Date:
20040729
Docket:
IMM-5826-03
Citation:
2004 FC 1043
Ottawa,
Ontario, this 29th day of July, 2004
PRESENT: THE
HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SNIDER
BETWEEN:
ELISA
MARIA PALACIOS MARTINEZ,
FREDERYCK
ALFONSO FRANCO PALACIOS
(a.k.a.
Frederyck Alfon Franco Palacios)
BRENDA
BERENICE FRANCO PALACIOS
Applicants
-
and -
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS
FOR ORDER AND ORDER
SNIDER J.
[1]
Ms. Elisa Maria Palacios Martinez, the principal Applicant, and her two
children, are citizens of Mexico who claim to have a well-founded fear of
persecution at the hands of persons who threatened the principal Applicant’s
husband.
[2] In a decision dated June
26, 2003, a member of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection
Division (the _Board member_) determined that the Applicants were
not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. The Board member
found that state protection is available to the Applicants should they return
to Mexico. In addition, the Board member did not believe the principal
Applicant’s allegation that the Judicial Police and government officials were
her agents of persecution.
[3] During the course of the
hearing, counsel for the Applicants raised two concerns:
1. The Board member’s comments and abrupt departure from the room
during the hearing indicated that the Applicants were not receiving a fair
hearing.
2. During a break in the hearing, the interpreter expressed the
opinion to the Applicants that the Board member was hard of hearing.
[4] After some discussion,
the Board member continued the hearing in spite of these concerns.
[5] The Applicants seek
judicial review of the decision, on the basis that they did not receive a fair
hearing. Neither of the key substantive conclusions by the Board is contested.
Issue
[6] This application raises
one issue:
1. Did the Board member exhibit a reasonable apprehension of
bias, thus violating the principles of natural justice?
Analysis
[7] Put
simply, in the Applicants’ submission,
their case was not heard by an impartial decision-maker.
[8] The test for reasonable
apprehension of bias is _what
would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically–and
having thought the matter through– conclude. Would he think that it is more
likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or
unconsciously, would not decide fairly?_
(Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board (1978),
68 D.L.R. (3d) 716 (S.C.C.)). This test has been imported into the immigration
context (Ahumada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (2001), 199 D.L.R. (4th) 103 (F.C.A.) at 109; Arthur
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 98
D.L.R. (4th) 254 (F.C.A.)
at 260; Mahendran v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 14 Imm. L.R. (2d) 30
(F.C.A.)).
[9] The Applicants submit
that the Board member suddenly and angrily left the hearing room; that he made
a hostile comment on his way out about not _getting
the story straight_; and, that
the parties _better get it
straight_ upon his return. With
respect, these allegations are not borne out upon a careful review of the
hearing transcript. The Board member did express some frustration and did state
that he was not getting the story straight. He did not, however, threaten the
parties that they _better get it
straight_ when he returns.
Further, when counsel raised concerns about the Board member’s sudden and
unexplained departure, the Board member disclosed that he had an urgent need to
use the washroom. In this context, I am not persuaded that the Board member
would not decide the Applicants’ claims fairly. A Board member’s expression of
some frustration at being unable to fully understand the evidence before him or
her does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias (Mahendran,
supra).
[10] The Applicant also
asserts that the Board member has a hearing problem and failed to address
counsel’s concerns as to how this impediment impacted the fairness of the
hearing. During a short break, the interpreter at the hearing allegedly
commented at length about the Board member having a hearing problem. After the
break, counsel expressed concern about the interpreter’s comments. Once the
problem was raised by counsel at the hearing, the Board member assured all
parties that he does not have a hearing problem.
[11] The Applicants referred
to various incidents recorded in the transcript that allegedly support a
conclusion that the Board member was having difficulty hearing the parties.
However, the Respondent also referred me to places where parties, other than
the Board member, asked that questions or comments be repeated. I also note
that, in spite of making very serious allegations at the hearing, the
interpreter did not swear an affidavit describing his experience working with
the Board member.
[12] Upon carefully reviewing
the entire hearing transcript and the decision, I am not persuaded, on a balance
of probabilities, that the Board member possesses a hearing problem that would
give rise to a breach of natural justice. Further, the Applicants did not point
me to any place in the testimony or in the decision of the Board member that
would indicate that they were unable to present their case. Indeed, in spite of
the concerns raised by counsel, the principal Applicant and even the
interpreter at the hearing, the Board member directed the parties back to a
hearing of the evidence which concluded in a normal fashion. In addition, the
decision of the Board member did not ignore or misconstrue any of the evidence,
which one might expect to have happened if a serious hearing problem existed.
[13] I am satisfied that the
Applicants received a fair hearing of their case. To put this conclusion into
the context of the test for apprehension of bias, an informed person, viewing
the matter realistically and practically–and having thought the matter
through–would not conclude that it was more likely than not that the Board
member would decide the matter unfairly. Accordingly, the application will be
dismissed.
[14] Neither party proposed a
question for certification. None will be certified.
ORDER
THIS COURT
ORDERS THAT:
1. The application is dismissed; and,
2. No question of general importance is certified.
_Judith A. Snider_
Judge