[1] In this application for judicial review Mr. Esteban challenges the decision of the Registrar of the Immigration Appeal Division ("IAD") discontinuing Mr. Esteban's pending appeal to the IAD as a result of the application of section 196 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 ( the "IRPA").

BACKGROUND FACTS

[2] Mr. Esteban is a permanent resident of Canada who, since 1990, has been convicted of five criminal offenses in Canada. The most recent and serious conviction was entered in January of 2001 when Mr. Esteban pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to traffic cocaine under paragraph 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. As a result, in February of 2001 Mr. Esteban was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment.

[3] In consequence of that conviction, on April 27, 2001 Mr. Esteban was reported for inquiry pursuant to paragraph 27(1)(d) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 ("former Act"). On August 3, 2001, he was then directed to inquiry pursuant to subsection 27(3) of the former Act. On December 9, 2001, a delegate of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration formed the opinion, pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the former Act, that Mr. Esteban is a danger to Canada. An application for leave and judicial review was filed in respect of that decision.

[4] A senior immigration officer gave Mr. Esteban notice of his immigration inquiry and on January 16, 2002 Mr. Esteban was ordered by an adjudicator to be deported. Mr. Esteban provided a notice of appeal of the removal order at the end of the hearing, as required. The notice of appeal was accepted by the IAD on a without prejudice basis in view of the existence of the danger opinion. This was because paragraph 70(5)(c) of the former Act precluded an appeal to the IAD by a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Act where the person was the subject of a danger opinion. However, Mr. Esteban was challenging the validity of the danger opinion.

[5] On June 28, 2002, the IRPA was proclaimed. On August 23, 2002, Mr. Esteban's application for judicial review of the ministerial danger opinion was allowed by the Court on consent of the respondent.

[6] Thereafter, the following occurred. On August 26, 2002, the IAD advised Mr. Esteban that his appeal of the deportation order was discontinued as a result of the existence of the danger opinion issued pursuant to subsection 70(5) of the former Act, and the application of subsection 64(1) of the IRPA and subsection 326(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The IAD appears to have resiled from that position upon being advised that the danger opinion had been quashed by the Court before the decision of the IAD. Following this, on August 30, 2002 a hearings officer at Citizenship and Immigration Canada in Winnipeg wrote to the Registrar of the IAD, drawing attention to the four-year sentence imposed upon Mr. Esteban as a result of his criminal conviction. The hearings officer requested that the IAD discontinue Mr. Esteban's appeal pursuant to sections 64 and 196 of the IRPA. Without waiting for responsive submissions on Mr. Esteban's behalf, on September 6, 2002 the Registrar of the IAD wrote to Mr. Esteban advising that his appeal had been discontinued as a result of the application of sections 64 and 196 of the IRPA. This application for judicial review is in respect of that decision.

THE ISSUE

[7] Mr. Esteban raises a number of issues on this application. First, he argues that the IAD incorrectly interpreted the relevant provisions of the IRPA. Second, Mr. Esteban asserts that in the circumstances of this case, section 196 of the IRPA and the declining of jurisdiction by the IAD violate sections 7, 12 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"). He also asserts violations of the principles of fundamental justice, particularly on the basis of retroactivity, delay, removal of vested rights, and removal of appeal without substitution of another avenue of recourse.

[8] On the view I take of this matter, the determinative issue is the proper interpretation of section 196 of the IRPA. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider the arguments advanced on Mr. Esteban's behalf with respect to the Charter and fundamental justice.

ANALYSIS

[9] The sections of the IRPA, in my view, relevant to the proper interpretation of section 196 are sections 36, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 192, 196, and 197. Also relevant are paragraph 49(1)(b), subsection 73(1), and section 74 of the former Act. All of these sections are appended to these reasons in Appendix A.

[10] Briefly, subsection 36(1) of the IRPA reflects Parliament's intent, at least when the IRPA is fully applicable to pending proceedings and the transitional provisions are spent, that permanent residents are inadmissible to Canada on grounds of serious criminality. Section 62 of the IRPA constitutes the IAD as the competent division of the Immigration and Refugee Board with respect to appeals under Division 7 of Part I of the IRPA. Its jurisdiction with respect to those appeals is set forth in section 66 of the IRPA, which allows the IAD, after considering an appeal: to allow the appeal in accordance with section 67; to dismiss the appeal in accordance with section 69; or to stay a removal order under appeal in accordance with section 68 of the IRPA.

[11] Notwithstanding that general grant of jurisdiction, subsection 64(1) of the IRPA is express that no appeal may be made to the IAD by a permanent resident if the permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on certain grounds, including serious criminality. For the purpose of subsection 64(1) and the loss of appeal rights, serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by term of imprisonment of at least two years. See: subsection 64(2).

[12] Relevant transitional provisions are found in sections 192, 196 and 197 of the IRPA. Because of their importance to this analysis, they are set out here for ease of reference:

192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.

[...]

196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.

197. Despite section 192, if an appellant who has been granted a stay under the former Act breaches a condition of the stay, the appellant shall be subject to the provisions of section 64 and subsection 68(4) of this Act.

192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.

[..]

196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.

197. Malgré l'article 192, l'intéressé qui fait l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi et qui n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis, est assujetti à la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi, le paragraphe 68(4) lui étant par ailleurs applicable.

[13] The gist of the dispute between the parties in this application is the proper interpretation to be given the phrase "granted a stay under the former Act" contained in section 196. The Minister states that the phrase only refers to stays granted by the IAD under section 73 of the former Act, and does not include a statutory stay arising automatically by operation of paragraph 49(1)(b) of the former Act. Mr. Esteban states that the phrase includes that statutory stay.¹

[14] It is conceded in the present case that Mr. Esteban is precluded by section 64 of the IRPA from making any appeal to the IAD. Hence, the transition provision found in section 196 of the IRPA will apply to him so as to discontinue any pending appeal unless the statutory stay he was entitled to under the former Act is a stay "granted" under the former Act within the contemplation of section 196.

[15] The relevant transitional provisions, including section 196, have been the subject of interpretation by this Court.

[16] In Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 634 Madam Justice Snider concluded that the word "stay" found in section 196 of the IRPA does contemplate a statutory stay that came into effect as a result of the operation of paragraph 49(1)(b) of the former Act (see particularly paragraph 48 of her reasons). Justice Snider's analysis was adopted by Mr. Justice Campbell in Jones v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship in Immigration) 2003 FCT 661 and Amado-Cordeiro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 847. A similar conclusion was reached by Madam Justice Heneghan in Cartwright v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 792 on the basis of a separate analysis (see paragraphs 72 through 87 of the reasons).

[17] A contrary result was, however, reached by Mr. Justice Blais in Nokhodchari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 803. There, Mr. Justice Blais appears to have distinguished Medovarski on the facts before him (see particularly paragraphs 11, 22, 23 and 30).

[18] Before me, counsel for the Minister urged that comity does not require me to follow the decision in Medovarski because it is "manifestly wrong". The force of that submission is no doubt weakened by the fact that the same conclusion was reached by Justices Campbell and Heneghan. I do not believe that the decisions in Medovarski and Cartwright are "manifestly wrong". Nor am I, with respect, prepared to distinguish those cases, as sought by the Minister, on the basis of the behaviour of the parties in the case at bar. I am not satisfied that in this case a different result should be reached just because a hearing date for the appeal had not been set or because the parties were uncertain as to whether the appeal would continue under the IRPA.

[19] Moreover, if the question before me was a matter of first impression, I would conclude that the IAD erred in its interpretation of section 196 of the IRPA.

[20] Section 192 is the general transitional provision applicable to appeals pending before the IAD when the IRPA came into force. This section acts generally to continue under the former Act appeals before the IAD which were commenced under the former Act. Counsel for the Minister agreed that section 192 applies to appeals which had been commenced by the filing of a notice of appeal and which had not yet been disposed of by the IAD. This intent is reflected by the language in section 192 which refers to the filing of a notice of appeal.

[21] It seems to me that an appeal may be pending, but not disposed of by the IAD, in one of two circumstances. First, a notice of appeal may have been filed but the appeal not yet adjudicated upon by the IAD. Second, the appeal may have been filed and adjudicated, but remained pending because the IAD had stayed the removal order rather than dismissing or allowing the appeal. The IAD thus remained seized of the proceeding in the sense that the IAD would review the case from time to time as contemplated by subsections 74(2) and 74(3) of the former Act.

[22] Turning then to section 196, this provision limits the general principle found in section 192 continuing appeal proceedings. The Minister argues that the general provision is limited by section 196 so that only where the IAD had granted a stay under the former Act does an appeal continue. This submission therefore requires consideration of the jurisdiction of the IAD under the former Act to grant a stay.

[23] That jurisdiction was contained in subsection 73(1) of the former Act. Subsection 73(1) provided that on an appeal brought by a permanent resident against a removal order the IAD "may dispose of" the appeal by allowing it, dismissing it, or by directing that execution of the removal order be stayed. The IAD was given no jurisdiction to issue a stay on an interim basis before a pending appeal was disposed of. A stay could only be ordered by the IAD when disposing of an appeal before it.

[24] It follows that if the Minister's argument is correct, where a person appeals a removal order under the former Act as a result of being sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least two years, there would be no circumstance where an appeal filed but not disposed of by the IAD could be continued under the IRPA. This is because there would be no circumstance where the IAD could have "granted a stay under the former Act" before hearing the appeal.

[25] Put another way, pursuant to section 192 of the IRPA appeals filed under the former Act generally are continued and proceed under the former Act. Under the former Act once an appeal was filed it remained in effect until it was "disposed" of by the IAD in one of three ways. To the extent that section 196 refers to appeals being "discontinued", this contemplates that the appeal had not yet been disposed of by the IAD. However, under the former Act a stay could not have been granted by the IAD while the appeal was pending, but not yet disposed of.

[26] Parliament could have enacted a provision whereby all appeals pending before the IAD upon the coming into force of the IRPA were terminated where the appeal was brought in respect of a removal order based upon the imposition of a term of imprisonment of at least two years. However, that is not what section 196 of the IRPA contemplates because it specifically envisages that in at least some circumstances a granted stay would be in existence so as to allow the appeal to continue.

[27] Section 196, in my respectful view, therefore only has any meaning if it contemplates a statutory stay. As Madam Justice Heneghan succinctly observed in Cartwright, supra, at paragraph 81:

[...] if Parliament had wanted section 196 to apply only to those people with outstanding appeals who actually had stays "granted" under the former Act, then there must have been some provision in the former Act for some Applicants to receive such "granted stays".

[28] Further, sections 196 and 197 of the IRPA should be read together because they both limit the general provision in section 192 continuing appeals under the former Act. Returning to the point that an appeal to the IAD may remain pending in two circumstances, it seems to me that Parliament intended that section 196 and section 197 each deal with one of those two circumstances. Section 196 applies to appeals launched but not heard or disposed of, while section 197 applies to appeals heard but still extant because a stay was issued by the IAD.

[29] The Minister did not argue that section 196 contemplates judicial stays. In any event, Solis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 693 (T.D.) reflected the view of this Court under the former Act that where a statutory stay was in effect, there was no need for the Court to grant a discretionary stay and the Court would decline to do so. Similarly, a number of judges of this Court declined to issue judicial stays where statutory stays were held to exist in the context of subparagraph 49(1)(c)(i) of the former Act. See for example, Ziyadah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 4 F.C. 152 (T.D.) and Kockovski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 6 Imm. L.R. (3^rd) 242 and the authorities reviewed therein by Mr. Justice Blais. The effect of the jurisprudence is that where a person was entitled to the benefit of a statutory stay, a judicial stay was likely not available.

[30] This analysis, in my view, interprets section 196 of the IRPA on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the words used, and on the basis of reading section 196 in its entire context, harmoniously, with the scheme and object of the IRPA and the intention of Parliament. The interpretation that section 196 contemplates a statutory stay avoids the result that there would never be a "granted" stay in respect of an appeal pending with the IAD, but not heard. Under this interpretation there are some cases where section 196 of the Act would operate to remove an appeal pending to the IAD. This was discussed by Madam Justice Snider at paragraphs 43 and 44 in Medovarski, supra.

[31] It follows that I conclude that the Registrar erred by concluding that Mr. Esteban's appeal was discontinued, and that such decision should be set aside.

[32] Counsel agreed that I should certify the same question as certified by the Court in Medovarski.

ORDER

[33] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The application for judicial review is allowed, and the decision of the Registrar of the Immigration Appeal Division made on September 6, 2002 accepting that the applicant's appeal had been discontinued is hereby set aside.

2. The following question is certified:

Does the word "stay" in section 196 of the IRPA contemplate a stay that came into effect under the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as a result of the operation of paragraph 49(1)(b)?

"Eleanor R. Dawson"

_______________________________

Judge

1. Under paragraph 49(1)(b) of the former Act, a deportation order was statutorily stayed where an appeal was filed with the IAD until either the appeal was heard and disposed of, or the IAD declared the appeal to be abandoned. In Solis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 2 F.C. 693 (T.D.), Mr. Justice Gibson concluded that while the issuance of a danger opinion might in some sense dispose of an appeal, the statutory language was conjunctive with respect to the hearing and disposition of the appeal. He concluded that paragraph 49(1)(b) of the former Act required that an appeal be both heard and disposed of before the stay expired. Accordingly, the issuance of a danger opinion did not vitiate a statutory stay unless or until the appeal was heard, or was declared abandoned by the IAD.

In the present case, Mr. Esteban's appeal was neither heard nor declared abandoned as a result of the issuance of the danger opinion while the danger opinion was in effect. By application of the principle articulated in Solis, Mr. Esteban was therefore entitled to have his removal statutorily stayed under the former Act as a result of the appeal he had filed with the IAD.

APPENDIX A

Relevant Provisions of the IRPA:

36(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for

(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;

(b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or

(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.

36(2) A foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of criminality for

(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by way of indictment, or of two offences under any Act of Parliament not arising out of a single occurrence;

(b) having been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence under an Act of Parliament, or of two offences not arising out of a single occurrence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute offences under an Act of Parliament;

(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence under an Act of Parliament; or

(d) committing, on entering Canada, an offence under an Act of Parliament prescribed by regulations.

36(3) The following provisions govern subsections (1) and (2):

(a) an offence that may be prosecuted either summarily or by way of indictment is deemed to be an indictable offence, even if it has been prosecuted summarily;

(b) inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) may not be based on a conviction in respect of which a pardon has been granted and has not ceased to have effect or been revoked under the Criminal Records Act, or in respect of which there has been a final determination of an acquittal;

(c) the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) and (2)(b) and (c) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or foreign national who, after the prescribed period, satisfies the Minister that they have been rehabilitated or who is a member of a prescribed class that is deemed to have been rehabilitated;

(d) a determination of whether a permanent resident has committed an act described in paragraph (1)(c) must be based on a balance of probabilities; and

(e) inadmissibility under subsections (1) and (2) may not be based on an offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Young Offenders Act.

[...]

62. The Immigration Appeal Division is the competent Division of the Board with respect to appeals under this Division.

[...]

64(1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.

64(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years.

64(3) No appeal may be made under subsection 63(1) in respect of a decision that was based on a finding of inadmissibility on the ground of misrepresentation, unless the foreign national in question is the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or child.

[...]

66. After considering the appeal of a decision, the Immigration Appeal Division shall

(a) allow the appeal in accordance with section 67;

(b) stay the removal order in accordance with section 68; or

67(1) To allow an appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at the time that the appeal is disposed of,

(a) the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact;

(b) a principle of natural justice has not been observed; or

(c) other than in the case of an appeal by the Minister, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case.

67(2) If the Immigration Appeal Division allows the appeal, it shall set aside the original decision and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, including the making of a removal order, or refer the matter to the appropriate decision-maker for reconsideration.

68(1) To stay a removal order, the Immigration Appeal Division must be satisfied, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, that sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case.

68(2) Where the Immigration Appeal Division stays the removal order

(a) it shall impose any condition that is prescribed and may impose any condition that it considers necessary;

(b) all conditions imposed by the Immigration Division are cancelled;

(d) it may cancel the stay, on application or on its own initiative.

68(3) If the Immigration Appeal Division has stayed a removal order, it may at any time, on application or on its own initiative, reconsider the appeal under this Division.

68(4) If the Immigration Appeal Division has stayed a removal order against a permanent resident or a foreign national who was found inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality or criminality, and they are convicted of another offence referred to in subsection 36(1), the stay is cancelled by operation of law and the appeal is terminated.

69(1) The Immigration Appeal Division shall dismiss an appeal if it does not allow the appeal or stay the removal order, if any.

69(2) In the case of an appeal by the Minister respecting a permanent resident or a protected person, other than a person referred to in subsection 64(1), if the Immigration Appeal Division is satisfied that, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case, it may make and may stay the applicable removal order, or dismiss the appeal, despite being satisfied of a matter set out in paragraph 67(1)(a) or (b).

69(3) If the Immigration Appeal Division dismisses an appeal made under subsection 63(4) and the permanent resident is in Canada, it shall make a removal order.

[...]

36(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants_:

a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d'une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans ou d'une infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est infligé;

b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans;

c) commettre, à l'extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans.

36(2) Emportent, sauf pour le résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour criminalité les faits suivants_:

a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d'une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation ou de deux infractions à toute loi fédérale qui ne découlent pas des mêmes faits;

b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation ou de deux infractions qui ne découlent pas des mêmes faits et qui, commises au Canada, constitueraient des infractions à des lois fédérales;

c) commettre, à l'extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation;

d) commettre, à son entrée au Canada, une infraction qui constitue une infraction à une loi fédérale précisée par règlement.

36(3) Les dispositions suivantes régissent l'application des paragraphes (1) et (2)_:

a) l'infraction punissable par mise en accusation ou par procédure sommaire est assimilée à l'infraction punissable par mise en accusation, indépendamment du mode de poursuite effectivement retenu;

b) la déclaration de culpabilité n'emporte pas interdiction de territoire en cas de verdict d'acquittement rendu en dernier ressort ou de réhabilitation - sauf cas de révocation ou de nullité - au titre de la Loi sur le casier judiciaire;

c) les faits visés aux alinéas (1)b) ou c) et (2)b) ou c) n'emportent pas interdiction de territoire pour le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui, à l'expiration du délai réglementaire, convainc le ministre de sa réadaptation ou qui appartient à une catégorie réglementaire de personnes présumées réadaptées;

d) la preuve du fait visé à l'alinéa (1)c) est, s'agissant du résident permanent, fondée sur la prépondérance des probabilités;

e) l'interdiction de territoire ne peut être fondée sur une infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions ni sur une infraction à la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants.

[...]

62. La Section d'appel de l'immigration est la section de la Commission qui connaît de l'appel visé à la présente section.

[...]

64(1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant.

64(2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans.

64(3) N'est pas susceptible d'appel au titre du paragraphe 63(1) le refus fondé sur l'interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations, sauf si l'étranger en cause est l'époux ou le conjoint de fait du répondant ou son enfant.

[...]

66. Il est statué sur l'appel comme il suit_:

a) il y fait droit conformément à l'article 67;

b) il est sursis à la mesure de renvoi conformément à l'article 68;

c) il est rejeté conformément à l'article 69.

67(1) Il est fait droit à l'appel sur preuve qu'au moment où il en est disposé_:

a) la décision attaquée est erronée en droit, en fait ou en droit et en fait;

b) il y a eu manquement à un principe de justice naturelle;

c) sauf dans le cas de l'appel du ministre, il y a - compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché - des motifs d'ordre humanitaire justifiant, vu les autres circonstances de l'affaire, la prise de mesures spéciales.

67(2) La décision attaquée est cassée; y est substituée celle, accompagnée, le cas échéant, d'une mesure de renvoi, qui aurait dû être rendue, ou l'affaire est renvoyée devant l'instance compétente.

68(1) Il est sursis à la mesure de renvoi sur preuve qu'il y a - compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché - des motifs d'ordre humanitaire justifiant, vu les autres circonstances de l'affaire, la prise de mesures spéciales.

68(2) La section impose les conditions prévues par règlement et celles qu'elle estime indiquées, celles imposées par la Section de l'immigration étant alors annulées; les conditions non réglementaires peuvent être modifiées ou levées; le sursis est révocable d'office ou sur demande.

68(3) Par la suite, l'appel peut, sur demande ou d'office, être repris et il en est disposé au titre de la présente section.

68(4) Le sursis de la mesure de renvoi pour interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité ou criminalité est révoqué de plein droit si le résident permanent ou l'étranger est reconnu coupable d'une autre infraction mentionnée au paragraphe 36(1), l'appel étant dès lors classé.

69(1) L'appel est rejeté s'il n'y est pas fait droit ou si le sursis n'est pas prononcé.

69(2) L'appel du ministre contre un résident permanent ou une personne protégée non visée par le paragraphe 64(1) peut être rejeté ou la mesure de renvoi applicable, assortie d'un sursis, peut être prise, même si les motifs visés aux alinéas 67(1)a) ou b) sont établis, sur preuve qu'il y a - compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché - des motifs d'ordre humanitaire justifiant, vu les autres circonstances de l'affaire, la prise de mesures spéciales.

69(3) Si elle rejette l'appel formé au titre du paragraphe 63(4), la section prend une mesure de renvoi contre le résident permanent en cause qui se trouve au Canada.

[...]

Relevant Provisions of the former Act:

49(1) Subject to subsection (1.1), the execution of a removal order made against a person is stayed

[...]

(b) in any case where an appeal from the order has been filed with the Appeal Division, until the appeal has been heard and disposed of or has been declared by the Appeal Division to be abandoned;

[...]

73(1) The Appeal Division may dispose of an appeal made pursuant to section 70

(a) by allowing it;

(b) by dismissing it;

(c) in the case of an appeal made pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b) or 70(3)(b) respecting a removal order, by directing that execution of the order be stayed; or

(d) in the case of an appeal made pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b) or 70(3)(b) respecting a conditional removal order, by directing that execution of the order on its becoming effective be stayed.

[...]

74(1) Where the Appeal Division allows an appeal made pursuant to section 70, it shall quash the removal order or conditional removal order that was made against the appellant and may

(a) make any other removal order or conditional removal order that should have been made; or

(b) in the case of an appellant other than a permanent resident, direct that the appellant be examined as a person seeking admission at a port of entry.

(2) Where the Appeal Division disposes of an appeal by directing that execution of a removal order or conditional removal order be stayed, the person concerned shall be allowed to come into or remain in Canada under such terms and conditions as the Appeal Division may determine and the Appeal Division shall review the case from time to time as it considers necessary or advisable.

(3) Where the Appeal Division has disposed of an appeal by directing that execution of a removal order or conditional removal order be stayed, the Appeal Division may, at any time,

(a) amend any terms and conditions imposed under subsection (2) or impose new terms and conditions; or

(b) cancel its direction staying the execution of the order and

(i) dismiss the appeal and direct that the order be executed as soon as reasonably practicable, or

(ii) allow the appeal and take any other action that it might have taken pursuant to subsection (1).

49(1) Sauf dans les cas mentionnés au paragraphe (1.1), il est sursis à l'exécution d'une mesure de renvoi:

[...]

b) en cas d'appel, jusqu'à ce que la section d'appel ait rendu sa décision ou déclaré qu'il y a eu désistement d'appel;

[...]

73(1) Ayant à statuer sur un appel interjeté dans le cadre de l'article 70, la section d'appel peut:

a) soit y faire droit;

b) soit le rejeter;

c) soit, s'il s'agit d'un appel fondé sur les alinéas 70(1)b) ou 70(3)b) et relatif à une mesure de renvoi, ordonner de surseoir à l'exécution de celle-ci;

d) soit, s'il s'agit d'un appel fondé sur les alinéas 70(1)b) ou 70(3)b) et relatif à une mesure de renvoi conditionnel, ordonner de surseoir à l'exécution de celle-ci au moment où elle deviendra exécutoire.

[...]

74(1) Si elle fait droit à un appel interjeté dans le cadre de l'article 70, la section d'appel annule la mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel et peut:

a) soit lui substituer celle qui aurait dû être prise;

b) soit ordonner, sauf s'il s'agit d'un résident permanent, que l'appelant fasse l'objet d'un interrogatoire comme s'il demandait l'admission à un point d'entrée.

(2) En cas de sursis d'exécution de la mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel, l'appelant est autorisé à entrer ou à demeurer au Canada aux éventuelles conditions fixées par la section d'appel. Celle-ci réexamine le cas en tant que de besoin.

(3) Dans le cas visé au paragraphe (2), la section d'appel peut, à tout moment:

a) modifier les conditions imposées ou en imposer de nouvelles;

b) annuler son ordre de surseoir à l'exécution de la mesure, et parallèlement:

(i) soit rejeter l'appel et ordonner l'exécution dès que les circonstances le permettent,

(ii) soit procéder conformément au paragraphe (1).

FEDERAL COURT

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: IMM-4491-02

STYLE OF CAUSE: Julio Esteban v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration

PLACE OF HEARING: Winnipeg, Manitoba

DATE OF HEARING: July 7, 2003

REASONS FOR ORDER:

AND ORDER: Hon. Madam Justice Dawson

DATED: July 29, 2003

APPEARANCES:

David Matas FOR THE APPLICANT

Aliyah Rahaman FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

David Matas

Barrister and Solicitor

Winnipeg, Manitoba FOR THE APPLICANT

Morris Rosenberg

Deputy Attorney General FOR THE RESPONDENT

of Canada

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Esteban v. Canada (Minister of citizenship and immigration), 2003 FC 930

Citations2003 FC 930

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2003 FC 930