Date: 20050616
Docket: IMM-9283-04
Citation: 2005 FC 852
Ottawa, Ontario, June 16, 2005
PRESENT: MADAM JUSTICE TREMBLAY-LAMER
BETWEEN:
EVGENIA REVICH
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a removal order made against the applicant by the respondent, which was converted to a deportation order through the combined effect of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations).
[2] On September 19, 2002, the respondent issued a departure order (DO) against the applicant pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Act and section 6 of the Regulations.
[3] Under subsection 49(2) of the Act, the DO made against the applicant was conditional and could not become effective until one of the conditions provided in the subsection had occurred. On October 23, 2003, the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected the applicant's refugee claim.
[4] The DO against the applicant came into force 15 days after the notification of the rejection of her refugee claim (paragraph 49(2)(c) of the Act).
[5] On February 27, 2004, the Federal Court refused the application for leave filed by the applicant against the RPD's decision. The refusal of the application for leave ended the stay of execution of the DO (paragraph 231(1)(a) of the Regulations). The DO became enforceable on February 27, 2004 (subsection 48(1) of the Act). On March 4, 2004, the respondent's counsel informed the respondent of the Federal Court's refusal of the application for leave.
[6] On March 29, 2004, the DO became a deportation order pursuant to subsection 224(2) of the Regulations.
[7] On May 22, 2004, during the interview with an enforcement officer, the applicant was notified of her right to file a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) application. The notice given on May 22, 2004 resulted in a stay of execution of the deportation order pending the PRRA decision (section 232 of the Regulations).
[8] On September 23, 2004, the PRRA application was rejected. As provided in paragraph 232(c) of the Regulations, the stay under section 232 of the Regulations ended with the rejection of the PRRA application.
ANALYSIS
[9] Under paragraph 160(3)(a) of the Regulations, the respondent is required to notify the persons subject to a removal order, such as the present applicant, that they are entitled to apply for a PRRA decision (unless the person is affected by a security certificate under subsection 77(1) of the Act). However, neither the Act nor the Regulations states at what time this notice must be issued. Meanwhile, because the person's refugee claim has been rejected, the stay of execution of the removal order is no longer in force.
[10] In other words, the removal order is "enforceable" and, after a 30-day period, the order will become a deportation order unless the person voluntarily leaves the country. The Regulations also provide for the stay of execution of a removal order when a person is notified that he or she may file a PRRA application.
[11] The applicant is not attacking the combined effect of these statutory provisions but instead is targeting the respondent's decision to send the notice under section 160 of the Regulations after the removal order became a deportation order, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to have the stay that the PRRA application would have triggered. So the essential question underlying this application is whether it is fair for the respondent to act in this way.
[12] In the context of administrative decision-making, the assessment of procedural fairness involves balancing certain factors such as the nature of the statutory scheme and the choices of procedures made by the administrative entity, the importance of the decision to the interested party and the latter's legitimate expectations (see Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817).
[13] In this case, the "decision", i.e. to send the notice after the time when the removal order had become a deportation order, has some major consequences for the applicant. She cannot return to this country without authorization because of the deportation order, although no authorization would be necessary if the departure order issued against her were still in place.
[14] However, that must be assessed in light of the objectives of the statutory scheme. Regarding the PRRA, Mr. Justice Martineau recently explained the scope and justification of this procedure in Figurado v. Canada(Solicitor General), [2005] F.C.J. No. 458 (F.C.) (QL), as follows:
¶ 40 The PRRA process was implemented to allow individuals to apply for a review of the conditions surrounding the risk of return prior to their removal from Canada and not after their removal. Indeed, the PRRA emerged as a result of the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada, which required a timely risk assessment to comply with section 7 of the Charter (Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 646 (F.C.A.) (QL); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3). It is clear that Parliament's primary intention in enacting the PRRA process was to comply with Canada's domestic and international commitments to the principle of non-refoulement, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement to the IRPA Regulations, Canada Gazette, Part I, December 15, 2001, pp. 4550, 4552). Subsection 115(1) of the IRPA, found in Division 3 - Pre-removal risk assessment which comprises sections 112 to 116 of the IRPA, assures that a person shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Naturally, this statutory right is subject to the exceptions mentioned at subsection 115(2) of the IRPA (however, for the purposes of the present case, it is not necessary to determine whether such exceptions contravene section 7 of the Charter). Accordingly, the PRRA is closely linked in time to removals and is carried out immediately prior to removal.
¶ 41 The fact that PRRA applicants receive a statutory stay of removal under section 232 of the IRPA Regulations is indicative of the legislative intent to have PRRAs completed before applicants are to be returned to face the risks they allege. The PRRA's fundamental purpose is to determine whether or not a person can safely be removed from Canada without being subject to persecution, torture or inhumane treatment. This purpose ceases to exist upon removal. ...
[15] In other words, the purpose of the PRRA is to prevent a foreign national whose refugee claim has already been rejected from being required to return to his country of residence or citizenship when the situation has changed in that country and he would be exposed to a risk of persecution.
[16] In my opinion, if this review is to be effective and consistent with Parliament's intention when creating it, the PRRA must coincide as closely as possible with the person's departure from the country.
[17] In fact, this is demonstrated by the factors set out in the CIC Removals Enforcement Manual (the Manual) (section 15.4) for determining the appropriate time to notify the persons. These factors are grouped around the person's ability to leave the country (e.g. if he or she has a valid travel document), as an indication of intention, in which case the PRRA decision should be issued at the time when the person in question is likely to leave Canada, or at least at some time that is close to it. The Manual provides:
15.4. When to notify a person to apply for a PRRA
There are several trigger points that could decide the timing of the notification for a person to submit a PRRA application. Based on a review of the case and the availability of travel documents, an officer should determine when it would be the most appropriate time to notify the person of the opportunity to apply for a PRRA. Notification can be done either by mail or in person. This decision is at the discretion of the officer based on an assessment of the case. It is highly recommended that notification be given in person in the majority of cases.
The following circumstances include examples of trigger points that officers should consider when assessing the timing for notifying the person to submit a PRRA application:
• a valid travel document is available;
• an expired travel document or valid identity or birth record is available and a Canada Immigration Single Journey Document [IMM 5149B] can be used;
• there is no valid travel document, an application for one has been submitted, the respective embassy or mission has approved the application in principle and the travel document is forthcoming; or
• there is no valid travel document and an application is completed and will be submitted to the embassy or mission.
Although these trigger points are not exhaustive, the officer preparing the file for removal should be able to judge whether the case is removal-ready through experience and consultation with a supervisor, if required.
[18] The Manual is important from the fairness standpoint, therefore. The policy adopted by the respondent is clearly not arbitrary and is not based on irrelevant considerations, which could make the discretionary decision unfair. On the contrary, the criteria in section 15.4 of the Manual, which contemplate the issuance of a notice once the possibility of a departure is in principle confirmed, are consistent with the objective of the PRRA procedure described above.
[19] Moreover, the Manual also establishes that "there is no legitimate expectation affecting the content of the duty of fairness" (Baker, supra, at p. 841). Indeed, a person cannot expect to receive the PRRA notice before the DO becomes a deportation order since this not usual practice for an administrative decision-maker who must consider a number of factors before determining the appropriate time, and those factors may vary in the assessment of each case.
[20] I recognize that the delay created by this process generally has the effect of delaying the sending of the notice after the DO has become a deportation order. However, I do not think this situation is unfair to a person.
[21] The statutory scheme as a whole, again in my opinion, reduces the value of this proposition. Providing crucial safeguards such as the PRRA process, on the one hand, in addition to the ordinary refugee claim process, there is an important interest in guaranteeing that the statutory framework will be effective and generally respected. This interest is reflected in the objectives of the Act, which, among numerous undertakings to fulfill international obligations and promote human rights by protecting refugees, include the following:
3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are
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3. (1) En matière d'immigration, la présente loi a pour objet :
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...
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[...]
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(f) to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the attainment of immigration goals established by the Government of Canada in consultation with the provinces;
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f) d'atteindre, par la prise de normes uniformes et l'application d'un traitement efficace, les objectifs fixés pour l'immigration par le gouvernement fédéral après consultation des provinces;
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...
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[...]
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3. (2) The objectives of this Act with respect to refugees are
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3.(2) S'agissant des réfugiés, la présente loi a pour objet :
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...
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[...]
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(e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings;
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e) de mettre en place une procédure équitable et efficace qui soit respectueuse, d'une part, de l'intégrité du processus canadien d'asile et, d'autre part, des droits et des libertés fondamentales reconnus à tout être humain;
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[22] Some provisions designed to secure voluntary compliance with the Act and the Regulations are an integral part of this important interest. The Regulations, and more particularly subsection 238(1), section 224 and subsection 240(1), clearly attempt to facilitate voluntary compliance with a removal order that has become enforceable:
238. (1) A foreign national who wants to voluntarily comply with a removal order must appear before an officer who shall determine if
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238. (1) L'étranger qui souhaite se conformer volontairement à la mesure de renvoi doit comparaître devant l'agent afin que celui-ci vérifie :
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(a) the foreign national has sufficient means to effect their departure to a country that they will be authorized to enter; and
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a) s'il a les ressources suffisantes pour quitter le Canada à destination d'un pays où il sera autorisé à entrer;
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(b) the foreign national intends to voluntarily comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 240(1)(a) to (c) and will be able to act on that intention.
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b) s'il a l'intention de se conformer aux exigences prévues aux alinéas 240(1)a) à c) et s'il sera en mesure de le faire.
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224. (1) An enforced departure order is prescribed as a circumstance that relieves a foreign national from having to obtain authorization under subsection 52(1) of the Act in order to return to Canada.
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224. (1) L'exécution d'une mesure d'interdiction de séjour à l'égard d'un étranger est un cas prévu par règlement qui exonère celui-ci de l'obligation d'obtenir l'autorisation prévue au paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi pour revenir au Canada.
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(2) A foreign national who is issued a departure order must meet the requirements set out in paragraphs 240(1)(a) to (c) within 30 days after the order becomes enforceable, failing which the departure order becomes a deportation order.
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(2) L'étranger visé par une mesure d'interdiction de séjour doit satisfaire aux exigences prévues aux alinéas 240(1)a) à c) au plus tard trente jours après que la mesure devient exécutoire, à défaut de quoi la mesure devient une mesure d'expulsion.
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240. (1) A removal order against a foreign national, whether it is enforced by voluntary compliance or by the Minister, is enforced when the foreign national
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240. (1) Qu'elle soit volontaire ou forcée, l'exécution d'une mesure de renvoi n'est parfaite que si l'étranger, à la fois :
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(a) appears before an officer at a port of entry to verify their departure from Canada;
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a) comparaît devant un agent au point d'entrée pour confirmer son départ du Canada;
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(b) obtains a certificate of departure from the Department;
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b) a obtenu du ministère l'attestation de départ;
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(c) departs from Canada; and
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c) quitte le Canada;
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(d) is authorized to enter, other than for purposes of transit, their country of destination.
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d) est autorisé à entrer, à d'autres fins qu'un simple transit, dans son pays de destination.
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[23] It should be pointed out that subsection 238(1), section 224 and subsection 240(1) of the Regulations in no way infringe on a person's right to file a PRRA application. The choice is up to the person if he or she thinks the circumstances so warrant.
[24] In the context of a possible class action in opposition to the PRRA process, Madam Justice Snider, in Nalliah v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 2005 (F.C.) (QL), commented that, of all the applications processed, only about 3% of all PRRA decisions were favourable; in other words, in 97% of the cases the applicants were not exposed to any danger. These statistics in no way undermine the important function Parliament has assigned to the PRRA procedure, as Martineau J. described it in the Figurado decision, supra, namely "to comply with Canada's domestic and international commitments to the principle of non-refoulement". It is an important safeguard, which should remain irrespective of the probable result, statistically speaking. However, from the standpoint of the system, this information underscores the fact that there are few instances in which a person who has taken advantage of the remedies provided by the Act remains at risk of persecution, and they highlight the fact that the PRRA exists as a final safety-valve.
[25] In short, if the interested party voluntarily complies with a removal order under section 238 of the Regulations, within the requisite period, he or she may avoid the consequences of a deportation order. However, requiring the respondent to issue a notice before a deportation order comes into force would in return eliminate the main incentive for people to comply voluntarily with a removal order prior to a PRRA decision.
[26] Notwithstanding the consequences for the applicant, I am unable to find that the respondent's decision to send the notice after the departure order became a deportation order fails to meet the requirements of procedural fairness having regard to the objective of the PRRA process, which is to serve as a final "safeguard" before the interested party is required to leave the country.
[27] In the case at bar, the applicant had until March 29, 2004 to leave Canada before the DO became a deportation order. She chose to remain in Canada and to file a PRRA application. Her PRRA application was refused on the ground that there was no personal risk.
[28] I am persuaded that the applicant has been given the full benefit of all the remedies available to her under the Act. In my opinion, there is nothing inequitable in her asking in the future for written authorization to return to Canada since she knew that this was the consequence of her choice. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the respondent so erred in law or in fact as to warrant the intervention of this Court.
[29] The application for judicial review is dismissed.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
[1] The application for judicial review is dismissed.
[2] The applicant's counsel asked that the following question be certified:
Is the PRRA officer required to send the notice under section 160 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations before the departure order becomes a deportation order, thereby putting the foreign national in an irregular situation?
Should the answer to the preceding question be positive, should the deportation order be set aside?
[3] I am satisfied that this is a question that transcends the interests of the parties to this litigation, that it raises questions with important consequences that are necessary in determining the outcome of this case. I will therefore certify the proposed question.
"Danièle Tremblay-Lamer"
Judge
Certified true translation
Peter Douglas