Date: 20100830
Docket: T-1184-09
Citation: 2010 FC 859
Ottawa, Ontario, August 30, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
INDIGO
BOOKS & MUSIC INC.
Applicant
and
C.
& J. CLARK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, for judicial review of a decision of the Trade-marks
Opposition Board (the Board) made under the authority of the Registrar of Trade-marks
(the Registrar) refusing to grant the applicant (Indigo) leave to file an
amended statements of opposition in opposition proceedings commenced by Indigo
in respect of the respondent’s (Clarks’) applications to register the trade-marks
INDIGO and INDIGO BY CLARKS.
[2]
Indigo
seeks an order:
1. Quashing
or setting aside the Board’s decision;
2. Directing
the Board to allow Indigo to file the amended statements of opposition;
3. In
the alternative, referring Indigo’s request for leave back to the Board for
reconsideration independently of Indigo’s request for an extension of time to
file supplementary evidence;
4. Granting
Indigo its costs of this application; and
5. Awarding
such further and other relief as counsel may request and this Honourable Court
may permit.
Background
[3]
On
May 1, 2005, Indigo filed statements of opposition pursuant to subsection 38(1)
of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13, as amended, (the Act) in
respect of Clarks’ applications to register the trade-marks INDIGO (Application
No. 1,191,731) and INDIGO BY CLARKS (Application No. 1,191,732), for use in
Canada in association with footwear.
[4]
The
grounds of opposition included, inter alia, allegations that Clarks’
trade marks are (i) confusing with Indigo’s INDIGO and INDIGO-formative
trade-mark registrations, applications or trade names; and (ii) Clarks’ trade-marks
are not distinctive and are not adapted to distinguish the wares of Clarks from
the wares and services of Indigo. The first ground was based on paragraph
12(1)(d), subsections 16(3) and 30(i) and paragraphs 38(2)(a, b, c) of the Act.
The second ground was based on section 2 (definition of distinctive) and paragraph
38(2)(d) of the Act.
[5]
On September 13, 2005, Clarks filed
counterstatements pursuant to subsection 38(6) of the Act. On May 11, 2006 and
May 30, 2007, Indigo and Clarks filed affidavit evidence, respectively, under
Rules 41 and 42 of the Trade-marks Regulations (the Regulations). Indigo
conducted one cross-examination in respect of Clarks’
evidence on April 17, 2008.
[6]
The Registrar called for the filing of written arguments in the opposition
by December 26, 2008. That due date was extended by four months to April 26,
2009.
[7]
Indigo asserts the parties were attempting to negotiate between March
26, 2008 and April 10, 2009.
[8]
On April 20, 2009, when it had become apparent that there would
not be a settlement, Indigo wrote to the Registrar requesting that pursuant to
sections 40 and 44 of the Regulations, the Registrar grant Indigo:
1. Leave to
file the amended statements of opposition attached to the April 20, 2009
letter; and
2. An
extension of time of two months until June 20, 2009, to file supplementary
evidence in support of the amendments to the statements of opposition.
[9]
The proposed amendments pleaded a new ground of opposition based
on a combination of subsection 30(i) and section 22 of the Act, namely, that
Clarks could not have been satisfied that it was entitled to use INDIGO or
INDIGO BY CLARKS in Canada in association with footwear because such use would
have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching to Indigo’s
registered INDIGO trade-marks.
[10]
In October of 2008, this Court issued its decision in Parmalat
Canada Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 2008 FC 1104, 69 C.P.R. (4th) 349, which held
for the first time that an opponent can rely upon section 22 of the Act in the
context of a subsection 30(i) ground of opposition. Indigo specifically
referred to the Parmalat decision in its April 20, 2009 letter and to
its prior settlement discussions with Clarks to explain why these requests for
leave had not been made earlier.
[11]
On April 24, 2009, Clarks responded
to the Registrar arguing against the granting of leave. Indigo sent a reply to
the Registrar on May 1, 2009.
Board’s
Decision
[12]
On June 22, 2009, the Board, under the authority of the Registrar,
issued a decision letter to both Indigo and Clarks refusing to grant the leave
requested by Indigo.
[13]
As set out in the Practice in Trade-mark Opposition Proceedings
(the Practice Notice), the Board would only grant leave to amend a statement of
opposition or to file additional evidence if satisfied that it is in the
interests of justice to do so having regard to all the surrounding
circumstances including the following:
1. The
stage the opposition proceeding has reached;
2. Why the
amendment was not made or the evidence not filed earlier;
3. The
importance of the amendment or the evidence; and
4. The
prejudice which will be suffered by the other party.
[14]
The Board considered Indigo’s argument that prior to the Parmalat
above decision, there was considerable doubt among trade-mark lawyers whether section
22 could be pleaded in the context of a subsection 30(i) ground of opposition.
The Board also considered Indigo’s submission that the parties were engaged in
settlement negotiations as an additional reason for the late amendment.
However, the Board agreed with Clarks that it was
far too late in the proceeding for Indigo to seek leave to both add a new
ground of opposition and file additional evidence.
[15]
The Board also agreed with Clarks’ submission that there was
nothing preventing Indigo from including the ground based on a combination of section
22 and subsection 30(i) in the original statement of opposition in 2005. In the
alternative, Indigo could have sought leave to amend two years earlier than it
did, after the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin c. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824,
wherein the possibility of pleading section 22 was discussed. Indigo’s
inability to provide sufficient reasons for not seeking leave earlier, combined
with the significant prejudice that would be suffered by Clarks
outweighed the importance of the proposed new ground in the Board’s view.
[16]
The Board thus concluded that it was not in the interests of
justice to grant the leave requested.
Issues
[17]
Indigo
is not seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision refusing to grant Indigo
an extension of time to file supplementary evidence. As such, the only decision
in question is the Board’s refusal to permit Indigo to amend its statements of opposition.
[18]
The
following issues are to be determined:
1. Can the Court review
the Board’s interlocutory decision?
2. If so, what is the
appropriate standard of review?
3. Did the Board commit
a reviewable error?
Applicant’s Written
Submissions
[19]
Indigo
submits that special circumstances exist which warrant the Court’s review of
the Board’s refusal to grant leave, notwithstanding that the decision was
interlocutory in nature. Such special circumstances exist because the impugned
interlocutory decision is finally dispositive of a substantive right of one of
the parties.
[20]
Indigo
submits that the Board’s decision was fundamentally premised on a number of
legal errors outlined below and to that extent, is reviewable on the standard
of correctness. However, even if the Board could properly refuse the request on
the basis of timing alone, its decision to do so would not be justified in any
event. Therefore, the Board’s decision should be set aside whether reviewed on
the standard of reasonableness or correctness or both.
[21]
Fundamentally,
the Board erred in failing to consider Indigo’s request for leave to amend its
statements of opposition as distinct from its request for leave to file
supplementary evidence. The Board’s decision was based on it being too late to
file new evidence. This tainted its consideration of the other request which
three of the four factors favoured granting. For example, simply allowing the
amendment without evidence could not possibly prejudice Clarks.
[22]
Second,
the Board erred in not considering Indigo’s explanation for the delay. Whether
or not Indigo was prevented from pleading the section 22 ground originally is
not relevant. What is relevant is Indigo’s explanation for the delay, namely,
the belief that the ground would be rejected by the Board until the Parmalat
decision.
[23]
Third,
the Board erred by stating that the Supreme Court discussed the possibility of
pleading section 22 as a ground of opposition in Veuve Clicquot above.
The Supreme Court did not.
[24]
Fourth,
the Board misapprehended the prejudice to the parties. In the context of the
distinct request to amend Indigo’s statements of opposition, Clarks may want to
amend its written arguments but doing so would not delay the hearing as the
hearing has not been scheduled and would likely be months away in any event. It
would not create a significant delay or expense to Clarks. Yet, the
Board failed to consider that if the request was refused, Indigo would be
unable to raise the section 22 ground in any subsequent appeal to this Court.
[25]
Finally,
the Board failed to consider Indigo’s concern that refusing to allow it to
include the section 22 ground would result in inconsistent decisions being
issued by the Board in respect of other INDIGO trade-marks filed by Clarks and
opposed by Indigo. Indeed, Indigo has opposed two other INDIGO applications by
Clarks and has included the section 22 ground in each opposition.
Respondent’s Written
Submissions
[26]
Clarks submits that
there are no special circumstances in this case that would support the Court
reviewing the interlocutory decision of the Board. Indigo suggests that special
circumstances exist merely because it was refused the opportunity to add a new
ground of opposition. If this were true, every interlocutory decision in respect
of a new ground would be a special circumstance. The Parmalat above
decision which found a special circumstance was significantly different from
the present case. In addition, Indigo has other remedies available to it.
Indigo can, at any time, commence an action against Clarks for a breach of any
rights Indigo may enjoy under section 22 or, after registration by Clarks, for
expungement based on an allegation pursuant to section 22.
[27]
Clarks submits that
the jurisprudence has already determined the appropriate standard of review,
namely, reasonableness. This was a decision where the Registrar applied her own
procedure as set out in the Practice Notice and came to a discretionary
decision.
[28]
The
Board’s decision was not only reasonable, it was also correct says Clarks. As a
preliminary point, Clarks points out that the Practice Notice makes clear
that no requests for further extensions of time will generally be granted where
a previous extension of time has already been granted as it was here.
[29]
Looking
at the factors, the Board was correct and certainly justified in its finding
that it was far too late in the proceedings. It had been nearly four years
since Indigo commenced its opposition. As regards the second factor (Indigo’s
explanation), there was no case law which stated that a party could not rely on
a combination of section 22 and subsection 30(i) as a ground of opposition.
Besides, after Veuve Clicquot above, it was not uncommon for opponents
to include that ground of opposition. Indigo’s failure to do so reflects a
choice. Indigo’s claim that it was unable to include the ground until the Parmalat
above decision has no merit. Even if that were true, over six months passed
between the issuance of Parmalat and Indigo’s request. Nor should Indigo
be able to rely on alleged overtures of settlement that it made to Clarks.
Those discussions are privileged and confidential. It would be perverse if
Indigo could use them to secure a tactical advantage.
[30]
Finally,
the Board’s conclusion on the fourth factor (prejudice) was justified. Clarks would be
prejudiced by Indigo’s waiting until the eleventh hour to file its request.
Clarks would face costs in regards to revising its pleadings and arguments, preparing
any evidence and conducting any cross-examinations. The delays that would no
doubt result if the request was granted would push back the date of the
hearing. Conversely, any prejudice felt by Indigo is self-inflicted by waiting
so long.
[31]
Indigo’s
argument that refusal to allow the additional ground of opposition could lead
to inconsistencies is without merit. No oppositions had been filed at the time
of the Board’s decision.
Analysis and Decision
[32]
Issue
1
Can the Court review the
Board’s interlocutory decision?
The Board’s refusal to grant
leave to Indigo to amend its statements of opposition was an interlocutory
decision. It took place within the process leading up to an opposition hearing
which has not yet taken place.
[33]
The
exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction is discretionary. Courts will
often refuse to entertain requests for judicial review of interim or
interlocutory decisions because such proceedings have the effect of fragmenting
and protracting administrative proceedings. Refusal is also justified on the
grounds that the completion of the administrative process may render the matter
moot (see Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R.
3, [1995] S.C.J. No. 1 (QL), paragraphs 34 to 36, Brown, D. J.
M., and J. M. Evans. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada,
1998 (loose-leaf ed. updated September 2009), at pp. 3:4300).
[34]
Upon
judicial review of the tribunal’s final decision, there are ways that an
applicant may obtain remedies for an unlawful interlocutory decision without
offending the doctrine of collateral attack. For example, the tribunal’s
interlocutory decision may have rendered the administrative process unfair.
[35]
At
times, courts will allow an applicant to proceed with a judicial review of an interlocutory
decision immediately. The general rule is that such interlocutory decisions
will not be judicially reviewed unless there are special circumstances (see Szczecka
c. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 333, [1993] F.C.J. No. 934
(Q.L.) and Parmalat above, at paragraph 21). The Federal Court of Appeal
has recently cautioned that judicial review of interlocutory decisions should
only be undertaken in the “most exceptional of circumstances” (see Greater
Moncton International Airport Authority v. Public Service Alliance of Canada,
2008 FCA 68, [2008] F.C.J. No. 312 (QL) at paragraph 1).
[36]
Special
circumstances will exist where, at the end of the proceedings, no other
appropriate remedy exists (see Szczecka above). In all material
respects, this reflects inquiries into the availability of an adequate
alternative remedy which arise in other contexts where courts consider their
discretion to refuse judicial review (see Brown and Evans, above, at pp
3:2000, see also Harelkin v. University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, 96
D.L.R. (3d) 14 and Canadian Pacific Ltd. above).
[37]
I
now turn to an examination of whether Indigo has an adequate alternative
remedy.
[38]
At
the end of proceedings, Indigo cannot seek judicial review but must engage the
statutory right to appeal decisions of the Registrar to this Court under section
56 of the Act. As discussed below, in the context of appeals of trade-mark
opposition decisions, such appeals are limited in scope to issues found in the
statements of opposition. The substance or procedural effects of the Board’s
interlocutory decision to refuse Indigo’s request to add a ground of opposition
could not be reviewed.
[39]
In
Parmalat above, the applicant, Parmalat, had similarly sought leave to
amend its statement of opposition and in particular, sought to include the
additional ground of depreciation based on section 22 and subsection 30(i) of
the Act. The Board member framed the issue to be resolved as a strictly legal
one: whether section 22 can be pleaded as a ground of opposition. The Board
member then conducted an analysis and concluded that complaints of depreciation
under section 22 were outside the scope of the limited grounds of opposition
listed in subsection 38(2). In essence, section 22 determinations were
determined to be outside the jurisdiction of the Registrar in the context of
opposition proceedings and Parmalat’s request was denied. Mr. Justice Lemieux,
in allowing Parmalat’s application for judicial review of the Board’s
interlocutory decision held:
24 In my view, there exist special
circumstances, in the context of oppositions to register trademarks under the Act,
which justify, in this case, an immediate judicial review of a decision not to
grant leave to add a new ground of opposition. The reason for this view is that
at the end of an opposition proceeding, which is an appeal to this Court, under
section 56 of the Act at the first appeal level there does not exist an
adequate remedy other than the course of action taken here by Parmalat.
25 The jurisprudence of this Court in
matters of trade-mark oppositions under the Act is to the effect the
Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with an issue not found in the
statement of opposition….
[40]
After
an analysis of the decision of Mr. Justice McKeown in McDonald's Corp. v.
Coffee Hut Stores Ltd., 76 F.T.R. 281 (F.C.T.D.), [1994] F.C.J. No. 638
(QL), Mr. Justice Lemeuix concluded:
27 These decisions are to the effect
Parmalat on a section 56 appeal from a finding of the TMOB could not raise the
section 22 issue (see also Mattel Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2002]
F.C.J. No. 1196, 2002 FCT 919).
[41]
Indigo
argues that it is facing the same situation as the applicant in Parmalat.
Even though the question answered by the Board in this case was not
jurisdictional as it was in Parmalat, the inadequacy of the remedy
contained in section 56 affects Indigo in precisely the same way.
[42]
Clarks concedes
that the scope of section 56 appeals is limited to grounds raised before the
Registrar but counters that there are other adequate remedies available to
Indigo in this specific case in the form of alternative judicial proceedings
under the Act.
[43]
Actions
have been determined to be more appropriate than judicial review where complex
factual issues are required to be resolved (see Bank of Montreal v. Canada
(Minister of Agriculture), 241 N.R. 198 (C.A.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 697
(C.A.) (QL), Alberta Commercial Fishermen Assn. v. Opportunity (Municipal
District) No. 17, 289 A.R. 47 (Q.B.), [2001] A.J. No. 459 (Q.B.) (QL)).
[44]
There
are two alternative judicial proceedings available to Indigo. First, Indigo can
commence an action at any time against Clarks, alleging that Clarks’ use of the
subject marks is a breach of any rights Indigo may enjoy under section 22.
Second, to the extent that Indigo is unsuccessful in the oppositions and
Clarks’ trade-mark applications proceed to registration, Indigo could commence
a proceeding in the Court for expungement of any such registrations pursuant to
section 57 of the Act, based again on an allegation pursuant to section 22.
These are appropriate remedies to any breaches of a substantive right under section
22. I would agree that these are appropriate realistic remedies.
[45]
Arguably,
the above mentioned actions provide a more appropriate method of defending
alleged rights under section 22 than opposition proceedings. As discussed by
the Supreme Court in Veuve Clicquot above, a section 22 plaintiff has to
show that the defendant has already used the mark in a manner that is likely to
depreciate the value of the goodwill attaching to the plaintiff’s trade-mark
(paragraphs 46, 47, 56 to 61). Thus, section 22 is premised on an analysis of
what a defendant has done, not what a defendant proposes to do, such as in the
context of most opposition proceedings. Reiterating this point, the Supreme
Court stated specifically that the linkage between the defendant’s use and the
plaintiff’s goodwill, which is the third element of a section 22 claim, is a
matter of “evidence not speculation” (paragraph 60).
[46]
Thus,
while the limited scope of section 56 appeals may give rise to special
circumstances facilitating immediate judicial review in some cases, in this
case, Indigo has adequate, and likely preferable, alternative remedies for
enforcing rights under section 22.
[47]
In
Parmalat above, the Registrar’s decision was quashed because the
tribunal misstated the issue before it by finding that the Board had no
jurisdiction to inquire into issues of depreciation and then found that section
22 of the Act was not a proper ground of opposition.
[48]
In
my view, the applicant has not established special circumstances that would
justify the judicial review of this interlocutory decision. The fact that the
Registrar did not allow the amendments does not automatically result in special
circumstances being established. As noted earlier, the facts of some cases when
an amendment is denied, may provide special circumstances so as to allow the
judicial review of the interlocutory decision to proceed. That is not the case
in the present proceeding as the Registrar dealt with the issues before it and
exercised its discretion to deny the motion.
[49]
Given
the adequate alternative remedies available to Indigo, I would decline to
proceed with judicial review of the Board’s interlocutory decision.
[50]
The
application for judicial review is therefore dismissed with costs to the
respondent.
JUDGMENT
[51]
IT
IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is dismissed with costs
to the respondent.
“John A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant Statutory Provisions
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-1
|
2. In this Act,
. . .
“distinctive”,
in relation to a trade-mark, means a trade-mark that actually distinguishes
the wares or services in association with which it is used by its owner from
the wares or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them;
4.(1) A trade-mark is deemed to be used
in association with wares if, at the time of the transfer of the property in
or possession of the wares, in the normal course of trade, it is marked on
the wares themselves or on the packages in which they are distributed or it
is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of the
association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is
transferred.
6.(1) For the purposes of this Act, a
trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name
if the use of the first mentioned trade-mark or trade-name would cause
confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and
circumstances described in this section.
. . .
(5) In
determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or
the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding
circumstances including
(a) the inherent
distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which
they have become known;
(b) the length
of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
(c) the nature
of the wares, services or business;
(d) the nature
of the trade; and
(e) the degree
of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound
or in the ideas suggested by them.
12.(1) Subject
to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
. . .
(d) confusing
with a registered trade-mark;
16.
. . .
(3) Any
applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for
registration of a proposed trade-mark that is registrable is entitled,
subject to sections 38 and 40, to secure its registration in respect of the
wares or services specified in the application, unless at the date of filing
of the application it was confusing with
(a) a
trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada
or made known in Canada by any other person;
(b) a
trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been
previously filed in Canada by any other person; or
(c) a
trade-name that had been previously used in Canada
by any other person.
22.(1) No person shall use a trade-mark
registered by another person in a manner that is likely to have the effect of
depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching thereto.
(2) In any
action in respect of a use of a trade-mark contrary to subsection (1), the
court may decline to order the recovery of damages or profits and may permit
the defendant to continue to sell wares marked with the trade-mark that were
in his possession or under his control at the time notice was given to him
that the owner of the registered trade-mark complained of the use of the
trade-mark.
30. An applicant
for the registration of a trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an
application containing
. . .
(i) a
statement that the applicant is satisfied that he is entitled to use the
trade-mark in Canada in association with the wares or
services described in the application.
38.(1) Within two months after the
advertisement of an application for the registration of a trade-mark, any
person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a statement of opposition
with the Registrar.
(2) A
statement of opposition may be based on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the
application does not conform to the requirements of section 30;
(b) that the
trade-mark is not registrable;
(c) that the
applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark; or
(d) that the
trade-mark is not distinctive.
. . .
56.(1) An
appeal lies to the Federal Court from any decision of the Registrar under
this Act within two months from the date on which notice of the decision was
dispatched by the Registrar or within such further time as the Court may
allow, either before or after the expiration of the two months.
|
2.
Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
. .
.
« distinctive »
Relativement à une marque de commerce, celle qui distingue véritablement les
marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée par son
propriétaire, des marchandises ou services d’autres propriétaires, ou qui est
adaptée à les distinguer ainsi.
4.(1)
Une marque de commerce est réputée employée en liaison avec des marchandises
si, lors du transfert de la propriété ou de la possession de ces
marchandises, dans la pratique normale du commerce, elle est apposée sur les
marchandises mêmes ou sur les colis dans lesquels ces marchandises sont
distribuées, ou si elle est, de toute autre manière, liée aux marchandises à
tel point qu’avis de liaison est alors donné à la personne à qui la propriété
ou possession est transférée.
6.(1)
Pour l’application de la présente loi, une marque de commerce ou un nom
commercial crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce ou un autre
nom commercial si l’emploi de la marque de commerce ou du nom commercial en
premier lieu mentionnés cause de la confusion avec la marque de commerce ou
le nom commercial en dernier lieu mentionnés, de la manière et dans les
circonstances décrites au présent article.
. .
.
(5)
En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la
confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de
toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris :
a)
le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux,
et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus;
b)
la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont
été en usage;
c)
le genre de marchandises,rvices ou entreprises;
d)
la nature du commerce;
e)
le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms
commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu’ils
suggèrent.
12.(1)
Sous réserve de l’article 13, une marque de commerce est enregistrable sauf
dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :
. .
.
d)
elle crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée;
16.
. .
.
(3)
Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de
l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce projetée et enregistrable, a droit,
sous réserve des articles 38 et 40, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard
des marchandises ou services spécifiés dans la demande, à moins que, à la
date de production de la demande, elle n’ait créé de la confusion :
a)
soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada
par une autre personne;
b)
soit avec une marque de commerce à l’égard de laquelle une demande
d’enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre
personne;
c)
soit avec un nom commercial antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre
personne.
22.(1)
Nul ne peut employer une marque de commerce déposée par une autre personne
d’une manière susceptible d’entraîner la diminution de la valeur de
l’achalandage attaché à cette marque de commerce.
(2)
Dans toute action concernant un emploi contraire au paragraphe (1), le
tribunal peut refuser d’ordonner le recouvrement de dommages-intérêts ou de
profits, et permettre au défendeur de continuer à vendre toutes marchandises
revêtues de cette marque de commerce qui étaient en sa possession ou sous son
contrôle lorsque avis lui a été donné que le propriétaire de la marque de
commerce déposée se plaignait de cet emploi.
30.
Quiconque sollicite l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce produit au
bureau du registraire une demande renfermant :
. .
.
i)
une déclaration portant que le requérant est convaincu qu’il a droit
d’employer la marque de commerce au Canada en liaison avec les marchandises
ou services décrits dans la demande.
38.(1)
Toute personne peut, dans le délai de deux mois à compter de l’annonce de la
demande, et sur paiement du droit prescrit, produire au bureau du registraire
une déclaration d’opposition.
(2)
Cette opposition peut être fondée sur l’un des motifs suivants :
a)
la demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’article 30;
b)
la marque de commerce n’est pas enregistrable;
c)
le requérant n’est pas la personne ayant droit à l’enregistrement;
d)
la marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive.
. .
.
56.(1)
Appel de toute décision rendue par le registraire, sous le régime de la
présente loi, peut être interjeté à la Cour fédérale dans les deux mois qui
suivent la date où le registraire a expédié l’avis de la décision ou dans tel
délai supplémentaire accordé par le tribunal, soit avant, soit après
l’expiration des deux mois.
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Trade-marks
Regulations,
SOR/96-195
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40. No amendment to a statement of
opposition or counter statement shall be allowed except with leave of the
Registrar and on such terms as the Registrar determines to be appropriate.
41.(1) Within four months after service of
the counter statement, the opponent shall
(a) submit to
the Registrar, by way of affidavit or statutory declaration, or in accordance
with section 54 of the Act, the evidence that the opponent is relying on to
support the opposition, or a statement that the opponent does not wish to
submit evidence; and
(b) serve the
applicant, where evidence is submitted, with a copy of the evidence or, where
the opponent does not wish to submit evidence, with a copy of a statement
that the opponent does not wish to submit evidence.
(2) Where the
opponent does not submit either the evidence under subsection 38(7) of the
Act or a statement that the opponent does not wish to submit evidence, within
the time set out in subsection (1), the opposition shall be deemed to have
been withdrawn for the purposes of subsection 38(7.1) of the Act.
42.(1) Within four months after service of
the opponent’s evidence or statement referred to in paragraph 41(1)(a), the
applicant shall
(a) submit to
the Registrar by way of affidavit or statutory declaration, or in accordance
with section 54 of the Act, the evidence that the applicant is relying on to
support the application, or a statement that the applicant does not wish to
submit evidence; and
(b) serve the
opponent, where evidence is submitted, with a copy of the evidence or, where
the applicant does not wish to submit evidence, with a copy of a statement
that the applicant does not wish to submit evidence.
(2) Where the
applicant does not submit either the evidence under subsection 38(7) of the
Act or a statement that the applicant does not wish to submit evidence,
within the time set out in subsection (1), the application shall be deemed to
have been abandoned for the purposes of subsection 38(7.2) of the Act.
44.(1) No further evidence shall be
adduced by any party except with leave of the Registrar and on such terms as
the Registrar determines to be appropriate.
(2) Before
giving notice in accordance with subsection 46(1), the Registrar may, on the
application of any party and on such terms as the Registrar may direct, order
the cross-examination under oath of any affiant or declarant on an affidavit
or declaration that has been filed with the Registrar and is being relied on
as evidence in the opposition.
(3) A
cross-examination ordered pursuant to subsection (2) shall be held at a time,
date and place and before a person agreed to by the parties or, in the
absence of an agreement, as designated by the Registrar.
(4) A
transcript of the cross-examination and exhibits to the cross-examination,
and any documents or material undertaken to be submitted by the party whose
affiant or declarant is being cross-examined, shall be filed with the
Registrar by the party conducting the cross-examination, within the time
fixed by the Registrar.
(5) If an
affiant or declarant declines or fails to attend for cross-examination, the
affidavit or declaration shall not be part of the evidence and shall be
returned to the party who filed it.
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40.
La modification d’une déclaration d’opposition ou d’une contre-déclaration
n’est admise qu’avec la permission du registraire aux conditions qu’il estime
indiquées.
41.(1)
Dans les quatre mois suivant la signification de la contre-déclaration,
l’opposant :
a)
soumet au registraire, par voie d’affidavit ou de déclaration solennelle ou
conformément à l’article 54 de la Loi, la preuve sur laquelle il s’appuie ou
une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire;
b)
s’il soumet cette preuve, en signifie copie au requérant, sinon lui signifie
copie de la déclaration.
(2)
Pour l’application du paragraphe 38(7.1) de la Loi, l’opposition est réputée
retirée si, dans le délai visé au paragraphe (1), l’opposant omet de
soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe 38(7) de la Loi ou une déclaration
énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire.
42.(1)
Dans les quatre mois suivant la signification de la preuve de l’opposant ou
de la déclaration visée à l’alinéa 41(1)a), le requérant :
a)
soumet au registraire la preuve, par voie d’affidavit ou de déclaration
solennelle ou conformément à l’article 54 de la Loi, sur laquelle il
s’appuie, ou une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire;
b)
s’il soumet cette preuve, en signifie copie à l’opposant, sinon lui signifie
copie de la déclaration.
(2)
Pour l’application du paragraphe 38(7.2) de la Loi, la demande est réputée
abandonnée si, dans le délai visé au paragraphe (1), le requérant omet de
soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe 38(7) de la Loi ou une déclaration
énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire.
44.(1)
Aucune autre preuve ne peut être produite par les parties, sauf avec la
permission du registraire aux conditions qu’il juge indiquées.
(2)
Avant de donner un avis aux termes du paragraphe 46(1), le registraire peut,
à la demande d’une partie et aux conditions qu’il fixe, ordonner le
contre-interrogatoire sous serment de l’auteur de tout affidavit ou
déclaration solennelle produit au bureau du registraire à titre de preuve
dans l’opposition.
(3)
Le contre-interrogatoire ordonné en vertu du paragraphe (2) se tient aux
date, heure et lieu et devant la personne dont ont convenu les parties ou,
faute d’accord entre celles-ci, qu’a désignés le registraire.
(4)
La transcription du contre-interrogatoire et les pièces connexes, ainsi que
tout document ou matériel que s’est engagée à fournir la partie pour le
compte de laquelle l’auteur de l’affidavit ou de la déclaration solennelle
subit le contre-interrogatoire, sont produits au bureau du registraire par la
partie qui procède au contre-interrogatoire, dans le délai fixé par le
registraire.
(5)
Si l’auteur de l’affidavit ou de la déclaration solennelle refuse ou omet de
se présenter au contre-interrogatoire, son affidavit ou sa déclaration
solennelle ne fait pas partie de la preuve et est retourné à la partie qui
l’a produit.
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