Date: 20060927
Docket: T-337-04
Citation: 2006
FC 1149
Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 27, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
FILM CITY ENTERTAINMENT LTD.,
MEI AH FILM PRODUCTION CO. LTD., and
MEI AH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD.
Plaintiffs
and
GOLDEN FORMOSA ENTERTAINMENT
LTD.,
CHIEN-WEN CHEN, HUI MEI CHEN,
And HUI-CHENG CHEN
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
Film City
Entertainment Ltd., Mei Ah Film Productions Co. Ltd., and Mei Ah Development
Company Ltd., (the plaintiffs), commenced an action claiming copyright
infringement by the defendants. This is a motion by the plaintiffs for summary
judgment against the defendants, pursuant to Federal Court Rules, 1998,
S.O.R. 198-106, Rule 216. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have
reproduced and distributed to the public a film in which copyright is owned and
licenced by the plaintiffs.
[2]
The
plaintiffs request the following relief:
That the
plaintiffs be granted summary judgment against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the film “Diva, Ah Hey!”
(the work);
2. A declaration that Mei Ah Film
Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that Mei Ah
Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and holds
a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd.;
4. A declaration that Film City
Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the Film from Mei Ah
Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-42 (the Act);
5. A declaration that the
defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work as described
herein;
6. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors, officers, employees,
servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly,
infringing copyright in the work by any one or more of the following means:
reproducing all or a substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or
renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or
rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to
prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of
doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff,
Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for;
7. The following damages jointly
and severally against the defendants:
(a) statutory
damages pursuant to section 38.1 of the Act in the amount of $10,000; and
(b) exemplary
and aggravated damages in the amount of $7,000;
8. Pre-judgment
interest calculated against the statutory damages of $10,000 from June 13,
2003, pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c-79;
9. Post-judgment
interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c-79, commencing from the date of judgment;
10. Costs of this action
in the amount of $3,840.00 in costs plus GST, and $667.86 for disbursements.
Background
[3]
The
plaintiffs have commenced an action for copyright infringement against the
defendants. The plaintiffs allege that Golden Formosa Entertainment Limited
(the corporate defendant), distributed to the general public, unauthorized
counterfeit versions of a film in which the plaintiffs own the copyright in Canada. The plaintiffs also allege
that the personal defendants, while acting in their capacities as either
managers or directors of the corporate defendant, knowingly authorized and
ordered the infringement.
[4]
The film
in question is a Chinese-language motion picture entitled (in English), “Diva,
Ah Hey!” (the work) with accompanying sound track. The work is distributed in Canada by Film City Entertainment
Ltd. (Film City) in various audio visual
formats, including VHS video cassette tape, VCD and DVD formats.
[5]
Film City owns the exclusive right
in Canada to reproduce, distribute,
sell, rent and offer for sale or rent the work, such right having been obtained
by written exclusive licence from the respective owners of the copyright.
[6]
Copyright
exists in the work in Canada.
[7]
The
affidavit evidence of Patrick Mak establishes that he attended at the premises
of the corporate defendant on June 13, 2003, and rented a video cassette of a
copy of what he believed to be the Chinese language film with the English
title, “Diva, Ah Hey!”.
[8]
The
affidavit evidence of Michael Leung establishes that he viewed the film and
stated it was a crude and counterfeit form of the work.
[9]
The
defendant, Hui Mei Chen orders and procures movie products for the corporate
defendant. In the past, this defendant purchased movies from Film City.
[10]
The
affidavit evidence of Mr. Leung also states that the defendants, Chien-Wen Chen
and Hui Mei and Hui-Cheng Chen are “family members who share actively in the
management and operation of the premises, including the principal activities of
the corporate defendant which involve obtaining and distributing Chinese
language movies and television shows (including the work) to the general public”.
Issue
[11]
Should
summary judgment be granted in this case?
Analysis and Decision
[12]
In
relation to summary judgments, Rules 213 to 218 of the Federal Courts Rules,
1998, apply and can be found in the attached annex.
[13]
The
plaintiffs also rely on sections 5 and 27 and subsections 38.1(5), 38.1(7),
39(2) and 53(2) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
[14]
Madam
Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Granville Shipping Co. v. Pegasus Lines
Ltd. S.A. et al. (1996) 111 F.T.R. 189 (F.C.T.D.), summarized the general
principles that apply in applications for summary judgment as follows:
[8] I have considered all of the
case law pertaining to summary judgment and I summarize the general principles
accordingly:
1. the purpose of the provisions
is to allow the court to summarily dispense with cases which ought not proceed
to trial because there is no genuine issue to be tried (Old Fish Market
Restaurants v. 1000357 Ontario Inc. et al.), at p. 222;
2. there is no determinative test
(Feoso Oil Limited v. Saria (1995), 184 N.R. 307 (F.C.A.) but
Stone, J. A., seems to have adopted the reasons of Henry, J., in Pizza Pizza
Ltd. v. Gillespie (Pizza Pizza) (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 225 (Gen.
Div.). It is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial, it is
whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the
trier of fact at a future trial;
3. each case should be
interpreted in reference to its own contextual framework (Blyth, supra,
and Collie, supra);
4. provincial practice rules
(especially rule 20 of the Ontario Rules) can aid in
interpretation (Feoso, supra, and Collie, supra);
5. this court may determine
questions of fact and law on the motion for summary judgment if this can be
done on the material before the court (this is broader than rule 20 of the Ontario
Rules of Civil Procedure) (Patrick);
6.
on the
whole of the evidence, summary judgment cannot be
granted if the necessary facts cannot be
found or if it would be unjust to do so (Pallman, supra, and Sears,
supra);
7. in the case of a serious issue
with respect to credibility, the case should go to trial because the parties
should be cross-examined before the trial judge (Forde, supra, and Sears,
supra). The mdere existence of apparent conflict in the evidence does not
preclude summary judgment; the court should take a “hard look” at the merits
and decide if there are issues of credibility to be resolved (Stokes, supra).
[15]
I have
considered the material filed on the motion, the submissions made by counsel
for the plaintiffs and the submissions made by Ms. Chen on behalf of the
defendants. I am of the view that summary judgment ought to be granted in this
case. The plaintiffs have established that they own copyright in the work and
that the copyright is registered in Canada.
They have also shown that the defendants rented a counterfeit version of the work
to Mr. Mak. With respect to the liability of the personal defendants, the affidavit
evidence of Michael Leung is referred to in paragraph 46 of the plaintiffs’
memorandum of fact and law. In his affidavit, Michael Leung stated that the
defendant Hui Mei Chen, as a long time director and manager of the corporate
defendant, was aware of the existence of copyright and the plaintiffs’ rights
in the work. Michael Leung also stated at paragraph 33 of his affidavit:
In the within action, the personal
defendants all share the family name Chen. To the best of my belief, for the
reasons cited above, I believe that they are all family members who share
actively in the management and operation of the Premises, including the
principal activities of the Corporate Defendant which involve obtaining and
distributing Chinese language movies and television shows (including the Film)
to the general public.
[16]
The
defendants filed a defence to the statement of claim but the defence was a bare
denial that copyright subsists in the work and a denial that the plaintiffs did
the acts alleged. The jurisprudence of this Court has established that mere
denial is not a sufficient pleading in allegations of copyright infringement
(see Video Box Enterprises Inc. v. Lam, 2006 FC 546 at paragraph
23).
[17]
Applying
the general principles outlined in Granville Shipping, I am of the view
that summary judgment should be granted as there is no genuine issue to be
tried. There is no issue as to credibility and the necessary facts are present
to grant summary judgment.
[18]
The
plaintiffs have elected to claim statutory damages.
[19]
The
plaintiffs’ motion is granted as follows:
Summary judgment is granted
against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the work “Diva, Ah Hey!”;
2. A declaration that
Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that
Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and
holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co.
Ltd.;
4. A
declaration that Film City Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright
for the work from Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42;
5. A declaration that the
defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work;
6. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors,
officers, employees, servants, agents,
assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly, infringing copyright in
the work by any one or more of the following means: reproducing all or a
substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or renting out, or by
way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or rental, or
exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to prejudicially
affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of doing any of
those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff Film City
Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for.
[20]
With
respect to damages, I am not prepared to grant statutory damages in the amount
of $10,000. In assessing the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, I have
considered all relevant facts including the good faith or bad faith of the
defendants, the conduct of the defendants before and during the proceedings and
the need to deter other infringements of the copyright in question. In
particular, I have considered the information outlined in paragraph 51 of the
plaintiffs’ memorandum of fact and law. In particular, I note the defendants’
involvement in similar proceedings, attitude toward the judicial process and
high level of sophistication. I have also taken into account the plaintiff’s
submissions regarding the obviously counterfeit nature of the recording, the
defendants’ continuing copyright infringement and evidence that the defendant
has profited from the copyrighted work at the plaintiffs’ expense. Based on the
facts of this case, I am prepared to award statutory damages in the amount of
$5,000.
[21]
I am not
prepared to award exemplary and aggravated damages.
[22]
With
respect to costs, I will award the plaintiffs’ costs in the amount of $4,391.46
as claimed, as I believe that amount is reasonable on the facts of this case.
[23]
The
plaintiffs are awarded pre-judgment interest calculated against the statutory
damages of $5,000 from June 13, 2003 pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.
[24]
The
plaintiffs are awarded post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.79,
commencing from the date of judgment.
ORDER
[25]
IT IS
ORDERED that summary
judgment is granted against the defendants,
including:
1. A declaration that copyright
subsists in Canada in the work “Diva, Ah Hey!”;
2. A declaration that
Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that
Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and
holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co.
Ltd.;
4. Film City
Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah
Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-42;
5. A declaration that the
defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work as
described herein.
6. A permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and their respective directors,
officers, employees, servants, agents,
assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly, infringing copyright in
the work by any one or more of the following means: reproducing all or a
substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or renting out, or by
way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or rental, or
exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to prejudicially
affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of doing any of
those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff, Film City
Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for.
7. Statutory damages against the
defendants jointly and severally in the amount of
$5,000.
8. Pre-judgment
interest calculated against the statutory damages of $5,000 from June
13, 2003 pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.79.
9. Post-judgment interest pursuant to
the British Columbia
Court
Order Interest Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79, commencing from the date of judgment.
10. Costs in the amount
of $4,391.46.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Rules
213 to 218 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 state as follows:
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213.(1) A plaintiff may, after the
defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any
time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for
summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of
claim.
(2) A defendant may, after serving and filing a defence
and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion
for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim set out in the
statement of claim.
214.(1) A party may bring a motion
for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion
and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for
the hearing of the motion.
(2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment
shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days
before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion.
215. A response to a motion for
summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the
pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
216.(1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court
is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim
or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
(2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is
satisfied that the only genuine issue is
(a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the
Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a
reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or
(b) a question of law, the Court may determine the question
and grant summary judgment accordingly.
(3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court
decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the
Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either
on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence
to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law.
(4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in
whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action
not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or
order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.
217. A plaintiff who obtains
summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for
any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other
relief.
218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only
in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not
in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order
(a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim;
(b) for security for costs; or
(c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for
discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for
summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their
use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery.
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213.(1) Le demandeur peut, après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur —
ou avant si la Cour l’autorise — et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de
l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement
sommaire sur tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration.
(2) Le défendeur peut, après avoir signifié
et déposé sa défense et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de
l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement
sommaire rejetant tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la
déclaration.
214.(1) Toute partie peut présenter une requête pour obtenir un
jugement sommaire dans une action en signifiant et en déposant un avis de
requête et un dossier de requête au moins 20 jours avant la date de
l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis.
(2) La partie qui reçoit signification
d’une requête en jugement sommaire signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse
au moins 10 jours avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans
l’avis de requête.
215. La réponse à
une requête en jugement sommaire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les
allégations ou les dénégations contenues dans les actes de procédure déposés
par le requérant. Elle doit plutôt énoncer les faits précis démontrant
l’existence d’une véritable question litigieuse.
216.(1) Lorsque,
par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue qu’il
n’existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant à une déclaration ou à
une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(2) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en
jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue que la seule véritable question
litigieuse est:
a) le montant auquel le requérant a droit, elle peut
ordonner l’instruction de la question ou rendre un jugement sommaire assorti
d’un renvoi pour détermination du montant conformément à la règle 153;
b) un point de droit, elle peut statuer
sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(3) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en
jugement sommaire, la Cour conclut qu’il existe une véritable question
litigieuse à l’égard d’une déclaration ou d’une défense, elle peut néanmoins
rendre un jugement sommaire en faveur d’une partie, soit sur une question
particulière, soit de façon générale, si elle parvient à partir de l’ensemble
de la preuve à dégager les faits nécessaires pour trancher les questions de
fait et de droit.
(4) Lorsque la requête en jugement
sommaire est rejetée en tout ou en partie, la Cour peut ordonner que l’action
ou les questions litigieuses qui ne sont pas tranchées par le jugement
sommaire soient instruites de la manière habituelle ou elle peut ordonner la
tenue d’une instance à gestion spéciale.
217. Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire aux termes des
présentes règles peut poursuivre le même défendeur pour une autre réparation
ou poursuivre tout autre défendeur pour la même ou une autre réparation.
218. Lorsqu’un jugement sommaire est refusé ou n’est accordé qu’en
partie, la Cour peut, par ordonnance, préciser les faits substantiels qui ne
sont pas en litige et déterminer les questions qui doivent être instruites, ainsi
que:
a) ordonner la consignation à la Cour
d’une somme d’argent représentant la totalité ou une partie de la
réclamation;
b) ordonner la remise d’un cautionnement pour dépens;
c) limiter la nature et l’étendue de l’interrogatoire
préalable aux questions non visées par les affidavits déposés à l’appui de la
requête en jugement sommaire, ou limiter la nature et l’étendue de tout
contre-interrogatoire s’y rapportant, et permettre l’utilisation de ces
affidavits lors de l’interrogatoire à l’instruction de la même manière qu’à
l’interrogatoire préalable.
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