Salt River First Nation 195 (Councillors) v. Salt River First Nation 195 (Chief), 2006 FC 837

Date: 20060629

Docket: T-2007-02

Citation: 2006 FC 837

Ottawa, Ontario, June 29^th , 2006

PRESENT:      The Honourable Madam Justice Snider

BETWEEN:

MELVIN WANDERINGSPIRIT, DELPHINE BEAULIEU, TONI HERON,

RAYMOND BEAVER AND SONNY MCDONALD in their capacity as

COUNCILLORS OF THE SALT RIVERFIRST NATION 195,

elected August 30, 2002

Applicants

and

VICTOR MARIE uncontested Chief and NORMAN STARR,

uncontested duly elected BAND COUNCIL MEMBER,

NORA BEAVER, DAVID GOWANS, CONNIE BENWELL,

MICHEL BJORNSON, HARVEY LEPINE, AND DON TOURANGEAU,

purportedly elected BAND COUNCILLORS at a meeting held

November 3, 2002, AND JEANNIE MARIE-JEWELL,

acting as Interim Band Manager

Respondents

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

1.    Introduction

[1]         The Applicants seek an order of this Court that Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Nora Beaver, David Gowans, Michel Bjornson, Harvey Lepine, Don Tourangeau and Jeannie Marie-Jewell (referred to as the Respondents or alleged contemnors) are in contempt of a number of Orders of this Court. By Order dated October 6, 2005 (the show cause order), Justice Gibson ordered that the alleged contemnors appear to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court by reason of the acts particularized in that Order. The Particulars are set out in full in Appendix A to these Reasons. These Reasons and Order are the result of the contempt hearing that followed the show cause order.

[2]         Both the Applicants and the Respondents are members of the Salt River First Nation (SRFN). This contempt motion is the result of a lengthy dispute between these two groups which I would briefly set out as follows:

1. the Applicants together with two of the Respondents (Victor Marie as chief and Norman Starr as councillor) were elected to the Band Council by election in August 2002 (the August council);

2. In an election on November 3, 2002, the Applicants were removed from office; the "new" Band Council consisted of the Respondents (the November council), with Ms. Jeannie Marie-Jewell (one of the Respondents) acting as interim Band Manager.

3. On December 3, 2002, the Applicants commenced an application for judicial review to overturn the November election results.

4. Following the commencement of the application for judicial review, a series of Orders were obtained, the intent of which was to protect the financial assets of the SRFN pending the outcome of the judicial review. These Orders are the basis of this contempt motion and are discussed in more detail below.

5. In a decision dated May 29, 2003, reported as Wanderingspirit et al. v. Marie et al. (2003), 235 F.T.R. 106, aff'd (2003), 312 N.R. 385 (F.C.A.) (referred to as Wanderingspirit No. 1), the application was allowed. The effect of the decision was to overturn the November election and reinstate the August council.

6. Following the Federal Court decision in Wanderingspirit No. 1, another Order related to the financial administration of the Band was issued on June 20, 2003; the Applicants contend that certain of the Respondents were also in contempt of this Order.

2.    The Orders

[3]         As noted, there are a number of Orders in issue in this motion. The Applicants allege that the Respondents are in contempt of a number of provisions of these Orders. In the following, I have described those portions of the Orders that are relevant to this motion.

2.1 January 10 Order

[4]         In his first Order, dated January 10, 2003, Justice Rouleau ordered that all transactions, other than payroll, should not be processed without the consent of counsel for both parties. Specifically, the Order stated that:

1.       The trust account of the Band being administered by RBC Investments, Aboriginal Services in Winnipeg, Manitoba, remain frozen until further order of this Court or consent of all parties, save with respect to an amount owing for taxation, which sum may be paid by RBC Investments to the law firm of Dubouff & Edwards in trust, barristers and solicitors of Winnipeg, Manitoba;

2.       Two corporate bank accounts of 4991 NT Ltd. and 4992 NT Ltd. Operating with the Bank of Montreal, Fort Smith, North West Territories, are frozen until further order of this Court;

3.       Various and other bank accounts which are being operated by the Band also at the Bank of Montreal, Fort Smith Branch, North West Territories and being limited and are authorized to clear payments on the various accounts that pertain to payroll obligations and any and all other transactions should not be processed without the consent of counsel acting on behalf of the applicants and the respondents.

2.2 January 17 Order

[5]         In the second Order, dated January 17, 2003, Justice Rouleau allowed the payment of cheques to individuals listed in the attachment to that Order. Of significance is that: (a) Victor Marie was included in a "list of our people that will be receiving payroll cheques, which includes obligations such as honorariums"; (b) beside the name of Nora Beaver was a hand-written notation "MAY BE PAID"; and, (c) the names of Connie Benwell, Michel Bjornson, David Gowans, Harvey Lepine, Norman Starr and Don Tourangeau, whose names had originally been included on that list, had been struck.

2.3 May 29 Decision and June 5 Direction

[6]         In his decision in Wanderingspirit No. 1, above, Justice Rouleau stated clearly that the January 10 Order "is to remain in effect until the expiry of the appeal period". This further clarified in Justice Rouleau's Direction of June 5, 2003 where he stated that "my orders of January 10, 2003 are to remain in full force and effect until either varied by the Court of Appeal on June 12, 2003 or until further order of this Court which may or may not occur following motions to be heard on Thursday, June 19, 2003." The Court of Appeal did not vary the orders (Order dated June 12, 2003).

[7]         The motions referred to in the foregoing paragraph were heard by Justice Rouleau on June 19, 2003, following which an Order dated June 20, 2003 was issued. That Order, which is not at issue in this motion, restored the Applicants to "their full rights and privileges as Band Council members; and, permitted the Applicants "to conduct Band affairs along with Mr. Norman Starr and Chief Victor Marie".

2.4 June 20 Order

[8]         The final Order of Justice Rouleau that is relevant to the motion followed an emergency notice of motion filed on behalf of the Applicants and a teleconference held on June 19, 2003. This is not to be confused with the previous order also issued on June 20, 2003, discussed in the above paragraph. Of particular relevance, the Order provided that:

• "Any party . . . who have in their possession documents, computer data, ledgers, bank statements or documents, books of minutes or anything in that nature rightfully belonging to the Salt River First Nation 195 return them forthwith; failure to comply with this Order, contempt proceedings may be initiated";

• From Monday, June 23, 2003, only Chief Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Melvin Wanderingspirit, Delphine Beaulieu, Toni Heron, Raymond Beaver and Sonny McDonald were signing authorities of the Band Council of the SRFN; and

• "all negotiable instruments must be executed before being honoured by at least three of the above named individuals, one of which must always be Chief Victor Marie" [emphasis added].

3. Subsequent Court of Appeal Decision and Effect on Orders of Justice Rouleau

[9]         The Federal Court of Appeal overturned the June 20, 2003 order of Justice Rouleau on October 20, 2003 (Wanderingspirit et al. v. Marie et al., 2003 FCA 384 (Wanderingspirit No. 2)), holding that Justice Rouleau had no jurisdiction to issue an order relating to a matter that had been finally decided on May 29, 2003. It was held that the interim order of January 10, 2003 was valid until the final order of May 29, but once the issue was finally determined (that is, whether the election of November 2002 was valid), the interim orders were terminated and the administration of the Band Council was in the hands of the elected Members. Therefore, the orders of January 10 and June 20, 2003 were held to be no longer effective.

[10]       In spite of the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal, it should be noted that, where a court issues an order, that order must be obeyed even if later reversed. This is so because more is at stake than the simple question of the validity of the particular order. What is at stake is the very integrity and authority of the judicial institutions of Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1996] 1 F.C. 787 (C.A.) at para. 16; see also Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, (1990) 75 D.L.R. (4^th) 577 at p.635). Thus, in this case, if any of the Respondents did violate the Orders of January 10, 2003 or June 20, 2003 before they were declared invalid, they may still be found in contempt as the Orders were valid at the time those acts were committed. All of the acts in question occurred prior to this finding of invalidity.

4. Statutory Provisions

[11]       The procedure for contempt proceedings has been codified in the Federal Court Rules (Rules 466-472):

466. Subject to rule 467, a person is guilty of contempt of Court who (a) at a hearing fails to maintain a respectful attitude, remain silent or refrain from showing approval or disapproval of the proceeding; (b) disobeys a process or order of the Court; (c) acts in such a way as to interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the authority or dignity of the Court; (d) is an officer of the Court and fails to perform his or her duty; or (e) is a sheriff or bailiff and does not execute a writ forthwith or does not make a return thereof or, in executing it, infringes a rule the contravention of which renders the sheriff or bailiff liable to a penalty.	466. Sous réserve de la règle 467, est coupable d'outrage au tribunal quiconque : a) étant présent à une audience de la Cour, ne se comporte pas avec respect, ne garde pas le silence ou manifeste son approbation ou sa désapprobation du déroulement de l'instance; b) désobéit à un moyen de contrainte ou à une ordonnance de la Cour; c) agit de façon à entraver la bonne administration de la justice ou à porter atteinte à l'autorité ou à la dignité de la Cour; d) étant un fonctionnaire de la Cour, n'accomplit pas ses fonctions; e) étant un shérif ou un huissier, n'exécute pas immédiatement un bref ou ne dresse pas le procès-verbal d'exécution, ou enfreint une règle dont la violation le rend passible d'une peine.
467. (1) Subject to rule 468, before a person may be found in contempt of Court, the person alleged to be in contempt shall be served with an order, made on the motion of a person who has an interest in the proceeding or at the Court's own initiative, requiring the person alleged to be in contempt (a) to appear before a judge at a time and place stipulated in the order; (b) to be prepared to hear proof of the act with which the person is charged, which shall be described in the order with sufficient particularity to enable the person to know the nature of the case against the person; and (c) to be prepared to present any defence that the person may have. (2) A motion for an order under subsection (1) may be made ex parte. (3) An order may be made under subsection (1) if the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case that contempt has been committed. (4) An order under subsection (1) shall be personally served, together with any supporting documents, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.	467. (1) Sous réserve de la règle 468, avant qu'une personne puisse être reconnue coupable d'outrage au tribunal, une ordonnance, rendue sur requête d'une personne ayant un intérêt dans l'instance ou sur l'initiative de la Cour, doit lui être signifiée. Cette ordonnance lui enjoint : a) de comparaître devant un juge aux date, heure et lieu précisés; b) d'être prête à entendre la preuve de l'acte qui lui est reproché, dont une description suffisamment détaillée est donnée pour lui permettre de connaître la nature des accusations portées contre elle; c) d'être prête à présenter une défense. (2) Une requête peut être présentée ex parte pour obtenir l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1). (3) La Cour peut rendre l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) si elle est d'avis qu'il existe une preuve prima facie de l'outrage reproché. (4) Sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, l'ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) et les documents à l'appui sont signifiés à personne.
468. In a case of urgency, a person may be found in contempt of Court for an act committed in the presence of a judge and condemned at once, if the person has been called on to justify his or her behaviour.	468. En cas d'urgence, une personne peut être reconnue coupable d'outrage au tribunal pour un acte commis en présence d'un juge et condamnée sur-le-champ, pourvu qu'on lui ait demandé de justifier son comportement.
469. A finding of contempt shall be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.	469. La déclaration de culpabilité dans le cas d'outrage au tribunal est fondée sur une preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable.
470. (1) Unless the Court directs otherwise, evidence on a motion for a contempt order, other than an order under subsection 467(1), shall be oral. (2) A person alleged to be in contempt may not be compelled to testify.	470. (1) Sauf directives contraires de la Cour, les témoignages dans le cadre d'une requête pour une ordonnance d'outrage au tribunal, sauf celle visée au paragraphe 467(1), sont donnés oralement. (2) La personne à qui l'outrage au tribunal est reproché ne peut être contrainte à témoigner.

5. Decision of Justice Heneghan

[12]       The proceedings on contempt in respect of these matters were initially commenced in 2003 and heard by Justice Heneghan of this Court. The same individuals, plus Connie Benwell, were named in that application. In her decision (Wanderingspirit v. Salt River First Nation 195, [2005] F.C.J. No. 300 (Q.L.), 2005 FC 146 (referred to as Wanderingspirit No. 3), Justice Heneghan dismissed the application, without prejudice, against everyone but Ms. Benwell on the basis that the other Respondents were not properly served with the motion. As a result, Justice Heneghan's decision only dealt with the contempt order against Ms. Benwell, who was found in contempt of Count No. 6 in the show cause order.

6. Jeannie Marie-Jewell

[13]       Ms. Jeannie Marie-Jewell is named in the application before me. However, the Applicants failed to provide evidence that Ms. Jewell had been served with a copy of the show cause order. In light of this, the Applicants acknowledged that they could not proceed further against Ms. Jewell. As a result, Particulars 7 and 8, which related solely to the alleged actions of Ms. Jewell, need not be dealt with further.

7. The Hearing

[14]       At the hearing into these allegations of contempt, the Applicants presented a number of witnesses:

• Mr. Brad Marta, branch manager of the Bank of Montreal in Fort Smith;

• Mr. Mike Beaver, a member of the SRFN and, in June 2003, employed by the Band as a supervisor of summer programs;

• Mr. Ian Blackstock, a barrister and solicitor currently employed by the Department of Justice of the Northwest Territories, who was in private practice and acted for the Applicants from the commencement of the judicial review proceedings;

• Ms. Barbara McArthur, who resumed her duties as finance officer of the SRFN on June 18, 2003;

• Ms. Tanya Tourangeau, a financial clerk with the SRFN from September 2001 to the summer of 2002 and again from November 2002 to the summer of 2003; and

• Mr. Ram Mudalier, a financial consultant who provided services under contract to the SRFN from 1991 to September 2002 and, again, from June 2003 to the present.

[15]       I have reviewed the testimony of these witnesses and refer to it where appropriate within these reasons.

[16]       Pursuant to Rule 470(2), the Respondents cannot be compelled to testify. The Respondents did not testify; nor did they present any evidence.

8. Analysis

8.1 Effect of Orders on Respondents

[17]       At the outset, I wish to deal with the argument put forward by counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Gowans, that the January 10 Order, the January 17 Order and the May 29 Order are not directed at the Respondents, but at the Bank of Montreal. The argument appears to be that, unless the Orders are directed to the Respondents, they cannot be held to be in contempt. I do not accept these arguments.

[18]       The Orders are not as clear as they could be. Clause 3 of the January 10 Order, which is particularly important to this matter, does not appear to be grammatically sound. One interpretation of the words of this clause is, I accept, that it is directed to the Bank and does not explicitly state that the Respondents are prohibited from writing cheques or attempting to negotiate them in other financial institutions. In such a situation, the context of the Orders becomes very important. What was meant by the Orders? And how did the parties understand the Orders to operate?

[19]       In my view, the reasonable interpretation of the Orders is that they apply to the Respondents and all those who participated in the financial administration of the Band during the time they were in force. While Clause 3 of the Order may have the meaning alleged by Mr. Gowans, one cannot take those words out of context. The opening paragraph of the Order indicates that a conference call had been held to "find an interim solution regarding an application launched by these applicants in which they seek an order of the Court appointing a Receiver Manager to manage the affairs of the Salt River First Nation 195". Further, the preamble to Clause 3 indicates that the order is addressed to the "interest of the Band and the handling of its affairs". From this language, I can conclude that the Order was directed, first and foremost, to the actions of the parties. It was intended to leave the operation of the SRFN's finances in the hands of the November council with the restrictions imposed, rather than resorting to a Receiver Manager. Since the accounts of the SRFN were held at the Bank of Montreal in Fort Smith, the Bank was also included in the Orders; that does not mean that the Bank was the only party bound by the Orders.

[20]       The record shows that the Respondents, in seeking the consent of counsel for the Applicants prior to issuing various cheques, acted in a manner consistent with this interpretation.

[21]       The effect of these Orders on the Respondents was that they were prohibited from authorizing and issuing cheques except in conformity with the Orders. Any failure to do so would be grounds for an allegation of contempt.

8.2 Burden of Proof

[22]       As set out in Rule 469, a finding of contempt "shall be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Despite the wording of the show cause that the alleged contemnors "appear before a judge to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court", the Applicants bear the burden of proof.

8.3 Knowledge of the Orders

[23]       The Applicants must prove that the alleged contemnors had actual knowledge of the Orders in issue; that is, the orders of January 10 and 20, 2003, May 29, 2003 and June 20, 2003. An individual cannot be held to be in contempt of an Order of which he or she had no knowledge. According to Bhatnager v. Canada, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 217, the party alleging contempt must prove actual knowledge of the order allegedly breached by the alleged contemnor.

[24]       In this case, none of the Respondents were personally served with copies of the orders. Rather, the orders were served on their legal counsel. Does that mean that they did not have knowledge? In Apple Computer v. Minitronics of Canada Ltd., [1988] 2 F.C. 265 (T.D.), the Court found that knowledge of an order can be inferred from conduct, even if an alleged contemnor has not been served with the order.

[25]       There can be no question that Chief Marie was aware of all the Orders; the evidence shows that he was involved at each and every stage. Letters signed by him and references in other correspondence establish his knowledge.

[26]       With respect to the other Respondents, in spite of arguments to the contrary, I find that all of the Respondents had actual knowledge of the orders in question. I reach this conclusion on the basis of inferences drawn from a number of facts.

[27]       Firstly, the Respondents were represented by counsel - Mr. Robert Philp, Q.C. - at all times during the period during which these orders were issued. Mr. Ian Blackstock, who was the Applicants' counsel during the legal proceedings, was asked whether he had any reason to believe that any of the respondents were not being kept fully informed by Philp Law Office or by Chief Victor Marie. Mr. Blackstock's response was, "None whatever".

[28]       I also take into account that, on January 17, 2003, a motion was filed on behalf of the Respondents seeking an order to strike the application for judicial review and that a Notice of Appeal was filed on May 30, 2003 in respect of the Order issued May 29, 2003. There was nothing in the record before me that Chief Marie was authorized to represent the other Respondents. It would be a serious breach of professional conduct for Mr. Philp to proceed, at each of the many steps involved in this litigation, without obtaining the direction of each and every one of the named litigants.

[29]       Further, the Orders had direct impact on the Respondents who were part of the November council. As a result of the Orders, the November councillors were unable to receive any payments - either honoraria or expenses - without the consent of both counsel. The record before me shows that such consent was not easily obtained and that the councillors went without payment. Surely, the Respondents who were part of the November council would have known why they were not receiving their payments.

[30]       I find that the Respondents had actual knowledge of the Orders.

8.4 Count No. 1

[31]       Only Chief Victor Marie is alleged to be in contempt in Count No. 1. The Applicants assert that he refused to return financial records and documents in his possession, power or control, in particular "cheques for [SRFN] bank accounts and copies of cancelled cheques for the SRFN bank accounts".

[32]       The material that is the subject of this Count allegedly came to be in the possession of Chief Victor Marie as a result of two different events. First, the Applicants allege that, on June 12, 2003, Ms. Tourangeau, then financial officer for the Band, entered the Band Council Office and removed a computer hard-drive, which contained financial data, on the instructions of Chief Marie. It is alleged that she also removed financial and accounting records of the SRFN. In June 2003, Mr. Mike Beaver was an employee of the SRFN. He testified that, on June 12, 2003, he was in the Band Office and saw Ms. Tourangeau leave the Band Office with a Dell computer tower and boxes of files.

[33]       The second event was a "break in" that occurred on June 24, 2003. We have some evidence of this break in from Ms. Barbara McArthur, who had resumed her duties as a financial officer with the SRFN on June 18, 2003. She testified that, by June 20, some of the missing information had been returned, but not the Dell computer. On June 24, she returned from a coffee break to find that the locked door to the Band Officer was ajar and contained a large hole. Her testimony was that Natasha Tourangeau, a secretary in the Band Office told her that Chief Victor Marie had kicked in the door. After this break in, Ms. McArthur noted that a number of cheques were missing.

[34]       As noted above, the June 20 Order required that "Any party . . . who have in their possession documents, computer data, ledgers, bank statements or documents, books of minutes or anything in that nature rightfully belonging to the Salt River First Nation 195 return them forthwith." A further Order of Justice Rothstein dated July 10, 2003 referred to the missing materials in a recital that stated that:

AND UPON Chief Victor Marie, through his counsel, having undertaken to return to the Band Office on or before July 16, 2003, computer equipment and records taken from the Band Office on or about June 12, 2003, in an unaltered condition, plus cheque books and other documents taken subsequently.

[35]       I accept that Tanya Tourangeau removed the Dell computer tower and important files from the Band Office on June 24. It is also clear that not all financial records - in particular, cheque forms - were returned as required by the Orders and that the computer hard drive was not returned in an unaltered state. The Orders, it appears to me, were not complied with. However, I have some difficulty with finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chief Marie was in contempt of the Orders. For one thing, I have no direct evidence that Chief Marie was the person who kicked in the door and took any cheques. For whatever reason, the Applicants did not put Natasha Tourangeau forward as a witness. There is no compelling reason to accept the hearsay evidence of Ms. McArthur on this point. Further, I note that it was Tanya Tourangeau who removed the files and computer tower from the Band Office. I have no evidence as to how the files and computer ended up in the hands of Chief Marie or whether Ms. Tourangeau or others may have kept certain of the records.

[36]       For these reasons, I am not persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chief Marie is in contempt of Count No. 1.

8.5 Count No. 2

[37]       Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr are implicated in Count No. 2. That count involves a number of cheques dated May 23, 2003 or June 19, 2003 payable to a number of individuals, including all of the Respondents but for Mr. David Gowans and Mr. Harvey Lepine. All of the cheques in issue under this Count were signed by Chief Marie and Mr. Starr. The Applicants allege that the cheques were signed after the June 20 Order and back dated to May 23 or June 19, 2003. The following chart summarizes the cheques in question.

Cheque No.	Payee	Date	Amount	When Negotiated
150	J.M. Jewell	23 May	$12,927.93	7 July
250	Henry Beaver	19 June	$3,629.24	4 July
252	T. Tourangeau	19 June	$4,685.15	7 July
253	M. Bjornson	19 June	$8,470.90	15 July
254	D. Tourangeau	19 June	$6,000.00	15 July
255	N. Starr	19 June	$3,500.00	15 July
1550	J.M. Jewell	19 June	$7,702.31	4 July
1551	V. Marie	19 June	$8,596.92	4 July
1556	J.M. Jewell	19 June	$5,991.39	7 July
1557	J.M. Jewell	19 June	$10,424.04	15 July
1589	Bruce Barry	19 June	$35,000.00	(illegible)
2022	Bruce Barry	19 June	$1,950.00	(illegible)
2051	E. Beaver	19 June	$2,952.69	4 July
2055	N. Beaver	19 June	$3,264.83	7 July
2056	N. Starr	19 June	$7,900.00	15 July
2049	N. Beaver	19 June	$2,937.28	(illegible)

[38]       To establish the elements of this count, I must be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

1. the cheques (or some of them), even though dated May 23 or June 19, 2003, were actually issued after the June 20 Order;

2. Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Star signed the cheques and were aware that they were doing so in contravention of the June 20 Order.

[39]       The key question is when the cheques implicated in this count were actually signed. Were they written before or after the June 20 Order? If written after, and back dated to before that date, they were issued in contravention of that Order. There is no direct evidence establishing when the cheques were issued. For example, no witness appeared to confirm that he or she saw the cheques being written after June 20. Nevertheless, there is a substantial amount of evidence from which strong inferences may be drawn.

[40]       During the hearing, copies of a number of cancelled cheques were tendered as evidence through the testimony of Mr. Brad Marta, branch manager of the Bank of Montreal in Fort Smith. Further evidence was provided as to the date and place of negotiation of some of the cheques. I immediately note a few problems with the evidence. First, it is impossible to establish when or where two cheques written on June 19, 2003 (cheque #1589 and #2022) to Mr. Bruce Barry were negotiated. I will not consider these cheques further. Similarly, I exclude cheque #2049 from my analysis, as the copy was not certified.

[41]       Even if I eliminate these cheques, a review of the history of these cheques reveals a remarkable fact. That is, every one of the cheques was cashed in July; not a single one of the remaining 13 cheques was negotiated before July 4, 2003. In my view, it is unbelievable that all 13 payees would hold onto their June 19 cheques and fail to cash them until July. There is simply no plausible explanation for this fact. In addition, the amount of each cheque is not insignificant; the values range from $2,952.69 to $10,424.04. While one might not immediately cash a cheque for a small amount - say, $100 - it is highly improbable that not one of the cheques in these higher amounts would have been presented in June.

[42]       One other note of interest is that not one of these 13 cheques was negotiated at the Bank of Montreal in Fort Smith - the only bank in Fort Smith. Given that at least some of the individuals reside in Fort Smith and would have to travel some distance to Edmonton or Calgary to deposit or negotiate the cheques, this action is not consistent with what one would expect. This leads to an inference that the persons who deposited the cheques were also aware of the irregularity of the cheques - either as to the date of issuance or the manner in which they were authorized. Had the cheques actually been issued on June 19, one would have expected to see some of them deposited into the Fort Smithbranch of the Bank of Montreal.

[43]       Lastly, I refer to the fact that seven of the 13 cheques were issued to individuals who have, throughout the litigation, been named parties; these are Ms. Bjornson, Mr. Tourangeau, Mr. Starr, Chief Marie and Ms. Beaver. As of June 19, when the cheques were allegedly written, the litigation was very active; Justice Rouleau's decision had been appealed and the Respondents were in the process of seeking a stay. Given the status of the litigation on June 19, it defies credibility that there would have been any delay in depositing the cheques. The inference is that these cheques were not issued until July.

[44]       The final evidence supporting the Applicants' position comes from the testimony of Ms. Barbara McArthur who testified that a number of blank cheques had gone missing from chequebooks or boxes of the SRFN. All but one of the cheques in question were written on these missing blank cheques. This is not evidence that the cheques were stolen or that, without anything further, the cheques were written after the June 20 Order. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the other evidence on this question and tends to support my overall finding. Cheque #150 was not referred to in Ms. McArthur's testimony. Thus, even though this cheque was not negotiated until July, I have excluded it from my overall conclusion.

[45]       This leaves 12 cheques, all dated June 19 and all signed by Chief Marie and Mr. Starr. When the totality of the evidence is considered, the inescapable conclusion is that the 12 cheques were not signed on June 19; rather, they were issued some time after the June 20 Order and back dated to June 19. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the case.

[46]       In light of this conclusion, it follows that all cheques were required to be issued in compliance with the obligations set out in the June 20 Order. That Order provided that "all negotiable instruments must be executed before being honoured by at least three of the above named individuals, one of which must always be Chief Victor Marie" [emphasis added]. Again referring to the chart, each cheque (without dispute, a "negotiable instrument") was signed by only two individuals. Further, every single cheque was signed by the same two persons - Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr. No third signature is present on any of the twelve cheques.

[47]       Mr. Brad Marta confirmed that the signatures on the cheques were those of Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr. I have compared the signatures on the cheques with the signed banking records for the relevant accounts upon which these cheques were drawn. I am satisfied that the signatures on the cheques are those of Chief Marie and Mr. Starr.

[48]       Can I draw an inference that Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr never intended the cheques to be delivered and subsequently negotiated before the required third signature was obtained? I am confident that such an inference cannot be supported in this case. First, even if this could be a possible explanation for one cheque, it is a completely unreasonable conclusion to draw when all 12 cheques were subsequently negotiated. Secondly, three of the cheques were issued to either Chief Victor Marie or Mr. Norman Starr, the very people who signed the cheques. Finally, there is the fact that they were back dated to June 19. The two signing officers, in my view, were well aware of the obligations set out in the June 20 Order and never intended to obtain a third person to sign the cheques.

[49]       In sum on the issuance of these cheques, I find that these cheques were issued some time after the June 20 Order and that Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr signed these cheques in contravention of the Order and were aware that they were in contravention of the Order.

8.6 Count No. 3

[50]       Given my conclusion with respect to Count No. 2 - that cheques were back-dated to June 19 - it is unnecessary to deal with this Count as it was in the alternative to Count No. 2.

8.7 Count No. 4

[51]       Count No. 4 of the motion relates to Cheque #222 issued to Ms. Tanya Tourangeau in the amount of $8008.00. Cheque #222 was dated June 6, 2003 and was signed by Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr. In Count No. 4, the Applicants assert that Victor Marie, Nora Beaver, David Gowans, Norman Starr, Michel Bjornson, Harvey Lepine and Don Tourangeau authorized the issuance of the cheque "purportedly in payment of her wages, but in fact consisting partly of a payment to her and partly in payment of wages, but in fact consisting of a payment to her and partly in payment of monies earmarked as honoraria for the councillors purportedly elected on November 3, 2002". This, it is submitted, is in violation of the Orders of Justice Rouleau dated January 10 and 17, 2003 and May 29, 2003.

[52]       To establish the contempt charge set out in Count No. 4, the Applicants must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

1. Cheque #222 consisted, in part, of a payment to the November councillors;

2. Cheque #222 was authorized by the parties named in Charge No. 4;

3. The issuance of Cheque #222, to the extent that it included an overpayment, was in breach of the Orders of the Court; and

4. The alleged contemnors cited in this charge were aware that the issuance of a payment in this matter was contrary to the Orders.

[53]       The Applicants principal evidence in respect of this count was that of Ms. Tanya Tourangeau. Ms. Tanya Tourangeau appeared as a witness for the Applicants under subpoena. It was apparent from her testimony that she was reluctant to appear. I would characterize her testimony during examination as uncooperative and evasive. Throughout, she denied recollection of many relevant matters. In my view, her memory failures were contrived; quite simply, she did not want to implicate the alleged contemnors. As specific examples, I find it incredible that Ms. Tourangeau could not now recall:

• the circumstances in which Cheque #222 was issued in place of an earlier cheque for a lesser amount; or

• whether her pay cheques were frequently in excess of $1960; or

• that a portion of Cheque #222 was in respect of a motion passed by council.

With respect to the issuance of Cheque #222, all that Ms. Tourangeau would directly acknowledge was that "I just remember that there was two cheques made up for this time period and that one was voided".

[54]       What makes her current lack of memory amazing is that, on July 5 and 6, 2003, Ms. Tourangeau was cross-examined on an affidavit filed in respect of an earlier motion for contempt. Under oath, over two days of questioning, she responded to a large number of questions related to the issuance of Cheque #222, on these same areas where she now asserts no recollection. At that time, she had a detailed recollection of what had happened.

[55]       During her examination before this Court, portions of that transcript were read to Ms. Tourangeau. When confronted with her previous statements, Ms. Tourangeau did not dispute that she had been asked the questions read to her and had given the corresponding answers. She also acknowledged being under oath at that time. With a few minor clarifications, she did not attempt to provide further explanations or to change her testimony. There is no inconsistency between her earlier sworn testimony and that made before me. Finally, her testimony on these matters is not contradicted by any other witnesses or evidence. Accordingly, I conclude that Ms. Tourangeau's assertions of memory failure should be discounted and that the excerpts from the 2003 transcript should be accepted as evidence of the truth of the matters stated therein.

[56]       In particular, most relevant to Count No. 4 is Ms. Tourangeau's testimony on the circumstances surrounding the issuance of Cheque #222. That testimony was to the effect that:

(a)     a cheque in the amount of $5,642.92, dated June 6, 2003 and representing Ms. Tourangeau's regular pay plus overtime (and possibly travel claims), was prepared;

(b)     Chief Victor Marie directed her to void that cheque and prepare a cheque for $8008.00 payable to herself;

(c)     The difference between the two cheques - $2,365.08 - was passed on to the November councillors, who were not on the payroll list;

(d)     Neither CPP nor UIC amounts were deducted from the difference "because that amount is not my income";

(e)     Once Cheque #222 was deposited into the bank, Ms. Tourangeau transferred the difference to the accounts of the councillors "probably ... over the computer";

(f)       The difference was to account for the equivalent of honoraria to the November councillors; and,

(g)     This method was devised to "get around" the Court Order; when the Applicants did not provide approval for payment to the councillors "it left us with no other way, but with what we did on June 6^th to pay the necessary bills that had accumulated from the councillors of the SRFN".

[57]       These alleged facts are supported by the existence of a certified copy of Cheque #222 in the amount of $8008.00. Further, I heard testimony from Ms. Tourangeau, Ms. MacArthur and Mr. Mudalier, the SRFN financial consultant, as to Ms. Tourangeau's regular rate of pay being either $28 or $35 per hour. While the amount of the voided cheque would fall within the realm of possibility for regular pay for a two-week period, if one assumes some overtime and expenses were included, I am satisfied that the actual amount of cheque #222 far exceeded her regular pay. The inescapable conclusion is that $2,365.08 of Cheque #222 was not Ms. Tourangeau's regular pay, but was included in her pay cheque and was intended to provide honoraria to the November councillors in order to circumvent the Court Orders.

[58]       I have no bank records to show that the difference was actually deposited to the bank accounts of the November councillors. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that, based on the evidence of Ms. Tourangeau, that the overpayment was transferred to some of the November councillors.

[59]       However, because I do not have the bank records, I cannot determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all the November councillors received a share of the amount or which councillors received a share. In addition, Ms. Tourangeau's testimony on a council resolution approving the payment is not firsthand; she never saw a copy of the resolution or motion and was only advised by Chief Marie that such a motion had been passed. Thus, I have only hearsay evidence, unsupported by any other evidence, that this was the case. From this, I cannot find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the November councillors, other than Chief Victor Marie, had authorized the issuance of Cheque #222. On the other hand, the evidence does establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chief Victor Marie directed the issuance of the cheque; he must bear the responsibility and consequences that flow from that action.

[60]       Mr. Norman Starr is in a different situation from the other November councillors as he actually signed Cheque #222. Should I conclude, from this, that he also authorized the overpayment that was to be paid to the November councillors? The evidence does not, in my view, allow me to draw that inference beyond a reasonable doubt. It could be that Mr. Starr believed that this was a legitimate payroll cheque and was, thus, permitted under the Orders. The evidence as a whole tends to suggest that Mr. Starr was well aware of what was happening. Nevertheless, on the applicable high burden of proof, more than a suggestion is needed. I cannot hold Mr. Starr in contempt in respect of Charge No. 4.

[61]       Having determined that monies were paid to the November councillors from this overpayment to Ms. Tourangeau and that Chief Victor Marie authorized the issuance of Cheque #222, the next question is whether this was in breach of the Orders of Justice Rouleau. I believe that it was. In his first Order, dated January 10, 2003, Justice Rouleau ordered that all transactions, other than payroll, should not be processed without the consent of counsel for both parties. In the second Order, dated January 17, 2003, Justice Rouleau allowed the payment of cheques to individuals listed in the attachment to that Order. Of significance is that the names of the councillors had originally been included on that list and had been struck. In his decision of May 29, 2003, Justice Rouleau stated clearly that "the outstanding order [freezing the bank accounts and permitting only payroll and certain other transactions] is to remain in effect until the expiry of the appeal period".

[62]       Thus, as of the date when Cheque #222 was issued, on June 6, 2003, the Orders prohibited the payment of the portion of that cheque that subsequently was transferred to some or all of the councillors. Chief Victor Marie, in authorizing this amount, was in breach of the Orders.

[63]       The final question is whether Chief Victor Marie was aware that he was breaching the Orders of the Court. Without question, I can conclude that he was aware of the Orders, how they operated and that he took these steps to circumvent the Orders. The uncontroverted evidence is that he directed Ms. Tourangeau to carry out this scheme; that establishes, in my view, an undeniable awareness of the Orders.

[64]       In conclusion, I find Chief Victor Marie in contempt of the Orders of this Court on this Count No. 4. However, I am not satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the other alleged contemnors were in contempt as contemplated by this Count No. 4.

8.8 Count No. 5 and No. 6

[65]       Count No. 5, which implicates only Mr. Don Tourangeau, relates to Cheque #538 payable to Chief Victor Marie in the amount of $4,977.48, signed by Don Tourangeau and Connie Benwell and bearing the date of April 25, 2003. The Applicants allege that the cheque was back dated and that Mr. Don Tourangeau authorized, signed and issued this cheque after June 23, 2003 in violation of the June 20 Order. Count No. 6 is alleged as an alternative to Count No. 5. In Count No.6, the Applicants allege that, if the cheque was not back dated and was issued prior to June 23, 2003, Don Tourangeau did so without obtaining the consent of counsel for the Applicants as required by the 10 January Order, the 17 January Order and the 29 May Order.

[66]       These two Counts were considered by Justice Heneghan in Wanderingspirit No.3 as they related to Connie Benwell. As noted above, Justice Heneghan found Ms. Benwell to be in contempt under Count No. 6. That is, Justice Heneghan was satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Benwell had, with knowledge of the Orders, issued Cheque #538 in contravention of the Orders. However, she was not persuaded that the cheque was back dated.

[67]       A certified copy of Cheque #538, issued on the "Core" account of the Band, was tendered as evidence. I am satisfied, from a review of the applicable bank records, that one of the signatures on the cheque is that of Mr. Don Tourangeau and that he was a signing authority on the Core account. With respect to the timing of the cheque, there are only two possibilities; either the cheque was issued later than June 23 and back dated or it was written prior to that date.

[68]       This cheque was negotiated on July 7, 2003 in Edmonton, Alberta, raising the possibility that it was back dated, as alleged in Count No. 5 and as was the case with the cheques that were the subject of Count No. 2. I note, however, that there are significant differences between this cheque and those considered under Count No. 2. Those differences are as follows:

• Cheque #538 was signed by Don Tourangeau and Connie Benwell; the Count No. 2 cheques were signed by Norman Starr and Victor Marie.

• Cheque #538 was dated April 25, 2003; the Count No. 2 cheques were all dated June 19, 2003.

• The Count No. 2 cheques were all reported by Ms. Barbara McArthur as missing from the Band Office; Cheque #538 was not.

[69]       These differences raise, in my mind, a doubt as to whether the cheque was written after June 23, 2003. In other words, I have insufficient evidence to persuade me that the cheque was written after June 23 and in contravention of the June 20 Order. Accordingly, I find that the cheque was authorized and issued prior to June 23 and was, therefore, not issued in breach of the June 20 Order.

[70]       Having found that Cheque #538 was written before June 23, the next question is whether issuing this cheque was contrary to the Orders of January 10 and 17. Assuming that the cheque was issued on or about the date on its face - April 25, the May 29 Order is likely not applicable.

[71]       As I noted above, the January 17 Order provided clarification in that it contained a list of people who could be paid. Of significance is that Victor Marie was included in a "list of our people that will be receiving payroll cheques, which includes obligations such as honorariums". Except for Nora Beaver, no other councillors were allowed to be paid. Thus, in my view, the starting point for the determination of this Count is that the Orders did not provide for a blanket prohibition on the payment of monies to Chief Victor Marie. He was entitled, under the January 17 Order to receive "payroll cheques" which could include "obligations such as honorariums".

[72]       During the hearing of this matter, I heard testimony from Mr. Mudalier who had been asked to analyze the payments to Chief Victor Marie between September 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003. Mr. Mudalier based his calculations on an annual base salary of $78,000 per year. His conclusion was that, during this 10 month period, Chief Victor Marie was overpaid by $63,856 plus unauthorized travel of $23,784. With respect to Cheque #538, Mr. Blackstock testified that he did not approve this particular cheque and that, if it was a payroll cheque, it was far in excess of what Chief Victor Marie would normally receive. Their evidence was clear and did not waiver under cross examination. From this, I can conclude that the issuance of Cheque #538, in that it included amounts that were beyond "payroll", was contrary to the January 10 and 17 Orders. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not necessarily mean that Mr. Tourangeau, who signed the cheque, was aware that this cheque was more than a normal "payroll" cheque.

[73]       Mr. Tourangeau was a councillor who, as I have determined, had knowledge of the Orders. Nevertheless, as a councillor, it is possible that he was not as "in the loop" as Chief Marie. Of the cheques presented to me, only this one was signed by Mr. Tourangeau, whereas over a dozen were signed by Chief Marie and Mr. Starr. I have no evidence that Mr. Tourangeau signed other cheques for Chief Marie in the time frame in question; thus, I cannot determine that Mr. Tourangeau knew that Chief Victor Marie was collecting much more than his reasonable salary as Chief. Nor do I have evidence that Mr. Tourangeau participated in the litigation to the same extent as Chief Marie. When I take all of this into account, I am unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Tourangeau was aware that he was signing a cheque that was anything other than a legitimate payroll cheque.

[74]       I appreciate that this finding is contrary to that found by Justice Heneghan in Wanderingspirit #3 in respect of Ms. Connie Benwell. Ms. Benwell was also a signatory to Cheque #538. While my finding may appear inconsistent, I note that I must make the determination on the evidence before me; I do not know what evidence was before Justice Heneghan. I also observe that I was assisted in this hearing by counsel for Mr. Tourangeau who cross-examined the witnesses and pointed out certain evidence that may not have been highlighted in the earlier hearing. Ms. Benwell was not represented by counsel in the hearing before Justice Heneghan.

[75]       In conclusion, I do not find Mr. Don Tourangeau to be in contempt of Count No.5 or 6.

8.9 Count No. 9 and 10

[76]       Under Count No. 9, the Applicants allege that Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Nora Beaver, Michel Bjornson and Don Tourangeau were in violation of the 20 June Order by knowingly accepting cheques that were signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr or by Don Tourangeau and Connie Benwell after June 23, 2003. In the alternative, the Applicants allege, in Count No. 10, that the cheques involved were written prior to June 23, 2003 but knowingly accepted by the named Respondents in contravention of the January 10, January 17 and May 29 Orders. The cheques involved are the following:

Cheque No.	Date on cheque	Payee	Amount
538	April 25, 2003	V. Marie	$4,977.48
255	June 19, 2003	N. Starr	$3,500.00
2056	June 19, 2003	N. Starr	$7,900.00
253	June 19, 2003	M. Bjornson	$8,470.90
254	June 19, 2003	D. Tourangeau	$6,000.00
1551	June 19, 2003	V. Marie	$8,596.92
2055	June 19, 2003	N. Beaver	$3,264.83

[77]       All cheques, except for Cheque #538, were signed by Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr. Cheque #538 was signed by Mr. Don Tourangeau and Ms. Connie Benwell.

[78]       I begin with Cheques #255, 1551 and 2056 issued to Victor Marie or Norman Starr. As I concluded under Count No. 2, these are among the cheques that were issued after June 23, 2003 and back dated to June 19. Given that Norman Starr and Victor Marie were the signatories for these cheques, it is a logical inference that these two individuals knowingly accepted the cheques. It would be highly improbable - to the point of being ridiculous - that they would sign the cheques and then do nothing with them. They were aware of the existence of the cheques and either deposited them or directed that they be deposited. Further, as noted above, both men were aware that issuing these cheques without a third signature was contrary to the June 20 Order. It follows that accepting these cheques was also knowingly done in breach of the Order and that Mr. Starr and Chief Marie were in contempt of the June 20 Order.

[79]       Dealing next with Cheque #538 to Victor Marie, I have already concluded, under Count No. 5 and 6, that this cheque was issued prior to June 23, 2003, contrary to the January 10 and January 17 Orders. As discussed, Chief Victor Marie was, without doubt, aware of the Orders. He was front and centre at all stages of the litigation. His signature is found on correspondence and documents related to the various proceedings before this Court. It is also clear that this cheque was issued without the consent of the counsel for the Applicants, as required by the Orders, a fact that Chief Victor Marie must have known. I am also satisfied that Chief Victor Marie accepted the cheque, and either deposited it himself or directed that it be deposited. While the January 17 Order allowed the payment to him of his pay, including honoraria, the amount paid to him was far in excess of any reasonable sum for his pay and expenses. In sum, I find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chief Victor Marie was in contempt of the January 10 and January 17 Orders.

[80]       The balance of the cheques involved in these Counts present some difficulties. First, I do not have any evidence to show that the named individuals were aware of or accepted or deposited the cheques. It is possible (although not probable) that they were deposited into the various financial institutions without their knowledge. Secondly, while Nora Beaver, Michel Bjornson and Don Tourangeau were aware of the Orders, it is also possible that they believed that there had been the necessary approvals for the cheques in their names. There is some logic to the position that these three individuals, upon seeing the signatures of Chief Marie and Mr. Starr on the cheques, would have assumed that they had been properly authorized and issued.

[81]       I am unable to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Nora Beaver, Michel Bjornson and Don Tourangeau knowingly accepted the cheques in violation of the June 23 Order.

9. Conclusion

[82]       The motion for contempt against Nora Beaver, David Gowans, Michel Bjornson, Harvey Lepine, Don Tourangeau and Jeannie Marie-Jewell is dismissed in respect of all counts raised in this matter.

[83]       As against Chief Victor Marie and Mr. Norman Starr, I conclude that contempt has been established as follows:

(a)     Chief Marie and Mr. Starr are found in contempt of the June 20 Order, as set out in Count No. 2;

(b)    Chief Marie is found in contempt of the January 10, January 17 and May 29 Orders, as set out in Count No. 4;

(c)     Chief Marie and Mr. Starr are found in contempt of the June 20 Order, as set out in Count No. 9, by accepting cheques dated June 19 that were actually issued after the June 20 Order;

(d)    Chief Marie is found in contempt of the January 10 and January 17 Order by accepting Cheque #538, as set out in Count No. 10.

[84]       A further hearing must be held to deal with the issue of penalties to be imposed on Chief Marie and Mr. Starr. This hearing will be held on Thursday, September 28, 2006 at the Federal Court in Edmonton, Alberta commencing at 9:30 a.m., Edmonton time. This hearing will not consider the penalty to be imposed on Ms. Connie Benwell pursuant to Wanderingspirit No. 3; Justice Heneghan remains seized of that matter.

[85]       Should the Applicants or Chief Marie or Mr. Starr wish to make written submissions in relation to the penalty to be imposed (including the costs of the contempt motion), they may do so, provided that such submissions are served and filed on or before August 31, 2006.

[86]       Given the length of time that this matter has been outstanding and that the parties will have three months to prepare for the penalty hearing, this Court would not look favourably on any request for further delay except under the most compelling circumstances.

10. Costs

[87]       In a matter such as this, with multiple parties and issues, the proper allocation of costs is difficult. Further, the results were somewhat mixed; some Respondents were completely successful and others less so. The Applicants succeeded in part in establishing their allegations of contempt against Mr. Starr and Chief Marie. Pursuant to Rule 472, the issue of costs as against these two parties will be addressed as part of the penalty to be imposed on them.

[88]       At this stage, I propose to set out some guidelines in respect of the issue of costs for the other parties. In exercising my discretion in determining the allocation of costs, I have considered the factors set out in Rule 400(3) of the Federal Court Rules.

(a)     There has been no behaviour on the part of any party to these proceedings that would justify an award of costs on a solicitor and client basis.

(b)    Mr. Gowans, Mr. Tourangeau and Mr. Lepine were represented by counsel and were successful Respondents. Through their counsel, they were of considerable assistance to the Court with respect to all of the issues, including those that extended beyond their clients' interests. It is reasonable, therefore, that they are entitled to their costs to be assessed in accordance with the middle of Column IV of Tariff B.

(c)     Ms. Beaver and Ms. Bjornson were self represented. Further, they did not contribute significantly to the proceeding. Nevertheless, I believe that their reasonable disbursements should be allowed in an amount fixed at $500 for each.

ORDER

THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES THAT:

1.       The motion for contempt against Nora Beaver, David Gowans, Michel Bjornson, Harvey Lepine, Don Tourangeau and Jeannie Marie-Jewell is dismissed.

2.       The motion for contempt as against Victor Marie, as set out in Count No. 2, Count No. 4, Count No. 9 and Count No. 10 is granted.

3.       The motion for contempt as against Norman Starr, as set out in Count No. 2 and Count No. 9 is granted.

4.       David Gowans, Harvey Lepine and Don Tourangeau are awarded costs to be assessed in accordance with the middle of Column IV of Tariff B.

5.       Nora Beaver and Michel Bjornson are awarded costs fixed in the amount of $500 each.

6.       Oral submissions on penalties will be heard on Thursday, September 28, 2006 at the Federal Court in Edmonton, Alberta commencing at 9:30 a.m. Edmonton time.

7.       For the penalty hearing, parties may, if they choose, make written submissions provided that such submissions are served and filed on or before August 31, 2006:

_______"Judith A. Snider"_____

Judge

       APPENDIX "A"

to the

Reasons for Order and Order dated June 29^th , 2006

In

MELVIN WANDERINGSPIRIT, DELPHINE BEAULIEU, TONI HERON,

RAYMOND BEAVER AND SONNY MCDONALD in their capacity as

COUNCILLORS OF THE SALT RIVERFIRST NATION 195,

elected August 30, 2002

and

VICTOR MARIE uncontested Chief and NORMAN STARR,

uncontested duly elected BAND COUNCIL MEMBER,

NORA BEAVER, DAVID GOWANS, CONNIE BENWELL,

MICHEL BJORNSON, HARVEY LEPINE, AND DON TOURANGEAU,

purportedly elected BAND COUNCILLORS at a meeting held

November 3, 2002, AND JEANNIE MARIE-JEWELL,

acting as Interim Band Manager

T-2007-02

PARTICULARS OF ACTS ALLEGED TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT

1.          Victor Marie failed or refused to return financial records and documents in his possession, power or control, in particular cheques for Salt River First Nation ("SRFN") bank accounts and copies of cancelled cheques for the SRFN bank accounts, to the SRFN band office pursuant to the Orders of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated June 20^th, 2003 and the Honourable Mr. Justice Rothstein dated July 10, 2003 and is in contempt of court under subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

2.          Victor Marie and Norman Starr authorized and signed cheques purportedly dated May 23^rd, 2003 or June 19^th, 2003 payable to Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Don Tourangeau, Michel Bjornson, Jeannie Marie-Jewell, Tanya Tourangeau, Nora Beaver, Eileen Beaver, Henry Beaver Sr. and Bruce L. Barry, which, while backdated to before June 23^rd, 2003 were in fact issued and signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr after June 23^rd in violation of Mr. Justice Rouleau's Order dated June 20^th, 2003 and are in contempt of court under subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

           

3.          In the alternative, if the cheques referred to in paragraph (b) above were issued before June 23^rd, 2003, Victor Marie and Norman Starr violated the Orders of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated January 10^th and 17^th, 2003 and May 29^th, 2003 and are in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, by reason of issuing cheques to the said individuals dated May 23^rd, 2003 or June 19, 2003 without obtaining the consent of counsel for the Applicants, contrary to the said orders.

4.          Victor Marie, Nora Beaver, David Gowans, Norman Starr, Michel Bjornson, Harvey Lepine and Don Tourangeau authorized the issuance of a cheque in the amount of approximately $8,000.00 (eight thousand dollars) dated on or about June 6^th, 2003, payable to Tanya Tourangeau, purportedly in payment of her wages, but in fact consisting partly of a payment to her and partly in payment of monies earmarked as honoraria for the councillors purportedly elected on November 3, 2002, without the consent of counsel for the Applicants, in violation of the orders of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated January 10^th and 17^th, 2003 and May 29^th, 2003 and are in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, (1998).

5.          Don Tourangeau authorized and signed a cheque purportedly dated April 25^th, 2003 payable to Victor Marie which, while backdated before June 23^rd, 2003 was in fact issued and signed after June 23^rd, 2003 in violation of the Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated June 20^th, 2003 and is in contempt of court under subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules (1998).

6.          In the alternative, if the cheque referred to in paragraph (5) was issued before June 23^rd, 2003, Don Tourangeau violated the orders of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated January 10^th and 17^th, 2003 and May 29^th, 2003 and is in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) by reason of issuing a cheque to Victor Marie dated April 25^th, 2003 without obtaining the consent of counsel for the Applicants, contrary to the said Orders.

7.          Jeannie Marie-Jewell knowingly accepted backdated cheques purportedly issued before June 23^rd, 2003 signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr on behalf of the SRFN, which cheques were in fact written and issued before June 23^rd, 2003 in violation of the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated June 20^th, 2003, and is in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

8.          In the alternative, Jeannie Marie-Jewell violated the orders of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated January 10^th and 17^th, 2003 and May 29^th, 2003 by knowingly accepting cheques signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr on behalf of the SRFN which were in payment of claims other than wages, or alternately for wages in excess of $3,000.00 (three thousand dollars) in violation of the said orders and is in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

9.         Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Don Tourangeau, Michel Bjornson and Nora Beaver, knowingly accepted cheques signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr, or by Don Tourangeau and Connie Benwell after June 23^rd, 2003, in violation of the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated June 20^th, 2003, and are in contempt of court pursuant to subsection 466(b) or subsection 466(c) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

10.        In the alternative, Victor Marie, Norman Starr, Don Tourangeau, Michel Bjornson and Nora Beaver knowingly accepted cheques signed by Victor Marie and Norman Starr, or by Don Tourangeau and Connie Benwell, dated April 25th, or June 19^th, 2003 without the consent of the counsel for the Applicants, in violation of the orders of the Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau dated January 10^th, and 17^th, and May 29^th, 2003, and are in contempt of court under subsection 466(b) or subsection 466(c) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

FEDERAL COURT

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                           T-2007-02

STYLE OF CAUSE:                           MELVIN WANDERINGSPIRIT ET AL. v. VICTOR MARIE ET AL

PLACE OF HEARING:                     Edmonton, Alberta

DATE OF HEARING:                       May 1 and 2, 2006

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER:                                  SNIDER J.

DATED:                                              June 29^th, 2006

                                                           

APPEARANCES:

Christopher Harvey, Q.C. Chris J. Watson	FOR THE APPLICANTS
Bruce Logan	FOR THE RESPONDENT, David Gowans
Vicki Giannacopoulos	FOR THE RESPONDENT, Don Tourangeau
Barry J. Massing Victor Marie Norman Starr Nora Beaver                                                   Michel Bjornson Turnbull	FOR THE RESPONDENT, Harvey Lepine FOR THE RESPONDENT, ON HIS OWN BEHALF FOR THE RESPONDENT, ON HIS OWN BEHALF FOR THE RESPONDENT, ON HER OWN BEHALF FOR THE RESPONDENT, ON HER OWN BEHALF

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

MacKenzie Fujisawa Vancouver, BC	FOR THE APPLICANT(S)
Dobko Logan Innes & Hougestol Grande Prairie, AB McLennan Ross LPP Edmonton, AB Hendrickson Gower Massing Olivieri LLP Edmonton, AB	FOR THE RESPONDENT, David Gowans FOR THE RESPONDENT, Don Tourangeau FOR THE RESPONDENT, Harvey Lepine