Date: 20061005
Docket: T-1808-05
Citation: 2006
FC 1193
OTTAWA, ONTARIO,
October 5, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice von Finckenstein
BETWEEN:
DALE
MCGREGOR
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,
LYNN LAJOIE, and SUSAN MCKENZIE
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
Applicant, Dale McGregor, took part in a closed competition for the position of
Regional Administrator, Human Resources with Correctional Service Canada
(“CSC”) for the Pacific and Ontario regions. This competition followed
a successful appeal filed by the Applicant with regard to a previous
competition to staff the same position in the Pacific Region. A three-person Selection
Board (“Selection Board”) assessed the candidates based on three criteria: (1)
their education and experience, (2) knowledge qualifications, and (3) their
abilities and personal suitability. The knowledge component was assessed on the
basis of a written test, and the abilities and personal suitability components were
assessed on the basis of simulation exercises and case study questions, an
interview, and reference checks. The Applicant did not pass the knowledge exam
and as a result, he was no longer considered for the position and did not
participate in the case study questions or the simulation exercise.
[2]
The
Applicant appealed to the Public Service Commission Appeal Board (“Appeal
Board”) against the selections made for appointments pursuant to s. 21 of the Public
Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33 (“PSEA”). For the appeal, the
Applicant divided his arguments into three categories: “screening”, “elements
of pre-selection”, and “inconsistencies in the conduct of the competition”. The
Applicant argued that the Selection Board did not establish the evidentiary
framework necessary to support its conclusions or to demonstrate that the most
meritorious candidate was chosen for the position. He took particular exception
to the fact that all members did not evaluate all knowledge questions but
rather one member evaluated questions 1 and 2, another evaluated questions 3 to
7 and the third evaluated questions 8 and 9. The only member who testified and
appeared before the Appeal Board was the third member who had evaluated
questions 8 and 9.
[3]
The Appeal
Board concluded that no intervention was required. The Appeal Board found that
the onus was on the candidate to demonstrate with evidence that the merit
principle was not adhered to, such as by calling Selection Board Members as
witnesses, but the Applicant had failed to do so. The Appeal Board also concluded
that it was not inappropriate for individual Selection Board Members to be
responsible for marking only a select few questions. The Appeal Board
maintained that since each candidate was assessed identically, this method of
assessment did not violate the merit principle. Finally, the Appeal Board held
that the Selection Board had established a sufficient evidentiary framework for
its decision.
[4]
The
Applicant is now seeking judicial review of the Appeal Board decision. He
raises two questions:
1.
Did the
Appeal Board err in placing the onus on the Applicant to adduce evidence in
support of his allegation?
2.
Did the
Appeal Board err in finding that the Selection Board had demonstrated an
appropriate evidentiary framework?
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
[5]
The relevant
provisions of the PSEA and the Public Service Employment Regulations,
2000 (“PSER”) SOR/2000-80 are set out in the attached Annex A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[6]
Both sides
agree that questions of law involving whether the merit principle has been
respected should be reviewed on a standard of correctness (see Boucher v. Canada [2000] F.C.J. 86). Questions relating to
the selection process involve mixed fact and law and should be reviewed on a
reasonableness standard (see Canada (Attorney General) v. Jeethan, [2006] F.C.J. No. 152).
ANALYSIS
Issue
1. Did the Appeal Board err in placing the onus on the Applicant to adduce
evidence in support of his allegation?
[7]
The
Applicant argues that in an appeal under the PSEA all he has to do is raise
allegations. It would then be up to the Selection Board to rebut these
allegations by showing that it had an evidentiary framework and that the framework
was applied in a fair and consistent manner resulting in a decision based on the
merits. In this case, the Applicant argues that since the Selection Board never
called any witnesses to explain how questions 1 to 7 of the knowledge component
were handled, it failed to establish the required evidentiary process. As he
states in his Affidavit at paragraphs 6 and 7:
For example, in question 6,
the successful candidates and I were all awarded 4 out of 5 marks for our
answers. For this question, the original rating plan D19 stated that the
candidates had to provide three stakeholders in order to receive the full five
marks. I argued that there was no reason why I received only 4 marks since I
correctly provided the required number of stakeholders. On cross-examination,
Mr. St. Laurent stated that it was necessary for the Selection Board Member who
marked that question to be convinced that the answer deserved a “true 5” in
accordance with the “global rating” system used. There was, however, no
departmental witness who I could question further on this point.
Similarly, in question 7, the
rating plan called for 5 points per key trend and explanation. Yet for both
successful candidates, partial points of 3 out of 5 and 4 out of 5 were awarded
for one candidate and 3 out of 5 and 3 out of 5 for the other candidate, with
no explanation as to the rationale for the variation from the rating plan
scoring procedure. In my argument, I challenged both the variation from the
rating plan scoring procedure, as well as the fact that there was no
explanation or reason to suggest why the response of one of the successful
candidates scored higher than the other successful candidate. This supported
my argument that the knowledge exam was not marked consistently between
candidates. The departmental representative stated that the new adjectival
grid (Exhibit D20) had been used in the marking of this question. This was
in contrast to his earlier statement that the grid had not been used by the
selection board. Again, however, I was not able to put my questions to any
Departmental witness, as the Department chose not to call the Selection Board
members that marked questions 1 to 7.
[8]
In my view
this position reveals a misunderstanding of the appeal process. The appeal process
is an adversary process (see Wiebe v. Canada [1992] 2 F.C. 592 at paragraph
9).
[9]
Sections 25 to 27 of the PSER have set out a complete
process for adversarial hearings. They provide for full disclosure, access to
information, allegations in writing, and a hearing.
[10]
Once this process is
invoked it is up to the Applicant to establish that there was a real possibility the
merit principle was not applied. As Beaudry J.A in Leckie v. Canada, [1993]
2 F.C. 473 at paragraph 15 (C.A.) states:
In order to
succeed under section 21 in establishing that the merit principle had been
offended, the applicants had to convince the Appeal Board that the method of
selection chosen was "such that there could be some doubt as to its
fitness to determine the merit of candidates" … i.e. as to its fitness to
determine whether "the best persons possible" … were found. An appeal
board's main duty being to satisfy itself that the best persons possible were
appointed, it goes without saying that an appellant, before even embarking on a
challenge to the method of selection chosen, should at least allege (and
eventually demonstrate) that there was a real possibility or likelihood
that the best persons possible were not appointed.
(notes deleted
and underlining added)
[11]
The
Applicant relies on Field v. Canada, [1995] F.C.J. No. 458 and Jeethan,
supra. Neither of these two cases is of any help to the Applicant. In Field,
McGillis J. at paragraph 5 held:
In my opinion,
the Appeal Board erred in law in misconstruing the duty of the Selection Board
to rate the candidates on all of the qualifications required for the position
in a manner which would permit "...an assessment of the candidates'
relative merit."
…
In the
present case, there was an absence of any cogent evidence, either oral or
documentary, in the record to establish the manner in which the merit of
the candidates was assessed by the Selection Board on the qualification of
personal suitability. In the absence of an appropriate evidentiary framework,
the Appeal Board could not have properly determined that the merit principle
was respected in the assessment of the candidates on personal
suitability. Furthermore, the Appeal Board purported to place on the
applicant the obligation to adduce evidence to establish that her personal
qualities "...should have been rated any differently than the personal
qualities of the selected candidate." In doing so, the Appeal
Board improperly relieved the Selection Board of its onus of establishing that
the assessment of the candidates was conducted in accordance with the merit
principle.
[12]
I read
this case as imposing a duty on the Selection Board to establish an evidentiary
framework. In so doing, it discharges its onus of establishing that the
assessment of the candidates was conducted in accordance with the merit
principle. However, this
onus only arises once the Applicant has not met his own onus as enunciated in Leckie
above; namely to “at least allege (and eventually demonstrate) that
there was a real possibility or likelihood that the best persons possible were
not appointed’. Similarly,
Jeethan, supra, stands for the proposition that “the selection board
must satisfy the Appeal Board that the merit principle has been respected” (at paragraph
18). It does not in any way contradict Leckie above.
[13]
The
Applicant asked the testifying Board Member questions as to how the knowledge
component was marked (see quote in paragraph 7 above). Evidently, there was
nothing in the disclosed materials that could establish a likelihood or
possibility that the merit principle was not followed. An Applicant, of course,
can and often does make his case out of the mouth of the Selection Board Member.
However, here, the Member questioned turned out to be the one who did not mark
questions 1 to 7 and thus, could not answer those questions. At this point the
Applicant seemingly gave up, instead of asking for an adjournment and
questioning the other Selection Board Members. He thus, failed to meet the onus
of establishing a ‘real possibility or likelihood’ that the merit principle had not been
respected as
required by Leckie, supra.
[14]
Accordingly,
the Appeal Board did not err when it found at paragraph 45:
The appellant challenged the
marking done by Ms. Marshall, but he did not demonstrate that she reached
obviously unreasonable opinions. He asserted that Mr. St-Laurent could not
adequately explain the marking during the hearing and therefore the marks could
not be justified. However, the onus was on him to demonstrate that the marking
was faulty, for example by calling Ms. Marshall as a witness.
Issue
2: Did the Appeal Board err in finding that the Selection Board had demonstrated
an appropriate evidentiary framework?
[15]
The
Applicant submits that the Selection Board must provide cogent evidence, either
oral or documentary for its decision (Field, supra). In this case, a
global assessment system was used for the abilities and personal suitability
elements. For these elements, the Selection Board used inputs from three
sources: simulation exercises and the related questions, interviews, and
reference checks. It was established that the Selection Board had taken careful
notes and it had met to discuss and assign scores to each sub-element of the abilities
and personal suitability components. Each score was based on the consensus that
it arrived at after considering the input from these three sources. The final
tabulation reveals which questions (also called memos) were considered for each
sub-element.
[16]
The only
witness called by the Respondent, a Mr. St. Laurent, could only attest that a
global assessment was used, not how it worked or how the inputs from the three
different sources (simulation exercise and case study questions, interview, and
reference checks) were used to score the abilities or personal suitability
elements. (Affidavit of Dale McGregor at paragraphs 16 to 19)
[17]
The
Applicant argues that without any specifics on how the responses were
evaluated, it was impossible for him to challenge the consistency or
appropriateness of the marks awarded. He submits that it leaves his right to an
appeal meaningless.
[18]
Given that
the Applicant failed the knowledge component, he was not tested regarding the
elements of abilities and personal suitability. As I have found that the Appeal
Board did not err with regard to its findings on the knowledge element, there
is no need for me to consider his allegations regarding the other two elements
on which he was not tested.
[19]
Accordingly
this application cannot succeed.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this application be dismissed.
“Konrad
W. von Finckenstein”
ANNEX A
[20]
Section
10(1) of the PSEA states as follows:
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10. (1) Appointments to or from within
the Public Service shall be based on selection according to merit, as
determined by the Commission, and shall be made by the Commission, at the
request of the deputy head concerned, by competition or by such other process
of personnel selection designed to establish the merit of candidates as the
Commission considers is in the best interests of the Public Service.
(2)
For the purposes of subsection (1), selection according to merit may, in the
circumstances prescribed by the regulations of the Commission, be based on
the competence of a person being considered for appointment as measured by
such standard of competence as the Commission may establish, rather than as
measured against the competence of other persons. Amended 1992, c. 54, s. 10.
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10.(1) Les nominations internes ou
externes à des postes de la fonction publique se font sur la base d’une
sélection fondée sur le mérite, selon ce que détermine la Commission, et à la
demande de l’administrateur général intéressé, soit par concours, soit par
tout autre mode de sélection du personnel fondé sur le mérite des candidats
que la Commission estime le mieux adapté aux intérêts de la fonction
publique.
(2) Pour
l’application du paragraphe (1), la sélection au mérite peut, dans les circonstances
déterminées par règlement de la Commission, être fondée sur des normes de
compétence fixées par celle-ci plutôt que sur un examen comparatif des
candidats.
L.R. (1985), ch. P-33, art. 10; 1992, ch. 54, art. 10;
2003, ch. 22, art. 206(A).
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[21]
Section 21
of the PSEA reads, in part:
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21.(1) Where a person is appointed or
is about to be appointed under this Act and the selection of the person for
appointment was made by closed competition, every unsuccessful candidate may,
within the period provided for by the regulations of the Commission, appeal
against the appointment to a board established by the Commission to conduct
an inquiry at which the person appealing and the deputy head concerned, or
their representatives, shall be given an opportunity to be heard.
…
(4) Where a person is appointed or is
about to be appointed under this Act as a result of measures taken under
subsection (3), an appeal may be taken under subsection (1) or (1.1) against
that appointment only on the ground that the measures so taken did not result
in a selection for appointment according to merit. Amended 1992, c. 54, s.
16.
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21.(1) Dans le cas d’une
nomination, effective ou imminente, consécutive à un concours interne, tout
candidat non reçu peut, dans le délai fixé par règlement de la Commission, en
appeler de la nomination devant un comité chargé par elle de faire une
enquête, au cours de laquelle l’appelant et l’administrateur général en
cause, ou leurs représentants, ont l’occasion de se faire entendre.
…
(4) Une nomination,
effective ou imminente, consécutive à une mesure visée au paragraphe (3) ne
peut faire l’objet d’un appel conformément aux paragraphes (1) ou (1.1) qu’au
motif que la mesure prise est contraire au principe de la sélection au
mérite.
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[22]
Regulations
25 to 27 of the Public Service Employment Regulations, 2000 (“PSER”) SOR/2000-80
provide:
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25.(1)
Subject to subsection (4), the registrar of appeals shall send to the deputy
head concerned, the successful candidate and the appellant a notice in
writing indicating the date, time and place of the hearing at least 14 days
before the date of the hearing.
Notice after full
disclosure
(2)
Subject to subsections (5) and (7), the notice of hearing shall only be given
after full disclosure is completed.
Full disclosure
(3)
Subject to subsection (8) and (9), full disclosure shall be completed within
45 days after the date of the letter, referred to in paragraph 23(b),
that acknowledges receipt of the written document bringing the appeal.
Shorter notice
(4)
If the persons referred to in subsection (1) agree, the notice of hearing may
be given less than 14 days before the date of the hearing.
Hearing after disclosure
period expired
(5)
The notice of hearing may be given after the period referred to in subsection
(3) has expired, whether or not full disclosure has been completed.
Hearing after disclosure
completed
(6)
The notice of hearing may be given before the expiry of the period referred
to in subsection (3) if full disclosure has been completed and confirmed in
writing by the persons referred to in subsection (1).
Hearing in other
circumstances
(7)
The notice of hearing may be given before full disclosure is completed if the
appeal concerns
(a) an acting
appointment;
(b) an appointment
for a specified period;
(c) an appointment
made as a result of measures taken under subsection 21(3) of the Act; or
(d) a jurisdictional
issue.
Extensions and other
measures
(8)
If an appeal board has reasonable grounds to believe that full disclosure
cannot be completed within the period referred to in subsection (3), it may
within that period, on the request of the appellant or the deputy head
concerned, make an order
(a) if necessary,
extending that period one or more times; or
(b) imposing any
measure it considers necessary to complete full disclosure.
Order
(9)
An appeal board may, at any time, make an order imposing any measure it
considers necessary to complete full disclosure.
Access
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25.(1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (4), le greffier des appels
envoie à l'appelant, à l'administrateur général en cause et au candidat reçu
un avis indiquant les date, heure et lieu de l'audition de l'appel, au moins
quatorze jours avant la date de l'audition.
Avis après
la divulgation complète
(2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (5) et (7), l'avis d'audition
ne peut être donné qu'après la divulgation complète.
Divulgation
complète
(3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (8) et (9), la divulgation
complète doit être réalisée dans les quarante-cinq jours suivant la date de
l'accusé de réception du document écrit visé au paragraphe 21(1).
Délai plus
court
(4) Si les personnes visées au paragraphe (1) y consentent,
l'avis de l'audition peut être donné moins de quatorze jours avant la date de
l'audition.
Audition à
l'expiration du délai
(5) L'avis d'audition peut être donné après l'expiration du
délai visé au paragraphe (3), que la divulgation complète soit réalisée ou
non.
Audition
après la divulgation complète
(6) L'avis d'audition peut être donné avant l'expiration du
délai visé au paragraphe (3), si la divulgation complète est réalisée et est
confirmée par écrit par les personnes visées au paragraphe (1).
Audition
suite aux autres circonstances
(7) L'avis d'audition peut être donné avant que soit réalisée la
divulgation complète si l'appel porte sur, selon le cas :
a) une nomination
intérimaire;
b) une nomination
pour une période déterminée;
c) une nomination
consécutive à une mesure visée au paragraphe 21(3) de la Loi;
d) une question
de compétence.
Prorogation
et autres mesures
(8) Si le comité d'appel a des motifs raisonnables de croire que
la divulgation complète ne peut être réalisée dans le délai visé au
paragraphe (3), il peut, à la demande de l'appelant ou de l'administrateur
général en cause, avant l'expiration de ce délai, rendre une
ordonnance :
a) prorogeant le
délai une ou plusieurs fois, s'il y a lieu;
b) imposant toute
mesure qu'il estime nécessaire pour en permettre la réalisation.
Ordonnance
(9) Le comité d'appel peut, à tout moment, rendre une ordonnance
imposant toute mesure qu'il estime nécessaire pour permettre la divulgation
complète.
Accès
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26.(1) An appellant shall be
provided access, on request, to any information, or any document that
contains information, that pertains to the appellant or to the successful
candidate and that may be presented before the appeal board.
Copies
(2)
The deputy head concerned shall provide the appellant, on request, with a
copy of any document referred to in subsection (1).
Refusal to disclose
(3)
Despite subsections (1) and (2), the deputy head concerned or the Commission,
as appropriate, may refuse to allow access to information or a document, or
to provide a copy of a document, if the disclosure might
(a) threaten
national security or any person's safety;
(b) prejudice the
continued use of a standardized test that is owned by the deputy head's
department or the Commission or that is commercially available; or
(c) affect the
results of such a standardized test by giving an unfair advantage to any
individual.
Appeal board
(4)
If the deputy head concerned or the Commission refuses to allow access to
information or a document under subsection (3), the appellant may request
that the appeal board order such access.
Conditions
(5)
If the appeal board orders access to information or a document under
subsection (4), that access is subject, before and during the hearing, to any
conditions that the appeal board considers necessary to prevent the
situations described in paragraphs (3)(a) to (c) from
occurring.
Use
(6)
Any information or document obtained under this section shall be used only
for purposes of the appeal.
SOR/2000-129, s. 8(F).
Allegations in writing
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26.(1) L'appelant a
accès sur demande à l'information, notamment tout document, le concernant ou
concernant le candidat reçu et qui est susceptible d'être communiquée au
comité d'appel.
Copies
(2) L'administrateur général en cause fournit sur demande à
l'appelant une copie de tout document visé au paragraphe (1).
Refus de
divulguer
(3) Malgré les paragraphes (1) et (2), l'administrateur général
en cause ou la Commission peut refuser de donner accès à l'information ou aux
documents ou de fournir copie des documents dont l'un ou l'autre dispose,
dans le cas où cela risquerait :
a) soit de
menacer la sécurité nationale ou la sécurité d'une personne;
b) soit de nuire
à l'utilisation continue d'un test standardisé qui appartient au ministère de
l'administrateur général en cause ou à la Commission ou qui est offert sur le
marché;
c) soit de
fausser les résultats d'un tel test en conférant un avantage indu à une
personne.
Comité
d'appel
(4) Si l'administrateur général en cause ou la Commission refuse
de donner accès à de l'information ou à des documents aux termes du
paragraphe (3), l'appelant peut demander au comité d'appel d'en ordonner
l'accès.
Conditions
(5) Si le comité d'appel ordonne que l'accès soit donné à de
l'information ou à des documents en vertu du paragraphe (4), cet accès est
assujetti, avant et pendant l'audition, aux conditions que le comité d'appel
estime nécessaires pour prévenir les situations décrites aux alinéas (3)a)
à c).
Utilisation
(6) L'information ou les documents obtenus en vertu du présent
article ne peuvent être utilisés que pour les besoins de l'appel.
DORS/2000-129,
art. 8(F).
Allégations
par écrit
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27.(1) The allegations
submitted by the appellant to the deputy head concerned shall be in writing
and sufficiently detailed to permit the deputy head to provide a response.
Oral allegations
(2)
Despite subsection (1), in exceptional circumstances and with the consent of
the appeal board, allegations may be submitted orally.
New or amended allegations
(3)
An appellant may only amend allegations, or introduce new allegations, at an
appeal if the amendments or new allegations result from information obtained
after full disclosure has been completed that could not otherwise have
reasonably been obtained by the appellant during disclosure.
Request adjournment
(4)
The appellant or deputy head concerned may request that the appeal board adjourn
the appeal hearing if they have been prejudiced by the submission by the
other party of documents, information or allegations that, for reasons beyond
the party's control, could not be disclosed within the period referred to in
subsection 25(3).
SOR/2000-129, s. 9(F).
Completion of inquiry
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27.(1) Les
allégations que l'appelant envoie à l'administrateur général en cause sont
remises par écrit et sont suffisamment détaillées pour que celui-ci puisse y
répondre.
Présentation
orale
(2) Malgré le paragraphe (1), les allégations peuvent, dans des
circonstances exceptionnelles et avec le consentement du comité d'appel, être
présentées oralement.
Allégations
nouvelles ou modifiées
(3) L'appelant ne peut modifier ses allégations ou en déposer de
nouvelles que par suite d'une information obtenue après la divulgation
complète et à laquelle il ne pouvait raisonnablement avoir accès lors de la
divulgation.
Demande
d'ajournement
(4) L'appelant ou l'administrateur général en cause peut
demander au comité d'appel d'ajourner l'audition s'il a subi un préjudice du
fait que l'autre partie a produit des documents, de l'information ou des
allégations qu'elle n'a pu divulguer dans le délai visé au paragraphe 25(3)
pour des motifs indépendants de sa volonté.
DORS/2000-129,
art. 9(F).
Fin de
l'enquête
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