Date: 20120508
Docket: IMM-3798-11
Citation: 2012 FC 42
Toronto, Ontario, May 8, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Hughes
BETWEEN:
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JEAN LEONARD TEGANYA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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AMENDED REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
Applicant Jean Leonard Teganya is an adult male citizen of Rwanda. In November
1999 he entered Canada and claimed refugee status. He was excluded
from refugee protection in 2002, the matter was sent back by a consent Order of
this Court. He was again excluded in 2005. This Court upheld that decision. In
2010 the Applicant received a negative PRRA decision, that decision was upheld
by this Court in March 2011. The Applicant submitted a second PRRA application
which was denied in a decision dated June 11, 2011. This is a judicial review
of the June 11, 2011 decision.
[2]
For
the reasons that follow I find that the application is allowed.
[3]
The
Applicant is the eldest of a family of four children. The Applicant was a
medical student in a Rwandan hospital. He and other members of his family fled Rwanda in 1994
during the period when a civil war going on there. They fled first to the Congo, he then
fled to Kenya and then to India. While in India the
Applicant continued his studies. The Applicant’s father meanwhile, returned to Rwanda where he was
arrested and detained for considerable period in prison then was tried and
convicted of crimes relating to genocide. His father remains in prison in Rwanda serving a 22
year sentence.
[4]
The
Applicant believed that he could not, as a student, seek asylum in India. He feared
returning to Rwanda, believing
that he, as the son of his father who was convicted, would be arrested and,
even if ultimately tried and found not to be guilty, the period of imprisonment
before trial, which he believed may be a long period, would, in his belief
subject him to torture and punishment in any event. It is to be noted that of
all his siblings only the applicant bears his father’s surname a matter that
the Applicant believes makes him particularly vulnerable to arrest in Rwanda.
[5]
In
support of his second PRRA application resulting in the decision under review,
the Applicant, through Counsel, submitted a number of documents including:
a.
Newspaper
reports, including those from Canada and Rwanda specifically naming the Applicant;
b.
Numerous
documents respecting current country conditions in Rwanda;
c.
Two expert
reports from individuals knowledgeable as to country conditions in Rwanda;
d.
An
affidavit from a formerly friend who had lived in Rwanda;
e.
An
affidavit from a Rwandan lawyer respecting the conviction of the Applicant’s
father and the unavailability to communicate with him while he is in prison.
[6]
The
PRRA Officer gave little weight to much of this evidence and concluded:
Suite à l’analyse du dossier, ainsi que
de la preuve objective sur les conditions du pays, j’estime que le demandeur
n’a pas démontré qu’il pourrait être à risque au Rwanda.
La demande est refusée.
[7]
The
Officer did not request a hearing.
[8]
Counsel
for both parties at the hearing before me agreed that the standard of review of
the Officer’s decision is reasonableness. They also agreed that the question
that the Officer had to address can be stated as: based on an assessment of the
evidence, on a balance of probabilities, would the Applicant be subjected
personally to a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if he was required to return to Rwanda. It is to be noted that the
test is a “risk” and not a “certainty” and that the risk is to be assessed on a
balance of probabilities. The decision of Rothstein J.A. (as he then was) in Li
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1, supports this view. He wrote at
paragraphs 12 to 14:
12.
McGuigan
J.A. adopted the "reasonable chance [of] persecution" test as the
legal test to meet to obtain Convention refugee status, i.e. not necessarily
more than a 50 percent chance but more than a minimal possibility of
persecution.
13.
The
certified question deals with subsection 97(1). The relevant portions of
subsection 97(1) provide:
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose
removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a
country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on
substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or
to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment ... .
14.
As
was found by McGuigan J.A. to be the case with respect to section 96, nothing
in subsection 97(1) suggests that the standard of proof to be applied in
assessing the danger or risk described in paragraphs 97(1)(a) and (b) is anything other than the
usual balance of probabilities standard of proof. The answer to the first
certified question is therefore:
The standard of proof for
purposes of section 97 is proof on a balance of probabilities.
[9]
The
risk alleged by the Applicant is set out as follows at page 3 of the Officer’s
reasons:
RISQUES ALLÉGUÉS
Dans la présente demande ERAR
subséquente, le demandeur réitère en partie les risques invoqués dans sa
demande ERAR initiale.
Ceux-ci étaient à l’effet que son père
était soupçonné d’une implication dans le génocide rwandais et qu’à ce titre il
ne pourrait bénéficier d’un procès équitable. Le demandeur soulignait que sa
situation serait la même étant donné qu’il est le fis de son père. Il soulignait
ses origines ethniques hutues ainsi que la possibilité qu’il soit considéré
comme opposant au régime actuel.
Dans la présente demande, il souligne un
risque étant donné l’association de son père avec le MRND. Il précise que son
père aurait été arrêté et emprisonné au moment du retour de la famille au
Rwanda en 1997. Il ajoute qu’après une détention préventive de 7 ans, son père
aurait été condamné à 22 ans d’emprisonnement.
Monsieur rapporte qu’étant donné la
situation de son père, mais également parce qu’il est le premier né et porte le
même nom de famille que celui-ci, il serait à risque de traitements cruels et
inusités.
Il allègue également qu’étant donné la
parution d’articles dans les médias concernant la décision de la Cour fédérale
de maintenir la décision de la CISR et du premier ERAR, les autorités
rwandaises auraient été informées de la demande d’asile de monsieur ainsi que
le fait qu’il soit reconnu complice du génocide.
Il souligne qu’étant donné cette
situation, il est maintenant un réfugié sur place et qu’il serait aussitôt
arrêté advenant un retour au Rwanda.
Il rapporte qu’il pourrait être détenu
pour une longue période et de façon arbitraire, puis, jugé devant un tribunal
Gacaca, lesquels auraient été largement critiqués sur une base internationale
puisqu’ils ne rencontraient pas les critères internationaux de procédure en
plus d’une certaine forme de corruption.
Il mentionne qu’il ne pourrait obtenir un
procès juste et équitable au Rwanda étant donné qu’on le considérerait comme complice
du génocide.
[10]
The
first document considered by the Officer in evaluating risk was a newspaper
article published in Rwanda. It is important to
repeat that article in full:
RWANDA:
GENOCIDE Suspect Faces Deportation From Canada
James Karuhanga 31
March 2011
Reports
from Canada indicate that following a ruling this
month, a court found that Jean Leonard Teganya, a Genocide suspect, could be
deported to Rwanda.
Teganya
was an intern at Butare University Hospital in April, 1994, where militia killed
nearly 200 Tutsi patients and staff at the hospital.
When
contacted yesterday, Prosecutor General Martin Ngoga said it was a positive
step.
“Much
as it is a matter still within Canadian jurisdiction, and subject to further
appeal, it is a positive step in our collective endeavor as community of
nations to deal with every detail that would help bring perpetrators of
Genocide to justice and deny them safe haven anywhere in the world,” Ngoga
said.
Agnes
Murekatete, a Genocide survivor, said that it is unfair that suspects like
Teganya remain at large.
“I
just feel that life is so unfair. Many of those who made me and others orphans,
many of those who killed our relatives in cold blood are sheltered all over the
world.”
“I
have no option but to forgive, yet the continued genocide denial fills me with
sorrow. And they are all out there, everywhere, she said.”
At
the University Hospital, in 1994, it was reported that
nurses compiled lists of patients and staff to be killed, while doctors refused
to treat Tutsi patients or kicked them out of the hospital where the
Interahamwe militiamen were waiting.
Teganya’s
father was a regional lader of the extremist Mouvement Révolutionaire National
pour le Développement (MRND) party.
In
2002, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board asked
Teganya why he wasn’t killed at the hospital, and whether that meant militiamen
identified him as someone sympathetic to their cause.
[11]
The
Officer dismissed this article in saying that it does not say that charges
would be laid against the Applicant or that the Applicant is charged in Rwanda:
Je constate que le demandeur ne présente
pas de document démontrant que le procureur général aurait porté des
accusations spécifiques à son endroit. D’ailleurs, le demandeur ne démontre pas
avoir été accusé au Rwanda.
Cela dit, si des accusations étaient
déposées, le demandeur pourrait devoir subir un procès.
[12]
This
determination as to a critical piece of evidence is unreasonable. First, it is
not necessary to show that charges will be laid but only that there is a
risk. Clearly that is evident. Secondly, the Applicant’s fear is
prolonged detention prior to a trial, during which there is a risk of
cruel and unusual punishment. Rarely does one see in cases of this kind such
clear evidence of risk personally directed against an Applicant.
[13]
Applicant’s
Counsel argued that, in the next portion of the Reasons the Officer made only a
selected reference to the documents in the record and that many documents
addressing conditions of prolonged detention before charges are laid and
torture during such detention are ignored. I agree that a more thorough
analysis of all aspects of the issues presented in these documents will be
warranted at a subsequent determination. However, if the only issue were the
treatment of these documents I would not have found the determination to be
unreasonable.
[14]
I
find unreasonable, in addition to the treatment of the newspaper article the
treatment by the Officer of the evidence of many individuals presented on
behalf of the Applicant. The Officer appears to have been doggedly determined
to find reasons, however slight, to dismiss or give little weight to these
documents instead of considering what evidence and expert opinions they do
present and giving proper weight to them. It must be remembered that the
evidence is unrebutted. The Officer had on the other hand only country
condition documents that were more or less weighted on both sides of this
issue. It was incumbent upon the Officer to give full attention to what is set
out in these documents.
[15]
The
first document considered in the reasons is a declaration of Noel Twagiranungu
who holds a BA from the National University of Rwanda, an LLB from Utrecht University and is a PhD
candidate at the Fletcher School of Law at Tufts University. He gave a detailed history of the civil
strife in Rwanda and is knowledgeable in criminal procedures and modalities of
prosecution and punishment in Rwanda. He concludes that the Applicant’s fear of seeing his basic
rights to a free and fair trial denied and his life endangered were he to be
returned to Rwanda to be credible and
reasonable.
[16]
The
Officer unreasonably and without giving any basis for the conclusion reached
stated that this evidence is a personal interpretation and partisan:
Bien que certains des évènements
mentionnés soient rapportés par d’autres sources fiables, je considère que
l’information rapportée n’est pas neutre et objective.
Pour ces raisons, je considère que ce
document reflète une idéologie spécifique et partisane.
Je constate que les conclusions de ce
document sont une interprétation personnelle de certaines lois du Rwanda.
[17]
There
is simply no basis in the reasons for these conclusions.
[18]
Next
the Officer considered the Statement of Dr. Susan M. Thomson. She is an assistant
professional of Contemporary African Politics at Hamphire College, Amherst, MA. Among other notable things she is Anmesty
International’s country advisor for Rwanda and Burundi. She provides an extensive review of
country conditions in Rwanda and provides a number
of conclusions including that among Rwandans are circumscribed in their
actions.
[19]
The
Officer unreasonably dismisses this report as not being supported by objective
and independent sources and lacking corroboration and that it fails to mention the
Applicant specifically:
Bien que je reconnaisse la formation de
l’auteure, je constate que le document en question est une opinion qui n’est
pas soutenue, dans le document, par des sources objectives et indépendantes.
D’ailleurs, certains propos mentionnés
par l’auteure ne sont pas corroborés par des documents de sources neutres et
indépendantes.
Je considère que ce document ne mentionne
pas la situation particulière du demandeur et ne démontre pas que le demandeur
pourrait être à risque étant donné un retour au Rwanda.
[20]
The
Officer’s findings are unreasonable. It is not necessary that opinions
expressed by an expert such as this be footnoted or filled with references to
this source or that. It is a statement, not a scholarly research article.
Further, it is not necessary that the Applicant’s situation be addressed
specifically in every piece of evidence. This statement serves as a background
for other, more specific, evidence.
[21]
The
next piece of evidence from an individual that was addressed by the Officer is
the affidavit of Venant Munyantwari. He is a friend of the family of the
Applicant, now resident in the United States. He appeared as a witness in the trial of the
Applicant’s father. He attested that since the Applicant has the same last name
as his father he possibly could have the same problems suffered by his father.
[22]
The
Officer irrationally and unreasonably dismissed this evidence because the
Officer did not know how Mr. Munyantwari was found and that it was simply a
letter of convenience:
J’ignore également comme le demandeur a
retrouvé le signataire aux États-Unis. Étant donné ce qui précède, mais
également parce que je considère qu’il s’agit d’une lettre de complaisance, je
n’accorde que peu de poids à ce document.
[23]
It
is immaterial how this person was located. Evidence from friends is frequently
tendered in proceedings such as this. This affidavit cannot be dismissed as it
was.
[24]
The
last significant piece of evidence from an individual is an affidavit from a
Rwandan lawyer, [xx]. That affidavit speaks to the trial of the
Applicant’s father, his prolonged detention before trial (10 years) and that
contact now with the father is impossible. The Officer dismisses the affidavit
on the basis that it does not address certain issues specific to the Applicant:
De plus, bien que ce document en question
mentionne que le père de monsieur a été condamné à 22 ans de prison, il ne
permet pas de conclure à la présence de risques pour le demandeur.
Ce dernier rapporte des frères et sœurs
au Rwanda pour lesquels il ne précise ni incarcération, ni arrestation. Il
n’explique pas non plus en quoi le fait d’être le fils de son père pourrait lui
causer des risques au Rwanda étant donné le défaut de monsieur de démontrer que
sa fratrie aurait, depuis cette condamnation, rencontré des difficultés de la
part des autorités qui pourraient conduire à une incarcération.
Je considère, donc, que ce document ne
permet pas de conclure que le demandeur pourrait être incarcéré ou accusé
advenant un retour au Rwanda, ni qu’il pourrait être à risque dans son pays
d’origine.
[25]
This
dismissal is unreasonable. The affidavit must be considered for what it does
say. Not every piece of evidence must be directed to every specific point in
issue. A party must be allowed to build its case, certain parts are background,
other parts fill in gaps. The evidence as a whole is to be considered. No piece
should be dismissed simply because it is a piece.
[26]
The
Officer reviewed certain other pieces of documentary evidence submitted on
behalf of the Applicant. I will not review this in detail. Suffice it to say
that all the documentary evidence should be considered by a different person
with a fresh mind. It is most desirable that a hearing should be held.
[27]
In
conclusion, I find that the manner in which the Officer treated critical pieces
of evidence is unreasonable, hence the conclusion must be considered
unreasonable. The decision is to be set aside and reconsidered by a different
Officer, preferably with a hearing.
[28]
The
matter is fact specific, no party requested a certified question. None will be
certified.
JUDGMENT
FOR THE REASONS PROVIDED
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that:
1. The Application is allowed;
2. The matter is
returned for redetermination by a different Officer;
3. There is no
question for certification;
4. No Order as
to costs.
“Roger
T. Hughes”
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