Date: 20060907
Docket: IMM-7223-05
Citation: 2006 FC 1071
Ottawa, Ontario, September 7,
2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
JUNE
RAMKISSOON
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
The
Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) denied the Applicant’s refugee claim
which was based on the allegation that she was a female victim of abuse. The
grounds of that denial were that she did not have a well founded fear of
persecution and that she had not rebutted the presumption of state protection
in Trinidad
and Tobago,
her country of citizenship. This is the judicial review of the Board’s
decision.
II. Facts
[2]
The
core of the Applicant’s claim is that she feared her in-laws who blamed her for
the death of her ex-husband. She also claimed that she had complained to the
police who did nothing. The Applicant had no objective evidence to support her
contention that she had complained.
[3]
The
Board made three critical findings:
·
that
the Applicant was not a “generally credible and trustworthy witness” because of
her demeanour during her testimony (she was not “open and convincing”), and her
failure to produce documents or a reasonable explanation for failing to do so;
·
that
the Applicant did not truly have a subjective fear of persecution because of
her delay in departing Trinidad, her failure to make a claim during her previous
stay in Canada for two years and her subsequent return to Trinidad; and
·
that
the Applicant did not rebut the presumption of state protection and her failure
to take reasonable steps to seek such protection.
[4]
In
this judicial review, the Applicant raised the following issues:
(a) Did
the Board’s conduct during the hearing raise a reasonable apprehension of bias?
(b) Did
the Board commit a reviewable error with respect to its assessment of the
Applicant’s alleged subjective fear?
(c) Did
the Board commit a reviewable error with respect to its finding of the
availability of state protection?
III. Analysis
[5]
The
allegations of bias were based on her feelings of being rushed during her
testimony and on a few instances where the Board Member interrupted her
responses to questions.
[6]
An
allegation of bias (or reasonable apprehension of bias) is a serious matter which
must be clearly established. There is no basis for this claim. The transcript
shows nothing more than normal discourse; there was nothing confrontational or
undue in the Member’s conduct.
[7]
The
Board’s decision on subjective fear is based on its assessment of the
Applicant’s credibility. A credibility finding is subject to a high degree of
deference. (Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration) (1993), 160 N.R. 315)
[8]
The
Applicant’s attack on the Board’s decision is an attack on its credibility
conclusions. The Board’s conclusions that she had not provided a reasonable
explanation for failing to provide documentary evidence or for failing to seek
protection when she was first in Canada are based on its finding of
credibility.
[9]
The
Court is unable to find any basis for concluding that the Board’s determination
of credibility is patently unreasonable.
[10]
On
the issue of state protection, the Board obviously did not believe her evidence
that she had filed complaints with the police. The Board also considered the
structures in place in Trinidad and Tobago to provide state
protection for abused women.
[11]
The
Board also considered whether there was an “air of reality” about those
structures such that it was reasonable to conclude that state protection could
be presumed to exist.
[12]
The
Applicant has raised the issue of the proper standard of review of the issue of
state protection. In my view, the standard depends on the particular sub-issue
being addressed.
[13]
In
its determination that the Applicant had not sought state protection, the Board
decided the matter on the basis of the credibility of her story that she had
complained to police and that she could not afford to hire a lawyer to assist
her in approaching other organizations of state protection. As this is a matter
of fact and credibility, the standard of review is patent unreasonableness.
[14]
The
assessment of the adequacy of state protection is generally a matter of mixed
law and fact for which the standard is reasonableness simpliciter.
[15]
The
Applicant relied on this Court’s decisions in Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 133, [2006] F.C.J. No. 185 (QL)
and in Simpson v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 970, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1224 (QL).
These cases are easily distinguished because in both cases there was evidence
from a Jamaican government official responsible for women’s issues that women
in Jamaica could not be
protected from domestic violence. In both cases that evidence was ignored.
[16]
In
the present case there is no such admission in respect of Trinidad and
Tobago.
Further, there is no evidence or basis to suggest that the Board failed to
consider that there was evidence pro and con state protection.
[17]
Under
these circumstances, there is no reason to overturn the Board’s conclusions on
state protection.
[18]
Therefore,
this application for judicial review will be dismissed. There is no question
for certification.
JUDGMENT
IT IS ORDERED THAT this
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Michael
L. Phelan”
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