Date: 20061011
Docket: IMM-6469-05
Citation: 2006 FC 1206
OTTAWA, Ontario, October 11, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Paul U.C. Rouleau
BETWEEN:
HAJI
DIADAMA
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to section 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) for judicial review of a
decision of M. Clive Joakim, a member of the Immigration Refugee Board (“the
Panel”) dated October 5, 2005, wherein the Panel held that the applicant was
not a Convention refugee pursuant to s. 96 of the IRPA and was not a
person in need of protection pursuant to s. 97 of the IRPA.
[2]
Mr.
Haji Diadama is a 34 year-old citizen of Liberia and claims
protection on the grounds of religion and membership in a particular social
group. Mr. Diadama is a Mandingo Muslim and claims his parents are forcing
him into a marriage not of his choosing. Mr. Diadama has a Christian
girlfriend – Ms. Nyima Konteh - and his parents are not supporters of
inter-faith relationships. In 1999, Mr. Diadama’s parents brought a Muslim
woman – Ms. Nato Camara – to his house telling him that he must marry her,
and he must have sexual relations with her to prove his manhood. When he
refused, Mr. Diadama alleges that his family beat him, breaking his wrist and
thumb.
[3]
Mr.
Diadama broke of relations with his Christian girlfriend, Ms. Konteh, in 2000.
During 2000-2003 his family did not harass him regarding relationships.
However, in 2004, Mr. Diadama started seeing Ms. Konteh again. In May
2004, Mr. Diadama attended a Christian Church with Ms. Konteh to witness
her sister’s marriage. Upon leaving the Church, Mr. Diadama was seen by
members of the Muslim community who believed that he was going to convert to
Christianity and later assaulted him at his house breaking his nose. Mr.
Diadama stopped the assault by agreeing to marry a Muslim woman of his parents
choosing. Mr. Diadama did not go to the police as he feared that the
police would not help him and may even assist in torturing him. Mr. Diadama
fled Liberia before his
bride-to-be could be brought to him, fearing that if he refused to marry her
again he would be killed.
[4]
Mr.
Diadama came to Canada in October 2004, after having travelled through
Gambia, Senegal, France, Mexico and the United
States.
He did not file a refugee claim in any of these countries.
[5]
The
Panel found the applicant was not a Convention Refugee, as there was not a
serious risk to his life or a risk of him being subjected to cruel or unusual
treatment or torture, for the following reasons.
[6]
The
Panel accepted country condition reports that provided evidence that the
relations between Muslims and Christians in Liberia are
generally considered “good”.
[7]
Also,
the Panel examined documentary evidence and could not find support for the
proposition that arranged marriages were prevalent in Liberia. This
omission in the Liberian documentary evidence was particularly apparent given
that other countries in West Africa – i.e. Nigeria and Ghana – expressly
had discussions of forced marriages in their country condition reports. Also,
in those countries where forced marriages do occur, it is typically women being
forced into marriage, and not men.
[8]
The
Panel was clear that they accepted the applicant’s testimony as credible, in
that there were no internal inconsistencies with his testimony. However, the
Panel did impugn the applicants credibility on the basis that there was no
documentary evidence presented that could support the particulars of his claim,
including country condition reports. The Panel noted that the applicant was
represented by counsel and had sufficient time to obtain supporting
documentation.
[9]
The
only corroborative evidence provided by the applicant was a letter from a
friend in Liberia discussing
the applicant’s situation. However, the Panel found this letter to be of no
probative value as it appeared to have been written with the purpose of backing
up the applicant’s story. The Panel came to this conclusion since the letter
explained things the applicant was already aware of, implying that there had
previously been contact between the applicant and the author of the letter.
[10]
Given
the lack of documentary support, and the silence of the country condition
reports with respect to arranged marriages [particularly since the other
countries expressly discussed this topic where prevalent] the Panel found the
applicants story not credible. The Panel found that there were appropriate
circumstances to rebut the presumption of truthfulness of the applicant’s
testimony.
[11]
Consequently,
the Panel determined the applicant was not at risk if he returned to Liberia.
[12]
The
relevant sections of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)
provide as follows:
96
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a)
is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason
of that fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of each of
those countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
97(1)
A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a)
to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b)
to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i)
the
person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themselves of
the protection of that country;
(ii)
the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country;
(iii)
the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv)
the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
|
96
A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention – le réfugié – la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
(a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces
pays;
(b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
97(1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
(a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture; ou
(b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i)
elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii)
elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes – sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales – et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
|
[13]
The
applicant points out that the Panel’s basis for a negative determination of
credibility is not based on internal inconsistencies, but rather, on a lack of
documentation to support the applicant’s factual assertions. The applicant
contends that this is not rational as there is a presumption of truth in a
claimant’s testimony and a lack of documentation alone cannot overcome this
presumption.
[14]
Also,
the applicant takes issue with the fact that the Panel relied on country
condition reports [of Nigeria and Ghana to show that these countries have
arranged marriages] in support of its finding that Liberia does not have
arranged marriages since the Liberian country conditions are silent on this
point. The applicant asserts that this analysis does not consider the different
religions, politics, or reliability of the human rights reports of these
different countries, and therefore the Panel cannot draw the inference it did.
[15]
The
respondent submits that the Panel did not commit any reviewable error in
determining that the applicant was not a Convention refugee.
[16]
The
respondent asserts that the Panel was correct in determining that there was no
real risk to the applicant. It was entirely reasonable for the Panel to have
expected the country condition reports of Liberia to include
reference to forced marriage and problems of persecution relating to
inter-faith marriages in the Liberian culture. The Panel noted that the
Liberian country condition reports discuss freedom of religion, discrimination,
female genital mutilation by some societies and differential treatment of
insular groups, - i.e. women and homosexuals.
[17]
Thus,
given the array of topics covered in the Liberia country
conditions, it is not patently unreasonable for the Panel to have expected to
find information regarding forced marriages, if it were indeed prevalent in Liberia. This is
particularly true when other nation’s country condition reports expressly
discuss forced marriage and pressure that may result from non-compliance with
forced marriages.
[18]
I
agree with the respondent. It is not unreasonable to assume that if a person
was being forced into a marriage, the denial of which will result in physical
harm or death, and cannot seek help from the authorities, that this practice
would be present in an impartial country condition report. I would suggest that
since the applicant is a man being forced to marry, [which is likely rarer than
forcing women to marry] this also militates towards forced marriage being the
type of thing that would be mentioned in country condition reports if it
existed.
[19]
I do
not understand how the applicants can say that the panel’s use of the Nigerian
and Ghana country condition
reports is unreasonable. All three nations are in the same geographical region,
and it seems perfectly logical to me that if a concern is addressed in one
nations report, it would be addressed in the others if the same condition
existed. While true there may be different cultures and religions amongst these
three countries, I do not see how this supports the applicant’s position that
the Liberian country condition report is not accurate with respect to it’s
omission as to forced marriages.
[20]
The
respondent relies on Attia v. Canada, 2005 FC 690 for the proposition
that the Panel is entitled to draw a negative inference from a lack of
information in documentation that might reasonably be expected to be mentioned
in the circumstances.
[21]
In
Attia, the Egyptian claimant alleged that he was abducted and forced to
convert to Islam to marry an Islamic woman. There was no documentary evidence –
including in the country condition reports - supporting the proposition that
this type of thing would occur in Egypt. Madam Justice
Layden-Stevenson held the Panel did not do a “selective reading” of the country
conditions and the Panel’s negative credibility finding was not unreasonable.
In this case, Justice Layden-Stevenson accepted that the lack of supporting
documentary evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of truthfulness of
the claimant.
[22]
In
my opinion, it is very hard to distinguish Attia from the present case –
both legally and factually - which effectively disposes of this judicial
review, unless one disagrees with the conclusion of Attia.
[23]
Also,
Mr. Justice Hugessen also came to the same conclusion in Adu v. Canada,
[1995] F.C.J. No. 114, where, despite the claimant alleging there was a law he
was being persecuted under, the claimant could not bring forward evidence of
the laws existence. Justice Hugessen held that if the fact alleged existed, it
would be reasonable to have documentary evidence supporting the allegation. A
failure of the documentary evidence to mention what one would normally expect
it to mention may rebut the presumption of truthfulness.
[24]
The
also relies on King v. Canada, [2003] FC 1120 to support the proposition
that an absence of corroborating documents cannot be used for a negative
credibility finding. In King, the Panel erred by drawing a negative
inference as to the claimants credibility as the claimant did not show
documentation that women are abducted and forced to undergo genital mutilation.
However, the Court held there was ample evidence –via country condition reports
- that female genital mutilation occurred in Liberia and there
was no need for the Panel to have required specific documentary evidence of the
exact situation the claimant was fearful of – i.e. being abducted. It was
enough that the country condition reports demonstrated that female genital
mutilation occurs; there is no need to provide documentation as to the exact
method in which the torture will occur in each situation. That would be too
high of burden on the claimant.
[25]
However,
in my opinion, in the facts at bar, the missing documentation goes to the very
root of the claim –whether or not men are forced into marriage in Liberia -
and thus the present case is akin to Attia and Adu where one
might reasonable expect the documentation to mention the issue in question.
[26]
I am
of the opinion that the Panel was entitled to draw a negative inference as to
the applicant’s credibility on these facts. I would suggest that that the fact
that the Liberian country condition reports does not address forced marriages –
particularly those of men – is strong evidence that this is not a common
practice in Liberia. The fact that other
Western African nations –Nigeria and Ghana – have the issue of forced marriage
specifically addressed in their country condition reports only highlights the
logic used by the Panel in this case.
[27]
Given
the above, I cannot see how the adverse finding of credibility, and
consequently the denial of refugee status, could be considered a patently
unreasonable finding.
JUDGMENT
This application for judicial
review is dismissed.
"Paul U.C. Rouleau"
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS
OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-6469-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: HAJI DIADAMA v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 5, 2006
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Rouleau, D.J.
DATED: October 11, 2006
APPEARANCES
BY:
Ronald Poulton
(416) 862-0000 for
the Applicant
Marianne Zoric
(416) 954-8046 for
the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
MAMANN & ASSOCIATES
Barristers & Solicitors
74 Victoria Street, Suite 303
Toronto, Ontario
M5C 2A5 for
the Applicant
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
130 King Street West, Suite 3400
Exchange Tower, Box 36
Toronto, Ontario
M5X 1K6 for
the Respondent