Date: 20051129
Docket: T-2095-04
Citation: 2005 FC 1605
Montréal, Quebec, November 29, 2005
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE de MONTIGNY
BETWEEN:
DANIEL
NORMANDIN
Applicant
and
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This
application for judicial review seeks to set aside a decision by the National
Parole Board (the “Board”) dated November 8, 2004 renewing for the third time a
90-day residency requirement, as part of a community supervision order issued
under section 753.1 of the Criminal Code.
FACTS
[3]
The
applicant served a second two-year federal sentence for sexual offences against
the person, namely, forcible confinement and indecent acts (five counts), as
well as for possession of Schedule II substances and failure to comply with a
probation order.
[4]
The
applicant’s warrant of committal expired on June 27, 2004.
[5]
The
applicant was also declared a long-term offender under section 753.1 of the Criminal
Code.
[6]
Consequently,
the court ordered that the applicant be subject to a long-term community
supervision order pursuant to subsection 753.1(3) and section 753.2 of the Criminal
Code.
[7]
The
supervision order was for a maximum period of five years following expiry of
the applicant’s warrant of committal, that is, effective June 27, 2004.
[8]
On June 3,
2004, the Board ordered that the applicant comply with a special residency
condition with any Community Correctional Centre/Community Residential Centre
(“CCC/CRC”), for a period of 90 days.
[9]
As a
result of the Board’s decision, a long-term supervision certificate was issued
against the applicant. The certificate listed the special conditions imposed,
including the aforementioned residency condition, for a period of 90 days.
[10]
The CCC
named in the certificate was the Hochelaga CCC, located on Hochelaga Street in
Montréal.
[11]
On August
18, 2004, the Board rendered a second decision renewing the applicant’s
residency condition for an additional 90 days.
[12]
On August
25, 2004, Jean-Guy Desrosiers of the Hochelaga CCC suspended the applicant’s
supervision, authorized his apprehension and ordered his commitment to custody
pursuant to subsection 135.1(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act (the “Act”).
[13]
The arrest
warrant was executed on August 25, 2004, and the applicant was committed to
custody at the Leclerc Institution.
[14]
On October
18, 2004, the Board reviewed the applicant’s case and cancelled the suspension
of the long-term supervision.
[15]
A new
certificate was issued to this effect on October 18, 2004. The certificate
extended the residency order by 54 days to the new expiry date, November 15,
2004.
[16]
The CCC
named in the new certificate was the Hochelaga CCC.
[17]
A third
certificate was issued on November 16, 2004 (locked November 8, 2004). This
certificate was the subject of the application for judicial review.
[18]
This third
warrant referred to a new residency requirement for a 90-day period, that is,
until February 13, 2005.
[19]
The CCC
named in the third certificate was, once again, the Hochelaga CCC.
[20]
In each of
his three stays at the Hochelaga CCC, the applicant had to, and must still,
comply with the CCC’s rules, which are the same for an offender under a
residency order as part of his statutory release as for another offender under
a residency order as part of his long-term supervision.
[21]
As for all
offenders, special arrangements concerning the rules may be made for individual
offenders. For example, a resident who needs a cell phone for his work could,
under certain conditions, be exempted from the rule.
[22]
For the
requirements of the present application for judicial review, the applicant does
not contest the facts reported in the Board’s decisions but disagrees with the
legal conditions.
[23]
For the
requirements of the present application for judicial review, the applicant
admits that, if the Board had the power to impose a residency condition on him,
which he denies, that condition would be reasonable, necessary in order to
protect society and to facilitate his successful reintegration into society and
justified by the facts of the case.
ISSUE
[24]
The only
issue in the present application is the following:
Does the Board have
jurisdiction to renew the special supervision conditions of an offender who has
been declared a long-term offender pursuant to subsection 753.1(1) of the Criminal
Code, with the result that a succession of 90-day residency requirements
are imposed on him?
ANALYSIS
[26]
When the
court finds an offender to be a “long-term offender” under subsection 753.1(1)
of the Criminal Code, it is required to impose a sentence of
imprisonment of two years or more for the offence for which the offender has
been convicted and order the offender to be supervised in the community (subsection
753.1(3)).
[27]
This
period of supervision within the community begins when the offender has
finished serving the sentence imposed for the offence for which he has been
convicted, and all other sentences for offences for which the offender is
convicted and for which sentence a term of imprisonment is imposed on the
offender, either before or after the conviction for the aforementioned offence
(subsection 753.2(1)).
[28]
This
period of supervision must also be administered in accordance with the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20. Subsection 134.1(1) of the
Act states that long-term offenders are subject to subsection 161(1) of the Corrections
and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620, P.C. 1992-2223, October
29, 1992 (the “Regulations”).
[29]
Furthermore,
subsection 135.1(1) provides that, when an offender breaches a condition of a
long-term supervision order, the long-term supervision order may be suspended.
It should be noted that any breach of condition of release may result in an
order authorizing the commitment of the long-term offender to a community-based
residential facility or a mental health facility.
[30]
After
reviewing the case, the Board may cancel the suspension without adding new
conditions to the long-term supervision order, cancel the suspension but add
any conditions that the Board considers necessary to protect society or, where
the Board is satisfied that no appropriate program of supervision can be
established that would adequately protect society from the risk of the offender
reoffending, recommend that an information be laid charging the offender with a
breach of the supervision order (subsection 135.1(6)).
[31]
In the
applicant’s view, an offender subject to a long-term supervision order cannot
be committed for successive 90-day periods under subsection 135.1(6), since
subsection (2) of that same section stipulates that the period of commitment of
the offender must not exceed 90 days. Furthermore, it would go against the
spirit of the Act if successive residency requirements were issued for an
uninterrupted period of more than 90 days, as the offender would have finished
serving his sentence when he was placed under long-term supervision.
[32]
It is
uncontested that the appropriate standard of review is correctness. The issue
before us is purely a question of law, since we must determine the meaning and
scope of a statutory provision by considering its legislative framework. The
Board has no special expertise in this area and is in no better position than
this Court to resolve the issue. I note, furthermore, that the correctness
standard was recently applied by this Court in similar situations: see McMurray
v. Canada (National Parole Board), [2004] F.C.J. No. 565 (Q.L.); Normandin
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1701 (Q.L.).
[33]
Despite
the skill and conviction with which counsel for the applicant pleaded her case,
I cannot endorse her arguments. It seems clear to me that, in fact, the
residency requirements were imposed on the applicant under section 134.1, not
section 135.1. The latter provision is only applied in cases of actual or
anticipated breaches of the conditions of a long-term supervision order. Only
when the conditions are breached or when “the member or person is satisfied
that it is necessary and reasonable to suspend the long-term supervision in
order to prevent a breach of any condition of it or to protect society” may a
member of the Board or a person designated by it authorize the “commitment” of
the offender to a community-based residential facility. The order will end
when the Board has reviewed the case and determined what measures should be
taken, and must not exceed 90 days.
[34]
In other
words, once the Board rules on the case of an offender referred to it for
breach of a condition in the long-term supervision order or because of the risk
to society, section 134.1 becomes operative once more and is the authority
whereby the original order is extended (with or without new conditions) and
possibly renewed.
[35]
The
Federal Court of Appeal recently determined that section 134.1 authorizes the
Board to impose a residency requirement among the conditions that it may set in
a long-term supervision order. In the context of an application for judicial
review by an applicant concerning the legality of a long-term supervision
certificate issued by the Board on June 3, 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the
judgment delivered by my colleague Tremblay-Lamer J. ([2004] F.C.J. No. 1701)
after conducting an extensive analysis of that section and of the Act as a
whole (Normandin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA
345).
[36]
In that
case, counsel for the applicant argued that section 134.1 could not be
interpreted as conferring power on the Board to impose a condition of residency
in a community-based residential facility, since the provision, read in
conjunction with section 99.1 of the Act and subsection 61(1) of the
Regulations, does not expressly refer to that condition. Relying on the
expressio unius est exclusion alterius rule, Ms. Magas made much of subsections
133(4.1) and 135.1, which do expressly authorize that condition, in support of
her argument.
[37]
In
response to those claims, Létourneau J.A. carefully examined the relevant
sections of the Act, its purpose and its general scheme. After providing a detailed
and persuasive critical analysis, he concluded that subsection 134.1(2)
contains a general power to ensure the protection of society and facilitate the
successful reintegration into society of a long-term offender by imposing on him or her any condition
of supervision that the Board considers appropriate, including those not expressly referred
to in section 99.1.
[38]
While
there is no need here to reproduce Létourneau J.A.’s detailed reasoning as to
how section 134.1 should be interpreted, his comments concerning section 135.1,
however, are quite relevant to the present case, in my view, and so I will
reproduce a brief excerpt here:
[56] What section 135.1 confers is a power of
commitment to a residence and not a power to assign to a residence. The first,
the power of commitment, punishes the conduct of the long-term offender while
the second, the residence requirement, refers to a condition of his long-term
supervision or, in the case of an offender on statutory release, to a condition
of that release (see subsection 133(4.1)). The first is expressed and exercised
by a warrant, the second simply by a statement or stipulation in the
supervision measures.
[57] Parliament has taken the trouble to use a
different terminology in order to clearly differentiate between the two
concepts. Subsection 133(4.1) states, in the case of an offender on statutory
release, that the releasing authority “may . . . require that
the offender reside . . .”. This terminology contrasts with that of subsection
135.1(1), applicable to the long-term offender, where the Board “may, by
warrant . . . authorize the commitment of the offender to a
community-based residential facility or . . .
to custody”.
. . .
[61] Again, the limited
applicability of section 135.1 contrasts with the much broader power to set
conditions of supervision under subsection 134.1(2). The duration of the
commitment to residence under subsection 134.1(2) is established by the Board
and determined by the necessity and reasonableness of imposing such a condition.
This subsection, I note again, does not set any maximum time limit for
commitment to residence, as is the case for the warrant of commitment in
section 135.1.
[39]
This
excerpt from the Federal Court of Appeal judgment speaks volumes in confirming,
if confirmation was needed, the very different natures and purposes of sections
134.1 and 135.1. The purpose of the latter is to provide the Board with the
tools to address an emergency situation, and the only purpose of the
“commitment” is to protect society while the Board examines the offender’s
case. It is crystal clear from a reading of subsections 135.1(6) and (8) that
the original supervision order becomes operative again as soon as the Board
decides to cancel the suspension, with or without new conditions, unless it
recommends that an information be laid charging the offender with an offence
under section 753.3 of the Criminal Code.
[40]
Since the
applicant admitted that the residency requirement would have been reasonable if
the Court had found that the Board had that power, the present application for
judicial review must be dismissed, without costs.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that the application for
judicial review be dismissed, without costs.
“Yves
de Montigny”
Certified
true translation
Michael
Palles