage of the judicial review application to deal in
depth with the various back and forth exchanges and positions adopted. It is
sufficient to say that there is a significant amount of frustration, anger and distrust.
[29]
The
record on this motion included evidence and references to residential schools
and other mistreatment of First Nations people including those in the AFN.
While this evidence may help explain certain reactions and supports the bona
fides and sincerity of the AFN’s opposition to the TPM, the issue before
the Court on an injunction application is narrower than the issues raised by
that evidence. It may be relevant to the judicial review.
[30]
Lastly,
on facts relevant to this injunction proceeding, by December 2, 2011 the AFN
had obtained a quote for the construction of 22 modular homes (commonly called
trailers) at a cost of $2.4 million.
[31]
The
AFN and TPM signed a contract for the construction of these homes and some
money has been advanced so that construction of the trailers and the shipment
of them as they are completed could be undertaken by the supplier.
[32]
The
AFN has a plan for the servicing of the necessary lots, the shipment and the installation
of the trailers. De Beers Canada Inc. (De Beers), the mining company that has a
mine on the reserve, has agreed to act as project manager. The plan and De
Beers’ role has been accepted by the Minister.
[33]
There
are trailers at Moosonee (and more to come) and the winter road is hardening.
Despite all this, the parties seem locked in an inability to act in concert to
move the trailers on site. Time is critical; a loss of the ability to ship over
the ice road means that the urgent project would be deferred until next year.
[34]
At
the hearing and with counsel doing their best to explain the almost
unexplainable gap in perceptions between the two sides, the Respondent
explained that if the AFN presents the invoices and De Beers confirms that
these invoices are in accord with the approved plan, the TPM will issue payment
and the project can move ahead with the necessary urgency. In so doing, the AFN
is not now being asked to “accept” the legitimacy of the TPM. Any such actions in
submitting invoices and dealing with the TPM by the AFN will be without prejudice
their opposition to the appointment of the TPM.
[35]
With
that somewhat abbreviated outline of the facts, the Court will turn to the
analysis of the legal basis for the issue of an injunction.
III. LEGAL
ANALYSIS
[36]
The
tripartite test for an injunction is clearly established in RJR-MacDonald
Inc v Canada (Attorney
General),
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-MacDonald]. The applicant for the injunction must
establish that (a) there is a serious issue to be decided, (b) irreparable harm
would be caused to the applicant absent an injunction, and (c) the balance of
convenience favours the granting of injunctive relief.
[37]
However,
before turning to the tripartite test, the Respondent raises a preliminary
issue: they argue that injunctive relief is not available against the Crown by
virtue of s. 22 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.
22. (1) Where in proceedings
against the Crown any relief is sought that might, in proceedings between
persons, be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, a court
shall not, as against the Crown, grant an injunction or make an order for
specific performance, but in lieu thereof may make an order declaratory of
the rights of the parties.
(2)
A court shall not in any proceedings grant relief or make an order against a
servant of the Crown that it is not competent to grant or make against the
Crown.
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22. (1) Le tribunal ne peut,
lorsqu’il connaît d’une demande visant l’État, assujettir celui-ci à une
injonction ou à une ordonnance d’exécution en nature mais, dans les cas où
ces recours pourraient être exercés entre personnes, il peut, pour en tenir
lieu, déclarer les droits des parties.
(2)
Le tribunal ne peut, dans aucune poursuite, rendre contre un préposé de
l’État de décision qu’il n’a pas compétence pour rendre contre l’État.
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[38]
As
was clear from Zenon Environmental Inc v Canada, 2005 FC 210, where
Justice Strayer described the immunity of the Crown from general law to be an
anomaly, the provision operates where there is an action against the Crown, but
not where there is an attack on the authority exercised by a public official on
the grounds that the official was acting outside of his statutory or
constitutional powers. Section 22 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act
merely codified the common law. Most particularly, s. 22 does not apply where
the proceeding is a proper Federal Courts Act s. 18.1 application for
judicial review.
[39]
This
Court has in several cases, including Musqueam Indian Band v Canada (Governor in
Council),
2004 FC 579, ordered injunctive relief in the context of s. 18.1 Federal
Courts Act judicial review proceedings. The prohibition of injunctions
against the Crown is a long held common law principle which predates the more
specific language of the Federal Courts Act.
[40]
The
Respondent’s position is tantamount to asking this Court to dismiss, at this
early stage, the application for judicial review without prejudice to the
Applicant’s right to bring an action against the Crown.
[41]
There
is ample authority that judicial reviews should not be struck down at a
preliminary stage except in the most exceptional circumstances where the
application for judicial review is bereft of any possibility of success (see David
Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc v Pharmacia Inc (CA), [1995] 1 FC 588; Chiasson
v Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FC 1208).
[42]
The
Respondent’s position is based on the argument that the relationship between
the Band and the federal government under the CFA is contractual in nature – a
contract for the delivery of programs and services. The Respondent relies on Irving
Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA
116. That decision was based on an analysis of the nature of the relationship
between the parties – a process which the current court record does not allow. It
is premature to reach a final conclusion on this legal argument.
[43]
Even
in a contractual type situation, public law remedies may be available where the
grounds of attack are constitutional in nature or are based on a party lacking
the required jurisdiction or exceeding their authority. The Applicant’s grounds
of attack include allegations of improper use of authority, taking into account
irrelevant factors and acting for an improper purpose – all grounds amenable to
judicial review.
[44]
Therefore,
the Court does have the jurisdiction under s. 18.1 and s. 18.2 of the Federal
Courts Act to issue injunctive relief against the Respondent in the
appropriate circumstances. This conclusion does not foreclose any of the
Respondent’s arguments regarding the appropriateness of a s. 18.1 proceeding
being advanced at the judicial review hearing.
[45]
The
Respondent’s argument as to the nature of the relationship between the parties
and the characterization of the relationship under the CFA may well raise a
serious issue to be determined – the first prong in the tripartite test which
the Court will now address.
A. Serious
Issue
[46]
As
RJR-MacDonald, above, established, the threshold of “a serious issue” is
not high; an applicant for injunctive relief need only show that there is an
issue for adjudication and that it is not “frivolous and vexatious”.
[47]
In
such cases as Kehewin Cree Nation v Canada, 2011 FC
364, and Tobique Indian Band v Canada, 2010 FC 67, this Court has
confirmed that the Minister’s decision to appoint a Third Party Manager is
reviewable on a “reasonableness” standard of review.
[48]
The
AFN has alleged that the Minister exercised the power to appoint the TPM for an
improper purpose, not for the purpose for which the power was established, and
in doing so took into account extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
[49]
The
Applicant places considerable reliance on circumstantial evidence including the
timing of political statements and that of the appointment of the TPM. It also
relies on the failure of the department to follow its own policies in making
the decision to appoint the TPM.
[50]
The
Applicant further argues that there must be a connection between poor
management/mismanagement of funds on the part of the AFN and the health, safety
and welfare crisis which the parties agree exists. The Applicant says no such
connection exists.
[51]
Whether
the Applicant can establish the elements of improper purpose on the part of the
Minister remains to be seen. There is obvious need for cross-examinations and
further evidence.
[52]
However,
the Applicant has gone far enough to establish that there is a serious issue to
be determined and that the matter is not frivolous and vexatious. There is a
genuine dispute as to the interpretation of the CFA, the characterization of
the relationship between the parties and the legal principles applicable to
this dispute.
B. Irreparable
Harm
[53]
The
Applicant must also establish that it will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not granted pending the determination of the judicial review.
Irreparable harm refers to the nature of the harm and not to its magnitude.
[54]
As
noted by the Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v Canada
(Information Commissioner), 2001 FCA 25, an applicant must establish that
irreparable harm would occur; the harm cannot be speculative or hypothetical.
[55]
The
Applicant claims that the appointment of the TPM causes irreparable harm by its
very nature because it deprives the Applicant of dignity, self-determination
and the ability to remediate serious and urgent risks to the members of its
community for whom and to whom the Chief and Council are responsible.
[56]
The
Respondent undermines those concerns by pointing out that the powers and
responsibilities of the Chief and Council remain in place, that the TPM only
affects the CFA and no other funding or powers.
[57]
One
should not be dismissive of the impact that the TPM may have on the concerns
raised by the Applicant. However, the potential for the appointment of a TPM
was contemplated by the CFA and the nature of the harm accepted (albeit
reluctantly perhaps) by the Applicant particularly where there was a proper
appointment. It is not the appointment itself which causes irreparable harm -
that harm to dignity, self-government and ability to remediate risk only arises
if the appointment is improper. The establishment of improper appointment has
not been made out yet and is the matter for the judicial review.
[58]
The
other types of harm alleged, such as harm to the fiduciary relationship to the
Crown, the harm to the trust between the parties and other forms of intangible
(but potentially no less real) harm have not been established at this stage of
the proceedings absent an improper appointment of the TPM.
[59]
The
only area of real and present harm which the Applicant has established is the
delay in the servicing of the lots and the delivery of the trailers referred to
earlier. The question of who is responsible for this harm is a somewhat open
matter.
[60]
On
this matter, the interests of the people in the community are directly affected
and must take precedence over the arguments between the Chief/Council and the
Minister. There is real harm to the affected people and to the community at
large if the “window of opportunity” is missed due to legal wrangling.
[61]
The
Applicant’s argument that the use of funds to pay the TPM cause irreparable
harm has not been sufficiently established as an issue of irreparable harm
distinct from one for which damages may suffice.
C. Balance
of Convenience
[62]
The
third part of the tripartite test requires the Court to consider the balance of
convenience which has been described as a
… determination of which of the two
parties will suffer the greater harm from the grant or refusal of an
interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits.
(See Manitoba (Attorney General) v
Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 at 129)
[63]
In
the situation of injunctive relief against a public authority, this
consideration of who is most harmed is layered with a consideration of the
public interest.
[64]
The
Respondent relies on the following quote from RJR-MacDonald, above, to
establish that given the duties of the Minister, any restraint would cause the
Minister, not the Chief and Council, irreparable harm.
71 In our view, the concept of
inconvenience should be widely construed in Charter cases. In the case
of a public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public
interest is less than that of a private applicant. This is partly a function of
the nature of the public authority and partly a function of the action sought
to be enjoined. The test will nearly always be satisfied simply upon proof that
the authority is charged with the duty of promoting or protecting the public
interest and upon some indication that the impugned legislation, regulation, or
activity was undertaken pursuant to that responsibility. Once these minimal
requirements have been met, the court should in most cases assume that
irreparable harm to the public interest would result from the restraint of that
action.
[65]
The
difficulty in the present circumstances is that both parties are public
authorities charged with various and sometimes complimentary elements of public
interest.
[66]
The
balance of convenience is generally fairly evenly balanced in this situation.
The Minister is responsible to the Canadian public for the proper expenditure
of funds. The Minister and the Chief/Council have a responsibility to the
community at Attawapiskat. This is
particularly so where the risk is to people’s health, safety and welfare.
[67]
It
is only in respect of the issue of the installation of the trailers where the
balance clearly favours the Applicant. There is no other evidence of problems
with the TPM impacting the people of Attawapiskat so directly.
IV. CONCLUSION
[68]
In
the exercise of the Court’s discretion with respect to the equitable relief of
injunction, having considered the tripartite test as required by law, the Court
will not issue an injunction at this time subject to compliance by the Minister
and his TPM with the terms of the Order regarding payments for matters in
respect of the 22 trailers to be installed at the Attawapiskat Reserve.
[69]
The
Court would expect the Chief and Council to take the steps necessary to permit
the TPM to comply with the terms imposed on the Order dismissing this
injunction application.
[70]
It
will be a term of the Order that upon the TPM being presented with invoices
related to the installation of the trailers (including servicing of lots,
transportation or anything reasonably related thereto) and upon confirmation by
the Project Manager, De Beers, that the goods or services in the invoices are
consistent with the remedial plan previously approved by the parties, the TPM
will forthwith pay those invoices.
[71]
The
Applicant shall not be required to accept, acquiesce or acknowledge the legality
of the appointment of the TPM in order to secure payment of the invoices.
[72]
In
the time prior to the hearing of this injunction application, the parties had
the benefit of the mediation efforts of Justice Mandamin. Should there be any
difficulties in effecting the terms of the Court’s Order, the parties may call
upon Justice Mandamin to assist if possible. Otherwise any adjudication of the
matters arising from the Order shall be referred to the Court.
[73]
The
application will be dismissed without costs.
“Michael
L. Phelan”
Ottawa, Ontario
February 3, 2012