Date: 20100409
Docket: IMM-2614-09
Citation: 2010 FC 365
Ottawa, Ontario, April 9, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Reilly
BETWEEN:
TI-BEB
FE-TARI HARRIS
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I.
Overview
[1]
Mr.
Ti-Beb Fe-Tari Harris came to Canada in 1990 when he was 7 years old. After
having been convicted of a series of criminal offences, a deportation order was
issued against him in 2006. Mr. Harris appealed the order on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds, but the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) dismissed his
appeal in 2009.
[2]
Mr.
Harris argues that the IAD made three serious errors. He urges me to overturn
the decision and order a different panel to reconsider it. However, I cannot
find any basis for overturning the IAD’s decision and must, therefore, dismiss
this application for judicial review.
[3]
The
issue is whether the IAD made factual errors that rendered its decision
unreasonable.
II. Analysis
(a) The IAD’s
decision
[4]
Mr.
Harris did not dispute the legal foundation of the deportation order against
him. However, he asked the IAD to overturn it on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds. The IAD considered a broad range of factors as required by Ribic
v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.D.D. No. 4 (QL).
[5]
The
IAD noted that Mr. Harris had been convicted of a number of offences under the Criminal
Code, as well as an offence under the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-8. The
criminal charges involved drug trafficking and firearms. The traffic violation
involved driving while suspended.
[6]
In
its reasons, the IAD stated that:
• to
his credit, Mr. Harris had not been convicted of a criminal offence since
February 2008;
• Mr.
Harris had been granted refugee status in Canada;
• it
could not decide whether Mr. Harris was likely to commit other offences.
[7]
Mr.
Harris contends that the first two statements are erroneous and that the third
represents a failure on the IAD’s part to discharge its mandate. He submits that
these errors justify overturning the IAD’s decision.
(b) The IAD’s alleged
errors
(i) Criminal
history
[8]
While
the IAD noted that Mr. Harris had not been convicted of a crime since February
2008, in fact, he had not been charged with a criminal offence since 2005. This
error was included in the portion of the IAD’s decision dealing with Mr.
Harris’s likelihood of committing other crimes.
[9]
Mr.
Harris acknowledges that the IAD correctly outlined his criminal history in
other parts of its decision. However, he claims that the misstatement is
serious nonetheless because it may have affected the IAD’s treatment of what is
arguably the most important consideration in an analysis of humanitarian and
compassionate factors in this context – the likelihood of re-offending.
[10]
In
my view, reading the decision as a whole, the IAD was clearly aware of the
particulars of Mr. Harris’s criminal record. It set out the details in its
reasons. The single erroneous reference to February 2008 was obviously an inconsequential
error that could not have affected the IAD’s analysis.
(ii) Refugee
status
[11]
Early
in its decision, in describing Mr. Harris’s background, the IAD made a
parenthetical remark that he had achieved refugee status in Canada in 1993.
Clearly this was wrong. It would have prevented him from being deported to Jamaica. The IAD was
obviously aware that Mr. Harris could be returned to Jamaica because it
discussed in detail whether his return would cause him hardship. Its error
appears not to have any impact on the IAD’s analysis.
(c) Failure to
determine likelihood of re-offending
[12]
The
IAD did not actually decline to decide whether Mr. Harris was likely to
re-offend, as he alleges. In fact, the IAD said that, based on his criminal
record, Mr. Harris probably would commit further crimes. However, it went on to
discuss Mr. Harris’s family connections and, given the uncertainty about the
significance of those to him, it could not say whether he would be likely to
re-offend.
[13]
Admittedly,
the IAD’s decision is somewhat difficult to follow but it is clear that it did
not fail to consider Mr. Harris’s likelihood of re-offending. It appears to
have concluded that there were factors suggesting he would likely commit more
crimes, as well as another factor whose influence was uncertain. It did not
fail to address the question.
III. Conclusion
and Disposition
[14]
Clearly,
the IAD made some errors in its reasons. Further, its reasons could have been
clearer. However, the errors were minor and did not affect the IAD’s analysis
or conclusions. I cannot conclude, therefore, that the IAD’s decision as a
whole was unreasonable or that its reasons were inadequate. I must, therefore,
dismiss this application for judicial review. Neither party proposed a question
of general importance for me to certify, and none is stated.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application for judicial review is dismissed;
2.
No
question of general importance is stated.
“James
W. O’Reilly”
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