Tran v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 744

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2004 FC 744

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Date: 20040521

Docket: IMM-1246-03

Citation: 2004 FC 744

BETWEEN:

THANH HOANG TRAN,

Applicant,

- and -

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,

Respondent.

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.

[1] This application for judicial review concerns the section 196 transitional provision contained in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). My review of the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal in Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FCA 85 leads me to conclude that the application must be dismissed.

FACTS

[2] Mr. Tran was born in Vietnam in 1969 and entered Canada on May 12, 1986 after claiming refugee status before the United Nations. He considers himself stateless and apparently has no documentation with respect to his birth or citizenship in Vietnam. Although he was granted permanent resident status in Canada, he did not obtain Canadian citizenship.

[3] On September 1, 2000, Mr. Tran was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and was sentenced to 25 months imprisonment in addition to the time served in pre-sentence custody (approximately one year). The conviction triggered a deportation order under paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (IA). A deportation order was issued March 12, 2001, and Mr. Tran appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD).

[4] At the appeal hearing on December 11, 2001, Mr. Tran relied on paragraph 70(1)(b) of the IA and said that he should not be deported "having regard to all the circumstances of the case". Mr. Tran's counsel requested that the hearing be adjourned for the purpose of obtaining a report regarding Mr. Tran's progress in a drug treatment program. Counsel did not have her diary with her at the hearing when the continuation date was set for February 28, 2002. Upon checking her schedule, counsel learned that she was not available on February 28^th and on December 13, 2001, she so informed the IAD. At the same time, counsel advised regarding her availability for March and April, 2002.

[5] Meanwhile, Mr. Tran had been apprehended for violation of the conditions of his parole and when the IAD scheduling unit contacted his counsel on January 29, 2002, counsel did not know where Mr. Tran was incarcerated. The record discloses that this information was provided to the IAD on June 7, 2002. Mr. Tran was scheduled for release on July 5, 2002. On June 18^th, the scheduling unit scheduled the continuation of the appeal for September 30, 2002.

[6] On September 30^th, the presiding member (the Member) requested submissions regarding sections 64, 192 and 196 of IRPA, which had come into effect on June 28, 2002. Based on his instructions, counsel for the respondent did not request a discontinuance, but specifically noted that the failure to do so could not impact on the issue of jurisdiction. Mr. Tran's counsel made written submissions on November 1, 2002.

THE DECISION

[7] The Member, on January 31, 2002, discontinued the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He stated as follows:

Removal order appeals pending before the Immigration Appeal Division prior to the coming into force of the IRPA will be continued under the former Immigration Act in accordance with section 192 of the IRPA. However, when an appeal is pending before the IAD prior to the coming into force of the IRPA, section 196 provides that the appeal shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of the IRPA. The appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act. Section 64 of the IRPA indicates that a permanent resident has no appeal to the IAD, if the permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible for serious criminality. Section 64(2) indicates that serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years. The appellant was convicted of a crime, trafficking in cocaine, for which he received a sentence of 25 months imprisonment. I find that the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made after June 28, 2002, because of the serious criminality provision of the IRPA.

[8] Mr. Tran applied for judicial review of the Member's decision on February 25, 2003. The decision in Medovarski, supra, was released on March 3, 2004.

ISSUES

[9] Mr. Tran presents two questions for determination:

(a) Did the Member misinterpret the relevant provision in IRPA?

(b) Was the IAD's inability to schedule the appeal's continuation before IRPA took effect a breach of natural justice?

THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

[10] The relevant statutory provisions from both the Immigration Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are attached to these reasons as Schedule "A". For ease of reference, sections 64, 190, 192 and 196 are reproduced here.

*Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, S.C. 2001, c. 27 64. (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.		*Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés*, L.C. 2001, ch. 27 64. (1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years.		(2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans.

(3) No appeal may be made under subsection 63(1) in respect of a decision that was based on a finding of inadmissibility on the ground of misrepresentation, unless the foreign national in question is the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or child.		(3) N'est pas susceptible d'appel au titre du paragraphe 63(1) le refus fondé sur l'interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations, sauf si l'étranger en cause est l'époux ou le conjoint de fait du répondant ou son enfant.

190. Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force.		190. La présente loi s'applique, dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et procédures présentées ou instruites, ainsi qu'aux autres questions soulevées, dans le cadre de l'ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise.

192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.		192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.

196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.		196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

[11] It is not necessary, on the facts of this matter, to engage in a pragmatic and functional analysis because I conclude that the decision of the Member is correct. Insofar as a breach of natural justice is concerned, the standard of review is irrelevant.

ANALYSIS

[12] Mr. Tran argues that "serious criminality" in section 64 of IRPA requires a finding by the IAD; it is not defined by subsection 64(2). Section 64, it is said, replaces subsection 70(5) of the IA that involved findings that individuals were a danger to the public and therefore were prohibited from appealing to the IAD. There was no such finding with respect to Mr. Tran and the respondent did not file a discontinuance regarding this appeal. Mr. Tran argues that there must be an "official finding of serious criminality before section 196 of IRPA can operate to bar an appeal, and the burden of proof falls on the Minister, as with all removal situations". Nothing in IRPA removes that burden of proof and the Minister must seek to have the right of appeal taken away. The Minister made no such submission.

[13] Mr. Tran contends that subsection 64(2) mentions imprisonment of "at least" two years to ensure that no finding of serious criminality is made against people who received sentences of less than two years, but it does not give a definition for serious criminality. If the provision applies universally, i.e., all sentences of two years or more would lead to an automatic application of the term "serious criminality", Parliament would have used the words "all" or "every". Any other interpretation is absurd and a contravention of the rules of statutory interpretation. Therefore, the Member erred in finding that he had no jurisdiction to continue the appeal. The distinction between this case and the Medovarski case, Mr. Tran argues, is that Ms. Medovarski conceded that she came within subsection 64(2). Mr. Tran makes no such concession.

[14] Because I consider the reasoning in Medovarski, supra, to be dispositive, it is useful to set out the findings contained therein, although not necessarily in the order in which they are found in the reasons of the majority judgment. The following propositions are relevant to the disposition of this matter.

- IRPA deals expressly and in detail with the transition between it and the former Act, including the continuation and discontinuance of appeals to the IAD;

- Sections 192, 196 and 197 of IRPA comprise part of the package of transitional provisions in Part 5 of the Act and should be considered together;

- In reviewing the transitional scheme, particularly the provisions applying to appeals to the IAD, the general rule is that IRPA applies to "every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section: IRPA, section 190 (emphasis added). Section 192 creates an exception to section 190 by enacting the opposite general rule for appeals to the IAD. It provides that "if a notice of appeal has been filed ... immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act". Section 196 carves a specific exception out of section 192 by providing that appeals to the IAD filed before the coming into force of the section shall be discontinued if "the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act [it is common ground that Mr. Tran was not granted a stay] and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act".

- Subsections 64 (1) and (2) abolish the right of appeal by permanent residents against removal orders on the basis of, among other things, serious criminality;

- The general rule of IRPA is that persons who have committed a serious offence should not have a right of appeal to the IAD;

- IRPA permits appeals to the IAD to continue under the former Act only if the IAD has made a decision in favour of the appellant. This explanation fits with the IRPA's objective of protecting the public interest by providing the legal means for securing the expeditious removal from Canada of those who, among other things, have committed serious criminal offences;

- There is no room for the application of a presumption in favour of preserving existing rights of appeal to the IAD. It is sufficiently clear that Parliament did not intend to preserve the right of appeal of permanent residents against their removal from Canada who had simply filed their appeal prior to the coming into effect of IRPA, but whose cases had not been disposed of by the IAD;

- The argument that the Minister did not issue a danger opinion under the former Act cannot be accorded much weight because the Minister's reasons are not known;

- In enacting IRPA, Parliament re-balanced the interests of public safety and individual rights by broadening the categories of persons who may be removed without an appeal to the IAD;

- Section 196 is not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. In relation to an argument that an appellant was misled into thinking the right of appeal exists, no one has a legitimate expectation that the law will not be changed from time to time or that the procedural rights granted by Parliament may not be removed;

- Persons finding themselves in this position have some opportunities to bring to the attention of immigration officials reasons why they should not be removed, despite their criminal convictions. In particular, appellants will not be removed without an assessment of the risks to life, limb or liberty to which they may be exposed if returned to their country of citizenship: IRPA, subsection 112(1). In addition, they may make an application to remain in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds under IRPA, subsection 25(1) although they may be removed before this process is complete. The duty of fairness does not require that considerations of this kind be the subject of an appeal to an independent tribunal.

[15] When the above-noted propositions are applied to the facts of Mr. Tran's situation, in my view, the result is self evident. I agree with the respondent that subsection 36(1) of IRPA describes "serious criminality" in relation to inadmissibility and that the term can apply to a sentence as low as one in excess of six months. Section 64 of IRPA is analogous to paragraph 27(1)(d) of the IA rather than to subsection 70(5). Regulation 320(5)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227 mandates that anyone found inadmissible under paragraph 27(1)(d) is still inadmissible under IRPA if a sentence of at least six months has been imposed. Thus, paragraph 36(1)(a) defines serious criminality for purposes of admissibility and section 196 defines it, by reference to section 64, for purposes of appeals to the IAD. Sections 64 and 196 of IRPA eliminate appeals for serious criminals in relation to a crime committed in Canada where a sentence of at least two years of imprisonment was imposed.

[16] I have considered that, in Mr. Tran's situation, the appeal was substantially complete when IRPA came into effect. All that remained was for the Member to receive the report of the drug treatment centre and counsel's submissions. However, it is clear to me that Parliament's intent was to include, by virtue of sections 64 and 196, all matters pending before the IAD that had not been disposed of before June 28, 2002. I find support for that conclusion by referring to sections 191 and 193 of IRPA. They provide that matters before the Refugee Protection Division (section 191) and the Immigration Division - formerly the Adjudication Division - (section 193) in which "substantive evidence has been adduced, but no decision has been made" will continue under IRPA. Section 192 is broader than sections 191 and 193 in that it permits the continuation of all IAD appeals under the former Act except, by virtue of section 196, those where an appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of IRPA. Appeal hearings before the IAD in progress, but not disposed of, could have been addressed (as in sections 191 and 193) had that been the intent of Parliament.

[17] With respect to Mr. Tran's argument regarding delay and natural justice, he submits that a nine and one-half month delay between notification of the need to reschedule and the hearing continuance date is unreasonable. Mr. Tran maintains that his appeal was adversely affected and there was no reason an earlier hearing date could not have been selected. Thus, he contends that there is a denial of natural justice in that he was not provided the opportunity to present his full case. He notes that the IAD practice notice states that the IAD has a duty to ensure appeals are dealt with expeditiously.

[18] There is no allegation of bad faith, malice, or arbitrary conduct on the part of the IAD. But for the loss of the right to appeal, timing would not be an issue. It is significant that the request for a delay was made by Mr. Tran for the purpose of obtaining the report regarding his drug treatment progress. The February 28^th hearing date was not an available hearing time; the Member was forfeiting an assigned writing day to accommodate Mr. Tran. It was Mr. Tran's counsel who was not able to attend on the assigned date. When contacted by the scheduling unit on January 29^th, counsel did not know where Mr. Tran was located. There is no evidence before me to indicate that a date prior to June 28^th was available. Moreover, Mr. Tran was in custody and was not eligible for release until after IRPA came into effect. In considering all of the circumstances, the delay was not inordinate.

[19] I reiterate the comments of Mr. Justice Evans in Medovarski, supra, that no one has a legitimate expectation that the law will not be changed from time to time or that the procedural rights granted by Parliament may not be changed. Mr. Tran has not referred to any authority wherein a delay of this length has been considered to be a breach of natural justice. Mr. Tran was not assured of success on the appeal and although it may be that, if success were certain, the result of the implementation of IRPA has produced a most unfortunate result for him, he was not denied natural justice. Even if I were to conclude that he had been denied natural justice, the Member would still be without jurisdiction to deal with the appeal and the victory would be a hollow one.

[20] Counsel for Mr. Tran proposed the following question for certification:

Does interpretation of serious criminality in IRPA subsection 64(2), for purposes of subsection 64(1), apply to all crimes committed in Canada punishable by two years or more?

[21] The provisions of IRPA that are discussed in these reasons clearly define serious criminality for purposes of appeals to the IAD. Additionally, the Member's reasons in this matter provide a finding of serious criminality with respect to Mr. Tran. It is section 196, the transitional provision, that applies section 64 to Mr. Tran. The transitional provisions of IRPA have limited application and it cannot be said that, at this stage, those provisions raise serious issues of general importance. I decline to certify the question.

O R D E R

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified.

_________________________________

Judge

Ottawa, Ontario

May 21, 2004

FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

DOCKET: IMM-1246-03

STYLE OF CAUSE: THANH HOANG TRAN

Applicant

- and -

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION

Respondent

PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING: MAY 13, 2004

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

BY: LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.

DATED: MAY 21, 2004

APPEARANCES BY: Mr. Dorothy E. Fox

For the Applicant

Ms. Marianne Zoric

For the Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Mr. Dorothy E. Fox

Barrister & Solicitor

Toronto, Ontario

For the Applicant

Morris Rosenberg

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

For the Respondent

SCHEDULE "A"

to the

Reasons for order and order dated May 21, 2004

THANH HOANG TRAN

- and -

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

IMM-1246-03

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Immigration Act,

R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2

27. (1) An immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the

Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the

immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who

(a) is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c.2), (d), (e), (f),

(g), (k) or ( l);

(a.1) outside Canada,

(i) has been convicted of an offence that, if committed in Canada, constitutes an

offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of

imprisonment of ten years or more, or

(ii) has committed, in the opinion of the immigration officer or peace officer, based

on a balance of probabilities, an act or omission that would constitute an offence

under the laws of the place where the act or omission occurred and that, if

committed in Canada, would constitute an offence that may be punishable under

any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more,

except a person who has satisfied the Minister that the person has been rehabilitated

and that at least five years have elapsed since the expiration of any sentence imposedfor the offence or since the commission of the act or omission, as the case may be;

(a.2) before being granted landing, was convicted in Canada of

(i) an indictable offence, or

(ii) an offence for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which

the offender is punishable on summary conviction,

that may be punishable by way of indictment under any Act of Parliament by a

maximum term of imprisonment of less than ten years;

(a.3) before being granted landing,

(i) was convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would

constitute an offence referred to in paragraph (a.2), or

(ii) committed outside Canada, in the opinion of the immigration officer or peace

officer, based on a balance of probabilities, an act or omissio n that constitutes an

offence under the laws of the place where the act or omission occurred and that, if

committed in Canada, would constitute an offence referred to in paragraph (a.2),

except a person who has satisfied the Minister that the person has been rehabilitated

and that at least five years have elapsed since the expiration of any sentence imposed

for the offence or since the commission of the act or omission, as the case may be;

(b) if that person was granted landing subject to terms and conditions, has knowingly

contravened any of those terms or conditions;

(d) has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament, other than an

offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act, for which a term

of imprisonment of more than six months has been, or five years or more may be,

imposed;

(e) was granted landing by reason of possession of a false or improperly obtained

passport, visa or other document pertaining to his admission or by reason of any

fraudulent or improper means or misrepresentation of any material fact, whether exercised or made by himself or by any other person;

(f) wilfully fails to support himself or any dependent member of his family in Canada;

(g) is a member of the inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(j) who was

granted landing subsequent to the coming into force of that paragraph; or

(h) became a member of the inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(j)

subsequent to the coming into force of that paragraph.

Loi sur l'immigration,

S.R.C., 1985, ch. I-2

27. (1) L'agent d'immigration ou l'agent de la paix doit faire part au sous- ministre,

dans un rapport écrit et circonstancié, de renseignements concernant un résident

permanent et indiquant que celui-ci, selon le cas :

a) appartient à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c.2), d), e),

f), g), k) ou l);

a.1) est une personne qui a, à l'étranger :

(i) soit été déclarée coupable d'une infraction qui, si elle était commise au Canada,

constituerait une infraction qui pourrait être punissable, aux termes d'une loi

fédérale, par mise en accusation, d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à

dix ans, sauf si la personne peut justifier auprès du ministre de sa réadaptation et du

fait qu'au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis l'expiration de toute peine lui ayant

été infligée pour l'infraction,

(ii) soit commis, de l'avis, fondé sur la prépondérance des probabilités, de l'agent

d'immigration ou de l'agent de la paix, un fait - acte ou omission - qui constitue

une infraction dans le pays où il a été commis et qui, s'il était commis au Canada,

constituerait une infraction qui pourrait être punissable, aux termes d'une loi

fédérale, par mise en accusation, d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à

dix ans, sauf si la personne peut justifier auprès du ministre de sa réadaptation et du

fait qu'au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis la commission du fait;

a.2) avant que le droit d'établissement ne lui ait été accordé, a été déclaré coupable au

Canada d'une infraction punissable par mise en accusation d'un emprisonnement

maximal de moins de dix ans et qui est :

(i) soit un acte criminel,

(ii) soit une infraction dont l'auteur peut être poursuivi par mise en accusation ou

par procédure sommaire;

a.3) avant que le droit d'établissement ne lui ait été accordé, a, à l'étranger :

(i) soit été déclaré coupable d'une infraction qui, si elle était commise au Canada,

constituerait une infraction visée à l'alinéa a.2), sauf s'il peut justifier auprès du

ministre de sa réadaptation et du fait qu'au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis

l'expiration de la peine lui ayant été infligée pour l'infraction,

(ii) soit commis, de l'avis, fondé sur la prépondérance des probabilités, de l'agent

d'immigration ou de l'agent de la paix, un fait - acte ou omission - qui constitue

une infraction dans le pays où il a été commis et qui, s'il était commis au Canada,

constituerait une infraction visée à l'alinéa a.2), sauf s'il peut justifier auprès du

ministre de sa réadaptation et du fait q u'au moins cinq ans se sont écoulés depuis la

commission du fait;

b) a sciemment contrevenu aux conditions dont était assorti son droit d'établissement;

c) [Abrogé, 1992, ch. 49, art. 16]

d) a été déclaré coupable d'une infraction prévue par une loi fédéra le, autre qu'une

infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions :

(i) soit pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement de plus de six mois a été

imposée,

(ii) soit qui peut être punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à

cinq ans;

e) a obtenu le droit d'établissement soit sur la foi d'un passeport, visa - ou autre

document relatif à son admission - faux ou obtenu irrégulièrement, soit par des

moyens frauduleux ou irréguliers ou encore par suite d'une fausse indication sur un

fait important, même si ces moyens ou déclarations sont le fait d'un tiers;

f) manque délibérément à son obligation de subvenir à ses besoins ou à ceux d'une

personne à charge - membre de sa famille - au Canada;

g) appartient à la catégorie non admissible visée à l'alinéa 19(1)j) et a obtenu le droit

d'établissement après l'entrée en vigueur de cet alinéa;

h) est devenu membre de la catégorie non admissible visée à l'alinéa 19(1)j) après

l'entrée en vigueur de cet alinéa.

70. (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely, (a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and (b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the personshould not be removed from Canada. (2) Subject to subsections (3) to (5), an appeal lies to the Appeal Division from a removal order or conditional removal order made against a person who (a) has been determined under this Act or the regulations to be a Convention refugee but is not a permanent resident; or (b) seeks landing or entry and, at the time that a report with respect to the person was made by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a), was in possession of a valid immigrant visa, in the case of a person seeking landing, or a valid visitor's visa, in the case of a person seeking entry. (3) An appeal to the Appeal Division under subsection (2) may be based on either or both of the following grounds: (a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and (b) on the ground that, having regard to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations, the person should not be removed from Canada. (3.1) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person with respect to whom a certificate has been filed under subsection 40.1(1) where it has been determined, pursuant to paragraph 40.1(4)(d), that the certificate is reasonable. (4) A person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made may appeal to the Appeal Division on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact, where the person is (a) a person, other than a person described in subsection (5), with respect to whom a certificate referred to in subsection 40(1) has been issued; or (b) a person, other than a person described in subsection (3.1), who has been determined by an adjudicator to be a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), (f), (g), (j) or (l). (5) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) or (b) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be (a) a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d); (b) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(a.1); or (c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed. (6) Where the Appeal Division directs that the execution of a deportation order or conditional deportation order be stayed, the direction is of no effect and, notwithstanding subsection 74(2), the Appeal Division may not review the case, where the Minister is of the opinion that the person has breached the terms and conditions set by the Appeal Division and that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be (a) a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d); (b) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(a.1); or (c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed.		70. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), les résidents permanents et les titulaires de permis de retour en cours de validité et conformes aux règlements peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel en invoquant les moyens suivants : a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte; b) le fait que, eu égard aux circonstances particulières de l'espèce, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada. (2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) à (5), peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel : a) les non-résidents permanents qui se sont vu reconnaître le statut de réfugié au sens de la Convention aux termes de la présente loi ou de ses règlements; b) les personnes qui, ayant demandé l'admission, étaient titulaires d'un visa de visiteur ou d'immigrant, selon le cas, en cours de validité lorsqu'elles ont fait l'objet du rapport visé à l'alinéa 20(1)a). (3) Les moyens que peuvent invoquer les appelants visés au paragraphe (2) sont les suivants : a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte; b) le fait que, pour des raisons d'ordre humanitaire, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada. (3.1) Ne peut faire appel devant la section d'appel la personne à l'égard de laquelle il a été décidé, en application de l'alinéa 40.1(4)d), que l'attestation visée au paragraphe 40.1(1) est raisonnable. (4) Les moyens d'appel sont limités aux questions de droit, de fait ou mixtes dans le cas d'appels relatifs à une mesure d'expulsion ou d'expulsion conditionnelle interjetés par les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon le cas : a) ont fait l'objet de l'attestation prévue au paragraphe 40(1), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (5); b) appartiennent, selon la décision d'un arbitre, à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)e), f), g), j) ou l), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (3.1). (5) Ne peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon la décision d'un arbitre : a) appartiennent à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada; b) relèvent du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)a.1) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada; c) relèvent, pour toute infraction punissable aux termes d'une loi fédérale d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada. (6) Malgré le paragraphe 74(2), la section d'appel ne peut réexaminer le cas - l'ordonnance de sursis visant la mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel cessant alors d'avoir effet - si, selon le ministre, la personne n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis et constitue un danger pour le public au Canada et que, selon la décision d'un arbitre, elle : a) appartient à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d); b) relève du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)a.1); c) relève, pour toute infraction punissable aux termes d'une loi fédérale d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)d).

*Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, S.C. 2001, c. 27 25. (1) The Minister shall, upon request of a foreign national who is inadmissible or who does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on the Minister's own initiative, examine the circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or obligation of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to them, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected, or by public policy considerations		*Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés*, L.C. 2001, ch. 27 25. (1) Le ministre doit, sur demande d'un étranger interdit de territoire ou qui ne se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut, de sa propre initiative, étudier le cas de cet étranger et peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables, s'il estime que des circonstances d'ordre humanitaire relatives à l'étranger - compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché - ou l'intérêt public le justifient.

36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for (a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;		36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants_: a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d'une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans ou d'une infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est infligé;

64. (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years. (3) No appeal may be made under subsection 63(1) in respect of a decision that was based on a finding of inadmissibility on the ground of misrepresentation, unless the foreign national in question is the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or child.		64. (1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant. (2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans. (3) N'est pas susceptible d'appel au titre du paragraphe 63(1) le refus fondé sur l'interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations, sauf si l'étranger en cause est l'époux ou le conjoint de fait du répondant ou son enfant.

112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).		112. (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n'est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).

190. Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force.		190. La présente loi s'applique, dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et procédures présentées ou instruites, ainsi qu'aux autres questions soulevées, dans le cadre de l'ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise.

191. Every application, proceeding or matter before the Convention Refugee Determination Division under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section, in respect of which substantive evidence has been adduced but no decision has been made, shall be continued under the former Act by the Refugee Protection Division of the Board.		191. Les demandes et procédures présentées ou introduites, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, devant la Section du statut de réfugié sont, dès lors que des éléments de preuve de fond ont été présentés, mais pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise, continuées sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section de la protection des réfugiés de la Commission.

192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.

192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.193. Every application, proceeding or matter before the Adjudication Division under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section, in respect of which substantive evidence has been adduced but no decision has been made, shall be continued under this Act by the Immigration Division of the Board		193. Les demandes et procédures présentées ou introduites, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, devant la Section d'arbitrage sont, dès lors que des éléments de preuve de fond ont été présentés, mais pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise, continuées sous le régime de la présente loi, mais par la Section de l'immigration de la Commission.

196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.		196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.

197. Despite section 192, if an appellant who has been granted a stay under the former Act breaches a condition of the stay, the appellant shall be subject to the provisions of section 64 and subsection 68(4) of this Act.		197. Malgré l'article 192, l'intéressé qui fait l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi et qui n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis, est assujetti à la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi, le paragraphe 68(4) lui étant par ailleurs applicable.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations

320.(5) A person who on the coming into force of this section had been determined to be inadmissible on the basis of paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Act is

(a) inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act on grounds of serious criminality if the person was convicted of an offence and a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed or a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more could have been imposed; or(b) inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act on grounds of criminality if the offence was punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years or more but less than 10 years.

Règlement sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés

320.(5) La personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, avait été jugée être visée à l'alinéa 27(1)d) de l'ancienne loi :

a) est interdite de territoire pour grande criminalité en vertu de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés si elle a été déclarée coupable d'une infraction pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement de plus de six mois a été infligée ou une peine d'emprisonnement de dix ans ou plus aurait pu être infligée;

b) est interdite de territoire pour criminalité en vertu de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés si elle a été déclarée coupable d'une infraction punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à cinq ans mais de moins de dix ans.

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Tran v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 744

Citations2004 FC 744

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2004 FC 744