Date: 20060927
Docket: T-345-04
Citation: 2006
FC 1150
Halifax, Nova
Scotia, September 27, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
FILM CITY ENTERTAINMENT LTD.,
and
THE MOTION PICTURE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION
R.O.C.
Plaintiffs
and
RACHEL CHEN and SIMON CHEN
doing business as
FORMOSA COQUITLAM VIDEO
GOLDEN FORMOSA ENTERTAINMENT LTD.
CHIEN-WEN CHEN
HUI MEI CHEN
HUI-CHENG CHEN
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
Film City
Entertainment Ltd. and the Motion Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. (the
plaintiffs), commenced an action claiming copyright infringement by the
defendants. This is a motion by the plaintiffs for summary judgment against the
defendants pursuant to Federal Courts Rules, 1998, S.O.R. 198-106, Rule
216. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have reproduced and distributed
to the public a television program in which copyright is owned and licenced by
the plaintiffs.
[2]
The
plaintiffs seek an order pursuant to Rule 216 of the Federal Courts Rules, 1998,
granting summary judgment against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the television program
“The 40th Golden Horse Awards Presentation Ceremony and Walk of Fame” (the
program);
2. A declaration that the Motion
Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. is the owner of
the copyright in the program;
3. A declaration that Film City
Entertainment Ltd. hold a licence under copyright for the program from the
Motion Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. which is protected by the Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (the Act);
4. A declaration that the
defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the program;
5. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors, officers, employees,
servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly,
infringing copyright in the program by any one or more of the following means:
reproducing all or a substantial part of the program in a material form;
selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering
for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent
as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the
purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the
plaintiff, Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid
for;
6. The following damages jointly
and severally against the defendants:
(a) statutory damages
pursuant to section 38.1 of the Act in the amount of $10,000; and
(b) exemplary
and aggravated damages in the amount of $7,000;
7. Pre-judgment interest
calculated against the statutory damages of $10,000 from January 1, 2004,
pursuant to the British
Columbia Court
Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79;
8. Post-judgment interest
pursuant to the British
Columbia Court
Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79, commencing from the date of
judgment;
9. An order granting the
plaintiffs their costs of this action in the amount of $3,840.00 in costs plus
GST, and $671.76 for disbursements.
Background
[3]
The
plaintiffs have commenced an action for copyright infringement against the
defendants, alleging that Golden Formosa Entertainment Limited, (the corporate
defendant), distributed to the general public, unauthorized counterfeit
versions of a television program in which the plaintiffs own the copyright in
Canada. The plaintiffs also allege that the personal defendants (Rachel Chen,
Simon Chen, Chien-Wen Chen, Hui Mei Chen and Hui-Cheng Chen) while acting in
their capacities as either managers or directors of the corporate defendants,
knowingly authorized and ordered the infringement.
[4]
The action
in this matter was originally commenced by the plaintiffs in February 2004. The
statement of claim was amended in December 2004 when the defendants, Rachel
Chen and Simon Chen, filed a defence stating that they were employees of the
corporate defendant. As a result, the plaintiffs amended their statement of
claim to include the corporate defendant and its directors.
[5]
The
defendants filed an amended defence in which the corporate defendant claims to
have acquired the rights to distribute the program in Canada from a legitimate copyright owner. The
defendants therefore claimed that there was no copyright infringement.
[6]
The
program in question is a Chinese-language Taiwanese television awards program, entitled
(in English), “The 40th Annual Golden Horse Awards” (the program).
[7]
The
affidavit evidence of Michael Leung shows that the plaintiff, Film City Entertainment
Ltd., registered its interest in the program with the Canadian Intellectual
Property Office.
[8]
The affidavit
of Derek Wong states that in December 2003, he rented a copy of the program in
video format at 360
Johnson Street, Coquitlam, British Columbia and that he gave it to
Michael Leung.
[9]
The
affidavit evidence of Mr. Leung establishes that the defendants, Formosa
Coquitlam Video and Golden Formosa Entertainment Ltd., operated from 360 Johnson Street, Coquitlam, British Columbia.
[10]
The
affidavit evidence of Michael Leung states that he viewed the copy and that it
was a crude and counterfeit form of the program.
[11]
The
affidavit evidence of Michael Leung states the following in paragraph 34 of his
affidavit:
In the within action, the personal
defendants all share the family name Chen. In past discussions with her, Hui
Mei Chen told me that one of the other named directors of the Corporate
Defendant showing on the company search was her sister and that her sister ran
the business with her. To the best of my belief, for the reasons cited above
and in light of the circumstances, I believe that the personal defendants are
all family members who share actively in the management and operation of the
Premises, including the principal activities of Golden Formosa which involves
obtaining and distributing movies and television shows (including the Program)
to the general public.
[12]
Michael
Leung also stated in his affidavit that the defendant, Hui Mei Chen, was
responsible for ordering and procuring movie products distributed by her
companies (including Golden Formosa), and that from 1996 until approximately
2001, she repeatedly purchased movies from Film City Entertainment Ltd. In
addition, Leung stated that Hui Mei Chen held herself out to be the manager and
director of these companies.
[13]
Michael Leung
stated in his affidavit that he telephoned the premises at 360 Johnson Street and spoke to a person who
stated that he was the defendant, Simon Chen, and that he owned the premises
along with his mother.
[14]
Richard
Lin stated in his affidavit that the program was never distributed in Canada by Taipei International
Satellite TV (Canada) Inc. (Taipei TV). Taipei TV
is the exclusive Canadian rightsholder of certain television programs produced
and first broadcast in Taiwan by Chinese Television Systems
(CTS), Taiwan Television Enterprise Ltd. (TTV) and the China Television Company
(CTV). Lin stated that in the summer of 2004, he and Mandy Chen discussed the
possibility of her distributing Taipei TV programs. He further stated that
Taipei TV never sold, leased or authorized the use of the program to Mandy Chen
nor to any other individuals or stores. Mandy Chen is also known as Hui Mei
Chen.
Issue
[15]
Should
summary judgment be granted in this case?
Analysis and Decision
[16]
In
relation to summary judgment, Rules 213 to 218 of the Federal Courts Rules,
1998 apply and can be found in the attached annex.
[17]
The
plaintiffs also rely on sections 5 and 27 and subsections 38.1(5), 38.1(7),
39(2) and 53(2) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
[18]
Madam
Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Granville Shipping Co. v. Pegasus Lines
Ltd. S.A. et al. (1996) 111 F.T.R. 189 (F.C.T.D.), has summarized the
general principles that apply in applications for summary judgment as follows:
[8] I have considered all of the
case law pertaining to summary judgment and I summarize the general principles
accordingly:
1. the purpose of the provisions
is to allow the court to summarily dispense with cases which ought not proceed
to trial because there is no genuine issue to be tried (Old Fish Market
Restaurants v. 1000357 Ontario Inc. et al.), at p. 222;
2. there is no determinative test
(Feoso Oil Limited v. Saria (1995), 184 N.R. 307 (F.C.A.) but
Stone, J. A., seems to have adopted the reasons of Henry, J., in Pizza Pizza
Ltd. v. Gillespie (Pizza Pizza) (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 225 (Gen.
Div.). It is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial, it is
whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the
trier of fact at a future trial;
3. each case should be
interpreted in reference to its own contextual framework (Blyth, supra,
and Collie, supra);
4. provincial practice rules
(especially rule 20 of the Ontario Rules) can aid in
interpretation (Feoso, supra, and Collie, supra);
5. this court may determine
questions of fact and law on the motion for summary judgment if this can be
done on the material before the court (this is broader than rule 20 of the Ontario
Rules of Civil Procedure) (Patrick);
6.
on the
whole of the evidence, summary judgment cannot be
granted if the necessary facts cannot be
found or if it would be unjust to do so (Pallman, supra, and Sears,
supra);
7. in the case of a serious issue
with respect to credibility, the case should go to trial because the parties
should be cross-examined before the trial judge (Forde, supra, and Sears,
supra). The mdere existence of apparent conflict in the evidence does not
preclude summary judgment; the court should take a “hard look” at the merits
and decide if there are issues of credibility to be resolved (Stokes, supra).
[19]
I have
considered the material filed on the motion, the submissions made by counsel
for the plaintiffs and the submissions made by Ms. Chen on behalf of the
defendants. I am of the opinion that summary judgment should be granted in this
case. The plaintiffs have established that the defendants rented a counterfeit
version of the program to Mr. Wong. The plaintiffs have also shown that
copyright subsists in the program in Canada
and that the plaintiff, Film City Entertainment Ltd., owns the copyright in the
program. The plaintiffs established that the defendants were or should have
been aware of the copyright in the program and that the corporate defendant
infringed the plaintiffs’ copyright. I am also satisfied that the infringement
took place under the knowing direction and control of the personal defendants.
[20]
I would refer to paragraphs 23-36 of the affidavit of Michael Leung and
in particular paragraph 29 which states:
Hui Mei Chen has been and, to the
best of my knowledge, is responsible for the ordering and procuring of movie
products that her companies (including Golden Formosa) distribute. From 1996
to approximately 2001, Hui Mei Chen repeatedly purchased movies from the Active
Plaintiff or its affiliates on behalf of her companies including Golden Formosa.
During this time, to the best of my knowledge, Hui Mei Chen and Golden Formosa
accepted our product and never questioned the validity of our rights to
distribute it. In her dealings with us, she has always held herself out to be
the manager and director of those companies, including Golden Formosa.
I would also note that the defendant, Simon Chen stated that
he and his mother owned the premises from which the counterfeit video was sold.
[21]
Based on
the evidence before me on this motion, the defences filed by the defendants do
not preclude the granting of summary judgment in this case.
[22]
Applying
the general principles outlined in Granville Shipping, I am of the opinion
that summary judgment should be granted as there is no genuine issue to be tried.
There is no issue as to credibility and the necessary facts are present to
grant summary judgment.
[23]
The
plaintiffs have elected to claim statutory damages.
[24]
The
plaintiffs are granted summary judgment against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the television program
“The 40th Golden Horse Awards Presentation Ceremony and Walk of Fame” (the
program) and that:
2. A declaration that the Motion
Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. is the owner of
the copyright in the program;
3. A declaration that Film City
Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the program from the
Motion Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. which is protected by the Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42;
4. A declaration that
the defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the program;
5. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors, officers, employees,
servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly,
infringing copyright in the program by any one or more of the following means:
reproducing all or a substantial part of the program in a material form;
selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering
for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent
as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the
purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff,
Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for.
[25]
I am not prepared
to grant statutory damages in the amount of $10,000. In assessing the amount of
statutory damages to be awarded, I have considered all relevant factors
including the good faith or bad faith of the defendants, the conduct of the
defendants before and during the proceedings, and the need to deter other
infringements of the copyright in question. In coming to my finding on the
amount of statutory damages, I have considered the submissions in paragraph 50
of the plaintiffs’ memorandum of fact and law. In coming to my finding
on the amount of statutory damages, I have considered the plaintiffs’
submissions found at paragraph 50 of their memorandum of fact and law. The
plaintiffs submitted that the defendants’ involvement in similar proceedings,
attitude toward the judicial process and high level of sophistication, are
factors which should be taken into account when assessing damages. The
plaintiffs also submitted that the program was obviously counterfeit in nature,
time-sensitive and profited from by the defendants at the plaintiffs’ expense. Based on the facts of this
case, I am prepared to award statutory damages in the amount of $5,000.
[26]
I am not
prepared to award exemplary and aggravated damages.
[27]
With
respect to costs, I will award the plaintiffs’ costs in the amount of
$4,300.56. I have deducted four units as this matter was argued together with
Court file T-337-04. Otherwise, I am of the view that the costs claimed were
reasonable.
[28]
The
plaintiffs are awarded pre-judgment interest calculated against the statutory
damages of $5,000 from January 1, 2004 pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.
[29]
The
plaintiffs are awarded post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79,
commencing from the date of judgment.
ORDER
[30]
IT IS
ORDERED that the
plaintiffs are granted summary judgment against the
defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the television program
“The 40th Golden Horse Awards Presentation Ceremony and Walk of Fame”;
2. A declaration that the Motion
Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. is the owner of
the copyright in the program;
3. A declaration that Film City
Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the program from the
Motion Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. which is protected by the Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42;
4. A declaration that
the defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the program;
5. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors, officers, employees,
servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly,
infringing copyright in the program by any one or more of the following means:
reproducing all or a substantial part of the program in a material form;
selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering
for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent
as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the
purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the
plaintiff, Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid
for.
6. Statutory damages against the
defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $5,000;
7. Pre-judgment interest
calculated against the statutory damages of $5,000 from January 1, 2004
pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c-79;
8. Post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia
Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c-79, commencing from the date of
judgment.
9. Costs in the amount of $4,300.56.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Rules
213 to 218 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 state as follows:
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213.(1) A plaintiff may, after the
defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any
time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for
summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of
claim.
(2) A defendant may, after serving and filing a defence
and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion
for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim set out in the
statement of claim.
214.(1) A party may bring a motion
for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion
and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for
the hearing of the motion.
(2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment
shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days
before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion.
215. A response to a motion for
summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the
pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
216.(1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court
is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim
or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
(2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is
satisfied that the only genuine issue is
(a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the
Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a
reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or
(b) a question of law, the Court may determine the
question and grant summary judgment accordingly.
(3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court
decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the
Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either
on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence
to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law.
(4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in
whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action
not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or
order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.
217. A plaintiff who obtains
summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for
any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other
relief.
218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only
in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not
in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order
(a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim;
(b) for security for costs; or
(c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for
discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for
summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their
use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery.
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213.(1) Le demandeur peut, après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur —
ou avant si la Cour l’autorise — et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de
l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement
sommaire sur tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration.
(2) Le défendeur peut, après avoir
signifié et déposé sa défense et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de
l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement
sommaire rejetant tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la
déclaration.
214.(1) Toute partie peut présenter une requête pour obtenir un
jugement sommaire dans une action en signifiant et en déposant un avis de
requête et un dossier de requête au moins 20 jours avant la date de
l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis.
(2) La partie qui reçoit signification
d’une requête en jugement sommaire signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse
au moins 10 jours avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans
l’avis de requête.
215. La réponse à
une requête en jugement sommaire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les
allégations ou les dénégations contenues dans les actes de procédure déposés
par le requérant. Elle doit plutôt énoncer les faits précis démontrant
l’existence d’une véritable question litigieuse.
216.(1) Lorsque,
par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue qu’il
n’existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant à une déclaration ou à
une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(2) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en
jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue que la seule véritable question
litigieuse est:
a) le montant auquel le requérant a
droit, elle peut ordonner l’instruction de la question ou rendre un jugement
sommaire assorti d’un renvoi pour détermination du montant conformément à la
règle 153;
b) un point de droit, elle peut statuer
sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(3) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en
jugement sommaire, la Cour conclut qu’il existe une véritable question
litigieuse à l’égard d’une déclaration ou d’une défense, elle peut néanmoins
rendre un jugement sommaire en faveur d’une partie, soit sur une question
particulière, soit de façon générale, si elle parvient à partir de l’ensemble
de la preuve à dégager les faits nécessaires pour trancher les questions de
fait et de droit.
(4) Lorsque la requête en jugement
sommaire est rejetée en tout ou en partie, la Cour peut ordonner que l’action
ou les questions litigieuses qui ne sont pas tranchées par le jugement
sommaire soient instruites de la manière habituelle ou elle peut ordonner la
tenue d’une instance à gestion spéciale.
217. Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire aux termes des
présentes règles peut poursuivre le même défendeur pour une autre réparation
ou poursuivre tout autre défendeur pour la même ou une autre réparation.
218. Lorsqu’un jugement sommaire est refusé ou n’est accordé qu’en
partie, la Cour peut, par ordonnance, préciser les faits substantiels qui ne
sont pas en litige et déterminer les questions qui doivent être instruites,
ainsi que:
a) ordonner la consignation à la Cour
d’une somme d’argent représentant la totalité ou une partie de la
réclamation;
b) ordonner la remise d’un cautionnement
pour dépens;
c) limiter la nature et l’étendue de
l’interrogatoire préalable aux questions non visées par les affidavits
déposés à l’appui de la requête en jugement sommaire, ou limiter la nature et
l’étendue de tout contre-interrogatoire s’y rapportant, et permettre
l’utilisation de ces affidavits lors de l’interrogatoire à l’instruction de
la même manière qu’à l’interrogatoire préalable.
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