Date: 20100614
Docket: T-1162-09
Citation: 2010
FC 642
Ottawa, Ontario, June 14, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Hansen
BETWEEN:
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent (Applicant)
and
UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION AND
U.S. STEEL CANADA INC.
Applicants (Respondents)
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
Introduction
[1] The
United States Steel Corporation and U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (U.S. Steel)
challenge the validity of section 40 of the Investment Canada Act, R.S.
1985, c.28 (1st Supp.) (ICA or Act) as being in violation of section 11(d)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and section 2(e) of
the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1985.
Facts
[2] For
the purpose of this motion, only a brief review of the facts is necessary. In
September 2007, U.S. Steel submitted an application for review under the
Act to obtain ministerial approval of its proposed investment in and
acquisition of control of Stelco Inc.’s Hamilton-based Canadian business. In
support of the application, U.S. Steel provided 31 undertakings including two
in relation to employment and production levels. On October 29, 2007, the
Minister approved the acquisition.
[3] On
May 5, 2009, the Minister sent a demand to U.S. Steel pursuant to section 39 of
the Act advising U.S. Steel that it was in contravention of the employment and
production undertakings and requested that U.S. Steel cease the contraventions,
remedy the default, show cause why there were no contraventions or justify any
non-compliance. Subsequent to U.S. Steel’s response to the demand, the
Minister informed U.S. Steel that he was not satisfied with the response. On
July 17, 2009, the Attorney General of Canada filed an application under
section 40 of the Act seeking an order directing U.S. Steel to comply with
the two undertakings and a penalty of $10,000 per day, per breach of the
undertakings calculated from November 1, 2008 until compliance with the
undertakings. U.S. Steel then filed the within motion.
Overview of the legislation,
transactions subject to review and the relationship between the parties
[4] Before
turning to a consideration of the issues raised in this motion, an overview of
the legislation together with some observations regarding the types of transactions
that are subject to review under the Act and the relationship between the
government and the non-Canadian investor are useful.
[5] The
ICA came into force in 1985. It repealed and replaced the Foreign
Investment Review Act, S.C. 1973 -1974, c. 46 (FIRA). The ICA provides that
certain investments in Canada by non-Canadian investors may not be implemented
unless the investment has been reviewed and approved by the Minister. To
initiate the review process, the non-Canadian investor is required to submit an
application containing the requisite information. In addition, the
non-Canadian investor may give written undertakings in support of the
application. Section 21 of the Act provides that if after taking into account
the information, undertakings and representations received under section 19 and
the factors set out in section 20 the Minister is satisfied that the proposed
investment “is likely to be of net benefit to Canada”, the proposed investment
will be given ministerial approval. Subsequent to the implementation of the
investment, the Minister has the authority to monitor the investment to
determine whether the investment is being carried out in accordance with the
application and any representations and undertakings given by the non-Canadian
investor in relation to the investment.
[6] Section
38 authorizes the Minister to issue guidelines and interpretation notes with
respect to the application and administration of the Act. The current
Guidelines issued by the Minister outline the procedural aspects of the
proposal and monitoring stages. The Guidelines contain information regarding
the pre-filing meetings, undertakings, third party representations, feedback
during the review process, the determination “is likely to be of net benefit to
Canada”, and post-approval monitoring.
[7] With
respect to undertakings, the Guidelines encourage investors to incorporate in
their plans as much detail and precision as possible to reduce the likelihood
that undertakings will be needed to supplement the plans. The Guidelines also
note that undertakings may still be “helpful to provide greater assurances when
issues, critical to the determination of net benefit, arise.” As to
monitoring, the Guidelines state that an evaluation will usually be made 18
months after the implementation of the investments.
[8] Section
39 provides that where the Minister believes that the non-Canadian investor has
failed, among other things, to comply with an undertaking given at the time of
the approval, the Minister may send a demand to the non-Canadian investor
requiring the investor within a specified period “to cease the contravention,
to remedy the default, to show cause why there is no contravention of the Act
or Regulations or, in the case of undertakings, to justify any non-compliance.”
[9] A
section 40 proceeding arises from the ministerial demand made pursuant to
section 39. It is initiated by an application in a superior court. If at the
conclusion of the hearing, the court is satisfied that the Minister was
justified in sending the demand and the non-Canadian investor has failed to
comply with the demand, the court may make any order or orders the court
considers the circumstances require including any of the orders provided in
subsection 40(2). In particular, for the purpose of this motion, the court may
impose a monetary penalty not exceeding $10,000 per breach for each day the
non-Canadian investor is in contravention and may direct the disposition by the
non-Canadian investor of any voting interests or assets acquired that are or
were used in carrying on a Canadian business.
[10] Section
40(3) provides that a monetary penalty is a debt due to Her Majesty the Queen
in right of Canada and is recoverable as such in a superior court. Under
section 40(4), a person or entity that fails or refuses to comply with an order
made under subsection (2), may be cited and punished by the court that made the
order “as for other contempts of that court”.
[11] Lastly,
under section 42, everyone who knowingly provides false or misleading
information under the Act or the Regulations or contravenes section 36 of the
Act is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
[12] For
ease of reference, the relevant statutory provisions are included with these
reasons in Annex “A”.
[13] Leaving
aside for the moment reviews undertaken in relation to investments that could
be injurious to national security, the Act applies to significant investments
by non-Canadian investors. In 2007, at the time of the approval of the
investment at issue in this proceeding, the financial threshold for investments
by non-Canadian investors from World Trade Organization countries was 281
million dollars. For non-World Trade Organization countries, the threshold was
5 million dollars. It is also important to note that the transactions that are
subject to review are private transactions involving the acquisition of
interests in Canadian businesses by non-Canadian investors.
[14] Undertakings
play an important role within the legislative scheme. As Richard Lajeunesse,
Investment Review Manager with Industry Canada explains in his affidavit, an
application for approval under the Act must include a detailed description of
the non-Canadian investor’s plans for the business being acquired with specific
reference to the section 20 factors that the Minister is required to take into
account in reaching a decision. In the case of significant investments,
non-Canadian investors will also often submit undertakings in relation to the
investor’s plans for the Canadian business directed at the section 20 factors
that include maintaining the business operations in Canada, Canadian
participation in the business and employment for Canadians. These undertakings
are intended to demonstrate that the investment will be carried out in a manner
that “is likely to be of net benefit to Canada”.
[15] During
the hearing, both parties characterized the relationship under the legislation
between the non-Canadian investor and the government, particularly in relation
to the undertakings, as being akin to a contractual relationship. It is not
necessary for the purpose of this motion to make a determination regarding the
legal nature of the relationship between the government and the non-Canadian
investor. It is sufficient to note that there is no dispute between the
parties that the undertakings drafted by the non-Canadian investor and
submitted to the government in support of the application for approval are
binding commitments.
The Charter
[16] The
first issue is whether section 11(d) of the Charter applies to a
proceeding under section 40 of the Act. Section 11(d) reads:
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according
to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
|
11. Tout
inculpé a le droit :
d) d’être présumé innocent tant qu’il n’est pas déclaré coupable,
conformément à la loi, par un tribunal indépendant et impartial à l’issue
d’un procès public et équitable;
|
[17] As
section 11(d) is limited in its application to “a person charged with an
offence”, U.S. Steel must establish that a person or corporation against whom a
section 40 proceeding is initiated “is a person charged with an offence”.
To do so, the parties agree that U.S. Steel must demonstrate that it meets
either of the two branches of the test articulated in R. v. Wigglesworth,
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 541. In Wigglesworth, Justice Wilson stated that
section 11(d) will apply if a matter by its very nature is a criminal proceeding
or if it involves the imposition of true penal consequences.
[18] The
first question to resolve is whether a section 40 proceeding is by its very
nature a penal proceeding. In Wigglesworth at paragraph 23, Justice
Wilson explained:
In
my view, if a particular matter is of a public nature, intended to promote
public order and welfare within a public sphere of activity, then that matter
is the kind of matter which falls within s. 11. It falls within the section
because of the kind of matter it is. This is to be distinguished from private,
domestic or disciplinary matters which are regulatory, protective or corrective
and which are primarily intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity
and professional standards or to regulate conduct within a limited private
sphere of activity”. … Proceedings of an administrative nature instituted for
the protection of the public in accordance with the policy of a statute are
also not the sort of “offence” proceedings to which s. 11 is applicable. … [citations
omitted]
[19] In
Martineau v. M.N.R. (2004), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), at paragraphs
21-22, Justice Fish echoed Justice Wilson’s earlier observation that “when a
matter is of a public nature, intended to promote public order and welfare
within a public sphere of activity, it falls, by its very nature within s. 11
of the Charter.” He also contrasted these types of proceedings with
“proceedings of an administrative – private, internal or disciplinary – nature
instituted for the protection of the public in accordance with the policy of a
statute” that are not penal in nature. At paragraph 24, Justice Fish explained
that the nature of a proceeding is to be determined on the basis of three
criteria: 1) the objectives of the Act and the relevant provision; 2) the
purpose of the sanction; and 3) the process leading to the imposition of the
sanction.
[20] Although
U. S. Steel acknowledges that it relies primarily on the second branch of the Wigglesworth
test, it maintains that the first branch of the test is also met.
[21] U.
S. Steel submits that the following five key factors bring section 40 squarely
within the test in Wigglesworth: 1) the purpose of the legislation is
public and not private; 2) the magnitude of the fine is significant; 3) the
failure to pay the monetary penalty leads to contempt proceedings and exposure
to a term of imprisonment; 4) the penalty goes to the Consolidated Revenue Fund
and not to an internal body to maintain or regulate an internal or private
sphere of activity; and 5) the penalties are imposed by a court and not by a
regulator.
[22] In
particular, with regard to the “by nature” branch of the test, U.S. Steel submits that the Act is of a public rather than of a private
nature. The Act has the effect of creating the offence of failure to comply
with a demand which if breached leads to a number of penalties including the
imposition of a fine. U.S. Steel contends that having regard to the
purpose of the legislation found in section 2, the factors in section 20 that
the Minister must take into account and the test “is likely to be of net
benefit to Canada”, the Act is not aimed at regulating a defined sphere of
private activity. Rather, it is directed at promoting the public order and
welfare within a public sphere of activity.
[23] U.S.
Steel points out that the typical characterizations of matters as being “private,
domestic or disciplinary which are regulatory, protective or corrective and which
are intended to maintain discipline, professional integrity and professional
standards or to regulate conduct within a limited private sphere of activity” do
not apply to the ICA.
[24] U.S.
Steel claims that the public nature of the legislation is also reflected in the
2009 amendment to the purpose of the Act which incorporated the recognition of
“the importance of protecting national security”. U.S. Steel also points out
that under the legislation a non-Canadian investor’s undertakings are given to
the government and not to a regulator. U.S. Steel maintains that while the statutory
scheme regulates private economic actors, these provisions illustrate the
public nature of the legislation.
[25] U.S.
Steel contends that a number of features of the ICA distinguish it from the
typical legislation that regulates private activity. U.S. Steel points out
that the activity being regulated by the Act is arbitrarily defined. That is,
not all investments by non-Canadian investors are regulated by the Act. It is
only applicable to investments in excess of 5 million dollars. In this respect,
it is not the usual type of regulation of private activity where a defined
sphere of conduct is regulated without limitations based on the magnitude of
the activity or its volume. As well, the ICA is atypical in another respect in
that it only provides a temporary monitoring period and not the ongoing
regulation of the activity subject to the legislation.
[26] U.S.
Steel also argues that other features of the ICA point to section 40 being
penal in nature. U.S. Steel notes that although many pieces of legislation
have both civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms, generally the penalties
imposed in the criminal process are greater than those imposed in the
administrative process. However, under the ICA, the penalties under section 40
far exceed those that may be imposed for a summary conviction offence. Further,
unlike section 40, the penalties within an administrative process are capped
and do not include a risk of imprisonment. U.S. Steel adds that there is no
“tribunal process” under section 40. Instead, the matter proceeds directly to
a court. Lastly, U.S. Steel notes that none of the typical civil remedies such
as damages, compensation or disgorgement are found in the legislation.
[27] U.S.
Steel also submits that even if section 40 does not meet the first branch of
the Wigglesworth test, the monetary penalty that may be imposed under
section 40 is a true penal consequence attracting the protection of
section 11(d). In particular, U.S. Steel maintains the magnitude alone of
the monetary penalty available under section 40 is sufficient to bring it under
the second branch of the Wigglesworth test. U.S. Steel disputes the
Attorney General’s interpretation that a true penal consequence has two
components and argues that it is at odds with Justice Wilson’s decision in Wigglesworth.
In particular, U.S. Steel submits that Justice Wilson did not create a two part
test that requires a fine of sufficient magnitude and that the fine is imposed
for the purpose of redressing a wrong done to society at large. That is, at
paragraph 24, Justice Wilson did not say a fine by its magnitude and is imposed
for the purpose of redressing a wrong done to society. Rather, Justice Wilson
stated that “a fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed”. It is the
fine by its magnitude that leads to the conclusion it is being imposed for the
purpose of redressing the wrong. U.S. Steel maintains that it is from the
magnitude of the fine that the purpose of the fine must be drawn. For this
reason, the magnitude of the fine is the critical issue.
[28] U.S.
Steel submits that its interpretation finds further support in Justice Wilson’s
observation “…that if a body or an official has an unlimited power to fine, and
if it does not afford the rights enumerated under s. 11, it cannot impose fines
designed to redress the harm done to society at large.” U.S. Steel argues that
this statement makes it clear that it may be inferred from the magnitude of the
penalty that it is being imposed for the purpose of redressing a wrong done to
society at large.
[29] U.S.
Steel submits that when the legislation is viewed objectively, the potential
monetary penalty under section 40 is so large that it cannot have any purpose
other than to redress a wrong done to society at large. That is, the purpose
of the penalty is to punish.
[30] U.S.
Steel also submits that there are two main indicators of the purpose of a
penalty. A key consideration is whether the penalty is in some manner
connected to the regulated activity or has a mathematical connection to the
regulated activity. U.S. Steel argues that if a monetary penalty, as in the
present case, is not connected in some way to the extent of the breach and
there is no relationship between the penalty and any actual damages or compensation,
then the purpose of the penalty must be to redress the wrong done to society
and to punish. The other key consideration is that under the ICA the penalty
goes into the Consolidated Revenue Fund and is not used for some internal
benefit.
[31] U.S. Steel submits that other indicators
also show that the monetary penalty under section 40 is a true penal
consequence. The penalty may be imposed for each breach of an undertaking and
there is no provision in the legislation capping the total amount of the penalty
irrespective of the number of contraventions. The fact that the monetary
penalty may be imposed for each day of contravention reflects a general and
specific deterrence purpose that is consistent with a penal purpose. The
consequences flowing from a finding of failure to comply with a ministerial
demand are penal in nature and far more serious than the penalty that may be
imposed for a contravention of the summary conviction offence under section 42
without any of the procedural and substantive Charter protections
afforded to an investor charged with the summary conviction offence. In
particular, the daily monetary penalty is double the total amount that may be
imposed for a summary conviction offence under section 42 of the ICA and, under
section 40, there is potential exposure to a term of imprisonment.
[32] U.S.
Steel also claims it is significant that under section 40, it is a court
imposing the monetary penalty and not a regulator. In U.S. Steel’s view, the
legislation is, in effect turning the court into a regulator. However, the
court is always an adjudicator and never in the business of regulating. The
only instance in which a court has jurisdiction to impose a fine is in the
criminal or quasi-criminal setting. U.S. Steel argues that a penalty is an
administrative penalty because it is imposed by an administrative tribunal.
The fact that the monetary penalty under section 40 is imposed by a court and
not a regulatory body also shows that it a true penal consequence.
[33] U.S.
Steel takes the position that as the cases relied on by the Attorney General, Lavallee
v. Alberta (Securities Commission), 2009 ABQB 17; Commissioner of
Competition v. Gestion Lebski Inc., 2006 Comp. Trib 32; and Martineau v.
M.N.R. (2004), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), are all cases where the fines
were imposed by a regulator, they are of no assistance for the purpose of this
motion.
[34] For
example, in Lavallee where the Securities Commission had imposed a fine
of one million dollars, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench concluded that Charter
rights were not engaged because a true penal consequence could not be imposed
by the Commission. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took into account
the fact that the magnitude of the penalty was statutorily capped; the penalty
was imposed by a tribunal and not a court; and the goal of the Securities
Commission is to regulate economic activity.
[35] Similarly,
in Lebski, a Competition Tribunal decision, the penalty was imposed by
an administrative tribunal and not a court. U.S. Steel rhetorically asks, “is
a fine when it is imposed by a court of law ever anything other than a true
penal consequence”.
Analysis
[36] Turning
to the first branch of the Wigglesworth test, in particular, the
objectives of the Act and section 40, the purpose of the legislation is found
in section 2. It reads:
Recognizing that
increased capital and technology benefits Canada, and recognizing the
importance of protecting national security, the purposes of this Act are
to provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians
in a manner that encourages investment, economic growth and employment
opportunities in Canada and to provide for the review of investments in Canada
by non-Canadians that could be injurious to national security.
[37] The
stated purposes are two-fold. The first is to establish a process to review
significant investments in Canada by non-Canadian investors that encourages
foreign investment and fosters economic growth and employment opportunities in Canada.
The second purpose is to provide a mechanism to review investments in Canada by
non-Canadian investors that could be injurious to national security. The
ultimate objective of the legislation in relation to the first purpose is to
ensure that the proposed investment “is likely to be of net benefit to Canada”.
As to the second, the objective is self-evident.
[38] As
to the objective of the proceeding at issue, a section 40 proceeding is the
second of a two stage process. As set out above, at the first stage under
section 39, the ministerial demand gives the non-Canadian investor an
opportunity to show cause why there has been no contravention, to remedy a
default and to justify any non-compliance with undertakings. The ministerial
demand also gives notice to the non-Canadian investor of the consequences
flowing from a failure to comply with the demand. Additionally, although
section 39.1 only came into force in March 2009, it provides that if the
Minister believes a non-Canadian investor has failed to comply with an
undertaking, the Minister may, after the implementation of the investment
accept a new undertaking from the investor.
[39] In
the event that the investor allegedly fails to comply with a ministerial
demand, the Minister may initiate a section 40 proceeding. The range of orders
that may be imposed if the court is satisfied that the Minister was justified
in sending the demand and there has been a failure to comply with the demand
include various degrees and forms of divestiture, directions to the investor to
comply with any undertakings and to provide information requested by the
Minister or the Director and the imposition of a penalty not exceeding ten
thousand dollars per breach for each day the investor is in contravention of
the Act.
[40] The
central feature of the legislation is the determination that the proposed
investment “is likely to be of net benefit to Canada”. This determination is
based on the strength of the investor’s information, representations and
undertakings in relation to the broad economic factors found in section 20. If
the investment is not carried out in accordance with the basis upon which it
was approved, in particular, if the undertakings are not honoured, there is a
risk that the ultimate objective of the legislation will be undermined.
[41] Read
in the context of sections 39 and 39.1, and having regard to the legislative
objectives and the types of orders available under section 40, the objective of
a section 40 proceeding is to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Act
and any undertakings that may have been given in support of the application for
approval.
[42] The second criterion in Martineau concerns the purpose of
the sanction. Although there are a number of sanctions that may be imposed
under section 40, the focus for the purpose of this motion is on the monetary
penalty. Having regard to the purpose and the objectives of the legislation,
the critical role that undertakings play in the approval process and in
ensuring the attainment of the legislative objectives, the opportunity for
voluntary compliance prior to the initiation of a section 40 proceeding, the
“for each day … in contravention” structuring of the monetary penalty, I find
that the purpose of the monetary penalty is to encourage and promote timely
compliance and to enforce compliance with any undertakings and provisions of
the legislation.
[43] As to the third criterion, the process leading to the imposition
of the sanction, under the Act is an application brought on behalf of the
Minister in a superior court, a civil proceeding. This reflects Parliament’s
deliberate choice to enforce compliance with undertakings and the provisions of
the Act through a civil and not a criminal proceeding.
[44] U.S. Steel stresses the public nature of the legislation
and that it is aimed at promoting the public order and welfare within a public
sphere of activity. There is no doubt that the legislation has a public aspect
in that it is aimed at encouraging investment, economic growth and employment
opportunities for the benefit of Canadians. However, it does not necessarily
follow from the broad public aspect of the legislation alone that the
legislation and, in particular, a section 40 proceeding is aimed at regulating
a public sphere of activity. In my view, a section 40 proceeding is not
concerned with a public sphere of activity. As stated above, a section 40
proceeding arises in the context of a private transaction involving the
acquisition of interests in Canadian businesses by private investors. A
section 40 proceeding concerns the information, representations and
undertakings given by a non-Canadian investor to the government to obtain
ministerial approval of a private investment. In a section 40 proceeding, the
investor is not being called to account to the public. The investor is being
called to account to the government for a failure to honour commitments made to
the government.
[45] Further,
apart from the assertion that a section 40 proceeding is intended to promote
public order and welfare, U.S. Steel did not explain the basis upon which the
regulated activity implicates or threatens the public order and welfare. While
I accept that a section 40 proceeding serves a public purpose, in my opinion it
does not serve the broader public service of promoting the public order and
welfare within a public sphere of activity.
[46] The
legislative history also supports the conclusion that a section 40 proceeding
is non-criminal in nature. Under the FIRA, the predecessor legislation,
the enforcement proceedings for non-compliance were criminal in nature. At the
February 5, 1985 meeting of the Standing Committee on Regional Development, the
responsible Minister, the Hon. Sinclair Stevens explained:
In order to ensure compliance with the proposed act,
sections 39 to 43 of the bill provide for certain penalties but, contrary to
the current legislation, Bill C-15 prescribes civil, as opposed to criminal
penalties for non-compliance. There is only one exception. There is a
criminal penalty for breach of confidentiality or the provision of false
information. …
|
De façon à assurer le respect de la loi,
les articles 39 à 43 du projet de loi prévoient certaines sanctions. À
l’encontre de la loi actuelle, le projet de loi C-15 prévoit des sanctions
d’ordre civil, plutôt que criminel, pur le défaut de se conformer à la loi.
Il n’y a qu’une exception : des sanctions criminelles sont prévues pour
bris de confidentialité ou faux renseignements. …
|
Accordingly, it can be seen that in
implementing the ICA Parliament intended a civil enforcement mechanism and
civil penalties to deal with non-compliance.
[47] It
is convenient at this point to touch briefly on the second purpose of the
legislation, namely, to ensure that proposed investments will not be injurious
to national security. U.S. Steel relies on the recognition of the importance
of national security to show the public nature of the Act. Clearly, national
security is a matter of public interest. However, as stated above, it does not
necessarily follow from this broad public interest component that the
legislation and a section 40 proceeding are penal in nature. In my view, the
provisions of the Act regarding national security are aimed at preventing
investments that may compromise national security and, in this sense, further
the legislative purpose.
[48] U.S. Steel also submits that the penal nature of a section 40
proceeding is also reflected in the fact that section 40 is in part VII of the
Act under the heading “Remedies, Offences and Punishment”. I am not persuaded
that this assists U.S. Steel’s position given that the heading includes
“remedies” and not just “offences and punishment” and section 42 in the same
part of the Act creates two offences punishable on summary conviction.
[49] In the course of its argument, U.S. Steel compared and
contrasted the ICA with other legislation in an attempt to demonstrate that
this legislation is unlike other regulatory legislation or legislation focused
on private, internal or disciplinary matters that are not penal in nature. In
my view, given the unique character of this legislation this approach is not
particularly helpful. As Chief Justice McLachlin stated in R.
v. Shubley, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3 at page 18, “the logic of R
v. Wigglesworth is to proceed not by a category approach, but by
application of the general principles” articulated in that case.
[50] Based on the above considerations, I conclude that a section 40
proceeding is not “by nature” a penal proceeding.
[51] Even
though, in my opinion, this is not the type of matter that was intended to come
within section 11 of the Charter, section 11 may still be engaged if it
involves the imposition of a true penal consequence. In Wigglesworth,
at paragraph 24, Justice Wilson described a true penal consequence in the
following terms:
This is not to say that if a person is charged
with a private, domestic or disciplinary matter which is primarily intended to
maintain discipline, integrity or to regulate conduct within a limited private
sphere of activity, he or she can never possess the rights guaranteed under s.
11. Some of these matters may well fall within s. 11, not because they are the
classic kind of matters intended to fall within the section, but because they
involve the imposition of true penal consequences. In my opinion, a true penal
consequence which would attract the application of s. 11 is imprisonment or a
fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed for the purpose of
redressing the wrong done to society at large rather than to the maintenance of
internal discipline within the limited sphere of activity.
[52] As
stated above, U.S. Steel contends that the magnitude of the monetary penalty
alone is sufficient to engage section 11(d) of the Charter. U.S. Steel
characterizes the potential monetary penalty under section 40 as being a “King
Kong fine” and submits that the magnitude is of such significance that it can
only be regarded as a true penal consequence. This assertion raises a number
of questions. The first is whether U.S. Steel’s interpretation of the second
branch of the test is correct. As set out earlier, U.S. Steel’s interpretation
is that it is the fine by its magnitude that leads to the conclusion it is
being imposed for the purpose of redressing the harm done to society.
[53] U.S.
Steel claims that its interpretation is supported by Justice Wilson’s
observation “… that if a body or an official has an unlimited power to fine,
and if it does not afford the rights enumerated under s. 11, it cannot impose fines
designed to redress the harm done to society at large”. I note, however, that
Justice Wilson added “[i]nstead, it is restricted to the power to impose fines
in order to achieve the particular private purpose.” I interpret Justice
Wilson’s observation to mean that a body can have an unlimited power to fine,
however, to determine whether the penalty is a true penal consequence the
analysis has to proceed beyond the magnitude of the fine to determine whether
it is being imposed for the purpose of redressing the harm done to society or
for a particular private purpose.
[54] I
note, as well, that U. S. Steel’s interpretation of the test does not find
support in the jurisprudence. In Martineau, the appellant argued that
the magnitude of the amount claimed under the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985
c.1 (2nd Supp.) made it a true penal consequence. In rejecting the
argument, Justice Fish observed that the argument was falsely premised on
magnitude alone and continued his analysis to determine whether the payment claimed
under the Customs Act constituted a fine that by its magnitude was being
imposed for the purpose of redressing a wrong done to society.
[55] More
recently, in Lavallee, a case concerning the Alberta
securities legislation, Chief Justice Wittmann, at paragraph 142, stated:
My reading of Wigglesworth is that, on
one hand, the fact that the Securities Act is regulatory legislation is
obviously not sufficient to determine whether the consequences of the
application of s. 29 leads to true penal consequences. On the other
hand, the dollar amount of the administrative penalty or its magnitude is not
determinant, in itself, to qualify as a true penal consequence. In
fact, it is the magnitude of the administrative penalty combined with the
purpose for which it can be imposed that will determine whether it entails true
penal consequences. [Emphasis added]
[56] Subsequent
to the hearing of this motion, the Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal
from this decision: Lavallee v. Alberta
(Securities Commission), [2010] A.J. No. 144. On the question
as to whether the magnitude of a penalty alone was sufficient to engage the
protections of section 11, of the Charter, the Court observed at
paragraph 23:
… The chambers judge rejected that argument, emphasizing the
need to consider the purpose of the sanction, and not just its magnitude, in
assessing whether it amounts to a true penal consequence. Moreover, when
considering the purpose of the sanction it is necessary to consider the
overarching purposes of the Securities Act, which include the
protection of investors and the public, the efficiency of the capital markets,
and ensuring public confidence in the system. In the end, the chambers judge
agreed with this Court’s conclusion, at para. 54 of Brost, that the
increase in the magnitude of administrative penalties reflects a legislative
intent to ensure that the penalties are not simply considered another cost of
doing business. He therefore concluded that no true penal consequences arise
under ss. 198 and 199 of the Securities Act and that s. 11 of the
Charter is, accordingly, not engaged here. I agree.
[57] Having
regard to Justice Wilson’s observation and the jurisprudence it is clear that
the magnitude of a monetary penalty alone is not a sufficient basis upon which
to conclude that the penalty is a true penal consequence. However, this does
not fully respond to U.S. Steel’s argument. U.S. Steel contends that there is
a point at which the penalty is so large that the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that it is a true penal consequence. U. S. Steel submits that the
characterization of a penalty as an administrative monetary penalty cannot
immunize it from Charter scrutiny and notes the following recent
statement of the Federal Court of Appeal in Doyon v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2009 FCA 152, at paragraph 27:
In short, the Administrative Monetary Penalty System has
imported the most punitive elements of penal law while taking care to exclude
useful defences and reduce the prosecutor’s burden of proof. Absolute
liability, arising from an actus reus which the prosecutor does not have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, leaves the person who commits a violation very
few means of exculpating him- or herself.
[58] The
difficulty with this argument is that the enormity of a monetary penalty cannot
be assessed in isolation. On the one hand, in the context of the financial
threshold of the investments subject to review under the ICA, 281
million dollars at the time of the approval in this case, a monetary penalty of
$10,000 per breach for each day the investor is in contravention may be less
significant. On the other hand, in the context of the five million dollar
financial threshold for investors from non-World Trade Organization countries
the potential penalty is enormous. Without context, it cannot be said that a
dollar value alone, can lead to no other inference but that the penalty is
being imposed to punish. To be effective, the legislated monetary penalty has
to be of a sufficient scope to address the financial range of the reviewable
investments. It also has to be of a sufficient magnitude to deter
non-compliance and to not be seen as simply a cost of doing business.
[59] As
part of the response to U.S. Steel’s assertion that the magnitude of the
monetary penalty alone is sufficient to make it a true penal consequence, the
Attorney General notes that the determination of the amount of the penalty is a
matter of judicial discretion to which U.S. Steel counters that the exercise of
judicial discretion cannot save an otherwise unconstitutional provision. This
argument is rejected for two reasons. First, the argument is premised on the
assertion that the magnitude of the maximum monetary penalty available under
the legislation alone is sufficient to render the provision unconstitutional.
Section 40 does not require the imposition of the maximum monetary penalty or
any monetary penalty. The court may make any order or orders the court
considers the circumstances require. Second, as the Attorney General submits,
this argument assumes a prospective breach of the Charter in the
exercise of the discretion under the monetary penalty provision of the Act. As
Justice Lebel reaffirmed in R. v. Shoker, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399, at para.
39, Parliament is entitled to assume that its legislation will be applied in a
manner consistent with the constitution.
[60] As
to U.S. Steel’s reference to the Doyon decision, on my reading of the
decision the reference to the “Administrative Monetary Penalty System” is not
to the use of administrative monetary penalties generally but to the particular
system established by the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary
Penalties Act, S.C. 1995, c. 40 and Regulations. Further, the
decision does not deal with the question as to what constitutes a true penal
consequence.
[61] The
fact that the upper limit of the monetary penalty is $10,000 per breach for
each day the non-Canadian investor is in contravention alone does not render
the provision unconstitutional.
[62] The
next question is whether the imposition of the monetary penalty under the Act
is to redress the harm done to society. U.S.
steel argues that a number of indicators show that it is. As Justice Wilson
stated in Wigglesworth, one indicator of the purpose of a fine is the
manner in which the recipient entity disposes of the fine. In particular, “if
the fines are not to form part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund but are to be
used for the benefit of the [body], it is more likely that the fines are purely
an internal or private matter of discipline”. Under the IAC, the monetary
penalty is a debt to her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada that
ultimately forms part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Although in the
context of legislation concerning professional disciplinary matters the fact
that the monetary penalty is used for some internal benefit is a useful
indicator of the purpose of the sanction, it is not a useful or relevant
indicator given that the legislation at issue does not concern these internal
types of matters. As well, the fact that the monetary penalty ultimately forms
part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund is at best neutral in light of the fact
that there is no internal body to which the penalty could be paid and there is
no other fund to which the penalty could be paid. I note, as well, that
administrative monetary penalties under other legislation, such as, income tax,
competition, and customs legislation all become part of the Consolidated
Revenue Fund.
[63] U.S.
Steel also points out that unlike other administrative penalties the monetary
penalty under the ICA is unconnected to the extent of the breach and it has no
mathematical connection with the regulated activity or the loss. In the same
vein, U.S. Steel notes that the monetary penalty is unlimited, it does not
serve some compensatory purpose, it is unrelated to the monetary implications
flowing from non-compliance and the Act does not provide any criteria for the
determination of the amount of the monetary penalty. U.S. Steel takes the
position that in these circumstances the only reasonable inference that can be
drawn is that the amount of the penalty is being determined on some other
basis, namely, to redress the harm done to society at large.
[64] As
to the monetary penalty being limitless, although, in my view, this
characterization is inaccurate in that there are both temporal and monetary
limits, even if it is correct, as Justice Wilson stated an unlimited power to
fine is permissible provided that it is being imposed to achieve a particular
private purpose. While it may be true that the existence of some connection
between the penalty and the conduct at issue is a useful indicator, it does not
necessarily follow that redressing the harm done to society is the only possible
purpose of the penalty.
[65] Additionally,
the absence of any criteria in the Act on which to determine the amount of the
monetary penalty is of no consequence. Should the circumstance arise, part of
the court’s task will be to identify those factors that are relevant to the
determination of the amount of the monetary penalty.
[66] U.S.
Steel also argues that the potential exposure to a term of imprisonment as a
result of a contempt proceeding makes the penalty a true penal consequence. I
reject this argument. The contempt proceeding is not brought under the ICA.
Rather, it is a separate proceeding brought pursuant to the Federal Courts
Rules, SOR/98-106 where the alleged contemnor will be accorded all of the
section 11(d) Charter protections and, if found guilty, will be subject
to the penalties provided in the Rules.
[67] In
the absence of any of the usual indicia, on what basis can it be determined
whether the monetary penalty by its magnitude is being imposed for the purpose
of redressing the harm done to society. In the context of ICA, the court
should have regard to the objectives of the legislation, the
legislative scheme including the nature of the monitoring process and the
availability of the opportunity to voluntary comply or remedy a default, the
critical role the investor’s undertakings play in the attainment of the
legislative objectives, the nature of the transaction subject to review, the
relationship between the investor and the government, the conduct being
sanctioned is not morally blameworthy conduct and the structuring of the
monetary penalty. Having regard to these factors, I conclude that the monetary
penalty is not a true penal consequence. Instead, the purpose of the monetary
penalty is to promote and ensure the attainment of the legislative objectives.
The Bill of
Rights
[68] Section 2(e) of the Bill
of Rights reads:
2. Every law of Canada
shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of
Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding
the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to
abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement
of any of the rights or freedoms
herein recognized and declared,
and in particular,
no law of Canada shall be
construed or applied so as to
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the
determination of his rights and obligations;
|
2. Toute loi du Canada, à moins qu’une loi du Parlement du Canada ne
déclare expressément qu’elle s’appliquera nonobstant la Déclaration canadienne
des droits, doit s’interpréter et s’appliquer de manière à ne pas
supprimer, restreindre ou enfreindre l’un quelconque des
droits ou des
libertés reconnus et déclarés aux présentes, ni à en autoriser la
suppression, la diminution ou la transgression, et en particulier, nulle loi
du Canada ne doit s’interpréter ni
s’appliquer comme
e) privant une personne du droit à une audition impartiale de sa
cause, selon les principes
de justice fondamentale, pour la
définition de ses droits et obligations;
|
[69] It
is not disputed that the Bill of Rights applies to the ICA. As well, it
is not disputed that the Bill of Rights section 2(e) protections extend
to corporations. The question is whether section 40 violates the right to a
fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. U.S.
Steel takes the position that it does.
[70] U.S.
Steel submits that the meaning of the phrase “the principles of fundamental
justice” is context-specific having regard to the nature of the rights and the
extent of the jeopardy at issue. In summary, U.S. Steel asserts that the
factual and legal context in the present case is one in which it is exposed to
extreme sanctions, including a multimillion dollar penalty, and the most
serious interference with the enjoyment of property, forced divestiture,
through a summary civil application process without the most basic procedural
protections of fundamental justice. In particular, it does not give the
non-Canadian investor a right of full disclosure, a right to know the case to
meet, or a right to hear the applicant’s case before being called upon to
answer. Additionally, the Act does not state the applicable burden of proof,
the requisite elements of a failure to comply and justification are not
defined, and the available defenses are not delineated. This results in
vagueness and leaves the judiciary to decide the matter in a vacuum.
[71] U.S.
Steel maintains that “given the severity of the consequences in the
adjudication of the rights at issue in the instant legislation,… the principles
of fundamental justice must provide the investor with the full range of
procedural and substantive protections available pursuant to the Bill of
Rights, including the right to know the case to meet, the right to full
discloser and the right to fair notice of the proscribed conduct and the
available defences.” At this point, it should be noted that U.S. Steel
initially argued that the Bill of Rights guarantees both substantive and
procedural rights, however, U.S. Steel abandoned its position in relation to
substantive rights.
[72] U.S.
Steel acknowledges that the term “the principles of fundamental justice” in
section 7 of the Charter does not have the same meaning as it does in
section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. However, relying on the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Reference re Motor Vehicles Act (British
Columbia) section 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, paras. 31-33, U.S. Steel argues
that the procedural protections provided by section 2(e) are much broader than
those provided under the common law principles of natural justice and that the
term “the principles of fundament justice” under section 2(e) is not synonymous
with the term “the principles of natural justice”. Therefore, Charter
jurisprudence is relevant and informs the meaning of “the principles of
fundamental justice” in the Bill of Rights.
[73] U.S.
Steel submits that the right to make full answer and defence is the bedrock of
the principles of fundamental justice. In R. v. Rose, [1998] 3. S.C.R.
262, at paras. 98 and 103, the Supreme Court of Canada stressed the importance
of this right and explained the breadth of the right and the manner in which
this right is implicated in other rights and principles. The Court stated:
98 The right to make full
answer and defence is protected under s. 7 of the Charter. It is one of the
principles of fundamental justice. In R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
326, at p. 336, Sopinka J., writing for the Court, described this right as
"one of the pillars of criminal justice on which we heavily depend to
ensure that the innocent are not convicted". The right to make full answer
and defence manifests itself in several more specific rights and principles,
such as the right to full and timely disclosure, the right to know the case to
be met before opening one's defence, the principles governing the re-opening of
the Crown's case, as well as various rights of cross-examination, among others.
The right is integrally linked to other principles of fundamental justice, such
as the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the principle
against self-incrimination.
…
103 A second and broader
aspect of the right to make full answer and defence, which might be understood
as encompassing the first aspect, is the right of an accused person to defend
himself or herself against all of the state's efforts to achieve a conviction.
The Crown is not entitled to engage in activities aimed at convicting an
accused unless that accused is permitted to defend against those state acts. …
[74] As
well, U.S. Steel submits that in R. v. Duke, [1972] 1 O.R. 61-77 at
para. 10 (OHCJ), rev’d, Justice Galligan held that the right to make full answer
and defence is an integral component of a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights.
He stated:
… One of the essential elements
of a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice is
the right to make full answer and defence. In the event that it is sought to
apply any provision of an Act of the Parliament of Canada in such a fashion
that this right is denied and an accused then, in my opinion, there is a clear contravention
of the provisions of s. 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. …
APPEAL by the Crown from an order
of Galligan, J., infra, 15 C.R.N.S. 51, prohibiting a Provincial Court Judge
from proceeding on an information
[1972] S.C.R. 917; [1972] R.C.S.
917;
[75] It
is well established that the meaning of the term “the principles of fundamental
justice” as it is used in section 2(e) will vary according to the context. In Canada
(Attorney General) v. Central Cartage Co., [1990] F.C.J. No. 407, at para.
13 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal recognized that the concept of a fair
hearing under section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights is not static. The
Court of Appeal instructed that a court interpreting the concept should not
lose sight of “its origin and evolution and the specific context in which it is
raised.” That is, “the guarantee of a fair hearing in paragraph 2(e) should be
given a meaning that recognizes not only the interpretation and evolution of
the term over time but also the particular circumstances involved.”
[76] U.S.
Steel’s submission that the term “principles of fundament justice” under
section 2(e) is broader than and not synonymous with the term “principles of
natural justice” has been the subject of comment in a number of cases. In the
pre-Charter Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duke v. The Queen,
[1972] S.C.R. 917 at 923, Chief Justice Fauteux stated:
… Under s. 2(e) of the Bill of
Rights no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to deprive him
of "a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundament
justice." Without attempting to formulate any final definition of those
words, I would take them to mean, generally, that the tribunal which
adjudicates upon his rights just act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in
a judicial temper, and must give to him the opportunity adequately to state his
case.
[77] More
recently, in Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Association,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, at paragraph 28, the Supreme Court of Canada noted
with approval that “Canadian courts have held that the content of s. 2(e) is
established by reference to common law principles of natural justice”. The
Court also noted that as the parties in that case had not suggested that the
guarantees of independence and impartiality under section 2(e) would differ
from the common law requirements of procedural fairness, a further
consideration of this issue was unnecessary. In the present case, U.S. Steel
acknowledges that the issues of independence and impartiality do no arise in the
present case.
[78] As
to U.S. Steel’s reliance on the B.C. Motor Vehicles case, on my reading
of the passage referenced, when Chief Justice Lamer stated that “to replace
"fundamental justice" with the term "natural justice"
misses the mark entirely” he was referring to the meaning of “fundamental
justice” as it is used in the Charter and not the Bill of Rights.
Similarly, in the reference to “the degree of
synonymy between the two expressions in the past”, the Chief Justice was
referring to the synonymy of the term “fundamental justice” and the term
“natural justice”
[79] Accordingly,
it can be seen that a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice in the context of section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights
is synonymous with the concept of natural justice and procedural fairness. It
remains to be determined what the requirements of natural justice are in these
circumstances.
[80] As
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé stated in Baker v. Canada (Mnister of
Citizenship and Immigraion), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paragraph 22, “the
duty of fairness is flexible and variable, and depends on an appreciation of
the context of the particular statute and the rights affected, …”. Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé explained that a number of factors are relevant to the
determination of the requirements of the duty of fairness are in a particular
context.
[81] However,
as the Attorney General points out, the Baker analysis is somewhat
anomalous in the present case as it is directed at the requirements of fairness
in the context of administrative hearings and not judicial hearings. I agree
with this observation. The Baker analysis is generally retrospective in
application and aimed at helping a court “determine whether the procedures that
were followed respected the duty of fairness.” While the structure of the
analysis may not be helpful, this does not undermine the importance and the
relevance of the principles that may be drawn from Baker.
[82] As
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé stated at paragraph 28, “[t]he values underlying the
duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual or
individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully
and fairly, and have decisions affecting their rights, interests, or privileges
made using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the statutory,
institutional, and social context of the decision.” That is, the underlying
values and all of the circumstances must be considered to determine the content
of the duty of fairness in a given situation.
[83] It
is evident from U.S. Steel’s oral and written submissions that while it
recognizes the context-specific nature of the analysis in principle, their
assertion as to the requirements of the duty of fairness is grounded on the
magnitude of the monetary penalty and the possibility of forced divestiture.
It is from this premise that U.S. Steel maintains that an investor facing a
section 40 proceeding should, in effect, be accorded the same right to make
full answer and defence together with the related rights including Stinchcombe
disclosure that would be accorded to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. In
my opinion, this position stems from a narrow focus on the penalties at issue
and fails to take into account the broader context and circumstances within
which a section 40 proceeding arises. Even if the focus of the inquiry was
limited to the nature of the penalties, it would not give rise to the expansive
rights U.S. Steel submits section 2(e) requires.
[84] There
is no doubt that the importance of the decision to the affected party is a
significant factor. However, a distinction must be drawn between those
decisions that implicate the life, liberty, and security of the person involved
and those, as in the present case, having only an economic impact. As well,
the magnitude of the penalty and the forced divestiture have to be viewed in
the context of the legislative scheme. Although when viewed in isolation the
monetary penalty may appear to be very large, as stated earlier, having regard
to the financial thresholds that trigger ministerial review and approval, the
penalties under the ICA have to be sufficiently significant to be effective
given the size of the investments under the Act. Further, although the
possibility of forced divestiture appears to be ominous and a serious intrusion
on the right to the enjoyment of property, having regard to the objectives of
the legislation and the broad discretion a court has in structuring a
divestiture, it does not rise to the level of those decisions in which the
life, liberty and security of the person are at stake. It is purely an
economic outcome. It is also important to note that a section 40 proceeding
arises in a regulatory context. As well, the parties seeking ministerial
approval are sophisticated, well represented, economic actors who are given an
opportunity of voluntary compliance before the application at issue is
undertaken.
[85] For
this reason, U.S. Steel’s reliance on R v. Rose, above, is misplaced.
That decision established a broad right to “make full answer and defence” in a
criminal context. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada noted, at
paragraphs 98 to 100, that this right was “one of the pillars of criminal
justice,” was linked to the presumption of innocence and the principle against
self-incrimination, and included “the right of an accused person to defend
himself or herself against all of the state’s efforts to achieve a
conviction.” Similarly, most of the cases upon which U.S. Steel relies in
support of its assertion of the procedural rights are from the criminal and are
not helpful in the context of the legislation at issue.
[86] Turning
to the application process contemplated in section 40 of the Act, U.S. Steel
does not seriously contend that it will be denied the opportunity to be heard
through both written and oral submissions or, as stated earlier, to have its
case decided by an independent and impartial decision-maker. Rather, U.S.
Steel argues that it will not be given an adequate opportunity to know the case
it has to meet. In summary, U.S. Steel says that it does not know why the
Minister thinks its undertakings were breached since the undertakings were
subject to the Guidelines with which U.S. Steel maintains it complied.
Furthermore, U.S. Steel also says it does not know the reason for the
Minister’s assertion that it failed to comply with the demand to justify its
breach of the undertakings and believes it has provided adequate
justification.
[87] In
my view, there are adequate procedural protections in the Federal Courts
Rules, SOR/98-106 relating to the conduct of applications to permit U.S.
Steel to know the case it has to meet. First, a notice of application must,
among other things, state the grounds intended to be argued, including any
reliance on statutory or regulatory provisions and must include a list of the
documentary evidence to be used at the hearing.
[88] Second,
the Attorney General must file his affidavits and documentary exhibits well in
advance of the hearing. Prior to submitting any legal argument, U.S. Steel
will have an opportunity to conduct cross-examinations on the Attorney
General’s affidavits. Thus, U.S. Steel will have all of the evidence upon
which the Attorney General intends to rely.
[89] Third,
before the matter comes on for hearing, the Attorney General, as the applicant,
will have had to serve and file the applicant’s record containing all affidavit
and documentary evidence, descriptions of any physical evidence together with
its memorandum of fact and law. Thus, U.S. Steel will know the basis for the
Minister’s belief that there has been a breach of an undertaking and the
Minister’s reason for rejecting its justification. Further, the Attorney
General is, without leave of the court, precluded from raising any new
allegations or arguments.
[90] Fourth,
U.S. Steel points out that it must serve and file its affidavit and documentary
evidence before fully knowing the Attorney General’s case, that is, before
cross-examining the Attorney General’s affiants and before receiving the
Attorney General’s memorandum of fact and law. However, U.S. Steel may apply
for leave to file additional affidavits, conduct additional cross-examinations
or file a supplementary record after the parties have exchanged records.
[91] Based
on the above review of the applications procedure, I am satisfied that having
regard to the context and the potential consequences to U.S. Steel, it
satisfies the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice, in particular, its right to know the case to meet.
[92] As
noted earlier, U.S. Steel abandoned its position that section 2(e) also
provides substantive rights. In its argument on the substantive rights, U.S.
Steel claimed that section 40 is void for vagueness under section 2(e) of the Bill
of Rights. However, in reply, U.S. Steel attempted to bring the vagueness
argument within the procedural right to know the case to meet. It argued that
the Minister is not given sufficient legislative guidance regarding the
circumstances that should require the issuance of a ministerial demand and the
“parameters governing the enforcement” of the Act. In R. v. Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, the Supreme Court of Canada
made it clear that the principle of vagueness is intended to ensure a citizen
understands that “certain conduct is the subject of legal restrictions” and is,
therefore, a substantive right. Accordingly, the vagueness argument will not be
considered.
Conclusion
[93] For
the above reasons, I conclude that section 40 of the ICA does
not violate section 11(d) of the Charter or section 2(e) of the Bill
of Rights. The motion will be dismissed with costs to the Attorney General.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is dismissed with
costs to the Attorney General of Canada.
“Dolores M. Hansen”