Date:
20060719
Docket: IMM-3580-06
Citation:
2006 FC 900
Montréal,
Quebec, July 19, 2006
Present:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Lemieux
BETWEEN:
BOGUI
SERGE DAGRI
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION OF CANADA
and
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA
Respondents
Motion
by the applicant for a stay of a removal order made against the applicant.
REASONS FOR ORDER AND
ORDER
[1]
Bogui
Serge Dagri (the applicant), a citizen of Ivory Coast whose request for a pre‑removal
risk assessment (PPRA) was refused on May 26, 2006, is seeking a stay of the
removal order until his application for leave and for judicial review of the
PPRA is decided.
[2]
His claim for refugee protection was refused on July 14,
2004, and his application for leave was dismissed by this Court.
[3]
The risks identified by Mr. Dagri are as follows:
(a)
the political situation in the Ivory Coast is volatile and
violent;
(b)
he is targeted because of his family name and relationship with Henriette
Dagri Diabaté. (She is the secretary general of an opposition political party
called Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR). She is the Minister of Justice
in the national government of reconciliation, which includes representatives of
the former party in power and of the RDR);
(c)
He is also allegedly targeted because of his Alladjan ethnicity.
[4]
Counsel for Mr. Dagri submitted that a PRRA officer had decided on
November 16, 2004, that his brother, Angelo Dagri, was entitled to refugee
protection in Canada because he was at risk of being subject to violence owing
to the fact that his family name was Dagri, that he was related to Henriette
Dagri Diabaté and that the situation in Ivory Coast was especially dangerous
and unstable.
[5]
The PRRA officer (the officer) based his negative decision on the following
elements.
[6]
First of all, he was of the opinion that the situation in Ivory
Coast had progressed considerably since the publication of the most recent
document submitted by Mr. Dagri, that is, document No. 11, dated
January 15, 2006. This is why he attached limited weight to the brother’s PRRA,
[translation] “which dealt with the special circumstances of an applicant in the context
of the Ivorian crisis as the situation was in November 2004 and not as it
presently is”
[7]
Secondly, he mentioned that, according to reliable documentary evidence,
since April 2006, [translation]
“substantial progress has been made toward attaining the objectives of the
Marcoussis Agreements, which now provide for the holding of elections in
October 2006”. He noted the steps undertaken to give Ivorians national identity
cards in anticipation of the elections and mentioned that the government militias
and the rebels had begun the first phase in demobilization.
[8]
Thirdly, he specified that the leaders of both parties wanted to reach a
negotiated solution so that the rebel leaders could come back to Ivory
Coast after a period of exile. According to this documentary evidence, the
President of the Ivory Coast acknowledges that his main adversary is
entitled to be a candidate in the elections, as his exclusion was one of the
factors triggering the original crisis.
[9]
On this point, he concluded as follows:
[translation]
Although the political
climate is still tense and the security situation is still volatile, this
situation is a generalized risk to which all Ivorians are subject, rather than
a personalized risk involving the applicant. On the basis of the
evidence submitted by the applicant, his complete record and the objective
documentary evidence about the present situation in Ivory Coast, the applicant
did not discharge the burden on him of showing that he is personally exposed to
the risks he invoked. I conclude that there is no more than a mere possibility
of him being exposed to these risks or to another risk within the meaning of
sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Accordingly, this application for protection does not meet the requirements of
the common considerations for all grounds of protection. The application is
rejected.
[10]
Concerning the applicant’s fear of being targeted because of his family
name, the officer wrote the following:
[translation]
I note on this point
that the applicant did not report having been targeted as a member of Ms. Diabate’s
family while he was in Ivory Coast and the crisis situation was in full
swing, and he did not mention that other family members had such problems,
either before he left or since his arrival in Canada. Moreover,
I note that the family relationship described by the applicant—Ms. Diabaté
is allegedly the daughter of his father’s cousin—is relatively tenuous, and he
did not submit any evidence to prove this relationship. Before the IRB, the
applicant stated having met Ms. Diabaté only once, in 1997, and said that he
did not know how to contact her. In light of the preceding, the applicant did
not show either that Ms. Diabaté’s family was targeted or that he had the
family relationship he alleged with Ms. Diabaté. I conclude that the
applicant did not meet the burden of showing that he is personally exposed to a
risk resulting from his family relationship with the Minister of Justice of
Ivory Coast.
[11]
Finally, the officer was of the opinion that the documentary evidence
submitted by Mr. Dagri did not support the existence of a risk of being
targeted because of his Alladjan ethnicity.
[12]
This motion for a stay must be dismissed because the applicant did not
convince me that there was a serious question, that Mr. Dagri would suffer
irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience was in his favour.
[13]
Counsel for Mr. Dagri raised the following serious questions against
the PRRA assessment:
(1)
lack of analysis and explanations;
(2)
insufficient reasons, especially concerning the change in the present
situation in Ivory Coast and how this change reduces the risks alleged or
changes the conclusions of the PRRA officer in the brother’s case; and
(3)
misinterpretation of the evidence with regard to the conclusion that Mr. Dagri
was not personally exposed to the identified risks.
[14]
I must reject these claims. I am of the opinion that the officer gave
adequate reasons for his conclusions. Anyone reading his assessment will easily
understand why the officer made this decision. He acknowledged that the
situation in Ivory Coast was difficult and is a generalized risk
for all Ivorians. His analysis shows that Mr. Dagri did not submit
sufficient evidence to satisfy the officer that he would be subject to the
alleged risks.
[15]
I note that, in the brother’s case, the PRRA officer came to the
conclusion that he was not a person in need of protection within the meaning of
section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; however,
because of documentary evidence different from that submitted by Mr. Dagri,
his brother was a Convention refugee.
[16]
The applicant submitted recent documentary evidence showing that Ms. Diabaté
and other high-ranking RDR leaders had been violently attacked on returning
from a political event. However, this evidence cannot overturn the officer’s
conclusion to the effect that Mr. Dagri did not submit sufficient evidence
to establish the likelihood of his being targeted because of his family name.
[17]
I also conclude that there is no irreparable harm. The lack of a serious
question as submitted by counsel for the Ministers obviously shows that the
applicant did not prove there was irreparable harm.
[18]
The judgement of the Federal Court of Appeal in Selliah v. Canada (M.C.I.) [2004]
F.C.J. No. 1200 leads me to conclude that the balance of convenience favours
the Ministers.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT this motion for a stay be
dismissed.
“François Lemieux”
Certified true translation
Michael Palles
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