Date: 20061016
Docket: DES-04-01
Citation: 2006 FC 1230
BETWEEN:
IN
THE MATTER OF a certificate pursuant to
Section 40.1 of
the Immigration Act, R. S. C. 1985,
c.I-2, now deemed
to be under s-s 77(1) of the
Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S. C. 2001, c. 27:
AND IN THE MATTER
OF the referral of that
Certificate to the
Federal Court of Canada;
AND
IN THE MATTER OF Mahmoud JABALLAH,
REASONS FOR
ORDER AND DETERMINATIONS
MACKAY D.J.
1. Introduction
[1]
These
are reasons for an order now issued arising from my review of a security certificate
dated August 13, 2001, stating that the respondent, Mahmoud Es Sayyid Jaballah,
a foreign national, is inadmissible to Canada on security grounds. That
certificate set out the joint opinion of the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (MCI) and the then Solicitor General of Canada that Mr. Jaballah is
inadmissible.
[2]
The
order now issued sets out my determinations. The first is that the Ministers’
security certificate is reasonable within s.-s. 80(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 as amended (IRPA). Reasons for
that are set out in Parts 2 to 9. The second, for reasons set out in Part 10,
is that the discretion of the MCI in removing him from Canada, in relying on
the security certificate as a removal order, is limited, and he may not be
deported to any country where there is a serious risk to his life or of torture
or cruel and unusual treatment.
[3]
The
following headings with initial paragraph numbers for discussion of each, may assist
in providing an overview of these reasons:
Paragraph
1. Introduction 1
2. The
legislative regime and the Ministers’ concerns 7
3. Immigration
circumstances of Mr. Jaballah 16
4. Particular
features of these proceedings 21
5. Information
and evidence before the Court, and
efforts
to ensure disclosure 24
6. Acceptance
or variation of certain findings of
the
Court in its 2003 decision 31
7.
Review
of the evidence and information for the
Ministers’
concerns 37
8. Statutory
security grounds for inadmissibility 64
9. Reasonableness
of the security certificate 71
10. The
duty and discretion to remove Mr. Jaballah
from
Canada 72
[4]
The
most recent chronology of events and decisions in this proceeding is found in
Appendix A to the decision Re Jaballah 2006 FC 346, [2006] F.C.J.
No. 404 (QL) (March 16, 2006), as supplemented by items listed as 18 to 23 in
Annex A to these Reasons. That Annex lists decisions or other proceedings, in
this and related cases concerning the two security certificates concerning Mr.
Jaballah and his detention under them. The Annex gives an overview of the
proceedings, the details of which I do not review in these reasons unless they
are significant for the issue of the reasonableness of the Ministers’
certificate.
[5]
These
proceedings have been prolonged and, since the certificate issued, Mr. Jaballah
has been detained in custody pursuant to paragraph 40.1(7)(b) of the Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as
amended
(the 1985 Act) and s-ss. 82(2) and 83(3) of the IRPA.
[6]
Throughout
the proceedings counsel and the Court have dealt with basic issues that concern
the relations between a foreign national, Mr. Jaballah, and the state, Canada, in light of
fundamental principles of justice and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Those issues are to be resolved, recognizing the roles of
Parliament, the Executive and the Courts in our democracy, as matters of immigration
law, balancing Mr. Jaballah’s claims to remain in Canada and the Government of Canada’s
claim and responsibility to determine who among foreign nationals may be
admitted to this country.
2. The
legislative regime and the Ministers’ concerns
[7]
The
certificate, issued under s. 40.1 of the 1985 Act which then governed this
proceeding, was referred to this Court for a determination whether the
certificate is reasonable under para. 40.1(4)(d) of the 1985 Act, now s-ss.
77(1) and 80(1) of IRPA. Since then the Solicitor General of Canada has been
succeeded in office by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
That Minister and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration are referred to
herein as “the Ministers”. Since then also, the 1985 Act has been repealed and
replaced on June 28, 2002 by IRPA, which provides by s. 190 that
190. Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act
that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of
this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force.
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190. La présente loi
s’applique, dès l’entrée en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et
procédures présentées ou instruites, ainsi qu’aux autres questions soulevées,
dans le cadre de l’ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour
lesquelles aucune décision n’a été prise.
|
[8]
Provisions
of IRPA relevant in this proceeding are reproduced in Annex B, with notations to
comparable provisions of the 1985 Act where that seems appropriate. The Court’s
role under IRPA in considering the Ministers’ certificate is set out in
Division 9 of that Act, in ss. 76 to 87. The primary role of the judge
designated to consider the certificate is set out in s.80 of IRPA.
80. (1) The judge shall, on
the basis of the information and evidence available, determine whether the
certificate is reasonable and whether the decision on the application for
protection, if any, is lawfully made.
(2) The judge shall quash a
certificate if the judge is of the opinion that it is not reasonable. If the
judge does not quash the certificate but determines that the decision on the
application for protection is not lawfully made, the judge shall quash the
decision and suspend the proceeding to allow the Minister to make a decision
on the application for protection.
(3) The determination of
the judge is final and may not be appealed or judicially reviewed.
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80. (1) Le juge décide du caractère raisonnable du certificat et,
le cas échéant, de la légalité de la décision du ministre, compte tenu des
renseignements et autres éléments de preuve dont il dispose.
(2) Il annule le
certificat dont il ne peut conclure qu’il est raisonnable; si l’annulation ne
vise que la décision du ministre il suspend l’affaire pour permettre au
ministre de statuer sur celle-ci.
(3) La décision
du juge est définitive et n’est pas susceptible d’appel ou de contrôle
judiciaire.
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[9]
In
the course of these proceedings I have previously determined that the decision,
made September 23, 2005, on behalf of the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration to refuse Mr. Jaballah’s application for protection under IRPA, was
lawful pursuant to s-s. 80(1) (see: Re Jaballah, 2006 FC 346, March 16,
2006). These reasons concern the other issue to be determined under s-s. 80(1)
of IRPA, whether the certificate of the Ministers is reasonable.
[10]
The
certificate before the Court is the second one issued by the Ministers in
respect to Mr. Jaballah on similar grounds. The first one dated March 31, 1999,
was referred to this Court and considered by my colleague, Mr. Justice Cullen. He
determined, on November 2, 1999, that the certificate before him was
unreasonable and it was quashed (see (Canada) Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration v. Jaballah, [1999] F.C.J.
No. 1681 (TD) (QL) (hereinafter “Jaballah No.1”). Thereupon Mr. Jaballah, who
had been detained after the certificate was issued, was released from
detention.
[11]
Less
than two years later, on August 13, 2001, the second certificate, now before
this Court, was issued. It sets out the Ministers’ conclusion that Mr. Jaballah
is inadmissible to Canada on security grounds, as a person described in
paragraphs 19(1)(e)(ii), 19(1)(e)(iv)(B), 19(1)(e)(iv)(C), 19(1)(f)(ii) and
19(1)(f)(iii)(B) of the 1985 Act. The summary information statement dated
August 14, 2001 disclosed to him on August 22, sets out that the grounds for
that conclusion, there described as the belief of “the Service” (i.e. the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service), are that Mahmoud Jaballah:
1.
will,
while in Canada, engage in or instigate the subversion by force of the
government of Egypt (see sub para. 34(1)(b) IRPA);
2.
is a
member of the Al Jihad (AJ), an organization that there are reasonable grounds
to believe will engage in or instigate the subversion by force of the
government of Egypt, and will engage in terrorism (see sub para. 34(1)(f) IRPA);
3. is and was a member of the AJ,
an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe is, or was engaged
in terrorism (see sub para. 34(1)(f) IRPA); and
4.
has
engaged in terrorism (see sub para. 34(1)(c) IRPA).
The references here to
paragraphs of s-s. 34(1) are to provisions of IRPA, comparable to those in the
1985 Act, within which, in my opinion, the specified grounds are included as
security grounds for determining inadmissibility to Canada.
[12]
The
factual bases alleged by the Ministers’ case concerning Mr. Jaballah, drawn from
the summary statements and elaborating information and evidence, in my opinion,
may be described thus.
1.
He
is believed to be a member of a terrorist organization, the Egyptian terrorist
group Al Jihad, an organization
a.
with
a history of violent activities in Egypt, intended to overthrow
the government there, and in terrorist activities abroad;
b.
that
is closely associated with Al Qaida in Osama Bin Laden’s network, seeking to
rid middle east countries of western influence and to attack western societies.
c.
In
turn, Al Qaida activities, including terrorist attacks in Pakistan, East
Africa, Yemen, New York, Bali, and attacks emulating its operations when
undertaken by others in Madrid, in London, and recently under investigation in
Toronto and London, leave little doubt that international terrorism, whether
directly fostered by Al Qaida or emulating it, presents a major threat to
society, particularly in Western countries. At least two statements issued by
Al Qaida leaders have indicated that Canada is a country of
interest for terrorist attack.
d.
Both
the Egyptian Al Jihad and Al Qaida have been designated, by P.C. SOR/2002-284
of July 23, 2002, issued by the Governor General in Council pursuant to s-s.
83.05(1) of the Criminal Code as amended by S.C. 2001, c.41, s.4, as
entities about which “there are reasonable grounds to believe, have knowingly
carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated terrorist
activity…”
2. He is
believed to have engaged in terrorism, in Egypt, and
subsequently, including serving to relay communications between AJ cells,
particularly those engaged on August 7, 1998 in the bombing of United States
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam,
Tanzania. Telephone
numbers associated with Mr. Jaballah in Canada are believed
to have been linked to Islamic extremists, in this country and abroad.
3. He is
believed to have followed “a travel pattern consistent with the profile of an
Islamic Mujahedin extremist - one who left Egypt to fight in Afghanistan, trained in
Yemen, and may have fought in Chechnya”. In the 1990’s Yemen and Azerbaijan were known
havens and training bases for Islamic terrorists. Moreover, it is believed that
he spent a period of time in Afghanistan. He cannot readily
return to Egypt without
facing the prospect of further prosecution, detention, or worse treatment.
4. He has been
associated with numerous known, senior participants in AJ and in other
terrorist or Al Qaida activities, including persons in Canada and abroad.
[13]
There
is no dispute about the activities of the AJ and Al Qaida. Not all of the above
allegations are directly relevant to the key issues here. In the course of
argument on the merits of the certificate, counsel for the Ministers,
responding to a query from opposing counsel, specified that the Ministers in
this case were not relying upon, or seeking to establish, “subversion”. I
understand that to mean that the Crown does not seek to establish the
allegations that Mr. Jaballah “will … engage in or instigate the subversion by
force of the government of Egypt” (the first of the Service’s alleged beliefs),
or that the Al Jihad (AJ) “will engage in or instigate the subversion by force
of the government of Egypt” (part of the second of the Service’s alleged
beliefs).
[14]
With
this modification, statutory concerns of the Ministers, are simplified to
these:
A. that
Mr. Jaballah is and was a member of the Al Jihad (AJ), an organization that
there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was or will engage in terrorism,
matters which fall within subparagraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA; and
B. that
Mr. Jaballah has engaged in terrorism, a matter within subparagraph 34(1)(c) of
IRPA.
[15]
I
return to these allegations and the suggested statutory security grounds for
inadmissibility later in these Reasons before dealing with the reasonableness
of the certificate.
3. Immigration circumstances of Mr.
Jaballah
[16]
Mr.
Jaballah and his family arrived in Canada in May 1996. The family
originated in Egypt where Mr.
Jaballah, his wife and his three older children are citizens. The family left
Egypt in July 1991 for Saudi Arabia on a religious
pilgrimage. They did not return to their home because of concern about the
treatment by Egyptian authorities of Mr. Jaballah, who claims he had faced
recurring arrests and detention seven times, solely because he was a devout
Muslim fundamentalist. He was tortured on some occasions, and so was his wife,
who had also been detained on a few of those occasions and once was so
mistreated that she is said to have had a miscarriage. After three months in Saudi Arabia the family
moved to Peshawar, Pakistan,
in 1991. There both Mr. Jaballah and his wife obtained teaching positions, she
in a school operated under the Saudi embassy, a school where Mr. Jaballah later
taught for a year after serving first as a teacher and then as the principal at
a school in Peshawar run by the
International Islamic Relief Organization.
[17]
In
August 1994, concerned that Egyptians and other Arab nationals would be
returned to their own countries from Pakistan, Mr. Jaballah says that
he travelled alone, using a false Iraqi passport, to Yemen where he
remained for a year. When he had not been able to obtain regular employment in
his teaching profession, Mr. Jaballah says that, using the same passport, he moved
on to Azerbaijan. There he
remained for about eight months, without success in finding regular employment.
He claims he supported himself in Yemen and in Azerbaijan mainly from
savings arising from his teaching in Pakistan for three years.
[18]
Meanwhile
his family had remained in Peshawar, including a fourth
child who had been born there. His wife continued to teach and to support the
family on her earnings. In March 1996 he returned to Pakistan, and with his
family moved to Azerbaijan, using a false Saudi Arabian passport, and thence, he
and his family travelled to Turkey, on to Germany, and finally to Canada. After
arriving in Toronto in May 1996
he claimed Convention refugee status for himself, his wife and four children.
Since their arrival in Canada two other children have been born to Mr.
Jaballah and his wife.
[19]
On
March 4, 1999, the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration
and Refugee Board (the “CRDD”) decided that Mr. Jaballah and his family born
abroad were not Convention refugees. That decision was then the subject of a
successful application for leave and for judicial review which set aside the
negative CRDD decision on September 28, 2000, after the first security
certificate had been issued and quashed. The refugee claim was referred back
for reconsideration by a differently constituted panel (see: Jaballah v.
Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 F.C.J. No. 1577, (2000) 196 F.T.R.
175).
[20]
Rehearing
of Mr. Jaballah’s refugee claim by the CRDD was scheduled for August 16, 2001, the
day after Mr. Jaballah was arrested under the second security certificate. That
hearing was adjourned. The refugee claim was subsequently dismissed so far as
Mr. Jaballah was concerned, but on April 9, 2003 so far as it concerned his
wife and four children born abroad the claim was allowed. Thus, while Mr.
Jaballah remains a foreign national, his wife and four children (born abroad) are
Convention refugees, and the two youngest children are Canadians.
4. Particular
features of these proceedings
[21]
Before
the decision on the refugee claim, when the second security certificate was
issued in mid-August 2001 and referred to this Court, I was designated to hear
the matter, pursuant to then s‑s. 40.1(4) of the 1985 Act, now ss. 76 and
77 of IRPA. As earlier noted, since August 15, 2001 Mr. Jaballah has been
detained, first for six weeks or so at Millhaven, a federal penitentiary, then
until April 24, 2006 at Toronto West Detention Centre, a maximum security
provincial remand centre, and since late April 2006 he has been at a newly
established Immigration Detention Centre at Kingston.
[22]
At
all Court hearings when he was at the Toronto Centre, and thereafter when he
testified, Mr. Jaballah was present in the Court. On two occasions, June 28 and
September 11-14, 2006 he attended hearings for observation purposes, as he
elected, by audio visual link, from the courtroom in Toronto to the Immigration
Detention Centre at Kingston. Those occasions were without witnesses, for
the purpose of receiving submissions of counsel for the parties.
[23]
The
proceedings arising from the 2001 certificate have gone through three phases,
somewhat overlapping in time but differing in purposes. From August 2001 to May
2003, the initial phase concerned the reasonableness of the certificate. Then,
after Mr. Jaballah declined to respond to the information before the Ministers,
the certificate was found to be reasonable, a decision set aside by the Court
of Appeal in July 2004. The second phase, from October 2003 to March 2006
concerned primarily applications by Mr. Jaballah for release from detention,
and reviews of decisions on behalf of the M.C.I. refusing Mr. Jaballah’s
application for protection. The third phase, from February to September 2006,
has been concerned to complete testimony and argument regarding the
reasonableness of the Ministers’ security certificate, and to consider a number
of preliminary interlocutory motions raised on behalf of Mr. Jaballah which
were heard from February to June, 2006.
5. Information
and evidence before the Court, and efforts to ensure disclosure
[24]
The
opinion certified by the Ministers is based in part upon “information”, defined
in s.76 of IRPA as meaning “security or criminal intelligence information that
is obtained in confidence from a source in Canada, from the government of a
foreign state, from an international organization of states or from an
institution of either of them”, and in part upon evidence or other sorts of
information in the normal sense, including testimony and documents submitted by
or on behalf of Mr. Jaballah or the Ministers. For purposes of these Reasons I
use the word “information” to refer to information as defined in the Act, and I
use the word “evidence” to relate to documents and testimony submitted by the
parties on the public record of this case. Much if not all of the information
of a security or criminal intelligence nature has remained in the Court as a
confidential record, not released to Mr. Jaballah or his counsel. I note that
by Direction dated February 13, 2002, the record in Jaballah No.
1, concerning the first security certificate, was admitted as evidence in
these proceedings, though any information then held in confidence remained so.
Further, the records from his applications for refugee status and for
protection were before the Court in the exercise of its review responsibility.
[25]
Six
volumes of evidence underlying the Ministers’ opinion were filed in the public
record and were released to Mr. Jaballah in August 2001, together with a
summary statement in accord with paragraph 78(h) of IRPA, intended to
reasonably inform him of circumstances giving rise to the certificate. Neither
the information disclosed nor the summary statement included anything that in
my opinion, if disclosed, would be injurious to national security or to the safety
of any person (as required by para. 78(h) IRPA).
[26]
The
summary statement issued in August 2001 was supplemented and amended in various
ways. By Direction of February 5, 2002 the Court identified “new” evidence not
available to the Ministers before November 2, 1999 when Jaballah No.
1 was decided, that had been released to Mr. Jaballah in August 2001. A
statement comparing summaries released to him in the 1999 certificate case and
in this case was also provided to him then. This followed upon testimony
concerning the perspective on what information was “new”, which was the
principal subject of the examination and cross-examination of Mike, a CSIS
officer, at public hearings in December 2001. Later, a supplementary summary
statement, dated November 18, 2003, was issued, as approved by the Court, in
relation to Mr. Jaballah’s first application for release from detention.
[27]
In
the course of hearings concerning his second application for release, in
September 2005, Mr. Jaballah testified for the first time in proceedings
arising from the second certificate. In his cross-examination, documents
produced as exhibits by counsel for the Ministers, in particular certain
records of long distance telephone calls and charges, were added to the public
record. Further, at various hearings counsel for Mr. Jaballah and for the
Ministers introduced additional documents to the public record. A second CSIS
officer testified on behalf of the Ministers in September 2005, in hearings in
relation to Mr. Jaballah’s second application for release from detention and
then, as had been the case when Mike testified in December 2001, a number of
documents were also introduced through his examination.
[28]
There
was in evidence before me, the testimony of Mr. Jaballah and his wife in September
2005 in relation to his application for release and the affidavits and
testimony of persons in support of Mr. Jaballah at public hearings in regard to
his two applications to be released from detention in 2003 and 2005, including
willing bonds persons if he were to be released. Both Mr. Jaballah and his wife
testified in response to the Ministers’ certificate and summaries, after leave
was granted at his request, and their testimony was heard in May and in July
2006.
[29]
Finally,
the summary statement of August 2001 and that of November 2003 were amended on
two occasions, in November 2005 and in June 2006 following separate reviews by
the Court of the confidential information that had not been disclosed to Mr.
Jaballah. The amendments introduced, while not extensive, ensured that with the
passage of time any information that could be disclosed, was. Only information
which if disclosed would, in my opinion under paragraph 78(h) of IRPA, be
injurious to national security or the safety of persons, despite the passage of
time, remained in the Court’s confidential file.
[30]
Thus
the volume of information and evidence before the Court is significant. Much of
the information and evidence added since August 2001 concerns updates or
perspectives on the information and evidence that was before the Ministers at
the time they certified their opinion. Not all of the information and evidence
in the record is relevant to the reasonableness of the security certificate. The
essence of that opinion is set out in the summary statement of August 2001 as
modified by the summary of November 2003 and again by Order of June 8, 2006.
The modifications include updating information, mainly about persons named in
the first summary statement, and their whereabouts and activities after August
2001. Events in the world since the certificate issued in August 2001 have
changed. There is heightened concern about international terrorism in much of
the western world since the tragedies in New York and Washington on September
11, 2001. Some background events, not dealing directly with Mr. Jaballah, are
the subjects of documents, testimony and argument submitted to the Court by the
parties, and the Court recognizes widely known developments on the basis of
judicial notice, but not in respect of matters relating directly to Mr.
Jaballah.
6. Acceptance
or variation of certain findings of the Court in its 2003 decision
[31]
Certain
of the Court’s determinations in its 2003 decision Re Jaballah, 2003 FCT
240, [2003] 4 F.C. 345, [2003] F.C.J. No. 822 (T.D.)(QL) warrant brief comment
before I turn to consider the evidence and argument on matters of concern
underlying the Ministers’ security certificate. While the 2003 determination
that the certificate was reasonable was set aside by the Court of Appeal (Re
Jaballah, 2004 FCA 257, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1199 (C.A.)(QL), other
determinations in the 2003 decision with some significance for this decision,
were accepted by the parties and the Court. I set those out briefly here,
noting whether the determination was accepted by the parties, or accepted as
varied by the Court, with reference to paragraphs in the 2003 decision, or to
relevant directions by the Court.
[32]
These
are the determinations of note.
(1) The
Court accepts that in security certificate proceedings the principles of res
judicata or abuse of process would preclude upholding a second security certificate
with respect to a person, when a first certificate has been found to be
unreasonable and is quashed, unless the second certificate is based upon new
information and evidence, known only after the decision on the first. (2003
decision, paras. 72 to 74) (Accepted by parties.) The primary implication of
this for this case is that matters dealt with in Jaballah No. 1 are not
subject to review or reconsideration in this proceeding unless there is new
evidence. In Jaballah No. 1 in 1999 Cullen J. found Mr. Jaballah to be a
credible witness, a general finding I do not question, but that does not
preclude my finding, on new information and evidence, that his testimony in
regard to certain matters is not credible.
(2) The
Court sets out the test for assessing whether information and evidence
underlying the second certificate is new. (2003 decision, paras. 75 to 80)
(Accepted by parties.)
(3) New
and partly new information, available after November 2, 1999 when the first
security certificate relating to Mr. Jaballah was quashed, is identified (2003
decision, paras. 81 to 89). (Accepted by parties.) Subsequently, new
information and evidence, including testimony and documents of Mr. Jaballah,
his wife and supporters, and on behalf of the Ministers, was received in
applications for his release from detention and in his submissions in 2006
against the concerns of the Ministers’ and their certificate.
(4) A
variation from factors stated in the 2003 decision was an erroneous reference
in the reasons in 2003 to testimony of a CSIS officer as a source for the
finding abroad of an address for Mr. Jaballah’s post office box in Toronto. This was
corrected by Order dated July 14, 2006. (Accepted as varied by the Court.)
(5) Another
variation, in the summary statement dated August 14, 2001, is an amendment,
approved by the Court’s Order dated November 22, 2005, which clearly states the
belief that “Mr. Jaballah served as a communications relay between AJ cells on
August 7, 1998, the day of the bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.” That
belief remained in issue, but the amendment is clearly a variation from my 2003
comment at para. 49, that “There is no reference to these perceived
communication links in the summary of the Ministers’ case…”, [i.e. links
between Al Jihad/Al Qaida cells, particularly in or about August 1998 when the
United States embassies in east Africa were targets of lethal car bombs on the
same day]. In that decision I added that diagrams showing links between Mr.
Jaballah in Toronto and certain
known Al Qaida operatives or centres) were of no weight in evidence. That was
accepted in closing submissions by counsel for the Ministers who acknowledged
that the diagrams, introduced in evidence through testimony of Mike, a CSIS
officer, were only used as illustrations of his oral evidence. I add that the
status of the diagrams has no bearing on the issue of whether Mr. Jaballah served
as a communications link between AJ cells.
(6) The
decision of a PRRA officer, dated August 15, 2002, resulting from preliminary
consideration of Mr. Jaballah’s application for protection, i.e. that there
were substantial grounds for belief that, if removed from Canada to his native
Egypt, Mr. Jaballah would face a risk of torture, and a risk to his life or of
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, was deemed by the 2003 decision (at
paras. 20, 22) to be the report of the Minister (MCI) in relation to the risk
facing Mr. Jaballah if he were returned to Egypt. That determination was not
set aside by the Court of Appeal in its 2004 decision (supra, at para.
23). By this Court’s Order of July 7, 2005 that determination (of 2003)
remained effective for purposes of reconsideration of the application for
protection by the MCI as a stage in consideration of the reasonableness of the
certificate. (Accepted by parties, although initially counsel for the Ministers
urged that all aspects of this Court’s 2003 determination were effectively set
aside by the 2004 decision of the Court of Appeal, a submission not accepted by
this Court.)
(7) Mr.
Jaballah’s opportunity to be heard regarding his inadmissibility, an
opportunity assured by para. 78(i) of IRPA, but which he declined to exercise
in 2003, was provided in these proceedings in 2006 in reconsidering the
Ministers’ certificate. It was utilized by Mr. Jaballah, after leave was sought
and granted for him to testify or to adduce evidence. He and his wife testified
in May and July 2006, and argument on his behalf concerning the reasonableness
of the certificate was heard in September 2006. In my opinion, he had a full
opportunity, as provided by para. 78(i) of IRPA, to respond to the Ministers’
decision that he is inadmissible to Canada. I believe that opinion
is accepted by counsel for the parties.
[33]
The
final variation in proceedings since the 2003 decision concerns the Court’s
role in dealing with constitutional issues arising in these proceedings. Some
issues of that nature were raised by then counsel for Mr. Jaballah in the
initial phase in 2001. In the 2003 decision (para. 44) I wrote:
… I
indicated that constitutional issues raised, so far as they were similar to
those raised before Mr. Justice Nadon in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Mahjoub, (2001), 199 F.T.R. 190, 13 Imm. L.R. (3d) 33, if
argued herein, would be dealt with as Nadon J. had done, unless this Court
could be persuaded that he was clearly wrong. That included his
determination that a judge considering a certificate issued under s. 40.1 of
the 1985 Act has no authority to consider arguments about the constitutionality
of that statutory provision, which has been found not to infringe ss. 7, 9, or
subsection 10(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or
paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights (see: Ahani v. Canada,
[1995] 3 F.C. 669,
appeal dismissed (1996), 201 N.R. 233 (F.C.A.),
leave to appeal refused, [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 496,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. p. v.). While there was no further argument of
constitutional issues before me, I note for the record that they were raised.
[34]
The law on this
matter was reconsidered by my colleague Justice Simon Noël in Re Charkaoui,
[2004] 3 F.C.R. 32, 2003 FC 1419, appeal dismissed, 2004 FCA 421, 247 D.L.R. (4th)
405, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060 (F.C.A.)(QL). In that case the learned judge
dismissed an application for a declaration that ss. 77 through 83 of IRPA were
unconstitutional. He held, and was subsequently supported by the Court of
Appeal, that as a designated judge he had jurisdiction to dispose of the
issues, constitutional or otherwise, arising in the context of an application
for review of the reasons for detention of a permanent resident held under a
ministerial warrant issued in proceedings concerning a security certificate,
and he further held that the questioned provisions of IRPA were not
unconstitutional.
[35]
Decisions of the
Court of Appeal, in Charkaoui, in Almrei and in Harkat,
all dealing with constitutional issues in certificate cases were appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada and heard in mid-June 2006. The appeals have
not yet been determined; and counsel for Mr. Jaballah in this case reserved
certain constitutional questions, said to arise here, for possible later resolution
depending upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions. That reservation was
acceptable to counsel for the Ministers and to the Court.
[36]
The
constitutional questions stated by counsel for Mr. Jaballah, considered under
reserve in this matter, as set out by counsel’s letter of September 20, 2006,
are the following:
A. The statutory regime
for the issuance of a security certificate and for the determination of its
reasonableness set out in s. 77 to 81 of the Immigration & Refugee
Protection Act does not comply with the principles of fundamental justice
in accordance with s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including
because:
i- the
substance of the case against the person is presented by the Ministers on an ex
parte and in camera and breaches the requirement that a person be
entitled to know the case against her and be given a fair opportunity to
respond, in particular in an instance where liberty is infringed at the
instance of the state and the person put at risk of removal to torture;
ii- the
absence of counsel for the person concerned, or even an independent amicus
in the secret part of the hearing compromises the independent and impartiality
of the designated judge such that it does not comply with the principles of
fundamental justice;
iii- the
‘reasonable grounds’ standard is such a low threshold as to render any defence
to the allegations that are known virtually illusory.
B. The statutory regime
for the issuance of a security certificate and for the determination of its
reasonableness, coupled with the mandatory and indefinite detention, set out in
s. 77 to 85 of the Immigration & Refugee Protection Act contravene the
equality rights of the applicant under s. 15 of the Charter in that they are
applied only to non-citizens and in that this applicant has been subjected to
them on the basis of racial religious profiling.
I note for
the record my opinion that there is no evidence or information in this case,
apart from critical comment on certificate cases generally, that Mr. Jaballah
has been subject to the application of ss. 77 to 85 of the IRPA “on the basis
of racial religious profiling”.
7.
Review
of the evidence and information for the Ministers’ concerns
[37]
There
is no question about the terrorist activities of the Egyptian Al-Jihad (AJ) or
Al Qaida, as appears from widely available public sources provided to the Court.
Moreover, interrelations between the two organizations have become more closely
integrated at least internationally, and the leadership of the AJ in recent
years has played a major role within the Al Qaida network. Dr. Ayman Al Zawaheri,
and other senior leaders of the AJ, have played leadership roles within Al
Qaida. Al Zawaheri for example, has been Osama Bin Laden’s principal
spokesperson and apparent second in command in recent years.
[38]
Counsel
for Mr. Jaballah suggested there is no current evidence that the AJ still
exists, but that is irrelevant when the evidence is that it did exist in the
1980s and 1990s, years when Mr. Jaballah was active. In any event, both
organizations continue to be designated in Canada, by P.C.
S0R/2002-284, dated July 23, 2002, pursuant to ss. 83.05(1) of the Criminal
Code as amended by S.C. 2001, c.41, s.4, as entities that there are
reasonable grounds to believe, have knowingly carried out, attempted to carry
out, participated in or facilitated terrorist activity.
[39]
The
only question for this Court, concerning the AJ or Al Qaida, is whether there
are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Jaballah is, or was a member of
either one, or of any terrorist organization. He has consistently denied this.
Yet, there is evidence and information upon which, in my opinion, a reasonable
observer would find grounds to believe that he was, or is a member of a
terrorist group, and of the AJ.
[40]
The
first evidence of this nature, new to the Ministers since the decision in
Jaballah No.1 in early November 1999, is an Interpol notice concerning a
fugitive wanted for prosecution in Egypt. The person named is
Mahmoud Said, also known as Mahoumoud Al Sayed Gaballah Said. The notice bears
a picture and fingerprints from 1989. In the 2003 decision, I described the notice
thus:
An Interpol notice, published July 13,
1999, which reached CSIS, acting for the Solicitor General, only on November
29, 1999, concerning an individual identified as Mahmoud Said, also known as Mahoumoud
Al Sayed Gaballah Said, who was wanted by the Government of Egypt under a
warrant alleging that he was a member of a terrorist organization responsible
for planning and logistics, the supply of weapons and explosives to, and the
escape of, active terrorists. In August 2000 CSIS was provided with a certified
comparison by an RCMP expert, of fingerprints taken in 1996 by Immigration
Canada on his arrival in Canada of Mahmoud Es-Sayyid Jaballah, the respondent,
and prints provided by the Government of Egypt to Interpol for its July 1999
notice. That certified comparison indicates that both sets of fingerprints are
those of the same person. Absent any explanation, the clear inference is that
Mr. Jaballah is the person whose fingerprints were circulated with the Interpol
notice and further, that Mr. Jaballah is the person subject to a warrant for
arrest in Egypt.
[41]
The
description in the notice of the fugitive is not apt for reference to Mr.
Jaballah in some respects. The date of birth is different from that claimed by
Mr. Jaballah, the faculty from which the fugitive graduated at the University
of Zagazig is said to be Arts whereas Mr. Jaballah claims to have graduated
from the Faculty of Biology, but the occupation given for the fugitive is
“teacher”, the same as Mr. Jaballah’s. There is also an unexplained anomaly in
passport numbers stated in the notice.
[42]
Despite
these differences, I find that the person intended by the Interpol notice is
the respondent, Mahmoud Jaballah. In testimony in 2006, he acknowledged the
picture on the notice is of him though he denies involvement in alleged
terrorism activities, and he has no explanation for the certificate of the R.C.M.P.
fingerprint expert that the fingerprints displayed in the notice are the same
as fingerprints taken from Mr. Jaballah on his arrival in Canada in 1996.
[43]
For
our purposes, the notice is significant in two other respects. The fugitive
(Mr. Jaballah) is wanted in Egypt on a charge of membership in a terrorist
organization under Egyptian criminal law no. 58/1937. For that offence, upon
conviction, the maximum penalty possible is said to be the death penalty. By
further Interpol notice dated 24/3/2003, received in Canada later in 2003,
Egyptian authorities acknowledge that is the maximum possible penalty, but it
is said “the maximum probable penalty is hard labour for life”.
[44]
For
Mr. Jaballah, counsel urged that no weight should be given by the Court to the
Interpol notice, or if any were given, it should simply be taken as confirmation
that the Government of Egypt was continuing to harass the respondent. Further,
in view of the reputation of Egyptian authorities for use of torture to obtain
information, the Court should ignore the notice unless it were satisfied that
it had the evidence on which the Egyptian charge was based and that the
evidence in support of the charge was not drawn by torture from an unwilling
witness. That, it seems to me, comes close to a standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, a higher standard of proof than the reasonable grounds basis,
which is here applicable.
[45]
The
evidence before the Ministers includes the Interpol notice. It cannot be
ignored. In my opinion, it is evidence that supports, as reasonable, a
conclusion that Mr. Jaballah is wanted for his membership, in earlier times, in
a terrorist organization. It seems clear that by the authorities in his own
country he is considered to be a terrorist, involved in a terrorist
organization.
[46]
The
second aspect of the evidence and information supporting the Ministers’ decision
as reasonable, is the picture that emerges from Mr. Jaballah’s contacts with a
number of persons in this country and abroad who are known or believed to be or
to have been associated with terrorist activities or organizations. Those
contacts support the view of the Ministers that Mr. Jaballah was in
communication with leading figures in the AJ-Al Qaida network, in a way that
only a person of reasonably senior status among them could have been.
[47]
Those
contacts I summarize below. First, I acknowledge, as counsel for Mr. Jaballah
argued, that there may be little in common among the persons of concern,
except, in my view, their shared belief and involvement, reported in the public
evidence and supported by undisclosed information, in terrorist activities to achieve
political and religious goals. I acknowledge that attention to ties to these
people may provide a narrow perspective about Mr. Jaballah, for the persons
named are not the only persons with whom he has been associated. Yet his
contacts with this collection of persons are of concern to the Ministers
because of the perceived involvement of these persons in terrorist activities.
[48]
This
belief in Mr. Jaballah’s contacts with others known to be involved with
terrorist activities is reasonably supported, in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation, by the numerous telephone calls made from and charged
to Mr. Jaballah’s telephone. With reference to evidence adduced in
cross-examination, in considering his 2005 application for release from
detention, the Court commented (see Re Jaballah, 2006 FC 115, at paras.
54-56):
¶ 54
I have no doubt about Mr. Jaballah's deep interest in being with and supporting
his family. Yet his credibility about other matters leaves much to be desired.
In cross-examination, he first stated that he could not remember whether he had
contacted anyone in Pakistan after he had come to Canada, he had not contacted
anyone in Yemen after leaving there where he only knew one person he had worked
with, and later after leaving Azerbaijan in 1995 he had left no friends behind
and had no communication with persons in either country after coming to Canada.
Later he was asked about telephone company records, then produced, which
indicated a number of calls to all three countries, including 72 to Yemen and
47 calls to Azerbaijan from his Canadian telephone, mainly in 1996 and 1997. He
then acknowledged that some of the recorded calls were his, or perhaps his
wife's. While some recorded calls were so brief, a minute or so, they might
have indicated inability to complete a call, as he suggested, numerous longer
calls that he appeared to acknowledge as his, were not satisfactorily
explained.
¶ 55
Again, there are telephone records of some 75 calls from his telephone to London
England, mainly to the International Office for Defence of the Egyptian
People, believed to be an office with an operational link for Al Qaeda. These
calls he admitted making when he was seeking advice or assistance for his
refugee claim, to support his application to review his failed refugee claim.
Yet many calls recorded in 1996 and early 1997 were made before Mr. Jaballah's
application for refugee status was heard, and, in my opinion, these were not
satisfactorily explained. Nor was there any satisfactory explanation of more
than 20 calls billed by Bell Canada to Mr. Jaballah's phone number from June 4
to 6, 1996, soon after his arrival in Canada, made to the United Kingdom,
Yemen, Azerbaijan and Pakistan.
¶ 56
Other testimony about his lack of communication with certain others in this
country after his arrival here, was cast into doubt by records of calls from
his telephone to Montreal, to Winnipeg and to Edmonton, in each centre to phone
numbers of persons suspected by C.S.I.S. of links to international terrorist activity.
As for travels within Canada he first said he had only visited Montreal, to
arrange automobile insurance at a lower premium than he could arrange in
Toronto, and to Niagara Falls and London. Later when asked specifically about
other centres he had visited, he acknowledged that he had driven to St.
Catherine's, and also to Winnipeg to visit a particular person, described by
him as not really a friend, who had been of assistance to him and his family on
their arrival in Canada. His contact with another person, then living in Alberta,
one since charged with terrorist funding activities by prosecutors in the
United States, was said to have been casual, and initiated by the person in Alberta
whom Jaballah claims he really did not know. Yet there were numerous phone
calls recorded from Jaballah's Toronto number to Edmonton and to Leduc where
his acquaintance was then based. These calls were not satisfactorily explained.
[49]
I
turn to a summary of my conclusions about the contacts of Mr. Jaballah with
persons of concern to the Ministers who it is believed were involved with
terrorist activities, and to the role he is perceived to have played as a link
in communications between cells, and leaders of AJ and Al Qaida related
operations.
[50]
First,
these are contacts alleged with persons in Canada who were of
concern to the Ministers because of the ties of those persons to terrorist
activities and organizations. Mr. Jaballah acknowledged contact with each of
these persons, but without knowledge on his part of their terrorist activities
and on his part, solely for innocent purposes. The persons of concern in Canada were these.
Ahmed Said Khadr, a Canadian, active in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in Canada, with his Canadian based
relief agency, Human Concern International. Since this case began in 2001 Mr.
Khadr is believed to have become a senior member of Bin Laden’s group and was
killed in a battle with Al Qaida forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. While Mr. Jaballah
acknowledges meeting Khadr, a well-known member of the Muslim community, at a
Mosque in Toronto, only after Jaballah came to
this country, there is some information provided to the Ministers of the
contact between the two men commencing before that in Peshawar, where both worked for different relief
agencies.
Hassan Farhat, who is believed to have held a key
position within Ansar-al-Islam, commanding a fighting unit of some 80
guerrillas and a six person cell of suicide bombers. The organization is among
those listed, as are AJ and Al Qaida, under P.C. SOR/2002-284 as amended, as
one for which these are reasonable grounds to believe that it is engaged in
terrorism. Mr. Jaballah claims to have met Farhat at a Mosque in Toronto, shortly after his arrival in
May 1996, when he was seeking help in getting his family settled. Farhat
introduced him to one who served as an interpreter and assisted in preparation
of his refugee claim. Farhat also helped him find accommodation for his family.
Farhat left Toronto about 4 months after Jaballah arrived there, and later that
fall or early winter, though he professes they were not really friends, Mr.
Jaballah drove with his young son and two other men to Winnipeg to see a then – ailing Farhat. Later,
after Farhat had moved to Montreal, Mr. Jaballah and his wife
visited him there.
Mohammed Zeki Mahjoub, (a.k.a. Mahmoud Shaker), a
permanent resident in Canada, a leading figure in the Vanguards of Conquest
faction of the AJ, another listed entity in SOR/2002-284 as amended, who was
the subject of a security certificate by the Ministers which was upheld as
reasonable in 2000. Mr. Jaballah admits to having met Mahjoub once only before
they were detained together in 2001. That first meeting, a social one, was
brief, at the home of Mr. Khadr’s mother-in-law in Toronto where both the wives of Messrs. Jaballah
and Mahjoub had gone for a social visit. When he was arrested in 2000, Mr.
Mahjoub had a paper containing the name Ahmed Jaballah and the Toronto telephone number of the
respondent, Mahmoud Jaballah, father of a son Ahmed then in his mid-teens. Mr.
Jaballah often gave his name as “Abu Ahmed” (i.e. father of Ahmed) following
Egyptian custom as he described it. There is no explanation why Mr. Mahjoub
would record the telephone number of Ahmed; then a teenager; the likely explanation
is that the number was intended to be, as it was, the number of Mahmoud
Jaballah.
Kassem Daher, a Canadian citizen, from Lebanon, who
by the mid 1990’s was a successful businessman in Alberta, where he is believed
to have raised funds and purchased arms for a Lebanese terrorist faction linked
to Al Qaida. He has been indicted, as one who funds international terror, in
the United States, and he was, at least for a
time, held in detention in Lebanon after he left Alberta. Numerous telephone calls from
Jaballah’s Toronto telephone to Daher’s numbers
in Alberta were unexplained except that Mr. Jaballah claimed to be seeking
information on possibly moving to Alberta.
There is information before the Ministers confirming contact by Mr. Jaballah
with Daher from soon after the former came to Canada and Mr. Jaballah acknowledges meeting
him in Toronto a month or two after he arrived in Canada.
Mustafa Mohammed Krer, a Canadian, who is believed
to be a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in Canada. Mr. Jaballah acknowledges
meeting him in Toronto and visiting Krer in Montreal where he assisted Jaballah to
arrange automobile insurance. There is information before the Ministers of
contact between the two men on a number of occasions.
[51]
There
were also contacts alleged with persons of concern outside Canada, including
the following.
Thirwat Salah Shehata, an Egyptian, one of the
leaders of AJ, closely involved with Dr. Ayman Al-Zawaheri in operations, not
only of AJ but of Al Qaida also. Mr. Jaballah acknowledges he retained Shehata,
a lawyer, to represent him in his difficulties with Egyptian authorities in the
1980’s and until he left for Saudi
Arabia in the
late spring of 1991. Shehata’s involvement with AJ, or Al Qaida, or in
terrorist activities, is said by Mr. Jaballah to be unknown to him, though he
is not surprised that Shehata may be wanted by Egyptian authorities for his
earlier activity as a lawyer representing opponents of the regime. Information
available to the Ministers supports a conclusion that the contacts between
Messrs. Jaballah and Shehata were more frequent and more recent than Mr.
Jaballah has acknowledged.
Ahmed Sulamah Mabruk, once thought to be the third
ranked leader of AJ, with whom it is believed Mr. Jaballah had regular contact
prior to Mabruk’s detention in Baku, Azerbaijan in September
1998. Information available to the Ministers supports the belief that Mabruk
was a regular contact of Mr. Jaballah.
Adel Abdel Al Bari and Ibrahim Eidarous,
Egyptians, leaders of AJ cell in London England in the 1990’s, since then held
in detention and released and detained again on extradition proceedings
initiated in the United States for involvement in communicating advance
warnings and subsequent claims for credit concerning bombings of U.S. Embassies
in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998 with losses of
hundreds of lives. Both have been indicted in the United States and both are wanted in Egypt for terrorist activities. Both were
operating from the International Office for the Defence of Egyptian People in
London, believed to be a front for the AJ, with links to Al Qaida, and the
latter network is believed to have been responsible for the embassy bombings in
East Africa. Eidarous reportedly was in
Baku, Azerbaijan to establish AJ operations
there at the time Mr. Jaballah was there, and he was sent thence to London to
head up AJ operations in England. Al Bari was responsible for
the London office (I.O.D.E.P.). Mr.
Jaballah acknowledges contact with Al Bari by telephone commencing in March
1997 when he was seeking information in support of his refugee claim in Canada, and contact also with
Eidarous, about possible arrangements to start a business in Canada selling clothing and other products
from the middle east.
Mr. Jaballah does not acknowledge that he
was in contact with Al Bari at the I.O.D.E.P. in London in June 1996, soon
after he had arrived in Canada, nor does he acknowledge contact made by
telephone with Azerbaijan and Yemen at that time, or with those places and
London on or about August 7, 1998 the day of the bombings of American Embassies
in East Africa. Information provided to the Ministers supports the conclusion
that Mr. Jaballah communicated with senior AJ representatives in London from
soon after his arrival in Toronto.
[52]
There
is also the allegation by the Summary Statement of the Ministers dated August
14, 2001 as amended that Mr. Jaballah is believed to have served as a
communications link between AJ cells on August 7, 1998, the day of the bombing
of U.S. embassies in
East Africa. That is echoed in the decision of the Minister’s delegate dated
September 23, 2005 at page 6) in rejecting Mr. Jaballah’s application for
protection in the following terms:
… In the reasons in the application for
protection decision rendered on 30 December 1993, [i.e., the first decision on
that application], E.A. Arnott refers to evidence of Mr. Jaballah’s active
participation from within Canada in the bombings in 1998 of
the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
I have independently examined this evidence and find it compelling.
[53]
There
is information available to the Ministers that reports communications between
Mr. Jaballah and telephone contacts, believed to be AJ cells or members, in Azerbaijan, in Yemen
and in London on or about
August 7, 1998. There is also information available to them about the same
contacts over time, commencing before and continuing after that date.
[54]
The
public evidence by documents adduced and by the testimony of Mike in December
2001, includes reference to the operating procedures and techniques of AJ, by
clandestine methods, with careful attention to internal security and by
relatively small cells operating largely independently, with only a few persons
knowing how contact is to be made. Observers believe that comparatively few
senior leaders of the AJ or Al Qaida would communicate with a variety of cells
of AJ or other operatives engaged in terrorist plots and activities.
[55]
Absent
any satisfactory explanation for telephone calls, known on the public record,
and reflected in the information available to the Ministers’, the inference
from Mr. Jaballah’s contacts with AJ cells and senior leaders in London,
Azerbaijan and Yemen is that he was a senior communicator within the AJ
network, including communications on or about August 7, 1998, when U.S.
embassies were bombed in East Africa with losses of hundred of civilians in
Nairobi and in Dar Es Salaam.
[56]
Finally,
I turn to a few general issues raised in relation to the evidence and
information before the Court.
[57]
For
the Ministers, it is urged that on review of the evidence of Mr. Jaballah, in
interviews with CSIS officers prior to the first certificate, before the
I.R.B., in this Court in 1999, and in these proceedings, Mr. Jaballah has been
inconsistent and not credible. That is in direct contrast with the finding of
Cullen J. when the first security certificate was quashed, that in the 1999
proceedings Mr. Jaballah was generally credible. I do not question that
determination and I am not disposed to find that his evidence generally is not
credible. Indeed, much of what the Court knows of his background and activities
is drawn from his evidence. At the same time, I do not accept his evidence in
certain respects.
[58]
In
some matters, the testimony of Mr. Jaballah was evasive. His responses to
questions were not always direct and when confronted by contradictory evidence
his story would vary. Thus, his evidence of not knowing anyone he would
telephone in Pakistan, or Yemen or
Azerbaijan, after he
came to Canada, was varied
but without reasonable explanation when he was confronted with records of
telephone calls made from his telephone on numerous occasions. Similarly, his
travels within Canada were limited, but the limitations were varied when he was
asked about travels to Winnipeg and Montreal. On another
matter initially he had said he borrowed a cell phone after arriving in Canada so that he
could be reached by his wife in case of any emergency. When pressed, he
acknowledged that he had kept the cell phone for some time and had freely used
it and given the number as his own to a number of people.
[59]
There
were respects in which his evidence was simply not credible, in my opinion. For
example, his professed ignorance of activities in, or in respect to,
Afghanistan in the years he was in Peshawar can only be feigned,
for that was a major city in Pakistan near the Afghan border,
and his work there is said to have included educating orphans and other
children, presumably of Arab origin. His evidence that a post office box he had
rented in Toronto was not used I do not accept in the face of testimony of
Mike, on behalf of CSIS, supported by information available to the Ministers,
that mail for Mr. Jaballah had been received at that box. More significant for
the Ministers’ opinion is the failure of his testimony to explain adequately
the numerous telephone calls to Yemen and Azerbaijan after he
arrived in Canada. His failure
to remember anyone in those countries except one former fellow worker in Yemen to whom
calls were made, is not credible. Similarly, his failure to explain calls to
London, Azerbaijan and Yemen shortly after his arrival in Toronto in 1996,
belies his explanation for London calls at least, that they were made at or
after his first hearing of his refugee claim in 1997, and his explanation that
he first learned of the London office of the International Office for the
Defence of Egyptian People from the internet after he had arrived in Canada is
not credible.
[60]
In
light of my conclusions, in one other respect I find that he was not a credible
witness, that is, in his denials of any involvement in terrorist activities or
as a member of a terrorist organization.
[61]
In
addition to credibility concerns, for the Ministers it is also urged that their
conclusions about Mr. Jaballah are supported by inferences drawn from his
travel before coming to Canada. In the summary statement of August 14, 2001,
as later amended, it is stated (para. 5(a)):
The service believes JABALLAH’s travel
pattern was consistent with the profile of an Islamic Mujahedine extremist –
one who left Egypt to fight in Afghanistan, trained in Yemen, may have
fought in Chechnya, and cannot return to Egypt.
[62]
I
decline to accept this as providing any support to the Ministers’ position.
What some or many others may have done in travels in the mid-East in the early
1990’s is not supportive of the Ministers’ opinions about his terrorist
background and membership in a terrorist organization. There is no information
at all about any involvement of Mr. Jaballah in any way in Chechnya. The belief
that he spent time in Afghanistan has consistently been
denied by him, a denial accepted by Cullen J. in 1999. The only new information
since that decision is general in nature, without specifics of where, when,
with whom or for what purpose he is believed to have been in Afghanistan. The quality
of the new information is less than desirable, in my opinion. In any event,
absent any evidence of when Mr. Jaballah is believed to have been in Afghanistan, and what he
may then have done, the allegation that he may have gone there is not
supported.
[63]
In
another respect, apparent differences in Mr. Jaballah’s story told at different
times, and differences with the testimony of his wife, about when he returned
to Pakistan from Yemen or Azerbaijan in the period 1994-96
are not significant or supportive of the Ministers’ conclusions. The
differences do lead me to conclude that Mr. Jaballah was not credible in his
evidence that he returned to Pakistan only in March 1996 before soon leaving
with his family for Canada. Yet his failure to be credible in this matter
does not, without more, support the Ministers’ opinion. Differences in his
evidence and that of his wife about his travel to Winnipeg from Toronto in 1996, and
in some other aspects, do not in my view add support to the Ministers’ case.
8. Statutory
security grounds for inadmissibility
[64]
In
discussion of the legislative regime here applicable (see paras. 11 and 14 above)
brief reference was made to certain provisions of s-s. 34(1) of IRPA concerning
inadmissibility to Canada of a permanent resident or foreign national on
security grounds. The Act also provides by s. 33 that ss. 34 to 37 are to be
interpreted so that “the facts that constitute inadmissibility … include facts
arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which
there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring
or may occur.”
[65]
The
words “reasonable grounds to believe” are also used in para. 34(1)(f) and a
similar phrase, “believed on reasonable grounds to be”, in para. 37(1)(a),
which refer to membership in an organization believed to be engaged, in
espionage, subversion or terrorism [34 (1)(f)] or in organized criminality [37
(1)(a)]. It is well settled that while these words create a relatively low
evidentiary threshold they do require more than mere suspicion or subjective
belief. The threshold does not require proof on a balance of probabilities;
rather it connotes a degree of probability, i.e. a bona fide belief in a
serious possibility, based on credible evidence (See Re Harkat, 2005 FC
393, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481 (QL); Chiau v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (F.C.A.); Thanaratnam
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 122, 45
Imm. L.R. (3d) 1 (F.C.A.).
[66]
In
considering the material before the Court para. 78 (j) of IRPA provides that
the designated judge, in determining whether the certificate is reasonable, may
receive into evidence anything that in her or his opinion is appropriate even
if it is inadmissible in a court of law and may base the decision on that
evidence.
[67]
Other
settled principles concerning the grounds set out in s-s. 34(1), for
inadmissibility on security grounds, are these.
1.
If
more than one ground of inadmissibility is certified, each is to be read
disjunctively and if one is established the certificate is to be determined to
be reasonable. (See Harkat, supra, at para. 43, Zundel
(Re), 2005 FC 295, [2005] F.C.J. No. 314 (QL), at paras. 16, 17).
2.
“Terrorism”
includes any act intended to cause death or serious injury to a civilian or a
non-combatant in armed conflict when the purpose of the act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or
international organization to do or abstain from any act. (Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 98.)
3.
The
term “member” of an organization referred to in relation to security grounds is
to be given an unrestricted and broad interpretation (see Harkat, supra
at para. 45). As Rothstein J. stated in Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1147
(T.D.)(QL) at para. 52 with reference to the grounds of inadmissibility
referring to membership in a terrorist organization as set out in s. 19 of the Immigration
Act then applicable, a comment I accept by analogy to the same words used
in paragraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA.
The provisions deal with subversion and
terrorism. The context in immigration legislation is public safety and
national security, the most serious concerns of government. It is trite to say
that terrorist organizations do not issue membership cards. There is no formal
test for membership and members are not therefore easily identifiable. The
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration may, if not detrimental to the national
interest, exclude an individual from the operation of subparagraph
19(1)(f)(iii)(B). I think it is obvious that Parliament intended the term
“member” to be given an unrestricted and broad interpretation …
[68]
While
the threshold for establishing facts on the basis of a reasonable ground to
believe may be lower than the accepted criminal or civil law standards of proof,
I am persuaded by counsel for Mr. Jaballah that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co. has some
significance for this case. Thus, whether facts alleged and established on the
basis of the threshold of “a reasonable ground to believe” fall within the
statutory provisions of s-s. 34(1) may depend on the quality and cogency of the
evidence. The question for the Court is to assess whether that evidence, and the
weight accorded to it, will lead to the conclusion that the requisite standard
of proof is met to support a finding that the facts fall within the conduct
prescribed by statute, bearing in mind any serious consequences Mr. Jaballah
may face. Those consequences concern directly whether or not he may be admitted
to Canada, and if he
is not admissible the prospects he may face if he is required to be removed by
the MCI.
[69]
On
review of the evidence and information available to the Ministers at the time
their opinion was certified, and relevant evidence of later origin,
subsequently filed in these proceedings after mid-August 2001, I find there is
a reasonable basis for the opinion of the Ministers that Mr. Jaballah is
inadmissible to Canada, in respect to the particular grounds of s-s.
34(1) of IRPA that remain in issue, that is,
that Mr. Jaballah was engaged in terrorist
activities in Egypt in the 1980’s, and after he left there in 1991 in
international terrorist activities of the AJ and Al Qaida, particularly as a
communicator between terrorist cells after he came to Canada; and further
that Mr. Jaballah, by inference from the
standing within AJ and other terrorist networks of the persons with whom he had
contact after his arrival in Canada, was a member, with senior
standing as a communicator among terrorist cells and persons of the AJ and of
the Al Qaida network.
These facts
are reasonably supported on the evidence in the public record and the
information in the confidential record available to the Ministers, both of
which have been considered by the Court. In my opinion, the information and
evidence provide reasonable grounds to believe the factual bases for the
opinion of the Ministers, and those facts fall within the conduct which
precludes admissibility of a foreign national to Canada. The
evidence and information clearly put Mr. Jaballah within the inadmissible
classes set out by s-ss. 34(1)(c) and (f) of IRPA.
[70]
Finally,
I record another fact, that is, that counsel for the Ministers expressly noted
that the Ministers have never suggested there is any evidence, either open or
classified, that Mr. Jaballah has personally committed an act of violence. “It
is our position that he participated as a communications link in relation to
the East
Africa
bombings, so that it is arguable he did have a role in violent events to that
extent”. I agree that there is no evidence or information to support a
conclusion that Mr. Jaballah personally committed an act of violence at any
time.
9. The
reasonableness of the security certificate
[71]
In
view of the conclusions I have reached on the evidence in the public record and
the information in the confidential record and in light of the new information
and evidence, not available to the Court in Jaballah No. 1, in 1999, an Order
will issue with my determination that the security certificate of the
Ministers, dated August 13, 2001 is reasonable. The certified opinion of the
Ministers, now found reasonable, is that Mr. Jaballah is inadmissible to Canada
as a person within paragraphs 34(1)(c) and 34(1)(f) of IRPA.
10. The
duty and discretion to remove Mr. Jaballah from Canada
[72]
When
it is ordered that my determination is that the Minister’s security certificate
is reasonable, that may not be appealed or judicially reviewed (s-s. 80(3),
IRPA), except, in accord with jurisprudence, on jurisdictional or on
constitutional grounds. That determination is conclusive proof that Mr.
Jaballah is inadmissible to Canada, and the order setting out the determination
is a removal order that may not be appealed against and that is in force
without the necessity of holding or continuing an examination or an
inadmissibility hearing (paras. 81(a) and (b) of IRPA). As a removal order it
comes into force on the day the order accompanying these reasons is filed
(subpara. 49(1)(a) of IRPA). Unless the order is stayed it is enforceable, and
Mr. Jaballah must leave Canada, or the Order is to be enforced by the MCI
as soon as is reasonably practicable (s-s. 48(1) and (2) of IRPA).
[73]
In
recognition of these circumstances and of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3 (QL), 2002 SCC 1, in closing submissions
counsel for the Ministers requested that if the Court were to determine that
the security certificate is reasonable in this case, it should also determine whether
there is any legal limitation to the exercise of the Minister’s discretion in
removing Mr. Jaballah. In the ordinary course, it might be expected that he
would be removed to Egypt as soon as travel arrangements could be made.
Yet among the facts of this case, as found in 2002 by a pre-removal risk
assessment officer on behalf of the MCI and accepted by this Court, if he were
to be removed to Egypt there is serious risk that he would face
torture, death or inhumane treatment. While it was earlier urged that this assessment
might be subjected to review and some steps were apparently initiated to obtain
assurances from the Government of Egypt that such a risk would not be met (see
comments of Rothstein J.A. of the Court of Appeal in its decision Jaballah
(Re), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1199 (QL) at para. 13), yet no other later
determination or assessment on behalf of the Minister about the risk to Mr.
Jaballah if he were to be deported to Egypt was brought to the attention of
this Court.
[74]
Counsel
for Mr. Jaballah argued in closing submissions that if the Court held the
certificate to be reasonable, it would be functus, without authority to consider
this issue, since it had declined to consider the issue when urged to do so by
that counsel at an earlier stage, in review of the decision on behalf of MCI
concerning Mr. Jaballah’s application for protection. While I did then decline to
accept submissions of his counsel that Mr. Jaballah should not be deported to
torture, in my view the question whether Mr. Jaballah would be removed to Egypt,
was not then before me. Rather, the question then was whether or not the
decision to refuse his application for protection based on the delegate’s
assessment, pursuant to subpara. 113(d)(ii) of IRPA, that the danger he
constituted to the security of Canada if he remained outweighed the risk of
torture or other harm to him if he were returned to Egypt. I was then
concerned to determine the lawfulness of the decision on the application for
protection. In my view, a decision of this Court that the protection decision
was reasonable or unreasonable, did not constitute a decision to remove or not
to remove Mr. Jaballah from Canada.
[75]
Following
conclusion of the hearings on September 14, 2006, the Court sought further
written submissions from counsel for the parties with regard to advice if it
were to proceed as requested by counsel for the Ministers, in resolution of the
question presented. The question was described by that counsel as the “Suresh
question”, which I understand and made clear this understanding to them in
requesting submissions, related to the possibility of limitations on the
exercise of the Ministers’ discretion with respect to removal of Mr. Jaballah
from Canada if the
certificate were found to be reasonable.
[76]
In
my view having determined the certificate is reasonable, knowing that the order
setting out that determination becomes a removal order, aware of the
implications of Suresh and the finding that Mr. Jaballah faces a serious
risk of torture or worse if he were removed to Egypt, I find the circumstances now
favour proceeding to resolve the issue whether in this case Mr. Jaballah can be
removed by the Minister from Canada to Egypt, or any other place where he faces
torture, or possible death or cruel and unusual punishment. This question has
been well argued before this Court, since the first decision of the Minister’s
delegate in relation to the application for protection was reviewed in
2004-2005, again in 2005 in review of the second decision by the Minister’s
delegate, and in proceedings since. It is an issue in virtually all security
certificate cases. Failure to determine that question earlier is said to be a
matter now before the Court of Appeal, but if that is so it relates to the
decision on review of the decision rejecting Mr. Jaballah’s application for
protection.
[77]
I
believe the circumstances arising with the finding that the security
certificate is reasonable, in this case, constitute sufficient factual basis in
light of the consequences under IRPA, for the Court to proceed to deal with the
question raised.
[78]
Counsel
for the both parties suggested the Court might order a stay of any removal of
Mr. Jaballah pending judicial determination of the issue now presented to me.
That would only postpone a judicial decision. A decision now, though it may be
raised on appeal may provide guidance for the MCI and ultimately a definite judicial
or legislative response. I propose to deal with the issue now.
[79]
In
Suresh the issue was well canvassed in discussion by the Supreme Court
of Canada. Among other comments the Court said (Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3
(QL), 2002 SCC1, 208 D.L.R. (4th), 1 S.C.R. at paras. 76, 77
and 78):
[76] The Canadian rejection of torture
is reflected in the international conventions to which Canada is a party. The Canadian and
international perspectives in turn inform our constitutional norms. The
rejection of state action leading to torture generally, and deportation to
torture specifically, is virtually categoric. Indeed, both domestic and
international jurisprudence suggest that torture is so abhorrent that it will
almost always be disproportionate to interests on the other side of the
balance, even security interests. This suggests that, barring extraordinary
circumstances, deportation to torture will generally violate the principles of
fundamental justice protection by s. 7 of the Charter. […]
[77] The Minister is obliged to exercise
the discretion conferred upon her by the Immigration Act in accordance
with the Constitution. This requires the Minister to balance the relevant
factors in the case before her. […]
In Canada, the balance struck by the Minister must
conform to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.
It follows that insofar as the Immigration Act leaves open the
possibility of deportation to torture, the Minister should generally decline to
deport refugees where on the evidence there is a substantial risk of torture.
[78] We do not exclude the possibility
that in exceptional circumstances, deportation to face torture might be
justified, either as a consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of
the Charter or under s. 1. […] Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there
are substantial grounds to believe he or she would be tortured on return, this
is not because art. 3 of the CAT [i.e., Convention Against Torture] directly
constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the fundamental
justice balance under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes
deportation to torture when applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict
that it will rarely be struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious
risk of torture. However, as the matter is one of balance, precise prediction
is elusive. The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if
any, must await future cases.
[80]
Suresh, thus far,
has led to debate, whether it is within the discretion of the MCI to deport an
inadmissible person to a country where there is a serious risk of torture. Mr.
Justice Dennis O’Connor, as Commissioner, in his Report of the Events Relating
to Maher Arar, Analysis and Recommendations, (2006) (Vol. 3) Part II pp. 51-52,
wrote of the right to be free from torture as an absolute right. In his view, “The
infliction of torture, for any purpose, is so fundamental a violation of human
dignity, that it can never be legally justified.” He makes reference to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to several international agreements, including
the Convention against Torture, to which Canada is a party,
and to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as the Criminal
Code of Canada, all of which confirm the absolute rejection of torture.
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture prohibits a state party from
expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another state where there are
substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.
[81]
That
prohibition is now widely recognized and accepted in many countries of the world,
including those within the European Union. It is reflected in the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh. That judgment’s reference to
exceptional cases left open for future consideration cannot have been intended
to leave many cases to be classed as exceptional. Rather, the general
principle, as I read Suresh, is that deportation to a country where
there is a substantial risk of torture would infringe an individual’s rights,
in this case Mr. Jaballah’s rights, under s. 7 of the Charter, and, in
my view, infringement generally would require that the exceptional case would
have to be justified under s. 1.
[82]
Here,
no case has been argued that Mr. Jaballah’s circumstances are exceptional, or
that they could be so qualified under s.1 of the Charter. I have found
the Ministers’ certified opinion to be reasonable. By inference that opinion
signifies that his continuing presence in Canada, without
restraints, would constitute a danger to the security of the country. Yet there
is no case argued that he has been personally involved in violence.
[83]
I
conclude that the facts of this case do not create an exceptional circumstance
that would warrant Mr. Jaballah’s deportation to face torture abroad.
[84]
This
does not mean that he may not be deported. The MCI has a responsibility to
deport him, as soon as may be reasonably done if he does not leave Canada voluntarily
(s-s. 48(2) of the IRPA). But deportation to Egypt or to any country where and
so long as there is a substantial risk that he would be tortured or worse would
violate his rights as a human being, guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
The MCI may not exercise discretion in a manner that would violate Mr.
Jaballah’s rights under the Charter. The Minister has significant discretion
under IRPA and if that is not sufficient it may be amended by regulatory or
legislative change. Under the Act now he may discharge his responsibility by
deporting Mr. Jaballah to a country where he does not face the prospect of
torture. If that proves impossible in a reasonable time, then if conditions
should change, so that the substantial risk of torture if he is returned to his
own country can be judged to have been essentially eliminated, he may then be
deported to his own country or another which is now perceived to present to him
a substantial risk of torture, or worse.
[85]
I
conclude that in the circumstances of this case the Minister, in reliance on
the security certificate, now found to be reasonable, as a removal order, may
not exercise discretion to remove Mr. Jaballah to any country where and when
there is a substantial risk that he would face torture or death or cruel and
unusual punishment.
[86]
In
my opinion, that limitation is consistent, not merely with the decision in Suresh
but also with Canada’s international obligations, with Canadian
jurisprudence in regard to extradition to a jurisdiction where the death
penalty is still imposed. and with Canadian values as reflected in the Criminal
Code’s provisions concerning torture and in the Charter of Rights,
particularly ss. 7 and 12.
[87]
The
Order now issued, sets out my determinations:
1.
that
the Ministers’ security certificate, dated August 13, 2001 determining that Mr.
Jaballah, a foreign national, is inadmissible to Canada, is reasonable within
s-s. 80(1) of IRPA, and
2.
that
if Mr. Jaballah does not voluntarily depart from Canada, in the exercise of his
responsibility and discretion to remove him in reliance on the security
certificate, now found to be reasonable, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
may not remove him to any country where and when there is a substantial risk
that he would face torture, death, or cruel and unusual treatment.
“W. Andrew MacKay”
Ottawa,
Ontario
October
16, 2006