Canadian Steel Producers Association v. Commissioner of Customs, 2003 FC 1311

Date: 20031110

Docket: T-654-01

Citation: 2003FC1311

BETWEEN:

                              CANADIAN STEEL PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION

                                                   and STELCO INC.

                                                                                                                                                  Applicants

                                                                                 and

                        THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND REVENUE

                                                                                                                                               Respondent

                                                                and

                                                                 DOFASCO INC.

Intervenor

                                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH

Introduction                                                                                                               1

The Parties                                                                                                                5

The Evidence                                                                                                             9

The Decision                                                                                                             11

The Investigation                                                                                                       14

The Domestic Producers' Interest in the Investigation                               19

The Electrohome Decision                                                                                       23

The Legislative History                                                                               29

The Guidelines                                                                                            30

The Practice in the United States                                                                             33

The Issue                                                                                                                   36

Statutory Interpretation                                                                               38

Conclusions                                                                                                               40

                                                            REASONS FOR ORDER

SIMPSON, J.

Introduction

[1]                 On February 16, 2001 Dofasco Inc. ("Dofasco") filed a written complaint under subsection 32(1) of the Special Import Measures Act 1984, c. 25, s. 1 (the "Complaint" and the "SIMA"). The Complaint alleged the injurious dumping of cold-rolled steel sheet exported to Canada from nine countries. They were: Brazil, Chinese Taipei, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and South Africa (collectively the "Exporters"). The three Canadian domestic producers of cold-rolled steel sheet, in addition to Dofasco, wrote to the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (the "CCRA") and expressed their support for Dofasco's Complaint. Those producers were Stelco Inc. ("Stelco"), Algoma Steel Inc. ("Algoma") and Ispat Sidbec Inc. ("Sidbec"). The four Canadian producers will be referred to collectively as the "Domestic Producers".

[2]                 On March 12, 2001, in response to the Complaint, the Commissioner of the CCRA (the "Commissioner") initiated a dumping investigation (the "Investigation") pursuant to subsection 31(1) of the SIMA.

[3]                 In a letter dated March 28, 2001 to Mr. Robert Séguin ("Mr. Séguin") the Acting Director General of the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate within the CCRA, counsel for Stelco expressed the view that, under subsection 84(3) of the SIMA, he was entitled to access to all the confidential information provided to the Commissioner by the Exporters in the course of the Investigation (the "Confidential Information"). He asked for access to the Confidential Information on behalf of counsel for all the Domestic Producers on the basis that they all had a significant interest in the outcome of the Investigation.

[4]                 On April 3, 2001, Mr. Séguin decided, on the Commissioner's behalf, to deny Stelco's counsel's request for access to the Confidential Information (the "Decision"). This application is for judicial review of Mr. Séguin's Decision.

The Parties

The Applicants

[5]                 The Canadian Steel Producers Association (the "CSPA") represents primary steel producers. Its eleven members operate sixteen plants and account for one hundred percent of Canadian primary steel production. The four Domestic Producers are members of the CSPA.

[6]                 Stelco is an applicant because, as noted above, its counsel wrote the letter dated March 28, 2001 asking Mr. Séguin to provide counsel for the Domestic Producers with access to the Confidential Information. The Decision denying access was made in response to this letter.

The Intervenor

[7]                 On October 22, 2001, Dofasco was given leave to intervene in this application by Prothonotary Lafrenière. Because it filed the Complaint, Dofasco was recognized as an interested party for the purpose of this judicial review proceeding.

The Respondent

[8]                 The Commissioner received the Complaint and started the Investigation. Mr. Séguin, on the Commissioner's behalf, made the Decision of April 3, 2001 denying counsel for the Domestic Producers access to the Confidential Information.

The Evidence

[9]                 Mr. Donald Belch made an affidavit dated May 11, 2001 on behalf of the CSPA and Stelco (the "Applicants' Affidavit"). On Dofasco's behalf, Mr. Dennis Martin swore an affidavit dated September 25, 2001 (the "Intervenor's Affidavit").

[10]            Mr. Wayne Neamtz swore an affidavit dated June 14, 2001 (the "Respondent's Affidavit") and a transcript of his cross-examination thereon is dated July 6, 2001 (the "Transcript"). At that time, he had been with the CCRA's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Directorate since 1978 and had been the Acting Director of Operational Policy since 1999.

The Decision

[11]            The Decision read in part:

I have read your submission with interest, however, I have decided not to grant access to the requested information to you by reason that you are not counsel to a party to the proceeding under consideration.

I can appreciate that your client has a significant interest in the outcome of the investigation. However, as outlined in the CCRA policy, a SIMA case is not a single proceeding that extends from the filing of a complaint to final decisions by the CCRA and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal. Rather, it is a series of distinct proceedings. The policy lists the various proceedings and the parties to each specific proceeding, which are critical on [sic] rendering a decision to allow the disclosure of confidential information. These administrative guidelines identify the exporters and importers who actively participate in the investigation as the only parties to the dumping investigation proceeding. It is for this reason that you are not entitled to access to confidential information with respect to the dumping investigation.

[my emphasis]

[12]            In his cross-examination, Mr. Neamtz elaborated on the reasons for the Decision when he said at page 127 of the Transcript that access to the Confidential Information was denied because, in the Commissioner's view:

a)          Domestic producers do not participate actively in investigations because, if they supply information, they do so on a voluntary basis; and

b)          Domestic producers are only indirectly (although significantly) interested in the outcome of investigations.

[13]            In other words, in the Commissioner's view, a party to an investigation must be an active participant with a direct interest in its outcome.

The Investigation

[14]            This description of the Commissioner's powers in relation to an investigation under the SIMA is taken from paragraph 35 of the Respondent's Memorandum of Fact and Law.

1. Domestic producers make a complaint to the Commissioner.

                                                                                                                                              s. 31(1)

     --         The complaint must be supported by domestic producers representing:

-50% of the production by producers of like goods who express either support for or opposition to the complaint, and

-25% of total domestic production of like goods.

·                 If not, no investigation is initiated.

                                                                                                                                              s. 31(2)

     --         Within 21 days, the Commissioner must determine whether the complaint is properly documented.

·                 If not, no investigation is initiated

                                                                                                                                              s. 32(1)

2. Within 30 days after determining that the complaint is properly documented, the Commissioner decides whether to initiate an investigation.

                                                                                                                                              s. 31(1)

     --         The Commissioner must form the opinion that there is evidence of dumping and a reasonable indication of injury.

·                 If not, no investigation is initiated.

                                                                                                                                              s. 31(1)

·                 If no investigation is initiated, the Commissioner must notify the complainant.

                                                                                                                                              s. 33(1)

·                 If no investigation is initiated on the ground that there is no reasonable indication of injury, the Commissioner or the complainant may refer the question to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("CITT").

                                                                                                                                              s. 33(2)

·                 Upon such reference, if the CITT decides that the evidence discloses a reasonable indication of injury, the Commissioner must initiate an investigation.

                                                                                                                                              s. 31(8)

3. The Commissioner then initiates the investigation

     --         Upon initiation, the Commissioner must give notice to the complainant, to affected importers and exporters, and to the public.

                                                                                                                                         s. 34(1)(a)

     --         The Commissioner terminates the investigation if he is satisfied that:

·                 the evidence of dumping is insufficient,

·                 the margin of dumping is insignificant, or

·                 the actual or potential volume of dumped goods is negligible

                                                                                                                                              s. 35(1)

·                 The Commissioner must give notice to the complainant, interested importers, exporters, and governments, and to the public.

                                                                                                                                              s. 35(2)

     --         Within 90 days, where the investigation has not been terminated, the Commissioner makes a preliminary determination of dumping and specifies estimated margins.

                                                                                                                                                   s. 38

     --         When a preliminary determination is made, the Commissioner may impose provisional duties.

s. 8

[15]            The evidence shows that filing a properly documented complaint under the SIMA is an onerous task and that complaints run to hundreds of pages. For this reason, the parties agreed that Dofasco would file the full Complaint and the other Domestic Producers would provide support. According to counsel for the applicants, Dofasco submitted a properly documented complaint in which it estimated the margin or extent of the dumping (the "Margin").

[16]            When Stelco, Algoma and Sidbec (together the "Supporters") wrote the CCRA to support Dofasco's Complaint, they each provided statistics dealing with their production and sale of cold-rolled steel sheet. The combination of the information in the Complaint and in the Supporters' correspondence satisfied the Commissioner that the Complaint was properly documented and that an investigation was warranted under subsection 31(1) of the SIMA. The resulting Investigation was initiated on March 12, 2001.

[17]            During the Investigation, the Commissioner sent the Exporters a document entitled "Request for Information". The data received in response to the request were verified by the CCRA. The CCRA also asked for additional information from the Domestic Producers and it was provided on a voluntary basis.

[18]            The evidence disclosed that, although an estimated Margin was included in the Complaint and was supported by the Domestic Producers, the Commissioner would form an independent conclusion about the Margin based on the Complaint, on the Exporters' responses to Requests for Information and on additional information provided by the Domestic Producers on a voluntary basis at the Commissioner's request. In the context of the Investigation, Mr. Séguin's Decision means that the Commissioner will not receive unsolicited information from counsel for the Domestic Producers commenting on the adequacy and the reliability of the Confidential Information provided by the Exporters.

The Domestic Producers' Interest in the Investigation

[19]            The Domestic Producers allege that they want their counsel to have access to the Confidential Information so that they can make submissions to the Commissioner based on their industry expertise about the adequacy and/or reliability of the Exporters' Confidential Information and about an appropriate figure for the Margin. Counsel for the Domestic Producers want to be able to influence the size of the Margin at the Investigation stage because, once the Commissioner has set the Margin, it cannot be challenged and is treated as a "given" in a subsequent hearing before the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (the "CITT"). The CITT's mandate is to use a number of factors, including the Margin set by the Commissioner, to determine (i) whether injury is being caused by the dumping and (ii) whether duties should be imposed.

[20]            Mr. Neamtz was asked on his cross-examination whether, if other factors were equal, a higher Margin would make it more likely (i) that the CITT would conclude that the dumping caused injury and (ii) that the CITT would impose duties. He refused to acknowledge either likelihood. Further, although he did agree with Mr. Séguin that the Domestic Producers have a "significant interest" in responding to counterclaims made by the Exporters in the course of the Investigation, he would not admit that their interest could be described as "direct".

[21]            The Applicants' Affidavit states in paragraph 30 that there is "...no issue that the Canadian industry has a great deal at stake in the outcome of the Commissioner's investigation." Unfortunately, the deponent did not elaborate on this statement and describe exactly what is at stake. Similarly, the Intervenor's Affidavit says that Dofasco has a great deal at stake and a direct interest in the outcome of the Investigation.

[22]            Counsel for the Respondent conceded that, although there is no legal causal relationship between the size of the Margin of dumping and the likelihood that injury will be found, it is more likely, in practice, that a higher Margin of dumping will result in an injury finding and the imposition of duties. In other words, the outcome of the Investigation will affect the magnitude of the economic relief given to the Domestic Producers.

The Electrohome Decision

[23]            Counsel for the Applicants submitted that the Federal Court has already decided that his clients are parties to the Investigation. In this regard he referred to Electrohome Limited et al v. Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Custom and Excise), [1986] 2 F.C. 344 ("Electrohome"). In that case, the issue was whether counsel for the companies, which had filed complaints about the alleged dumping of Korean colour televisions, were entitled to access to the confidential information supplied by the exporters during the CCRA's investigation. At that time, subsection 84(3) of the SIMA was written in a permissive and not in its present mandatory form. In Electrohome, the respondent argued that the decision about whether to divulge confidential information was discretionary but also took the position that the CCRA is taking on this application which is that Dofasco as the complainant is not a party to the Investigation and, therefore, not party to the proceedings within the meaning of subsection 84(3) of the SIMA.

[24]            At the time of the Electrohome decision, subsection 84(3) read as follows:

[25]            In Electrohome, as in the present case, the complainants' counsel argued that they wanted the confidential information provided by the Korean exporters so that they could make meaningful submissions in an effort to ensure that the CCRA correctly calculated the margin of dumping.

[26]            After dealing with the discretionary nature of subsection 84(3), Rouleau J. considered whether the complainants fell within subsection 84(3). In this regard, His Lordship said:

Alternatively, the applicants argue that if the word "may" in subsection 84(3) is construed as permissive, the Deputy Minister has failed to exercise his discretion or has capriciously exercised it, in that he has based his decision not to release the confidential information on the fact that he does not consider the applicants to be "parties to the proceedings" as is required by subsection 84(3). In his letter of December 30, 1985 to the applicants, the Deputy Minister stated that it was the Department's policy to consider the complainants in an anti-dumping case not to be parties to the proceedings, and therefore counsel for the complainants are not entitled to the information. I would like to now dispose of this argument made by the Crown. The applicants argue that they are parties to the proceedings by virtue of the wording in subsection 84(3) which allows for disclosure of confidential information provided to the Deputy Minister in any proceeding under the Act to "counsel for any party to those proceedings or to other proceedings under this Act arising out of those proceedings". I am of the opinion that the applicants are parties to "other proceedings under this Act arising out of those proceedings" and as such could be entitled to the confidential information. As a result the Crown's argument in this regard must fail.

[my emphasis]

[27]            I have found this paragraph difficult to understand because, in my view, "those proceedings" are the ones in which confidential information is supplied to the Commissioner. In Electrohome, the confidential information was received during the investigation. Accordingly, neither the complaint nor the investigation could have been a proceeding arising out of "those proceedings".

[28]            In my view, under subsection 84(3), counsel for Dofasco, as the complainant, and counsel for the Supporters are only entitled to the Confidential Information provided during the Investigation if:

(i)          they are treated as a party to the Investigation, or;

(ii)         they are treated as a party to subsequent proceedings arising out of the Investigation.

On the facts of this case (ii) cannot apply because the matter has not passed the Investigation stage. Accordingly, the only issue is whether Dofasco and its Supporters can be considered to be parties to the Investigation and Electrohome does not squarely address this issue. Accordingly, I have determined that Electrohome does not assist the Domestic Producers.

Legislative History

[29]            In this section I have, in large measure, reproduced in Part I, section C of the Applicants' Memorandum of Fact and Law. The underlined emphasis was in the Memorandum.

Parliamentary Review of SIMA

On May 17, 1996, the Finance Minister asked the Standing Committee on Finance and on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the House of Commons to jointly review SIMA and to advise the Government if any changes should be made to the law. The Standing Committee on Finance subsequently struck the Sub-Committee on SIMA Review, and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade assigned its Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes to work jointly with the Sub-Committee on SIMA Review to carry out the task of reviewing SIMA (collectively the "Sub-Committees").

In carrying out their mandate to report to Parliament in December 1996, the Sub-Committees conducted nine hearings, heard witnesses from 32 individuals or groups, and received written briefs from an additional eight individuals or groups. The Sub-Committees also received comments from the agencies responsible for administering SIMA.

The conclusion of the Sub-Committees following the completion of the hearing process was that SIMA was working well and that the SIMA legislation and process should be continued subject to certain modification addressed in the December 1996 Report of the Sub-Committees (the "Report"):

However, there were a number of proposal for changes to SIMA. It is the opinion of the Sub-Committees that these proposals did not represent opposition to SIMA, but were rather an attempt to modify the balance struck between producers and downstream users of imported products and consumers. Further, the proposals addressed dissimilarities between the Canadian and U.S. trade remedy systems, or were intended to improve procedural aspects of SIMA administration. These proposals are addressed in the various sections below.

One of the modifications recommended by the sub-Committees was in respect of the policy of the Deputy Minister of National Revenue (the predecessor to the Respondent) with respect to providing counsel access to confidential information. The Sub-Committees refer to the representations from the CSPA in their Report as follows:

The Canadian Steel Producers Association submitted that SIMA should be amended to provide counsel increased access to confidential information in anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigations conducted by Revenue Canada. There are two principal arguments in favour of greater disclosure. First, it would allow interested parties to make rebuttal submissions thus improving the quality and reliability of evidence. Second, it would result in greater procedural fairness and lead to greater consistency with U.S. policies that are applied to Canadian producers exporting to that country.

The Report also refers to arguments made against the granting of greater access to counsel to confidential information acquired by Revenue Canada (now the CCRA) in its anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigations:

However, a number of points were offered against any such proposal. It was contended that broader exposure to confidential information would result in parties becoming less forthcoming and would both lengthen the investigation process and render it more adversarial, thus substantially increasing the costs. Also, current SIMA timeframes might need to be extended to accommodate the consideration of rebuttal submissions and SIMA would have to be amended to provide for penalties to discipline the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by counsel.

The Sub-Committees nevertheless determined that increased access should be provided by Revenue Canada, and explained the rationale for this recommendation as follows:

The Sub-Committees recognize that Revenue Canada has established a reasonable practice for handling confidential information. However, the large majority of Canadian exports go to the United States, and in that country the U.S. practice of affording access to confidential information often leads to an increase in the information burden on Canadian exporters who are subject to U.S. investigations. In the interest of level playing field, the Sub-Committees recommend that SIMA should be amended to provide counsel increased access to confidential information in anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigations conducted by Revenue Canada. The Sub-Committees note that this recommendation promotes overall balance in this report.

The Sub-Committees also went on to note in their Report that implementation of the recommendation requiring greater access to counsel to the confidential information in an anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigation "will require the introduction of penalty provisions in SIMA for the unauthorized released by counsel of confidential information."

The Canadian Government supported the Sub-Committees' recommendation that SIMA should be amended to provide counsel increased access to confidential information in anti-dumping/countervailing duty investigations conducted by Revenue Canada. In supporting this recommendation, the Government noted as follows:

SIMA and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act (CITT Act) respectively provide the Deputy Minister of National Revenue and the CITT with the discretion to grant counsel for a party restricted access to confidential information. However, while the CITT regularly affords counsel access to confidential information in SIMA injury inquiries, Revenue Canada's policy has been to provide access to confidential information only in those cases where the Deputy Minister is of the opinion that the non-confidential summary is inadequate to convey a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information.

In addition to providing greater consistency in the treatment of confidential information throughout the investigation process, adoption of this recommendation would introduce greater procedural fairness into the SIMA process and improve the overall quality and reliability of the evidence upon which SIMA determinations are based by affording parties an opportunity to make informed rebuttal submissions. The recommendation could be implemented by amending the Act to require disclosure of confidential information to counsel for a party (subject to appropriate conditions and protective undertakings).

The concern was expressed that more liberal access to confidential information might require the extension of current SIMA time-frames in order to accomodate the consideration by Revenue Canada of rebuttal submissions. However, the Government believes that it should be possible to deal with these submissions within existing time-frames.

Finally, the concern that parties might be less forthcoming with sensitive business information if such information was routinely accessible to counsel for their competitors, could be minimized by providing appropriate penalties for the unauthorized release of confidential information. In this regard, the Government agrees with the Sub-Committees' view that a liberalisation of SIMA's counsel disclosure policy would have to be accompanied by appropriate statutory penalties for the unauthorized release of confidential information by counsel.

SIMA was thereafter amended on December 1, 1998 by Bill C-35, which received Royal Assent on March 25, 1999. Subsection 84(3) of SIMA became effective on April 15, 2000.

The Guidelines

[30]            The Commissioner submits that the Guidelines on the Disclosure of Confidential Information Provisions of the SIMA of April 2000 (the "Guidelines") take a restrictive approach to subsection 84(3) of the SIMA to encourage exporters to cooperate with an investigation. However, there was no evidence that any exporters had expressed concern about the prospect of wider dissemination of their confidential information.

[31]            The Guidelines were drafted in preparation for the April 15, 2000 amendments to the SIMA. Since the SIMA does not define either "parties" or "proceedings" in the context of an investigation, the Guidelines have filled this gap by providing that:

[32]            Appendix I to the Guidelines lists a total of fourteen distinct SIMA proceedings. The first three are relevant and are set out in Schedule "A" hereto. The Guidelines provide that only complainants are parties to a complaint and those who support it are non-parties at the complaint stage. During an investigation, only exporters who participate "actively" by providing information pursuant to a "Request for Information" are considered parties. Domestic producers, including complainants, are not treated as parties even if, as in this case, they provide data to support a complaint and voluntarily respond to the Commissioner's request for financial statements and cost and profitability data for the domestic market.

The Practice in the United States

[33]            The United States' Federal Register dated Monday, May 19, 1997, Part II, Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration 19 CFR Part 351 et al dealing with Antidumping and Countervailing Duties provides a definition, at Vol. 62, No. 96, page 27381, of a "Party to a Proceeding". It reads as follows:

Party to the proceeding. "Party to the proceeding" means any interested party that actively participates, through written submissions of factual information or written argument, in a segment of a proceeding. Participation in a prior segment of a proceeding will not confer on any interested party "party to the proceeding" status in a subsequent segment.

It also defines a "Segment of Proceeding" as:

Segment of proceeding

(1) In general. An antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding consists of one or more segments. "Segment of a proceeding" or segment of the proceeding" refers to a portion of the proceeding that is reviewable under section 516A of the Act.          

(2) Examples. An antidumping or countervailing duty investigation or a review of an order or suspended investigation, or a scope inquiry under § 351.225, each would constitute a segment of a proceeding.

[34]            When these provisions are compared to the definitions and illustrations in the Guidelines, it becomes apparent that the US definitions are more inclusive. In the US, a party must be interested. In Canada there must be a direct interest. As well, in the US there must be active participation in the form of factual or legal submissions in a segment of a proceeding. In Canada active participation is also required but the threshold is higher. It cannot be voluntary. For example, those domestic producers who support a complaint with additional evidence or who are asked to provide data to the Commissioner during an investigation are not treated as parties. Only exporters who are required to complete a response to a Commissioner's formal Request for Information are accorded party status.

[35]            This comparison is relevant because, as noted above, when Parliament amended subsection 84(3) of the SIMA on April 15, 2000 it intended to bring the SIMA disclosure provisions closer to the US practice in which it is undisputed that counsel for interested parties are given access to confidential information obtained during dumping investigations whether or not their interest is "direct" and whether or not their active participation is voluntary.

The Issue

[36]            There was no dispute that the Investigation was a proceeding under the SIMA. Accordingly, the issue can be stated as follows. Are the Complainant and its Supporters parties to the Investigation for the purpose of subsection 84(3) of the SIMA?

[37]            Subsection 84(3), in its amended mandatory form, now reads:

Statutory Interpretation

[38]            In Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Mr. Justice Iacobucci of the Supreme Court of Canada made the following statement about the proper approach to be taken to statutory interpretation. At page 4 of his decision for a unanimous Court, he said:

Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2^nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states:

Today there is only one principle or approach namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.

[39]            He also considered section 10 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 219. It does not apply in this case but section 12 of its Federal counterpart the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 is similar and it says:

Conclusions

[40]            The starting point must be the purpose of the SIMA. It was aptly described in Electrohome in the following terms:

Generally, the purpose of the Special Import Measures Act is to protect Canadian manufacturers and producers from the dumping of goods into the Canadian market which results from goods being imported into Canada at lower prices than they would be sold in their home market. The domestic market is entitled to protection under the Act if it is established that dumped goods have caused or threaten to cause injury to Canadian production of the same goods. Anti-dumping duty may be levied on these imports to offset the price advantage caused by dumping.

Simply stated, the SIMA is economic legislation which was established, in part, to deal with complaints about goods dumped into Canada.

[41]            In my view, the overarching proceeding is the resolution of the Complaint. This resolution may be achieved in a variety of ways. At one extreme, a complaint may be dismissed without an investigation or, at the other extreme, it may lead to an investigation which establishes the Margin of dumping and the imposition of interim duties and then to a CITT hearing which establishes that injury has been caused by dumping and imposes final duties.

[42]            The Guidelines, which do not have the force of law, provide that both Dofasco and its Supporters are not parties to the Investigation. The Commissioner says this is so because (i) they are not "directly" interested in the sense that their interest, although significant, is only economic and not a question of legal rights and (ii) because their involvement in the Investigation is only voluntary.

[43]            This position is asserted by the Commissioner even though:

-            Dofasco and its Supporters were required to estimate the Margin at the time the Complaint was submitted;

-            Dofasco and its Supporters voluntarily supplied information at the Commissioner's request during the Investigation ;

-            Counsel for the Domestic Producers are in the best position to provide information about the domestic market and about the reliability of the Confidential Information provided by the Exporters.

-            The Investigation establishes a margin which in practice affects the likelihood of a later finding of injury and the imposition of duties by the CITT.

-            The Complainant and the Supporters are entitled to participate in the injury hearing before the CITT.

-            The Commissioner acknowledges that the Domestic Producers have a significant interest in the outcome of the Investigation.

[44]            The Legislative history behind the recent amendments to the SIMA makes it clear (i) that disclosure is to be broader (because it became mandatory instead of discretionary), (ii) that confidentiality is to be respected (access remained limited to counsel and stiff penalties were provided), (iii) that subsection 84(3) of the SIMA is intended to align the SIMA with the practice in the United States where counsel for interested (not "directly" interested) parties who voluntarily participate in an investigation are given access to confidential information and (iv) that Parliament believed that information provided by the Domestic Producers would improve the quality of the evidence on which the Commissioner would base his calculation of the Margin.

[45]            For all these reasons, I have concluded that the Decision must be set aside because it is based on the Guidelines and they frustrate the intention of Parliament. Accordingly, the Complainant and its Supporters are entitled to access to the Confidential Information under subsection 84(3) of the SIMA on the basis that, in the circumstances of this case, they are parties to the Investigation which generated the Confidential Information.

                 "Sandra J. Simpson"          

JUDGE

Ottawa, Ontario

November 10, 2003

                                           SCHEDULE "A"

Appendix 1

Identification of SIMA Proceedings Conducted by the Commissioner and the Parties to the Proceedings

Annexe 1

Détermination des procédures LMSI menées par le Commissaire et des parties à ces procédures

                                       FEDERAL COURT

    NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:             T-654-01

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                        Canadian Steel Producers Association et al.

v.

The Commissioner of Customs and Revenue and Dofasco Inc.

PLACE OF HEARING:                                   Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:                                     April 28, 2003

REASONS FOR ORDER OF the Honourable Madam Justice Simpson

DATED:                 November 10, 2003

APPEARANCES:

Mr. Riyaz Dattu                                                                  FOR APPLICANTS

Mr. Geoff R. Hall

Mr. F.B. Woyiwada                                                                       FOR RESPONDENT

Ms. Laurel Broten                                                               FOR INTERVENOR

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Mccarthy Tétrault LLP                                                                  FOR APPLICANTS

Toronto, Ontario

Morris Rosenberg                                                               FOR RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Ottawa, Ontario

Bennett Jones LLP                                                              FOR INTERVENOR

Toronto, Ontario