Date: 20041108
Docket: T-1263-93
Citation: 2004 FC 1565
Toronto, Ontario, November 8th, 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE von FINCKENSTEIN
BETWEEN:
351694 ONTARIO LIMITED and 777761 ONTARIO INC.
Plaintiffs
and
PACCAR OF CANADA LTD. - PACCAR DU CANADA LTÉE.,
PACCAR PARTS OF CANADA LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
Background
[1] The Plaintiffs herein and their principals Roland and Brent Belzile, ("the Belziles") on May 28, 1993, started the present resale price maintenance action against the Defendants Paccar of Canada Ltd. and Paccar Parts of Canada Inc. ("Paccar").
[2] Paccar carries a business as a manufacturer and distributor of Kenworth trucks and parts under the trade name Canadian Kenworth Company ( CKW).
[3] The Plaintiff 351694 Ontario Ltd. has been a Kenworth truck, sales, parts and service dealer in Sudbury under the name of Mid North Kenworth ( Mid-North) since February 1, 1997. The Plaintiff 777761 Ontario Inc. has been a Kenworth parts and service dealer in Thunder Bay under the name of Kenworth of Thunder Bay ( KTB) since October 24, 1988.
[4] The dealerships were for 3 year periods at a time and did not provide for any automatic renewals. Indeed each agreement and its extensions specifically stated:
"this agreement contains the entire agreement between Kenworth and the dealer and there are no oral or collateral agreements of any kind except as incorporated by reference immediately below."
[5] In the period 1989 to May 31, 1991, disputes arose between the parties concerning sales allowance requests made by the Belziles. As a result of theses disputes:
a) the Plaintiffs advised the Defendants on May 7, 1991, that they would not seek a renewal of the KTB dealership and that it would be allowed to lapse on July 31, 1991;
b) the Defendants advised Plaintiffs on May 31, 1991, that both the Mid North dealership and the KTB dealership would be terminated effective July 31, 1991; and
c) both the KTB dealership and the Mid North dealership were terminated on July 31, 1997.
Issues
[6] At the outset of the trial the Defendants had brought two motions for dismissal, one based on res judicata, the other on limitation grounds. The res judicata motion was denied on the first day of trial, however the Court, at the request of the Plaintiffs, postponed the limitation motion until the Plaintiffs' evidence had been adduced so that there would be a sufficient factual basis for making the necessary determination.
[7] Having heard the Plaintiffs' evidence and the arguments of both sides in this motion, the Court must now decide the following issues:
a) Can the Court weigh the evidence for the purposes of this motion;
b) Do the limitation provisions set out in s. 36 (4)(a)(1) of the Competition Act apply to bar these proceedings with respect to any allegations made regarding a breach of s. 61(1) (a) of the Competition Act;
c) Do the limitation provisions set out in s. 36 (4)(a)(1) of the Competition Act apply to bar these proceedings with respect to any allegations made regarding a breach of s. 61(1) (b) of the Competition Act; and
d) Do any findings under b) and c) above apply to both Mid North and KTB?
Statutory Provisions
[8] The relevant statutory provisions of the Competition Act provide as follows:
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Recovery of damages
36. (1) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part VI, or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this Act,
may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section.
36(2) Evidence of prior proceedings
(2) In any action under subsection
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Recouvrement de dommages-intérêts
36. (1) Toute personne qui a subi une perte ou des dommages par suite_:
a) soit d'un comportement allant à l'encontre d'une disposition de la partie VI;
b) soit du défaut d'une personne d'obtempérer à une ordonnance rendue par le Tribunal ou un autre tribunal en vertu de la présente loi,
peut, devant tout tribunal compétent, réclamer et recouvrer de la personne qui a eu un tel comportement ou n'a pas obtempéré à l'ordonnance une somme égale au montant de la perte ou des dommages qu'elle est reconnue avoir subis, ainsi que toute somme supplémentaire que le tribunal peut fixer et qui n'excède pas le coût total, pour elle, de toute enquête relativement à l'affaire et des procédures engagées en vertu du présent article.
36(2) Preuves de procédures antérieures
(2) Dans toute action intentée contre une personne en vertu du paragraphe
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(1) against a person, the record of proceedings in any court in which that person was convicted of an offence under Part VI or convicted of or punished for failure to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this Act is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof that the person against whom the action is brought engaged in conduct that was contrary to a provision of Part VI or failed to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this Act, as the case may be, and any evidence given in those proceedings as to the effect of those acts or omissions on the person bringing the action is evidence thereof in the action.
36(3) Jurisdiction of Federal Court
(3) For the purposes of any action under subsection (1), the Federal Court is a court of competent jurisdiction.
36(4) Limitation
(4) No action may be brought under subsection (1),
(a) in the case of an action based on conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part VI, after two years from
(i) a day on which the conduct was engaged in, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of,
whichever is the later; and
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(1), les procès-verbaux relatifs aux procédures engagées devant tout tribunal qui a déclaré cette personne coupable d'une infraction visée à la partie VI ou l'a déclarée coupable du défaut d'obtempérer à une ordonnance rendue en vertu de la présente loi par le Tribunal ou par un autre tribunal, ou qui l'a punie pour ce défaut, constituent, sauf preuve contraire, la preuve que la personne contre laquelle l'action est intentée a eu un comportement allant à l'encontre d'une disposition de la partie VI ou n'a pas obtempéré à une ordonnance rendue en vertu de la présente loi par le Tribunal ou par un autre tribunal, selon le cas, et toute preuve fournie lors de ces procédures quant à l'effet de ces actes ou omissions sur la personne qui intente l'action constitue une preuve de cet effet dans l'action.
36(3) Compétence de la Cour fédérale
(3) La Cour fédérale a compétence sur les actions prévues au paragraphe (1).
36(4) Restriction
(4) Les actions visées au paragraphe (1) se prescrivent_:
a) dans le cas de celles qui sont fondées sur un comportement qui va à l'encontre d'une disposition de la partie VI, dans les deux ans qui suivent la dernière des dates suivantes_:
(i) soit la date du comportement en question,
(ii) soit la date où il est statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite;
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(b) in the case of an action based on the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court, after two years from
(i) a day on which the order of the Tribunal or court was contravened, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of,
whichever is the later.
Price maintenance
61. (1) No person who is engaged in the business of producing or supplying a product, who extends credit by way of credit cards or is otherwise engaged in a business that relates to credit cards, or who has the exclusive rights and privileges conferred by a patent, trade-mark, copyright, registered industrial design or registered integrated circuit topography, shall, directly or indirectly,
(a) by agreement, threat, promise or any like means, attempt to influence upward, or to discourage the reduction of, the price at which any other person engaged in business in Canada supplies or offers to supply or advertises a product within Canada; or
(b) refuse to supply a product to or otherwise discriminate against any other person engaged in business in Canada because of the low pricing policy of that other person.
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b) dans le cas de celles qui sont fondées sur le défaut d'une personne d'obtempérer à une ordonnance du Tribunal ou d'un autre tribunal, dans les deux ans qui suivent la dernière des dates suivantes_:
(i) soit la date où a eu lieu la contravention à l'ordonnance du Tribunal ou de l'autre tribunal,
(ii) soit la date où il est statué de façon définitive sur la poursuite.
Maintien des prix
61. (1) Quiconque exploite une entreprise de production ou de fourniture d'un produit, offre du crédit, au moyen de cartes de crédit ou, d'une façon générale, exploite une entreprise dans le domaine des cartes de crédit, ou détient les droits et privilèges exclusifs que confère un brevet, une marque de commerce, un droit d'auteur, un dessin industriel enregistré ou une topographie de circuit intégré enregistrée ne peut, directement ou indirectement_:
a) par entente, menace, promesse ou quelque autre moyen semblable, tenter de faire monter ou d'empêcher qu'on ne réduise le prix auquel une autre personne exploitant une entreprise au Canada fournit ou offre de fournir un produit ou fait de la publicité au sujet d'un produit au Canada;
b) refuser de fournir un produit à une autre personne exploitant une entreprise au Canada, ou prendre quelque autre mesure discriminatoire à l'endroit de celle-ci, en raison du régime de bas prix de celle-ci.
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61(2) Exception
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the person attempting to influence the conduct of another person and that other person are affiliated corporations or directors, agents, officers or employees of
(a) the same corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship, or
(b) corporations, partnerships or sole proprietorships that are affiliated,
or where the person attempting to influence the conduct of another person and that other person are principal and agent.
61(3) Suggested retail price
(3) For the purposes of this section, a suggestion by a producer or supplier of a product of a resale price or minimum resale price in respect thereof, however arrived at, is, in the absence of proof that the person making the suggestion, in so doing, also made it clear to the person to whom the suggestion was made that he was under no obligation to accept the suggestion and would in no way suffer in his business relations with the person making the suggestion or with any other person if he failed to accept the suggestion, proof of an attempt to influence the person to whom the suggestion is made in accordance with the suggestion.
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61(2) Exception
(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas lorsque la personne qui tente d'influencer la conduite d'une autre personne et cette dernière ont entre elles des relations de mandant à mandataire ou sont des personnes morales affiliées ou des administrateurs, mandataires, dirigeants ou employés_:
a) soit de la même personne morale, société de personnes ou entreprise individuelle;
b) soit de personnes morales, sociétés de personnes ou entreprises individuelles qui sont affiliées.
61(3) Prix de détail proposé
(3) Pour l'application du présent article, le fait, pour le producteur ou le fournisseur d'un produit, de proposer pour ce produit un prix de revente ou un prix de revente minimal, quelle que soit la façon de déterminer ce prix, lorsqu'il n'est pas prouvé que le producteur ou fournisseur faisant la proposition, en la faisant, a aussi précisé à la personne à laquelle il l'a faite que cette dernière n'était nullement obligée de l'accepter et que, si elle ne l'acceptait pas, elle n'en souffrirait en aucune façon dans ses relations commerciales avec ce producteur ou fournisseur ou avec toute autre personne, constitue la preuve qu'il a tenté d'influencer, dans le sens de la proposition, la personne à laquelle il l'a faite.
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61(4) Idem
(4) For the purposes of this section, the publication by a supplier of a product, other than a retailer, of an advertisement that mentions a resale price for the product is an attempt to influence upward the selling price of any person into whose hands the product comes for resale unless the price is so expressed as to make it clear to any person to whose attention the advertisement comes that the product may be sold at a lower price.
61(5) Exception
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not apply to a price that is affixed or applied to a product or its package or container.
61(6) Refusal to supply
(6) No person shall, by threat, promise or any like means, attempt to induce a supplier, whether within or outside Canada, as a condition of his doing business with the supplier, to refuse to supply a product to a particular person or class of persons because of the low pricing policy of that person or class of persons.
(7) and (8) [Repealed, R.S., 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. 36]
61(9) Offence and punishment
(9) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) or (6) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of the court or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both.
61(10) Where no unfavourable inference to be drawn
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61(4) Idem
(4) Pour l'application du présent article, la publication, par le fournisseur d'un produit qui n'est pas détaillant, d'une réclame mentionnant un prix de revente pour ce produit constitue une tentative de faire monter le prix de vente demandé par toute personne qui le reçoit pour le revendre, à moins que ce prix ne soit exprimé de façon à préciser à quiconque prend connaissance de la publicité que le produit peut être vendu à un prix inférieur.
61(5) Exception
(5) Les paragraphes (3) et (4) ne s'appliquent pas à un prix apposé ou inscrit sur un produit ou sur son emballage.
61(6) Refus de fournir
(6) Nul ne peut, par menace, promesse ou quelque autre moyen semblable, tenter de persuader un fournisseur, au Canada ou à l'étranger, en en faisant la condition de leurs relations commerciales, de refuser de fournir un produit à une personne donnée ou à une catégorie donnée de personnes en raison du régime de bas prix de cette personne ou catégorie.
(7) et (8) [Abrogés, L.R. (1985), ch. 19 (2e suppl.), art. 36]
61(9) Infraction et peine
(9) Quiconque contrevient aux paragraphes (1) ou (6) commet un acte criminel et encourt, sur déclaration de culpabilité, une amende à la discrétion du tribunal et un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans, ou l'une de ces peines.
61(10) Cas où l'on ne peut tirer aucune conclusion défavorable
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(10) Where, in a prosecution under paragraph (1)(b), it is proved that the person charged refused or counselled the refusal to supply a product to any other person, no inference unfavourable to the person charged shall be drawn from that evidence if he satisfies the court that he and any one on whose report he depended believed on reasonable grounds
(a) that the other person was making a practice of using products supplied by the person charged as loss-leaders, that is to say, not for the purpose of making a profit thereon but for purposes of advertising;
(b) that the other person was making a practice of using products supplied by the person charged not for the purpose of selling the products at a profit but for the purpose of attracting customers to his store in the hope of selling them other products;
(c) that the other person was making a practice of engaging in misleading advertising in respect of products supplied by the person charged; or
(d) that the other person made a practice of not providing the level of servicing that purchasers of the products might reasonably expect from the other person
(Underlining added)
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(10) Aucune conclusion défavorable à l'inculpé ne peut être tirée de la preuve faite au cours d'une poursuite intentée en vertu de l'alinéa (1)b) et indiquant qu'il a refusé de fournir un produit à une autre personne ou conseillé de le faire, s'il convainc le tribunal de ce que lui et toute personne aux dires de laquelle il s'est fié croyaient alors, pour des motifs raisonnables, que l'autre personne avait l'habitude, quant aux produits fournis par l'inculpé_:
a) de les sacrifier à des fins de publicité et non de profit;
b) de les vendre sans profit afin d'attirer les clients dans l'espoir de leur vendre d'autres produits;
c) de faire de la publicité trompeuse;
d) de ne pas assurer la qualité de service à laquelle leurs acheteurs pouvaient raisonnablement s'attendre.
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ISSUE 1: Can the Court weigh the evidence for the purposes of this motion?
[9] In this case, while the evidence of the Plaintiffs have been presented, the evidence of the Defendants is yet to come. Weighing the evidence at this point would be fundamentally unfair to the Plaintiffs as it would give the Defendants a road map for attacking the Plaintiffs' evidence if this motion does not succeed. The effect of this motion is very similar to a motion for non-suit; indeed one could consider it a non-suit motion because the Plaintiffs have not made out its case in terms of time. With regard to a non-suit motion, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Hodder v. Waddleton (1990), 87 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 52 stated:
There are various observations to be made regarding the trial judge's above comments, but the principal one is that, with respect, he has confused the two separate roles of judge and jury (or, where there is no jury, that of the judge in his capacity as trier of fact) in a negligence case. A clear, succinct and correct statement of those two separate roles and the applicable law is found in the text "The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases" (Sopinka and Lederman) at p. 521:
An important part of the division of roles between judge and jury is the assessment of the probative sufficiency of the evidence adduced by a party to establish his case. If a Plaintiff fails to lead sufficient material evidence, he may be faced at the close of his case by a motion for a non-suit by the Defendants. If such a motion is launched, it is the judge's function to determine whether any facts have been established by the Plaintiff from which liability, if it is in issue, may be inferred. It is the jury's duty to say whether, from those facts when submitted to it, liability ought to be inferred. The judge, in performing his function, does not decide whether in fact he believes the evidence. He has to decide whether there is enough evidence, if left uncontradicted, to satisfy a reasonable man. He must conclude whether a reasonable jury could find in the Plaintiff's favour if it believed the evidence given in trial up to that point. The judge does not decide whether the jury will accept the evidence, but whether the inference that the Plaintiff seeks in his favour could be drawn from the evidence adduced, if the jury chose to accept it. This decision of the judge on the sufficiency of evidence is a question of law; he is not ruling upon the weight or the believability of the evidence which is a question of fact. Because it is a question of law, the judge's assessment of the probative sufficiency of the Plaintiff's evidence, or the Defendants's evidence on a counter-claim for that matter, is subject to review by the Court of Appeal.
If the Plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case in his evidence in chief and the Defendants brings a successful non-suit motion, then the Plaintiff's action will be dismissed. (Underlining added)
[10] The situation here is sufficiently analogous to that of a motion for non-suit that the Court will not weigh the evidence but determine 'whether the inference that the Plaintiffs seeks in their favour could be drawn from the evidence adduced'.
ISSUE 2 : Do the limitation provisions set out in s. 36 (4)(a)(1) of the Competition Act apply to bar these proceedings with respect to any allegations made regarding a breach of s. 61(1) (a) of the Competition Act ?
[11] The dealership agreements between CKW and its dealers designated for each dealer an area of primary marketing responsibility. While dealers were legally free to sell outside their territory, considerable evidence was adduced that CKW frowned on such sales and actively discouraged them. Such evidence can be found, inter alia, in the testimony of Anne Marie Blanchet, Don Pearson and the letter of Chris Patterson of November 10, 1988.
[12] The Plaintiffs have also adduced evidence from which an inference can be drawn that there have been threats or like means to discourage the reduction of price, particularly the selling outside one's territory. Such evidence can be found, inter alia, in the testimony of Brent Belzile regarding the statement made by Tom Petch in the Bristol palace, the testimony of Don Pearson regarding statements by Chris Patterson and the letter of Chris Patterson of Nov 10, 1988.
[13] The Plaintiffs have also adduced evidence from which an inference can be drawn that the Defendants attempted to discourage the reduction of price for which their product was sold. "Any other person engaged in business" in the supply of the same product clearly includes other dealers on whom the termination of the dealership of a discounter like Mid North was not lost. Such an inference can be drawn from the testimony of Rupinder Singh Pannu, James Kuntz and Anne Marie Blanchet.
[14] The question that remains is whether such conduct occurred in the two years prior to May 28, 1993 (the date on which the statement of claim was issued).
[15] The Defendants argue that the termination itself does not qualify as a threat or like means as s. 61(1) implicitly is based on the notion that there is an existing buy and sell relationship. Once a relationship is terminated the section no longer has any application as there are no sales the price of which can be influenced.
[16] However, I note that s. 61(1)(a) refers to "any other person engaged in business in Canada". This does not have to be the person being terminated but it could be another person in the same line of business. In this situation while there will obviously be no further attempt by the Defendants to discourage the reduction of a price by the Plaintiffs, an inference can be drawn that the termination of the Plaintiffs will be a clarion call to any other dealers who try to discount or sell out of territory.
[17] The Defendants' main point however rests on the assertion that any alleged threat or like means occurred more than two years prior to May 28, 1993, and therefore falls outside the limitation period.
[18] The Plaintiffs point out that s. 36(4) does not refer to an event but to 'conduct' that has to occur within the limitation period. Such conduct can be an isolated incident or can be ongoing. Here the evidence allows an inference to be drawn that it was an ongoing conduct and discounting and sales out of territory was a perennial theme in the discussions between CKW and the Belziles. The termination is the ultimate fulfilment of the threat. It is not disputed that termination occurred within the limitation period.
[19] While it was pleaded that the western sales to Pannu and Roseneau caused CKW to terminate the dealerships, (i.e. fulfill the threat) no evidence to that effect was adduced. No evidence was presented that the alleged threat or like means continued after May 28, 1991.
[20] In addition, the dealership agreement for both Mid North and KTB under its terms would have ended in any event on July 31, 1991. While good business reasons and prior conduct (both Belziles had received sales awards from CKW) would have led the Belziles to assume it would be renewed, no evidence was adduced that they had any legal or equitable right for renewal. The contractual terms of the dealership agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of these reasons are quite specific. The evidence adduced is too tenuous to allow an inference to be drawn that, for the purposes of proving a violation under s. 61(1)(a), the termination (or properly speaking the non-renewal) is the culmination of an ongoing threat or like means.
[21] Consequently, the allegations of Plaintiffs based on s. 61(1)(a) of the Competition Act are barred by the limitation set out in s. 36(4)(a)(1).
ISSUE 3: Do the limitation provisions set out in s. 36 (4)(a)(1) of the Competition Act apply to bar these proceedings with respect to any allegations made regarding a breach of s. 61(1) (b) of the Competition Act?
[22] To succeed in respect of s. 61(1)(b) the Plaintiffs have to establish that a) there was a refusal to supply or otherwise discriminate and b) that such refusal or discrimination was due to the low pricing policy of the Plaintiffs.
[23] The Defendants argue that there is no evidence regarding refusal to supply or discrimination within the limitation period and that the Plaintiffs have no policy, written or enunciated, regarding low pricing. They allege Plaintiffs just sold for whatever price they could get.
[24] Addressing these points in reverse order I would observe that s. 61(10) provides for instances when no unfavourable inferences shall be drawn with respect to s. 61(1)(b). Each of the instances described refers to a ' practice'. It is thus clear that the term 'policy' as used in s. 61(1)(b) refers to a practice or a mode of doing business. Here ample evidence was given that Defendants, both as to parts and trucks, offered their products right up to termination at prices considerably lower than other Kenworth dealers. An inference can thus be drawn that this practice amounts to a policy within s. 61(1)(b).
[25] Were there refusals to supply or acts of discrimination within the limitation period? The evidence adduced indicates no instance regarding the supply of trucks from which the inference could be drawn that the Defendants refused to supply to or otherwise discriminated against the Plaintiffs. The last two trucks for Mid North were shipped to Montreal for "PDI" but no firm dates were provided in respect of such delivery. It is not clear how an inference could be drawn that such delivery in the final days of a dealership agreement would amount to 'otherwise discriminate'.
[26] However, with respect to parts the situation is different. Originally parts were shipped from the Defendants to the Plaintiffs or to the address of a customer designated by the Plaintiffs. However in response to the Plaintiffs selling parts at deep discount to a firm called Palings located in Hamilton, Ontario ( outside Plaintiffs' primary territory) the Defendants had instituted a so called 'Palings rule ' in the late 80's. Under that rule parts are shipped to a dealer or to a customer designated by the dealer so long as the customer is located in the dealer's territory. If the customer is located outside the territory the parts are shipped to the dealer who then has to re-ship them to the customer outside his territory. In Mid North's case it meant parts destined for Hamilton where shipped form Paccar's depot in Mississauga to Sudbury and had then to be reshipped to Hamilton incurring extra delay and expense. No rational explanation for this rule was furnished to the Belziles by CKW. Given that CKW is interested in selling as many parts a possible, adherence the Palings rule it reduces the dealer's possibility for profit and likely will diminish sale. An inference can be drawn that under these circumstances it amounts to act of discrimination in the supply of goods.
[27] It is argued that this was not an act of discrimination in the supply of goods as it applied to all dealers. However while the rule applied to all dealers, the evidence adduced shows that it was instituted in response to Mid North's discounting. There is no evidence at this point in time that other dealers sold parts outside their territory. Thus an inference can be drawn that the asymmetrical effect of the seemingly neutral rule amounts to 'other means of discrimination' in the supply of parts. This Palings rule was an ongoing rule which remained in place with respect to both dealerships right until the date of termination; i.e. well into the limitation period. Evidence was also adduced that parts were sold to both dealerships right up to termination.
[28] Accordingly, I find that with respect to the sale of parts, the allegation under s. 61(1)(b) is not barred by s. 36(4)(a)(1). Given that with respect to the sale of trucks no evidence regarding violation of s. 64(1)(b) was adduced, no inference can be drawn and any allegation based on the sale of trucks is barred by s. 36(4)(a)(1).
ISSUES 4 : Do the findings under b) and c) above apply to both Mid North and KTB?
[29] Claims based on a violation of s. 61(1)(a). Given that I have concluded that these claims are barred by reason of the limitation provisions of s. 36(4)(a)(1), there is no need to consider this issue.
[30] Claims based on a violation of s. 61(1)(b). Evidence has been adduced from which on can infer that Parts were delivered to both Mid North and KTB until the date of termination. Given my finding above regarding possible violations of s. 61(1)(b) based on the Palings rules, and given that this rule was applied to both dealerships any allegations in respect of parts based on proven violation of s. 61(1)(b) would not be barred by s. 36(4)(a)(1).
[31] Given the split outcome of this motion, I do not think it would be appropriate to award costs.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The claim both Plaintiffs based on violations of s. 61(1)(a) of the Competition Act are dismissed by reason of not meeting the requirement of s. 36(4)(a)(1) of the Competition Act.
2. The claim of both Plaintiffs based on violations of s. 61(1)(b) of the Competition Act, in so far as it concerns the refusal to supply trucks, are dismissed by reason of not meeting the requirement of s. 36(4)(a)(1) of theCompetition Act. The claims of both Plaintiffs relating to the sale of parts are unaffected by this ruling .
3. Given the partial success of this motion there will be no order as to costs.
"K. von Finckenstein"
J.F.C.
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1263-93
STYLE OF CAUSE: 351694 ONTARIO LIMITED
and 777761 ONTARIO INC.
Plaintiffs
and
PACCAR OF CANADA LTD. - PACCAR DU CANADA LTEE., PACCAR PARTS OF CANADA LTD.
Defendants
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 4, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: von FINCKENSTEIN J.
DATED: NOVEMBER 8, 2004
APPEARANCES:
James Morton
K. Wayne McCracken FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
Jerry Birenbaum
Craig Colraine FOR THE DEFENDANTS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Steinberg Morton Frymer LLP
Toronto, Ontario FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
Birenbaum, Steinberg, Landau
Savin & Colraine
Toronto, Ontario FOR THE DEFENDANTS
FEDERAL COURT
Date: 20041108
Docket: T-1263-93
BETWEEN:
351694 ONTARIO LIMITED and
777761 ONTARIO INC.
Plaintiffs
and
PACCAR OF CANADA LTD. - PACCAR DU CANADA LTEE., PACCAR PARTS OF CANADA LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
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