Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 2006 FC 443

Date: 20060424

Docket: T-1941-04

Citation: 2006 FC 443

Ottawa, Ontario, April 24, 2006

PRESENT:      The Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard

BETWEEN:

CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE

Applicant

and

CHIEF COMMISSIONER, CANADIAN

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Respondent

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

(Confidential Reasons for Order and Order issued on April 5, 2006)

1.         Introduction

[1]                The Applicant, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), seeks judicial review of the October 26, 2004 decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission), wherein the Commission ordered the disclosure of the "CIBC Employment Equity Compliance Report" (the Final Report) under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (the ATIA). The Applicant brings this review under section 44 of the ATIA.

[2]                The Applicant seeks the following relief:

a)          an order reversing the Commission's October 26, 2004 decision to disclose the Final Report; and

b)          an order that the Commission not disclose the Final Report.

[3]                In the alternative, the Applicant seeks:

c)          an order that the Commission sever and disclose only part of the Final Report; or

d)          an order that the matter be referred back to the Commission for reconsideration.

[4]                Finally, the Applicant seeks:

e)          an order granting the Applicant costs on a solicitor-client basis; and

f)           such further and other relief as this Court deems just.

[5]                The materials filed by the parties in their respective records before the Court are subject to the protective order of Prothonotary Roger Lafrenière dated January 21, 2005. At the hearing, the Applicant moved to have the hearing conducted in camera. Upon considering the nature of the information dealt with in this application and the submissions of the parties, and upon the Respondent consenting to the motion, I granted the Applicant's motion and ordered that the hearing be conducted in camera.

2.       Factual Background

[6]                In June 2000, the Commission informed the Applicant that it would be subject to an employment equity compliance review audit pursuant to the Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44 (the EEA). The Applicant co-operated during the audit, which included responding to questionnaires, disseminating workforce surveys to employees, allowing for on-site visits and interviews with employees, and providing documentary information related to its human resources practices, policies and initiatives.

[7]                In November 2002, the Commission received a written request under the ATIA for the release of the "CIBC Interim Employment Equity Report" (the Interim Report). The Commission informed the Applicant of the request and the conditions and timelines for response; the Commission referred the Applicant to paragraphs 20(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the ATIA as the grounds under which a third party could oppose disclosure. Under the ATIA, a third party is a party that is neither the access requester nor the government institution from which the information is being sought for disclosure. Here, the Applicant is the third party.

[8]                The Applicant stated its opposition to the release of the Interim Report on the basis of the statutory privilege provided by section 34 of the EEA, and that much of the content in the Interim Report was exempt from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA as confidential commercial information supplied by the Applicant to the Commission. The Applicant also took the position that any non-exempt portions of the Interim Report could not be reasonably severed from the exempted portions and therefore, nothing in the Interim Report should be disclosed. After a further exchange of correspondence, the Commission informed the Applicant, by letter dated February 13, 2003, that it had decided to withhold the Interim Report in its entirety on the basis of paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA.

[9]                On July 9, 2004, the Commission advised the Applicant that a request had been made for access to the Final Report and invited the Applicant to make submissions, again making reference to the section 20 exemption provisions in the ATIA. The Applicant responded in a letter dated August 6, 2004, opposing disclosure of the Final Report on virtually the same grounds as it had challenged release of the Interim Report. The Applicant provided the Commission with a copy of the Final Report highlighted to indicate the passages it considered exempt under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA.

[10]            On October 26, 2004, the Commission informed the Applicant that the Commission intended to disclose the Final Report in its entirety to the access requester.

[11]            Two days later, the Commission notified the Applicant that its decision not to release the Interim Report had been based on paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA - that its disclosure may injure a lawful investigation - and not paragraph 20(1)(b) as stated in its February 13, 2003 decision letter.

[12]            Pursuant to section 44 of the ATIA, the Applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Commission's decision to release the Final Report.

3.       Impugned Decision

[13]            The Commission did not provide the Applicant with substantial reasons for its decision to release the Final Report, stating only that:

Based upon the material which you have provided in your letter dated August 6, 2004, we do not have sufficient information to justify exempting the requested record from disclosure pursuant to subsection 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act. We now intend to disclose the Compliance Report to the requester.

[14]            The Commission informed the Applicant of its right to apply to the Federal Court for review of the Commission's decision, pursuant to section 44 of the ATIA. The Commission stated that if no notice of application for judicial review was filed, then the Commission would release the Final Report to the access requester on November 15, 2004.

4.                   Legislative Framework

[15]            The relevant statutory provisions of the ATIA, the EEA and the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 are appended to these reasons as Schedule "A". Specific statutory provisions will be included where required for ease of reference and clarity. Below, I set out briefly the legislative framework of the ATIA and of the EEA as it pertains to this case.

Access to Information Act

[16]            The ATIA codifies the public's right to access information.

[17]            Subsection 4(1) provides that every Canadian citizen or permanent resident has the right to request access to any record under the control of a government institution. Subsection 2(1) prescribes that exceptions to the right of access be available only in limited and specific circumstances. Section 24 requires the head of a government institution not to disclose any record that contains information the disclosure of which is restricted by a provision of a statute listed in Schedule II of the ATIA.

[18]            The ATIA also provides for other mandatory and discretionary exemptions to disclosure. For the purpose of this application, the following mandatory provisions are in play: section 19 and paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(c). Section 19 exempts personal information. Paragraph 20(1)(b) exempts confidential commercial, financial, scientific or technical information supplied by a third party to a government institution that has been consistently treated in a confidential manner. Paragraph 20(1)(c) exempts information that could reasonably cause material financial loss to a third party or reasonably harm its competitive position. The only discretionary provision at issue in the present case is paragraph 16(1)(c), which can be invoked by the head of a government institution in order to safeguard the conduct of lawful investigations.

[19]            In affirming that exceptions to the right of access must be limited and specific, the Court has held that that right should not be frustrated except in the clearest of circumstances: Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [1989] 1 F.C. 47 (C.A.). A heavy burden of persuasion rests upon the party resisting disclosure: Rubin v. Canada(Minister of Transport), [1998] 2 F.C. 430 (C.A.). The standard of proof to be applied in determining whether information falls within one of the mandatory exemptions under section 20 of the ATIA is the civil standard; that is, proof on a balance of probabilities: Pricewaterhouse Cooper, LLP. v. Canada(Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2002 FCA 406. The same standard of proof is applicable to exemptions under section 19 of the ATIA.

[20]            Even if some information in a record is found to be exempt, the remainder of the record may still be disclosed. Section 25 of the ATIA requires the head of a government institution to disclose the non-exempted information in a record if that information "can reasonably be severed" from the exempted information.

Employment Equity Act

[21]            The purpose of the EEA is to ensure equal representation in the workplace of persons who fall within the four designated groups - women, Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, and visible minorities. The EEA is applicable to certain private sector employers such as the Applicant, which is a federally regulated bank. Section 5 requires an employer subject to the EEA to complete an analysis of its workforce in order to identify areas where designated group members are under-represented and to identify barriers that contribute to these representation gaps. As well, the EEA requires employers to implement an employment equity plan to remove these barriers and ensure reasonable progress towards full representation.

[22]            Pursuant to its mandate under section 22, the Commission may initiate an employment equity compliance review audit on any employer subject to the EEA. Subsection 34(1) provides that information obtained by the Commission from employers during an audit is privileged and shall not knowingly be communicated, disclosed or made available without the written consent of the person from whom it was obtained. Subsection 9(3) also requires an employer to keep confidential any information provided to it by employees; the employer can only use the information for the purpose of implementing its obligations under the EEA.

[23]            Aside from making reasonable efforts to comply with the compliance review audit, section 18 of the EEA requires a private sector employer to report annually to the Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development (the Minister) on its progress in achieving employment equity. In so doing, the employer must file information in the following prescribed manner and form:

Section 19 of the EEA provides that the employment equity annual reports submitted by private sector employers shall be made available for public inspection at a designated place by any person for a prescribed fee.

5.          Issues

[24]            After having reviewed the submissions of the parties, I would state the issues raised in this application as follows:

1)                   Is the Commission's decision void because no written request was made for access to the Final Report?

2)                   Is the Final Report "under the control" of the Commission and thus subject to the ATIA?

3)                   Did the Commission breach procedural fairness by failing to provide the Applicant with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceeding?

4)                   Is the information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA?

5)                   Is information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA?

6)                   Is information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(c) of the ATIA?

7)                   Is information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under section 19 of the ATIA?

8)                   If any part of the Final Report is exempted, can the non-exempt information be reasonably severed and disclosed?

9)                   Is the Applicant entitled to costs on a solicitor-client basis?

6.          Standard of Review

[25]            The Applicant submits, and the Respondent agrees, that reviews initiated under section 44 of the ATIA are to be conducted de novo. The Applicant refers to Blood Band v. Canada(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2003 FC 1397, wherein at paragraph 46, Justice François Lemieux describes the role of the Court in conducting a hearing de novo:

When conducting a review de novo, the task of the Court is not to satisfy itself that the tribunal, here the respondent, through its Access Coordinator, committed an error but rather to arrive at its own conclusions based on the evidence adduced (see Canadian National Railways Co. and Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Canada (1993), 62 F.T.R. 150 (F.C.T.D.), in connection with an appeal de novo [...]. If it is appropriate to talk about the standard of review in these circumstances, that standard would be the standard of correctness. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)

[26]            In stating that an application under section 44 involves a new and independent review of the question of access to the requested information, Justice Lemieux drew from Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada(Minister of Transport), [1989] 37 Admin. L.R. 245 (F.C.T.D.). In that case, Justice Andrew MacKay stated at pages 265 to 266:

That the Court should undertake a review of the records in issue and determine what is exempt from disclosure and what is not, and further what information should be severed from exempt information and then released, may well be an onerous task in some cases. Nevertheless, it is consistent with the role which implicitly Parliament has established for the Court under the Act. [...]

The role of the Court, to conduct a "review of the matter" de novo, including examination document by document of the records proposed to be disclosed which the applicant third party seeks to have prohibited from disclosure, does not seem to have been thoroughly discussed previously, perhaps because it has been seen to be so obvious in previous cases that no issue was raised about it. [...] In light of the jurisprudence evolving in relation to the Act there can no longer be doubt that upon application for review, the Court's function is to consider the matter de novo including, if necessary, a detailed review of the records in issue document by document.

[27]            Section 44 of the ATIA does not expressly prescribe that a review be conducted as a de novo hearing or on the basis of a particular standard. Subsection 44(1) provides that:

44. (1) Any third party to whom the head of a government institution is required under paragraph 28(1)(b) or subsection 29(1) to give notice of a decision to disclose a record or a part thereof under this Act may, within twenty days after the notice is given, apply to the Court for a review of the matter.

44. (1) Le tiers que le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu, en vertu de l'alinéa 28(1)b) ou du paragraphe 29(1), d'avise de la communication totale ou partielle d'un document peut, dans le vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis, exercer un recours en révision devant la Cour.

However, subsection 2(1) of the ATIA makes clear that decisions regarding the disclosure of government information are to be reviewed independently of government. That prescription connotes a review by the Court more in line with a de novo hearing or at least a less deferential standard of review.

[28]            The jurisprudence has established the different questions to be considered by the Court in reviewing decisions made in respect of the mandatory and the discretionary exemption provisions of the ATIA: Canadian Jewish Congress v. Canada(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1996] 1 F.C. 268 (T.D.). With respect to mandatory exemptions, there is but one question to be considered; namely, the factual determination as to whether the material comes within the description of the exempting provision. If the contested information or record is found to fall within the description set out in the mandatory exemption provision, then the head of the government institution is obligated to refuse disclosure. In the case of discretionary exemptions, there are two decisions to be reviewed by the Court. First, as with mandatory exemptions, the Court must review the record to determine if the head of the government institution erred in making the factual decision as to whether or not the requested information falls within the exempting provision. If the information meets the criteria, the Court must then determine whether the head of the government institution exercised his or her discretion properly.

[29]            In Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 66 ("RCMP") and Wyeth-Ayerst Canada Inc. v. Canada(Attorney General), [2003] F.C.J. No. 916 (QL), the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal, respectively, had occasion to consider the applicable standard for reviewing decisions respecting disclosure of government information where a mandatory exemption provision was in play. In RCMP, the RCMP Commissioner had found that some of the information requested was exempt from disclosure by virtue of section 19 of the ATIA. In Wyeth-Ayerst, Health Canadahad determined that information of the third party, Wyeth-Ayerst, did not fall within the exemptions provided under subsection 20(1) of the ATIA. In both cases, the Courts applied the pragmatic and functional approach to determine the appropriate standard of review, and held that it was correctness.

[30]            In 3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254, Justice John Evans conducted a pragmatic and functional analysis in determining the appropriate standard for reviewing decisions made pursuant to a discretionary exemption provision under the ATIA. As the Courts in RCMP and Wyeth-Ayerst held, Justice Evans stated that reviewing whether the information falls within the description of the exempting provision is to be considered on a correctness standard. With respect to the second question as to whether the head of the government institution properly exercised discretion, the learned judge held that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter. At paragraph 47, Justice Evans summarized the applicable standards of review as follows:

In reviewing the refusal of a head of a government institution to disclose a record, the Court must determine on a standard of correctness whether the record requested falls within an exemption. However, when the Act confers on the head of a government institution a discretion to refuse to disclose an exempted record, the lawfulness of its exercise is reviewed on the grounds normally available in administrative law for the review of administrative discretion, including unreasonableness. I would only note that these conclusions are identical to those of La Forest J. in Dagg [v. Canada(Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403], without conducting a functional or pragmatic analysis.

[31]            With respect to the Commission's decision in this case to disclose the Final Report despite the objection of the Applicant under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA, I will apply the standard of correctness as I see no reasons to vary from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal.

[32]            I note that in this application for judicial review, the Applicant has raised additional grounds for objecting to disclosure of the Final Report which it had not addressed in its submissions to the Commission; namely, paragraph 16(1)(c), section 19 and paragraph 20(1)(c) of the ATIA. The Respondent did not take issue with the Court considering these grounds. Both parties have also adduced new evidence in support of their respective positions in this application, and have not objected to the opposing party's evidence. In these circumstances, in respect of these additional grounds for objecting to disclosure, I will conduct a hearing de novo. I will therefore consider the new evidence adduced and the arguments advanced by the parties.

7.          The Final Report

[33]            The record in question in this case - the Final Report dated April 19, 2004 - was written by a Compliance Review Officer (the CRO) with the Commission and comprises 39 pages and four appendices. The Final Report is the end result of the employment equity compliance review audit conducted by the Commission in relation to the Applicant.

[34]            In his affidavit sworn February 25, 2005, Rhys Phillips, Director of Policy and Legislation in the Employment Equity, Policy, Outreach and Communications Branch at the Commission, sets out the standard process used by the Commission in conducting an employment equity compliance review audit. The process as stated by Mr. Phillips in his affidavit can be summarized as follows:

-                the employer is notified by the Commission of the upcoming compliance review audit;

-                the CRO conducts research to gather publicly available information in respect of the employer;

-                the employer is given a copy of the Commission's document, "Framework for Compliance Audits under the Employment Equity Act", which sets out the audit process and assessment factors and includes a copy of the Employment Equity Audit - Questionnaire (the Questionnaire);

-                an audit plan is developed by the CRO and the employer;

-                the employer is asked to complete the Questionnaire and provide substantiating documents, including the employer's employment equity plan, self-identification survey package, workforce analysis, and policies and procedures related to such matters as accommodation and harassment;

-                based upon the results of the Questionnaire and the documentary information, the CRO conducts a preliminary analysis of the employment equity status of the employer;

-                the Commission conducts on-site verification visits, during which the CRO interviews selected employees and may ask to review additional documentation;

-                the CRO writes an Interim Report if the employer is not in full compliance with the requirements of the EEA, noting the areas of non-compliance and required undertakings by the employer, or a Final Report if the employer is in full compliance;

-                where an Interim Report is issued and undertakings are given by the employer, the CRO conducts follow-up auditing of the efforts made by the employer to address the areas of non-compliance; and

-                where a Final Report is issued, the audit is closed and the CRO returns all the employer's materials not required for monitoring purposes.

Nothing in the evidence or in the submissions of the parties indicates that the Commission's standard process was not followed in conducting the employment equity compliance review audit in respect of the Applicant.

[35]            The Final Report in this case includes information about the purpose and methodology of the Commission's employment equity compliance review audit, and the process undertaken in auditing the Applicant. The bulk of the Final Report is structured around the 12 requirements emanating from the EEA. Specifically, the EEA requires an employer to:

1)             conduct a self-identification workforce survey and maintain a system to store and protect data (Workforce Survey and Data Systems);

2)             complete a workforce analysis in order to determine the degree of under-representation of designated groups in each occupational group (Workforce Analysis);

3)             review its employment systems, policies and practices to identity barriers to equal representation (Employment Systems Review);

4)             specify in its employment equity plan short-term measures to be implemented to remove the barriers identified (Elimination of Barriers);

5)             include provisions in its employment equity plan for the "reasonable" accommodation of employees' needs (Accommodation);

6)             include positive policies and practices in its employment equity plan (Positive Policies and Practices);

7)             develop short-term goals for the recruitment and promotion of designated group members in each occupational group in which they are under-represented (Hiring and Promotion Goals);

8)             develop longer-term goals for increasing designated group representation in the employer's workforce (Representation Levels);

9)             monitor the implementation of its employment equity plan (Monitoring, Review and Revision of Plan);

10)         provide information to employees on an ongoing basis about the purpose of employment equity and steps taken by the employer to implement its employment equity program (Information to Employees);

11)         consult with employee and union representatives on the development, implementation and revision of the employer's employment equity plan (Consultation); and

12)         maintain records in key activities concerning employment equity (Maintenance of Records).

Under each of these headings, the CRO provided her assessment related to the Applicant's compliance in respect to each of the requirements under the EEA. The Final Report documents the CRO's findings related to the Applicant's compliance upon her preliminary analysis, the undertakings negotiated with the Applicant with respect to matters raised in the Interim Report, the steps taken by the Applicant where required in moving towards full compliance, the Applicant's compliance at the time of the Final Report, and the commitments made by the Applicant towards achieving greater compliance with the EEA.

8.          Analysis

ISSUE 1:       Is the Commission's decision void because no written request was made for access to the Final Report?

[36]            While section 6 of the ATIA requires that an access request be made in writing, in my view, the primary purpose of the section is to ensure the request be sufficiently detailed so as to allow the institution to readily identify the record. Section 6 provides as follows:

[37]            The Applicant notes that the Commission never received a written request for access to the Final Report; it only received a written request for the Interim Report. As a result, the Applicant asserts that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to release the Final Report. Moreover, the Applicant argues that, having made a final decision not to disclose the Interim Report and having not received a new access request in writing, the Commission was functus officio in respect of the Final Report.

[38]            In support of its submission, the Applicant cites Justice Marc Noël in Matol Botanical International Ltd. v. Canada(Minister of National Health and Welfare), [1994] 84 F.T.R. 168 (T.D.), [1994] F.C.J. No. 860 (QL). At paragraphs 34 and 35 of his reasons the learned judge wrote:

[...] Only one decision may be made with respect to an information request, and once it is made the institution in question does not have the discretion to get around it.

This is clear from the scheme of the Act, which sets out a very precise timetable and detailed procedure for processing an information request and with respect to the decision-making process which the institution concerned must follow.

[39]            The Respondent does not dispute the fact that the Commission did not receive a written request for the Final Report from the access requester. However, the Respondent notes that the initial request for the Interim Report constitutes a written request, and that the requester made a verbal request, with permission of the Commission, for the Final Report. Although the second request was not in writing, the Respondent asserts that considering it a valid request under section 6 is "in keeping with both the spirit and purpose of the ATIA". The Respondent also argues that the Commission is not functus officio because it reached two separate and distinct decisions based on two separate requests: one for the Interim Report and one for the Final Report.

[40]            I agree with the Respondent's arguments on this first issue. The Commission did not commit a reviewable error by accepting the second oral request as sufficient to engage its jurisdiction under the ATIA. It would have been desirable had a second written request been made for the Final Report; however, in my opinion, the requester's failure to comply strictly with section 6 of the ATIA does not render the Commission's decision void. Accepting the oral request in the circumstances satisfies the spirit and purpose of the ATIA, which is to provide - rather than hinder - access to information under the control of government institutions. In any event, even if I were to accept the Applicant's technical argument and determine that the Commission was wrong to proceed as it did, little purpose would be served in finding the error determinative of this application. Such a deficiency could be easily cured by the access requester filing a written request in compliance with the ATIA. In my view, the Commission's decision to proceed on the basis of a verbal request for access to the Final Report was not clearly wrong.

[41]            I am also of the view that the Commission was not functus officio regarding its decision to disclose the Final Report. I agree with the Respondent that the Commission rendered two separate and distinct decisions based on two separate and distinct requests. Moreover, I am of the opinion that Matol Botanical, above, is distinguishable. There, the government institution decided to release a record after considering the submissions of the third party, but then later decided to release additional records under the same access request without giving the third party an opportunity to challenge the release of those records. Such circumstances do not arise in this case.

[42]            In summary, I therefore find that the Commission's decision is not void by reason that the request for disclosure of the Final Report was not made in writing. I also find that the Commission was not functus officio when it rendered its decision in respect of the Final Report.

ISSUE 2:         Is the Final Report "under the control" of the Commission and thus subject to the ATIA?

[43]            A person has the right to access "any record under the control of a government institution". Subsection 4(1) of the ATIA provides that:

[44]            There is no dispute that the Commission is a government institution for the purpose of the ATIA. The issue here is whether the Final Report is "under the control of" the Commission. The Applicant argues that it is not because the information in the Final Report was obtained from the Applicant pursuant to section 34 of the EEA. Subsection 34(1) states that:

34. (1) Information obtained by the Commission under this Act is privileged and shall not knowingly be, or be permitted to be, communicated, disclosed or made available without the written consent of the person from whom it was obtained.

34. (1) Les renseignements obtenus par la Commission dans le cadre de la présente loi sont protégés. Nul ne peut sciemment les communiquer ou les laisser communiquer sans l'autorisation écrite de la personne dont ils proviennent.

The Applicant contends that because the Final Report falls within the "statutory privilege" of section 34, it cannot be disclosed without the written consent of the Applicant.

[45]            In support of its position, the Applicant cites Andersen Consulting v. Canada,[2001] 2 F.C. 324 (T.D.). In that case, the Court held that because of the implied undertaking rule, the record in question was not under the control of the Crown because its possession was constrained and restricted by law. The implied undertaking rule prohibits the use or disclosure of information obtained in the process of discovery in a civil action for purposes other than that related to that same action.

[46]            The Respondent counters that while there is no statutory definition of "control", the jurisprudence suggests that it is sufficient that a record be in the possession of the government institution for that institution to be in control of the record: Canada Post Corporation v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), [1993] 3 F.C. 320 (T.D.); aff'd [1995] 2 F.C. 110 (C.A.). The Respondent further notes that not only is the Final Report in the Commission's possession, the Final Report was also written by the Commission in furtherance of its obligations under the EEA.

[47]            In my opinion, the Applicant's contention is without merit. First, subsection 4(1) of the ATIA clearly provides that "[...] notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament," the provisions of the ATIA apply. Such language indicates that the provisions of the ATIA take precedence over other statutory provisions restricting disclosure, except for those provisions included in Schedule II of the ATIA. As noted above, section 24 provides a mandatory exemption for information of which disclosure is restricted by a statutory provision specified in Schedule II:

Section 34 of the EEA is not listed in Schedule II. As a result, I am of the opinion that Parliament did not intend section 34 to operate to prevent disclosure of a record that could otherwise be disclosed under the ATIA.

[48]            Second, I agree with the Respondent that the jurisprudence supports a broad and purposive approach to construing the meaning of "control" and, in general, it is sufficient that the record be in the possession of the government institution.

[49]            Third, I am of the opinion that Andersen Consulting, above, can be distinguished. That case concerned documents disclosed during the course of a trial but which did not, in the end, become part of the public record. The Crown argued that it could not return documents to the plaintiff in light of the Crown's legal obligation to retain them under an implied undertaking and then turn them over to the National Archives of Canada, pursuant to that institution's statute. The Court held that the law imposed a condition on the Crown; namely, that the Crown did not have the option to refuse giving an undertaking and that by accepting the documents the Crown was bound to the Court to deal with them in the way permitted by the undertaking: see Andersen Consulting, at paragraph 17. As a result, the Court held that the requested document was not in the Crown's control.

[50]            In my view, Andersen Consulting is not analogous to the circumstances of the instant case. In Andersen Consulting, the Court held that the legal obligation imposed on the Crown by the implied undertaking kept the control over the documents in question out of the Crown's hands. By contrast, in the present case, the legal obligations emanating from the EEA and the ATIA firmly put control over the Final Report into the hands of the Commission. No legal restriction or obligation in the circumstances of this case - namely, section 34 of the EEA - operates to wrest control over the Final Report from the Commission. Put differently, the Commission is not constrained in carrying out its obligations under the ATIA - nor can it be relieved of its obligations - because of the "notwithstanding" language in subsection 4(1) and the absence of section 34 of the EEA in Schedule II of the ATIA. To interpret the applicable provisions any other way would in effect be to give no meaning to subsection 4(1) of the ATIA.

[51]            As a result, I am of the opinion that the Final Report is "under the control" of the Commission and, in consequence, the ATIA finds application in this case. The Commission had the jurisdiction to make a decision on the access request.

ISSUE 3:          Did the Commission breach procedural fairness by failing to provide the Applicant with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceeding?

[52]            The Commission informed the Applicant after it had made its decision to release the Final Report that the Commission had misstated the basis for earlier refusing to release the Interim Report. Rather than pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA, the Commission's decision to withhold the Interim Report was made on the basis of paragraph 16(1)(c). The Applicant states that, in opposing the release of the Final Report, it had specifically relied on the similarities between the Interim Report and the Final Report and the fact that the Commission cited paragraph 20(1)(b) as the reason for not disclosing the Interim Report. The Applicant contends that, because of the Commission's error, the Applicant was denied "sufficient information to permit meaningful participation" in opposing release of the Final Report. The Applicant argues that, as a consequence, the Commission breached procedural fairness and its decision to release the Final Report must be invalidated. In support of its position, the Applicant cites Pride Beverages Ltd. v. Canada(Minister of Agriculture),[1996] F.C.J. No. 720 (T.D.) (QL), in which the Court held at paragraph 5 that a government institution must allow a third party "the option to establish that the information is protected under the Act from disclosure".

[53]            The Respondent submits that the Commission followed the procedural requirements set out in sections 27 and 28 of the ATIA by providing notice of the access request to the Applicant and allowing the Applicant ample opportunity to oppose release of the Final Report.

[54]            Should the Court find a breach of procedural fairness, the decision that flows from such a flawed process cannot stand. In this case, I am of the opinion that the Commission provided the Applicant with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceeding. In my view, Pride Beverage, above, is of no assistance to the Applicant. In that case, the error on the part of Agriculture Canada was in not adequately informing the third party as to which records it was planning to release. Justice William McKeown, at paragraph 4 of his reasons, stated the obligation of a government institution as follows:

[...] While the notice provisions of the Act are directive, in my view, the government must provide a third party with an opportunity to provide the government with its views on all the records sought to be released.

[55]                  In the present case, there was no confusion as to the record subject to the access request. The Commission informed the Applicant by letter dated July 9, 2004, that a request had been made to obtain the Final Report; the Commission also appended a copy of the Final Report to its letter. In its letter, the Commission told the Applicant that if it did not agree to the disclosure of the Final Report then the Applicant was "[...] required to provide an explanation in writing with respect to the application of exemptions under the Act." The Commission again referred the Applicant to subsection 20(1) of the ATIA and attached an "analysis guide" relating to that exemption provision. In my opinion, the Applicant therefore cannot rely on Pride Beverage in support of its assertion that it did not have sufficient information to permit meaningful participation in opposing the release of the Final Report.

[56]                  Further, I do not accept the Applicant's argument that it had relied on the similarities between the Interim Report and the Final Report in making its submission opposing the release of the latter report. Contrary to the Applicant's characterization of the two reports, I find them to be quite dissimilar in substance. The Interim Report provides greater detail regarding the findings as to the Applicant's efforts in meeting of employment equity goals; it sets out recommendations for further activities; and it seeks to impose undertakings on the Applicant to ensure compliance. A more distinctive feature of the Interim Report, as compared to the Final Report, is that it prescribes a deadline for the Applicant to agree to those undertakings. If undertakings are given, then the investigation continues to allow the Applicant to reach a level of compliance with all of the statutory requirements for employment equity. The Interim Report is intended to be a work-in-progress - one step in the compliance review audit process - whereas the Final Report marks the last step in the auditing of the Applicant's adherence to its obligations under the EEA. In any event, the Applicant does not suggest how its submissions to the Commission in response to the request for access to the Final Report would have been different had the Applicant known the Interim Report was released on the basis of paragraph 16(1)(c) and not paragraph 20(1)(b).

[57]                  In my view, the Applicant had sufficient information to permit meaningful participation in the process that led to the Commission's decision. As a consequence, I find that the Commission did not breach the principles of procedural fairness.

ISSUE 4:          Is the information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA?

[58]            Paragraph 16(1)(c) states that:

16. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains [...] (c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information (i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation, (ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or (iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or [...]

16. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents : [...] c) contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales ou au déroulement d'enquêtes licites, notamment : (i) des renseignements relatifs à l'existence ou à la nature d'une enquête déterminée, (ii) des renseignements qui permettraient de remonter à une source de renseignements confidentielle, (iii) des renseignements obtenus ou préparés au cours d'une enquête; [...]

Subsection 16(4) defines an "investigation" as follows:

16. (4) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(b) and (c), "investigation" means an investigation that (a) pertains to the administration or enforcement of an Act of Parliament; (b) is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or (c) is within a class of investigations specified in the regulations.

16. (4) Pour l'application des alinéas (1)b) et c), « enquête » s'entend de celle qui : a) se rapporte à l'application d'une loi fédérale; b) est autorisée sous le régime d'une loi fédérale; c) fait partie d'une catégorie d'enquêtes précisée dans les règlements.

[59]            I agree with the Applicant that the Commission's compliance review audit constitutes an "investigation" as defined in subsection 16(4) of the ATIA. Specifically, I note that the Commission's audit pertains to the administration and enforcement of the EEA, and that it is authorized by subsection 23(1) of the EEA. As a result, I find the Commission's compliance review audit to be a "lawful investigation" for the purposes of the paragraph 16(1)(c) exemption. The Commission implicitly acknowledged as much when it applied the section 16 exemption to the Interim Report. That said, the next question is whether paragraph 16(1)(c) may still be engaged once the lawful investigation has been concluded, as is the case here. The Applicant contends that "investigations" in section 16 cover future investigations and not only ongoing ones.

[60]            The Supreme Court of Canada in Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages),[2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, dealt with the question of whether future investigations fall within the scope of a "lawful investigation" in relation to a provision in the Privacy Act similar to section 16 of the ATIA. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commissioner of Official Languages could deny a person access to his own personal information in order to safeguard from harm its future investigations. The Supreme Court held that investigations covered under paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act are not limited to current investigations or to an identifiable prospective investigation. At page 807, Justice Charles Gonthier writing for the Court stated:

[...] None of the paragraphs of s. 22(3) limits the word "investigation" to investigations that are underway, or excludes future investigations or the investigative process in general from its protection.    It therefore seems, prima facie, that the word retains its broad meaning and may refer equally to investigations that are underway, are about to commence, or will take place. [...]

I note that the pertinent wording in subsection 22(3) of the Privacy Act is identical to the wording in subsection 16(4) of the ATIA.

[61]            While the Supreme Court in Lavigne dealt with investigations under paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act, I am of the view that the Court's interpretation finds application here given that the wording in paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act is essentially the same as that in paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA. I therefore adopt the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the word "investigation". While the Respondent did not address this issue in its written submissions, at the hearing counsel for the Respondent acknowledged that Lavigne does appear to expand the scope of "investigation" to cover both ongoing and future investigations. I now turn to assess whether release of the Final Report "could reasonably be expected to be injurious" to the conduct of future employment equity compliance review audits, as alleged by the Applicant.

[62]            As noted above, determining whether information should be exempted under paragraph 16(1)(c) - a discretionary exemption - involves considering two questions: first, whether the information in the Final Report falls within the ambit of paragraph 16(1)(c); and second, whether the head of the institution properly exercised his or her discretion. I will now consider the first question.

[63]            The Applicant argues that the Commission should have exercised its discretion under subparagraph 16(1)(c)(iii) and refused to release the Final Report because its disclosure could reasonably lead to a "chilling effect" on employers' willingness to freely volunteer confidential information to the Commission. In its memorandum, the Applicant claims that disclosing the Final Report could have the following detrimental effects on employers: (a) competitive prejudice; (b) furnishing of evidence that could be used against the employer in a human rights complaint or in other litigation; and (c) negative publicity. The Applicant contends that because of these potential detrimental effects, employers would "undoubtedly" become less co-operative with the Commission which would injure the Commission's ability to conduct its employment equity compliance review audits. According to the Applicant, the result would be that the Commission would have to resort to its coercive powers under section 23 of the EEA, which the Applicant says is inconsistent with subsection 22(2) of the EEA. Subsection 22(2) provides that the Commission should, wherever possible, resolve cases of non-compliance through persuasion and the negotiation of written undertakings.

[64]            In Lavigne, above, the Supreme Court of Canada held that to establish a reasonable basis for a non-disclosure exemption under paragraph 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act there must be a clear and direct connection between the disclosure of specific information and the injury that is alleged. The Supreme Court adopted the analysis of Justice John Richard in Information Commission v. Canada(Immigration and Refugee Board),(1997) 140 F.T.R. 140 (T.D.), where the learned judge stated at paragraph 43: "[t]he reasonable expectation of probable harm implies a confident belief." In my view, these principles are equally applicable to a discretionary exemption under paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA.

[65]            In the instant case, the Applicant provides no evidence to support its contention that employers, in general, and CIBC, in particular, would be less co-operative with the Commission if the Final Report were disclosed. The only evidence the Applicant refers to is the affidavit of Tom Proszowski, the Director of Employment Equity and Diversity at CIBC, sworn February 24, 2005. Mr. Proszowski states that disclosure of the Final Report would "reasonably be expected to cause probable harm" to CIBC's competitive position. Apart from the fact that Mr. Proszowski's evidence is speculative in nature, the Applicant does not indicate how the alleged harm to the CIBC's competitive position is clearly and directly connected to potential injury to the conduct of employment equity compliance review audits by the Commission.

[66]            In my opinion, the Applicant has failed to establish a confident belief or a reasonable basis for its assertion that disclosure of the Final Report could be injurious to future employment equity compliance review audits. It follows therefore that the information does not fall within the ambit of paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA. Given this finding there is no need to consider the second question in respect to the Commission's exercise of discretion under this provision. The inquiry ends here. In consequence, I find that there is no basis to exempt the Final Report under paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA.

ISSUE 5:         Is any of the information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(b)?

[67]            In order to establish that a mandatory exemption from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(b) is warranted, the Applicant must satisfy the four requirements set out in the provision; namely that:

            (1)         the information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical;

            (2)       the information is confidential;

            (3)       the information was supplied to the government institution by the third party, and

(4)         the information has been treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party.

Exempting information under the control of a government institution from disclosure is the exception to the general rule, and must only be done in limited and specific circumstances. The onus of proving that an exemption is justified lies with the Applicant. With respect to mandatory exemptions under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA, the only decision that needs to be made is the factual one of whether the information falls within the ambit of the exemption provision.

[68]            The Applicant states that it has no objection to the release of some of the information in the Final Report; namely, information that is already in the public domain, information resulting from compliance with requirements of the EEA, and opinions or recommendations of the Commission not drawn from information provided by the Applicant. However, the Applicant contends that significant portions of the Final Report should not be disclosed because the information meets all the criteria of paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. Along with its written submissions opposing disclosure, the Applicant had provided the Commission with a multi-colour highlighted version of the Final Report indicating the passages it asserts are exempt from disclosure under this mandatory exemption provision. That highlighted document is also before the Court. The information the Applicant claims must be redacted is colour-coded to correspond with one of the following categories of "sources of information" as defined by the Applicant:

a)       information about the CIBC's workforce analysis which the Applicant asserts is confidential under subsection 9(3) of the EEA;

b)       information from CIBC's employment systems review which the Applicant states was privately commissioned and paid for by CIBC;

c)       information provided by managers and employees of CIBC to the Commission's CRO during on-site visits;

d)       information that is particularly sensitive commercially; and

e)       information which is internal to CIBC.

Essentially, the Applicant contends that the highlighted portions of the Final Report are proprietary and confidential information provided by the Applicant to the Commission, and consequently is information that cannot be disclosed. The Applicant accepts that the non-highlighted information is not exempt because it is either: a) information in the public domain; b) the Commission's opinion; or c) recommendations not drawn from the information provided by the Applicant.

[69]            For its part, the Respondent acknowledges that the Final Report contains information belonging to the Applicant and information belonging to the Commission, along with some information which is already in the public domain. However, the Respondent characterizes the Final Report differently than does the Applicant. From the Respondent's perspective, the Final Report is the Commission's document not the Applicant's. The Respondent states that the content of the Final Report was written by the Commission's CRO and is drawn from information gathered during the employment equity compliance review audit process; namely:

            -            publicly available information regarding the Applicant;

            -            information obtained from the Commission's Questionnaire completed by the Applicant;

            -            information from the Applicant regarding its workforce survey and analysis;

            -            the Applicant's employment systems review and employment equity plan information; and

            -            information gathered through interviews with employees of the Applicant.

In its written submissions, the Respondent points to information regarding the Applicant's employment equity status and workforce data that is available in public documents, such as the annual employment equity reports which the Applicant must file pursuant to its obligations under section 18 of the EEA.

[70]            In the analysis that follows, I will examine the highlighted information in the Final Report and determine whether the information satisfies the requirements for exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b). I find that, save for a few exceptions, the highlighted information is not exempt under this mandatory provision. As will become clear in my reasons below, the Applicant has failed to establish that the highlighted information it seeks to redact from the Final Report meets all four requirements for exemption and, in particular, the objective test of confidentiality. The evidence proffered by the Applicant is unconvincing and in the end, the Applicant simply fails to meet its burden of proof.

1)       the information is commercial

[71]            The Applicant contends that all of the information sought to be exempted is internal human resources information of the Applicant and, as such, constitutes "commercial information" for the purposes of paragraph 20(1)(b). In Air Atonabee, above at page 268, Justice MacKay suggested that the dictionary was a good source for determining whether or not information is commercial. He wrote:

[...] In the circumstances, it seems to me that dictionary meanings provide the best guide and that it is sufficient for purposes of s. 20(1)(b) that the information relate or pertain to matters of finance, commerce, science or technical matters as those terms are commonly understood. [...]

In Canada(Information Commissioner) v. Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (1996), 109 F.T.R. 110 (T.D.), Justice Donna McGillis held, in the circumstances of the case before her, that the information at issue was commercial as it was gathered from the "commercial clients" of the Agency and pertained to their operations.

[...] given that the companies were commercial entities, information pertaining to their operations, including internal employment data, constitutes commercial information within the meaning of 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act.

In reversing the decision, the Federal Court of Appeal, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1723 (QL) (C.A.), did not take issue with the Trial Division's conclusion that human resources information fell within the category of "commercial" for the purposes of paragraph 20(1)(b).

[72]            The highlighted information in the Final Report relates for the most part to the Applicant's human resources. Specifically, the Final Report is centred on workforce information and information concerning the Applicant's employment policies and practices. I can think of no single element more important to a commercial enterprise and its operations than its human resources. I therefore find that the highlighted information in the Final Report to be "commercial" for the purpose of the exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b).

2)       the information is confidential

[73]            Whether or not information is confidential must be established on an objective standard. As Justice Barry Strayer held in OttawaFootball Club v. Canada(Minister of Fitness and Amateur Sports), [1989] 2 F.C. 480 (T.D.) at 487: "[...] it is not enough to state that their submission is confidential in order to make it so in an objective sense. Such a principle would surely undermine much of the purpose of this Act which in part is to make available to the public the information upon which government action is taken or refused." For example, that the Applicant and the Commission, up to the time the access request was made, may have treated the Final Report as confidential, is not sufficient to satisfy the confidentiality requirement of paragraph 20(1)(b).

[74]            In Air Atonabee, above at page 272, Justice MacKay, after reviewing the jurisprudence, re-stated the applicable test for confidentiality set out by Associate Chief Justice James Jerome in Montana Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1989] 1 F.C. 143 (T.D.). Justice MacKay wrote:

[...] This review leads me to consider the following as an elaboration of the formulation by Jerome A.C.J. in Montana, supra, that whether information is confidential will depend upon its content, its purposes and the circumstances in which it is compiled and communicated, namely:

(a)      that the content of the record be such that the information it contains is not available from sources otherwise accessible by the public or that could not be obtained by observation or independent study by a member of the public acting on his own ["not publicly available"],

(b)      that the information originate and be communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be disclosed ["reasonable expectation of non-disclosure"], and

(c)      that the information be communicated, whether required by law or supplied gratuitously, in a relationship between government and the party supplying it that is either a fiduciary relationship or one that is not contrary to the public interest, and which relationship will be fostered for public benefit by confidential communication ["public benefit"].

[75]            The above factors outlined by Justice MacKay in Air Atonabee are indicia to be considered in determining whether a given piece of information is of a confidential nature. The key in making this determination, as Justice MacKay notes, is to bear in mind the content, purpose and circumstances in which the information being requested is prepared and communicated. As stated above, the record in question in this case - the Final Report - came about as a result of the Commission, pursuant to its statutory obligations, conducting an investigation into and assessment of the Applicant's performance in meeting its employment equity obligations under law. The Final Report primarily consists of information in aggregate form drawn from various sources, most notably information provided by and gathered from the Applicant. With this in mind, I will now consider each of these three indicia of confidentiality in turn.

                                    a)          not publicly available

[76]            At the outset, it is useful to note that once information is in the public domain, it is no longer confidential even if its form is different. In Merck Frosst Canada & Co. v. Canada(Minister of Health), 2005 FCA 215; rev'g 2004 FC 959, Justice Alice Desjardins stated at paragraphs 2 and 3 that:

In our view, once the information is within the public domain, it is no longer confidential, even if it differs in form.

To rely on the form in which the information is presented in order to conclude that a document meets the criteria for the exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Act is necessarily contrary to the spirit of the Act and to the cases to date on this point (Air Atonabee Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1989] F.C.J. No. 453, page 15; Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health and Welfare), [1988] F.C.J. No. 290, page 4; Merck Frosst v. Minister of National Health, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1281, paragraph 9.) The important thing is the information. The form in which it is presented cannot preclude its disclosure.

[77]            In this case, the Applicant submits that none of the information in the Final Report that it has highlighted can be found in the public domain. The Applicant acknowledges that some information in the Final Report about its activities towards achieving employment equity and workforce data are provided in the EEA Annual Reports filed by the Applicant to the Minister and in CIBC's Public Accountability Statements, filed as a requirement under the Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46. These documents are accessible to the public.

[78]            However, the Applicant contends that those publicly available reports and the Final Report contain different information. First, the Applicant states that CIBC tailors the information to be included in the public reports so as to not disclose more than is required by statute. Second, the Applicant submits that the EEA Annual Reports and the Public Accountability Statements contain more general information than the detailed analysis of CIBC's employee and workforce data found in the Final Report. Third, the Applicant submits that EEA Annual Reports and the Public Accountability Statements contain little information about CIBC's future strategies, unlike the Final Report, which contains very detailed information about those strategies. Fourth, the Applicant states that the EEA Annual Reports and the Public Accountability Statements contain current information, unlike the Final Report, which is based on a May 31, 2000 workforce analysis and therefore is not an accurate reflection of current representation levels.

[79]            The Respondent, for its part, points to examples in the 2002 EEA Annual Report to illustrate that the highlighted information in the Final Report is available in the public domain.

[80]            A review of the documents in the records establishes that the following information is available in the public domain.

1)       The Applicant's 2001 Employment Equity Annual Report provides a table comparing the percentage of CIBC's permanent employees who are members of each designated group with their percentage in the workforce population, as well as a table listing the hiring, promotion and termination rates of members of the designated groups in 2000 and 2001. The Applicant also comments on qualitative measures taken by CIBC towards achieving employment equity, such as Diversity Month and a distinguished speakers' series. The Report also refers to CIBC's human resources policies, including its Workplace Accommodation Policy, Harassment Policy, and Global Hiring Policy, and states that those policies are permanently posted on CIBC's intranet site. The Applicant notes that its Chief Executive Officer, John Hankin, has added "accountability for employment equity" to his own performance assessment and has asked all of his direct reports to state their specific commitments to employment equity. The Applicant also acknowledges that it was chosen by the Commission for an employment equity compliance review audit and that the Applicant has submitted an employment systems review to the Commission, which includes an evaluation of CIBC's intake, developmental and promotion processes. The 2001 Report addresses the various initiatives related to members of the designated groups that CIBC has undertaken with respect to recruitment, training and development, promotion, retention, and accommodation. Finally, the Report sets out that one of the future plans of CIBC is to establish an organization-wide employment equity committee.

2)       In its 2002 Employment Equity Annual Report, in addition to commenting on its employment equity initiatives during that year, the Applicant states that CIBC plans to launch a three-year employment equity strategy that would include an aggressive series of initiatives aimed at achieving full representation of members of the designated groups.

3)       In its 2003 Employment Equity Annual Report, the Applicant notes that the compliance review audit is continuing and that CIBC has reached agreement with the Commission on a series of undertakings and a timeline for completion of these undertakings. The Report also states that its employment systems review submitted to the Commission formed the basis for CIBC's employment equity plan. In the Report, the Applicant refers to its future employment equity strategies, which include conducting a Workforce Representation Census, establishing an organization-wide employment equity committee with representatives from each strategic business unit, and recruiting members from the designated groups through its internal Employment Equity Agency.

4)       In its 2004 Annual Accountability Report, the Applicant states that CIBC is in compliance with all 12 requirements of the EEA. The Applicant also states its commitment to employment equity and its goal of achieving full representation by 2005. The Applicant refers to a number of policies it has implemented to address workplace, culture and behaviour issues respecting diversity. In the Report, the Applicant also states that CIBC has established an Employment Equity Agency that focuses on pre-employment training and is targeting in particular Aboriginal persons and persons with disabilities. The Report states that 102 new employees were hired through this initiative in 2004. Further, the Report notes that CIBC launched "Dialogues in Diversity" and established a National Employment Equity and Diversity Committee led by its Vice-President and Chief Risk Officer.

5)       Attached to the affidavit of the Respondent's affiant, Rhys Phillips, are tables of data about the Applicant's employees who are members of the designated groups. This data can be accessed on the website of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. This information was submitted to the Minister by the Applicant pursuant to its obligations under section 18 of the EEA. These tables contain very detailed data about each of the designated groups broken down according to such sub-categories as gender, salary, occupational groups, and province. The information in the tables concerns hirings, promotions and terminations, and the degree of representation of members of the designated groups.

[81]            It is apparent from the above review that significant information regarding the Applicant's operations in respect of employment equity matters is accessible in the public domain and that the Applicant itself has made that information public. Much of the workforce data in the Final Report, while presented differently than the information available from publicly accessible sources, is to a significant extent information that is essentially already available in the public domain. I recognize that in certain areas some information in the Final Report is not in the public domain, such as information about specific recruitment and hiring strategies. However, the fact that this information is not otherwise publicly accessible does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the information is confidential. The other indicia of confidentiality must be considered.

            b)       reasonable expectation of non-disclosure

[82]            I now turn to the second factor in Air Atonabee that the information originate and be communicated in a reasonable expectation of confidence that it will not be disclosed. The Applicant argues that all of the highlighted information was communicated to the Commission with the reasonable expectation of non-disclosure. The Applicant bases this expectation upon the statutory privilege in section 34 of the EEA which prohibits disclosure of the information collected by the Commission during the EEA audit without the Applicant's consent. In his affidavit, Tom Proszowski states the following:

At the time that CIBC provided the Exempt Information to the CHRC, we were aware both that the CHRC had statutory powers to require provision of that information but also that the CHRC was statutorily obliged to keep it confidential and not disclose it without CIBC consent. The Exempt Information was thus provided by CIBC to the CHRC with the reasonable expectation that it would be privileged and kept confidential.

[83]            I reject the Applicant's contention that its expectation that the Final Report would not be disclosed is reasonable. First, as stated earlier in these reasons, the confidentiality requirement in section 34 of the EEA is superseded by the Commission's obligations under the ATIA. Second, in any event, the evidence before the Court indicates that the Applicant knew or ought to have known that all of the information under the control of the Commission - such as the Final Report, including the documents the Applicant provided to the Commission during the compliance review audit - is subject to the disclosure requirements of the ATIA. In a letter dated August 29, 2000 advising the Applicant that it had been chosen for an employment equity compliance review audit, Brian Beaver, a Compliance Review Officer with the Commission, stated that he was enclosing a copy of the Commission's "Framework for Compliance Audits under the Employment Equity Act". Mr. Beaver's letter is attached to the affidavit of the Applicant's affiant, Tom Proszowski. As well as setting out the audit process and the assessment factors, the Framework Document provides information pertaining to the issue of confidentiality. The following passages are extracted from pages 15 and 16 of the Framework Document:

Section 34 of the Employment Equity Act requires information gathered as a result of compliance audits to be treated as confidential. Having said that, the Commission is also subject to the disclosure requirements of the Access to Information Act which take precedence over the stipulations of the Employment Equity Act.

[...]

Consequently, upon receiving a request under Access to Information, the Commission may be required to release any documents on file which do not contain personal information, trade secrets or other confidential business information. [...]

[84]            Given that the Applicant was made aware at the time the compliance review audit began that information provided to the Commission is subject to the ATIA, in my opinion, it cannot be said to be reasonable for the Applicant to have an expectation that such information would remain confidential pursuant to section 34 of the EEA and necessarily not be disclosed. The Applicant would have or should have known that the disclosure requirements of the ATIA override the confidentiality provision in the EEA. I therefore find, in the circumstances, that the Applicant's expectation that the Final Report would not be disclosed is ill-founded and therefore unreasonable.

            c)       public benefit

[85]            The Applicant argues that the public benefit to be fostered by ensuring that the highlighted information remains confidential is two-fold: first, to encourage self-identification by members of the designated groups; and second, to promote a full and frank exchange of information between employers subject to the EEA and the Commission.

[86]            With respect to encouraging self-identification, it is not disputed that when asked to participate in the survey, employees are given assurances by the Applicant that their individual information collected will be kept "strictly confidential" and only used by the Applicant to comply with its obligations under the EEA. Indeed, the information obtained through workforce surveys was provided by the Applicant to the Commission in aggregate form only. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the confidentiality of individual CIBC employees who have self-identified as members of a designated group has been breached. Still, the Applicant asserts that disclosure of the highlighted workforce information contained in the Final Report would discourage its employees who are members of a designated group from self-identifying as such in future employment equity workforce surveys by destroying the climate of trust and confidentiality.

[87]            I agree that there is a public benefit in having employees participate in employment equity surveys. It is also clear that should employees choose not to self-identify and therefore not participate in employment equity workforce surveys, because of concerns about confidentiality, this would be detrimental to the conduct of compliance review audits and to the goal of achieving employment equity. That said, the Applicant has adduced no evidence to support its contention that its employees would consider their confidentiality to have been violated if the highlighted information in the Final Report is released to the public. In fact, as I will expand on later, there is no evidence to establish that the Applicant's employees are under any impression that the aggregated workforce data contained in the Final Report would not be disclosed.

[88]            The Applicant's second argument is that public benefit is fostered in keeping the highlighted information in the Final Report confidential because doing so promotes a full and frank exchange of information between federal employers and the Commission. The Applicant argues that the guiding policy under subsection 22(2) of the EEA is that, wherever possible, the Commission is to enforce compliance with the EEA through persuasion and negotiation of written undertakings, rather than coercive measures provided for in the statute. The Applicant submits that this policy of co-operation is best promoted if employers are prepared to voluntarily disclose their confidential, proprietary information to the Commission.

[89]            While I acknowledge the existence of a public benefit in promoting a full and frank exchange of information between federal employers and the Commission, there is no public benefit to be fostered in accepting the proposition that the Applicant appears to be advancing. To accept that an employer subject to the EEA would likely not co-operate with an employment equity compliance review audit because the Final Report may be disclosed under the ATIA is, in my view, tantamount to condoning an unacceptable justification for an employer not complying with its obligations under the EEA. There is no public benefit to be gained in giving credence to such a proposition.

[90]            In considering the public interest in keeping information confidential, it is necessary to consider the purpose of the ATIA and the EEA. In its memorandum, the Respondent notes that both the ATIA and the EEA are quasi-constitutional in nature: see Canada(Attorney General) v. Canada(Information Commissioner), [2002] 3 F.C. 630 (T.D.) and Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571, respectively. I agree with the Respondent's submission that a broad and purposive approach should be taken in interpreting these statutes so as to best give effect to their purposes. As noted above, the purpose of the ATIA is to make available to the public information under the control of government institutions, except in limited and specific circumstances provided for in the ATIA; the purpose of EEA is to bring about equal representation in the workplace of members of designated groups. In my opinion, there is a public benefit in making transparent the performance of employers in meeting their statutory requirements under the EEA.

[91]            In Air Atonabee, above at page 274, Justice MacKay comments on the distinction between the public benefit that surrounds maintaining confidential documents which originated with a third party and communicated to the government institution in a reasonable expectation of confidentiality and the public benefit related to documents created by a government institution.

[...] Where the records are from department sources, not otherwise exempt from disclosure under section 20(1), the general purpose of the Act, which identifies as a public interest given priority by Parliament the provision of access to government controlled records, should be given effect unless the relationship between the third party and government is exceptional and warrants treating the records as confidential. Thus for records originating in departmental responsibilities, compiled by public officers at the public expense in this as in other regulatory regimes, unless there be reasons to support an exceptional conclusion that the public interest is better served by treating the records as confidential, the records would not be considered confidential for the purposes of the Act. [...]

In this case, the access requester does not seek disclosure of the documents provided by the Applicant to the Commission under section 34 of the EEA, such as the Applicant's internal workplace policies. Rather, as I have noted above, the document requested is the Final Report prepared by the Commission's CRO in which she considers the information gathered, in the context of the analytical framework used by the Commission in conducting an employment equity compliance review audit.

[92]            Upon considering the evidence and arguments before me and Justice MacKay's comments above, I am of the view that the relationship between the Applicant and the Respondent is not exceptional so as to warrant treating the Final Report as confidential. In my view, the Applicant has not established the existence of reasons to support the exceptional conclusion that the public interest is best served by treating the impugned records as confidential.

[93]            After a detailed and cautious review of the material, I find that the highlighted information in the Final Report, aside from two passages highlighted by the Applicant in red (on page 1 and page 30), does not meet the objective test and, in consequence, is not "confidential information" for the purposes of paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. Given the nature and content of the Final Report and the circumstances under which the information in the Final Report was prepared and communicated, I am of the view that the Applicant has failed to adequately demonstrate that the highlighted information - save a few passages I have noted - is of a confidential nature.

3)          information supplied to the Commission by the Applicant

[94]            In respect of this third criterion, I have no difficulty in concluding that the two specific passages I have determined above to be commercial and confidential is information that was also supplied to the Commission by the Applicant. Regarding the remainder of the highlighted information in the Final Report, while my finding with respect to confidentiality is determinative, I will nevertheless consider whether the information satisfies the third criterion under paragraph 20(1)(b).

[95]            The jurisprudence has established that just because a record is generated by the government institution does not automatically pull it outside the reach of section 20(1)(b). In Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCT 250; aff'd 2004 FCA 171, Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson held that if the record produced by a government institution contains information which was supplied by a third party, then the paragraph 20(1)(b) analysis applies only to those portions of the document. That said, in Air Atonabee, above at page 275, Justice MacKay stated that "[...] where a record consists of the comments and observations of public inspectors based on their review of the records maintained by the third party at least in part for inspection purposes, the principle established by Can. Packers Inc., supra, applies and the information is not to be considered as provided by the third party". In Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada(Minister of Agriculture), above at pages 54 to 55, the Federal Court of Appeal stated:

Paragraph 20(1)(b) relates not to all confidential information but only to that which has been "supplied to a government institution by a third party". Apart from the employee and volume information which the respondent intends to withhold, none of the information contained in the reports has been supplied by the appellant. The reports are, rather, judgments made by government inspectors on what they have themselves observed. In my view no other reasonable interpretation is possible, either of this paragraph or of the facts, and therefore paragraph 20(1)(b) is irrelevant in the cases at bar.

Further, in Merck Frosst, above at paragraph 6, Justice Desjardins held that a document prepared by an employee of a public authority in response to a request by a third party is not necessarily information supplied by the third party. Such a determination depends on the specific nature of the information in the document:

[6]      The trial judge could not find, either, that the reviewer's notes and correspondence between the parties should not have been communicated under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Act solely because they were written up in response to the respondent's [the third party's] request. The information contained in the reviewers' notes reflects certain information that does not emanate from the respondent, and the fact that these notes were written pursuant to the respondent's request does not affect this situation in any way (Canada Packers Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [1988] 1 F.C. 438, aff'd [1989] 1 F.C. 47).

[96]            In my view, the above jurisprudence sets out the following considerations for determining whether information is supplied by the third party:

1.       the specific nature of the information rather than its form must be considered;

2.       judgments expressed or conclusions drawn by government officials from observations made cannot be said to be information supplied by a third party; and

3.       if the record contains information which, in essence, is shown to be clearly and specifically information emanating from the third party, then paragraph 20(1)(b) may apply to those portions of the record.

[97]            It is true that much of the information upon which the Commission based the Final Report comes from the Applicant, but as I stated above, the content of the Final Report is essentially composed of the CRO's narrative about the audit process and her opinion as to the Applicant's compliance with its employment equity obligations. The Final Report essentially reviews and summarizes information gathered in respect of the Applicant's performance in relation to the Commission's analytical framework. In my opinion, information in the Final Report that reflects the CRO's assessment, judgment and recommendations with respect to the Applicant's compliance with its obligations under the EEA is not information that is supplied by the Applicant to the Commission. However, information in the Final Report which essentially documents the specific steps taken by the Applicant in bringing itself into compliance with its employment equity obligations is information that is supplied to the Commission by the Applicant.

[98]            Examples of information which I find to be supplied by the Applicant to the Commission are details about the Applicant's recruitment and selection of employees and its hiring process, found at pages 11 to 13 of the Final Report. This information is specific and clearly emanates from the Applicant; namely, from its employment systems review and its employment equity plan. Although the information is presented in the Final Report through the CRO's narrative summary, the information remains essentially unaltered from that supplied by the Applicant to the Commission. In the circumstances, it is also clear that the information can only emanate from the Applicant. As a result such information, wherever found in the Final Report, constitutes information that is supplied by the Applicant to the Commission.

[99]            Given my above finding that, with few exceptions, the Final Report is not confidential information, it is unnecessary to conduct a line by line review of the Final Report in respect to determining what information was supplied to the Commission by the Applicant. Suffice it to say that information in the Final Report which clearly emanates from the Applicant is information which satisfies this third criterion under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. Such a narrow construction is, in my view, consistent with the overriding purpose of the ATIA, which is to make information under the control of government institutions accessible to the public.

4)       information treated consistently as confidential

[100]        The final criterion under paragraph 20(1)(b) is that the highlighted information in the Final Report must have been treated consistently in a confidential manner by the Applicant. Information that has previously been disclosed or that has been made available to the public by the Applicant cannot satisfy this requirement. With respect to the two passages I have determined above to be commercial, confidential and supplied to the Commission by the Applicant, I accept that these passages meet this fourth requirement under paragraph 20(1)(b). Regarding the remainder of the information highlighted in the Final Report by the Applicant which I found not to be objectively confidential, I will now consider whether the information satisfies this fourth criterion.

[101]        As evidence that the Applicant has consistently treated the highlighted information as confidential, the Applicant points to its promise of confidentiality to employees participating in employment equity workplace surveys, a confidentiality clause in contracts with consultants hired to provide services in relation to the EEA compliance review audit, and its internal confidentiality and privacy policies.

[102]        The Applicant argues that much of the information it has highlighted in the Final Report as exempt from disclosure was derived from the workforce surveys mandated by subsection 9(1) of the EEA, and that pursuant to subsection 9(3), the Applicant is required to keep both individual information and all data derived from the surveys confidential. Subsection 9(3) states:

9. (3) Information collected by an employer under paragraph (1)(a) is confidential and shall be used only for the purpose of implementing the employer's obligations under this Act.

9. (3) Les renseignements recueillis par l'employeur dans le cadre de l'alinéa (1)a) sont confidentiels et ne peuvent être utilisés que pour permettre à l'employeur de remplir ses obligations dans le cadre de la présente loi.

In its "Workforce Census" conducted in June 2004, the Applicant informs its employees of the following with respect to confidentiality:

Information collected through this Census will be kept STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and will be used by the employment equity unit of CIBC's HR Policy & Governance Department to comply with our obligations under the Employment Equity Act. Your responses will be compiled in anonymous, aggregate form for employment equity purpose only. Your manager will NOT have access to your responses. (Emphasis in original.)

[103]        I agree that as a result of the above undertaking by the Applicant that its employees would expect their individual responses to the workforce surveys to remain confidential. However, there is nothing in the undertaking or the evidence before the Court to suggest that employees would expect the aggregate responses compiled from the workforce surveys to be kept confidential. Indeed, as mentioned above, aggregated workforce data are already publicly available through the annual workforce reports submitted to the Minister by the Applicant under the EEA. It therefore follows that the aggregate information gathered from the employment equity questionnaires completed by the Applicant's employees contained in the Final Report cannot be said to have been consistently treated as confidential by the Applicant.

[104]        The Applicant also contends that the confidentiality clause in the contract between the Applicant and consultants hired to provide services in relation to the EEA Audit is evidence that the Applicant has consistently treated the highlighted information in the Final Report as confidential. The confidentiality clause requires, among other things, that the consultants use confidential information solely for the purpose of performing the contracted services and that the consultants not disclose or reproduce confidential information provided by the Applicant. In his affidavit, Mr. Proszowski also cites the confidentiality clause in the employment agreements of full-time and part-time employees, the confidentiality and privacy clauses in the Applicant's "Code of Conduct", and the Applicant's "Employee Privacy Policy". The Applicant submits that these provisions are evidence that the Applicant considers employee information to be proprietary and confidential.

[105]        In general, I accept that the Applicant treats information about individual employees as confidential, and that the Applicant has also kept confidential the documents it provided to the Commission under section 34 of the EEA, such as its internal policies on dealing with hiring, accommodation and harassment, and its employment systems review and employment equity plan. I note though, that none of these documents are subject to the access request at issue. The request is for the Final Report. With respect to the highlighted information in the Final Report, I find that while much of the information has been consistently treated as confidential by the Applicant; some has not. For example, the Applicant has not kept confidential the fact that it was being audited by the Commission; this information was made public by the Applicant in its 2001 Employment Equity Annual Report, several years prior to the completion of the Final Report. As well, as I noted above, some of the measures the Applicant has undertaken towards meetings its employment equity obligations has been publicly stated by the Applicant. In summary, in respect to the impugned record, I find that the information that does not meet this fourth criterion for a mandatory exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) is that which corresponds with information the Applicant has already made public. I find that the remainder of the information highlighted in the Final Report has consistently been treated by the Applicant as confidential.

Conclusion

[106]        In my opinion, the Applicant has not met its burden of establishing that the highlighted information in the Final Report - save for a few passages - should not be disclosed by reason that it falls within the mandatory exemption of paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. I find that the public policy consideration that underlies the purpose of the ATIA - that government information should be available to the public - outweighs the evidence adduced by the Applicant in support of the exemption.

[107]        The exceptions to my above finding are two passages highlighted by the Applicant in red at pages 1 and 30 of the Final Report. In my opinion, the information in these passages qualify for an exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA because the information is commercial, was supplied by the Applicant to the Commission, and has consistently been treated by the Applicant in a confidential manner. I find also that the two passages satisfy the test of confidentiality because they are not available in the public domain, and is information not specifically relevant to one of the 12 categories of the analytical framework used by the Commission in conducting its employment equity compliance review audit. As such, I am of the view that disclosure of these two passages is not necessitated by public interest concerns; namely, holding employers accountable to meeting their requirements under the EEA.

[108]        In summary, I conclude that the highlighted information in the Final Report, except for the above noted passages, does not satisfy all of the requirements set out in paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA. Save for the two passages mentioned in the paragraph above as exempt from disclosure, I find that the Commission committed no reviewable error in determining that the exemption under paragraph 20(1)(b) did not apply in the circumstances of this case. On the evidence, I am of the view that the exemption was not warranted.

ISSUE 6:         Is information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(c)?

[109]        Paragraph 20(1)(c) provides for a mandatory exemption of information that could result in injury to a third party.

[110]        The jurisprudence establishes that a party relying on paragraph 20(1)(c) to resist disclosure of information must adduce evidence of harm that could reasonably be expected to be caused by the disclosure. The Federal Court of Appeal in Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. v. Canada(Minister of Supply and Services) (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 315, set the threshold at "probable harm" and also held that the burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities, rests with the Applicant. The Court of Appeal further stated that speculation or mere possibility does not meet the required standard. That is, the Applicant cannot meet its burden of proof by simply affirming by affidavit that disclosure would cause the requisite harm for the purposes of a paragraph 20(1)(c) exemption. Additional evidence is needed to establish probable harm: see SNC-Lavelin Inc. v. Canada(Minister of Public Works)(1994), 79 F.T.R. 113 (T.D.); and Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. National Capital Commission, [1998] F.C.J. No. 676 (QL) (T.D.).

[111]        The Applicant submits that the information in the Final Report that it has highlighted as originating from CIBC's workforce analysis, employment systems review or other internal sources is exempt under paragraph 20(1)(c) from disclosure. In support of its contention that the release of the Final Report could reasonably be expected to cause probable harm to CIBC's competitive position, the Applicant adduces the evidence of Tom Proszowski. In his affidavit, Mr. Proszowski deposes that CIBC is engaged in intense competition within the Canadian financial services industry to attract the best employees, especially among those in the designated groups. He states that CIBC's competitors are constantly trying to lure away its employees and that in fact, CIBC has had the experience of job candidates from designated groups in its pre-employment program being hired away by its competitors. Finally, Mr. Proszowski states that the "probable result" of disclosure of the Final Report is a decrease in employee participation in employment equity surveys which would result in material financial loss to the Applicant in the form of additional expenses being incurred to survey employees.

[112]        Mr. Proszowski states that disclosure of the Final Report could reasonably harm CIBC's competitive position because its competitors:

a)                   would learn of the Applicant's greatest gaps in achieving full representation and target their own strategies accordingly;

b)                   would learn of the Applicant's strategies in closing the under-representation gaps and implement strategies to counter those of the Applicant; and

c)                   are likely to adopt the Applicant's employment equity initiatives that were conceived and designed by contractors hired and paid for by the Applicant.

Mr. Proszowski attests to the amount of money CIBC spent on consultants' fees in connection with its employment systems review reports and employment equity plan. He states that disclosing CIBC's employment equity strategies and initiatives contained in the Final Report would put CIBC at a competitive disadvantage and would allow CIBC's competitors to "ride its coattails" without investing the same resources as CIBC has, resulting in a financial loss for CIBC and a financial gain for its competitors.

[113]        The Applicant submits that establishing a direct causal link between the disclosure of information in the Final Report and probable harm to CIBC is unnecessary to meet the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(c). While this may be so, in my opinion, the Applicant has not shown that there is any link between the disclosure of information in the Final Report and probability of harm to CIBC.

[114]        The Applicant provides no evidence except for Mr. Proszowski's speculative assertions that CIBC would have difficulty attracting the best employees especially among those in the designated groups. Further, aside from Mr. Proszowski's statements, the Applicant fails to direct the Court to any evidence that would support its contention that CIBC employees would be less likely to participate in employment equity surveys if the Final Report were disclosed under the ATIA.

[115]        With respect to the Applicant's contention that its competitors would likely adopt CIBC's employment equity strategies and initiatives if they found out about them from the Final Report, the evidence is insufficient. First, the Applicant does not point to any specific employment equity strategies initiated by CIBC and included in the Final Report that would be of interest to its competitors. In my view, the Final Report does not provide much detail about any of CIBC's employment equity activities; the information is quite general. For example, nothing in the Final Report indicates how much money CIBC spent on its employment equity initiatives or what marketing strategies CIBC plans on using to attract job candidates from among members of the designated groups. Second, the Applicant does not adduce any evidence as to whether or how CIBC's competitors would use the information in the Final Report for their own material financial gain to the detriment of the Applicant. Attached to Mr. Proszowski's affidavit are several academic articles as well as a speech given by a senior manager with one of CIBC's competitors about the value of diversity in the workplace. While I do not dispute the benefits of diversity, I do not see, on the evidence before me, how knowing about CIBC's general employment equity strategies would bring about "obvious financial advantage" to CIBC's competitors. I further note that as federally regulated banks, the Applicant's competitors would themselves be subject to the same requirements under the EEA. In fact, Mr. Proszowski's evidence indicates that CIBC's competitors have been or are being audited by the Commission. At paragraph 24 of his affidavit, he states:

I verily believe that the other major Canadian chartered banks also received notices that they would be subject of the same type of audit in or about June 2000 except for the Toronto-Dominion Bank, whose audit was postponed for a period after its merger with Canada Trust.

It is likely, then, that CIBC's competitors have also expensed their own monies in order to bring themselves into compliance with the EEA, such as the production of employment systems review reports and employment equity plans and by surveying their employees. There is no evidence to support the Applicant's contention that CIBC's competitors are waiting for the release of the Final Report so they can "ride on the coattails" of the Applicant.

[116]        In my view, the evidence adduced by the Applicant falls short of establishing that it would suffer any material financial loss or that there is a reasonable expectation of harm to its competitive position if the Final Report is disclosed. As a result, I conclude that the Applicant has not satisfied the exigencies of the mandatory exemption under paragraph 20(1)(c) of the ATIA.

ISSUE 7:          Is information in the Final Report exempt from disclosure under section 19?

[117]        Section 19 of the ATIA provides a mandatory exemption for records that constitute "personal information".

[118]        Under section 3 of the Privacy Act, personal information is defined as information about an "identifiable individual" that is recorded in any form. The following are examples of personal information listed in section 3:

i.          information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, age or marital status of an individual;

ii.          information relating to the criminal, medical or employment history of the individual; and

iii.         personal opinions or views of the individual [except in certain circumstances].

[119]        In Dagg v. Canada(Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the interplay between the ATIA and the Privacy Act. At page 426, Justice Gérard La Forest, in dissent but with the majority concurring on this point, wrote that:

[...] Personal information is thus specifically exempted from the general rule of disclosure. Both statutes recognize that, in so far as it is encompassed by the definition of "personal information" in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, privacy is paramount over access.

[120]        The learned judge, at page 436 of his reasons, provides further guidance for the interpretive exercise of determining what constitutes "personal information":

As noted by Jerome A.C.J. in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada(Solicitor General), [[1988] 3 F.C. 551 (T.D.)], at p. 557, the language of this section is "deliberately broad" and "entirely consistent with the great pains that have been taken to safeguard individual identity". Its intent seems to be to capture any information about a specific person, subject only to specific exceptions [...] Such an interpretation accords with the plain language of the statute, its legislative history and the privileged, foundational position of privacy interests in our social and legal culture. (Underlined in the original.)

[121]        The Applicant here asserts that a paragraph found at pages 14 and 15 of the Final Report satisfies the criteria of personal information of an identifiable individual, as defined by the Privacy Act and the jurisprudence. Specifically, the Applicant submits that the passage contains personal opinions of a group of visible minority senior managers who, because the total number of such managers numbered only seven at the time, are "reasonably identifiable". As a consequence, the Applicant submits that the paragraph must be redacted from the Final Report pursuant to section 19 of the ATIA.

[122]        The Applicant also argues that certain data in Appendix "A" of the Final Report, listing the number of persons from each designated group in the different occupational groups of CIBC, are personal information of identifiable individuals where the total number of persons is 20 or less. The Applicant submits that because of the small number, the individuals are identifiable, and because the information is about membership in a designated group and job classification, the information is personal information. As a consequence, the Applicant states, this data must be exempted from disclosure.

[123]        In my opinion, neither the paragraph at pages 14 and 15 of the Final Report nor the referenced data in Appendix "A" falls within the ambit of the mandatory exemption under section 19 of the ATIA.

[124]        With respect to the paragraph at pages 14 and 15 of the Final Report, there is no question that "personal opinions" may qualify as personal information under section 3 of the Privacy Act if the opinions can be attributed to an identifiable individual. In this present case, I am of the view that the "opinion" expressed in the impugned passage cannot be linked to any specific individual; rather, they appear to represent a collective opinion of a group of visible minority senior managers who have self-identified as such for the purpose of the employment equity compliance review audit. The Final Report reveals neither the number of visible minority senior managers interviewed for the "opinion" nor the total number of visible minority senior managers in the employ of the Applicant. In my opinion, the information in the passage is insufficient to reveal the identity of the speaker or speakers, even if the total number of visible minority senior managers working at CIBC at the time was small. Since the opinion cannot be attributed to any identifiable individual, the paragraph at pages 14 and 15 of the Final Report does not qualify for a mandatory exemption under section 19 of the ATIA.

[125]        As for the information in Appendix "A" of the Final Report, I am of the same view. Aside from the fact noted earlier in these reasons that detailed employment data of the Applicant are available in the public domain, it seems to me that to be able to extrapolate the identity of any specific employee from the table in Appendix "A" requires additional information about CIBC's employees that is not contained in the Final Report. In my opinion, this is not a case where information about small group constitutes personal information of identifiable individuals.

[126]        As a result, I find that the Final Report does not contain any personal information within the meaning of the Privacy Act that is exempted under section 19 of the ATIA and which must be redacted before any disclosure of the Final Report.

ISSUE 8:          If any part of the Final Report is exempted, can the non-exempt information be reasonably severed and disclosed?

[127]        Given my above determinations that only two passages in the Final Report are exempt from disclosure, I find that there is no difficulty in severing the non-exempt information from the exempted information. As a result, the Final Report can be disclosed in its entirety - save the portions exempted by the Court; namely, the two passages highlighted in red by the Applicant found at pages 1 and 30 of the Final Report - under section 25 of the ATIA.

ISSUE 9:         Is the Applicant entitled to costs on a solicitor-client basis?

[128]        Costs in applications for judicial review under section 44 of the ATIA may be awarded at the discretion of the Court. Section 53 provides that:

53. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Court under this Act shall be in the discretion of the Court and shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise. (2) Where the Court is of the opinion that an application for review under section 41 or 42 has raised an important new principle in relation to this Act, the Court shall order that costs be awarded to the applicant even if the applicant has not been successful in the result.

53. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), les frais et dépens sont laissés à l'appréciation de la Cour et suivent, sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, le sort du principal. (2) Dans les cas où elle estime que l'objet des recours visés aux articles 41 et 42 a soulevé un principe important et nouveau quant à la présente loi, la Cour accorde les frais et dépens à la personne qui a exercé le recours devant elle, même si cette personne a été déboutée de son recours.

The Respondent has been substantially successful and will therefore have costs assessed in accordance with the middle of Column III of Tariff B of the Federal Courts Rules. As I am of the opinion that this application raises no new principle in relation to the ATIA, I will not exercise my discretion and award costs to the Applicant.

[129]        In its amended notice of application, the Applicant specifically requests costs on a solicitor-client basis. Although I decline to award any costs to the Applicant, I note that even had the Applicant been successful in this application, there is no evidence here of any misconduct on the part of the Commission that would warrant awarding costs on a solicitor-client basis.

9.          Conclusion

[130]        I have carefully reviewed the Final Report - the impugned record in this proceeding - with the view of determining whether any information in the Final Report is exempt from disclosure under either the mandatory or discretionary exemption provisions of the ATIA. In considering the exceptions to the right of access in the circumstances of this case, I have interpreted the statutory provisions in a manner I believe to be consistent with the purpose of the EEA, the ATIA and the jurisprudence. Exemptions to the right of access are to be available only in limited and specific circumstances. In the result, I conclude that, except for two passages which I find to be exempt under paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA and which will be specifically provided for in the order below, the remainder of the information in the Final Report is not exempt from disclosure and may be disclosed.

[131]        For the above reasons, I would answer the issues raised in this application as follows:

Issue 1:              The Commission's decision is not void even though no written request was made for access to the Final Report.

                       

Issue 2:              The Final Report is "under the control" of the Commission and thus subject to the ATIA.

                       

Issue 3:              The Commission did not breach the principles of procedural fairness. The Applicant was provided with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the disclosure proceeding.

Issue 4:             There is no basis to exempt the Final Report under paragraph 16(1)(c) of the ATIA.

                       

Issue 5:              Save for two passages which are exempt, the remainder of the Final Report is not exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(b).

                       

Issue 6:             No information in the Final Report is exempt from disclosure under paragraph 20(1)(c).

                       

Issue 7:             No information in the Final Report is exempt from disclosure under section 19.

                       

Issue 8:             The non-exempt information can be reasonably severed from the information exempted under paragraph 20(1)(b), and can be disclosed pursuant to section 25 of the ATIA.

                       

Issue 9:             Given the result, the Applicant is not entitled to costs on the application, nor would the Applicant be entitled to costs on a solicitor-client basis had the Applicant been successful. The Respondent has been substantially successful and will therefore have costs.

[132]        The affidavits and documents contained in the records and filed on a confidential basis shall remain sealed.

ORDER

            THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1.          The application is allowed in part;

2.          Thepassages identified by the Applicant in red highlighting at pages 1 and 30 of the Final Report are exempted from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(b) of the ATIA;

3.                   The remaining information in the Final Report may be reasonably severed from the exempt information and is to be disclosed; and

4.                   Costs are awarded to the Respondent to be assessed in accordance with the middle of Column III of Tariff B of the Federal Courts Rules.

5.         The affidavits and documents contained in the records and filed on a confidential basis shall remain sealed.

"Edmond P. Blanchard"

SCHEDULE A

Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1

Loi sur l'accès à l'information, L.R. 1985, ch. A-1

Purpose 2. (1) The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to provide a right of access to information in records under the control of a government institution in accordance with the principles that government information should be available to the public, that necessary exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government.     (2) This Act is intended to complement and not replace existing procedures for access to government information and is not intended to limit in any way access to the type of government information that is normally available to the general public. Right to access to records 4. (1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is (a) a Canadian citizen, or (b) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution.    (2) The Governor in Council may, by order, extend the right to be given access to records under subsection (1) to include persons not referred to in that subsection and may set such conditions as the Governor in Council deems appropriate.     (3) For the purposes of this Act, any record requested under this Act that does not exist but can, subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by regulation, be produced from a machine readable record under the control of a government institution using computer hardware and software and technical expertise normally used by the government institution shall be deemed to be a record under the control of the government institution. Request for access to record 6. A request for access to a record under this Act shall be made in writing to the government institution that has control of the record and shall provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the institution with a reasonable effort to identify the record. Law enforcement and investigations 16. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains (a) information obtained or prepared by any government institution, or part of any government institution, that is an investigative body specified in the regulations in the course of lawful investigations pertaining to (i) the detection, prevention or suppression of crime, (ii) the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province, or (iii) activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, if the record came into existence less than twenty years prior to the request; (b) information relating to investigative techniques or plans for specific lawful investigations; (c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information (i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation, (ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or (iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or (d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security of penal institutions.       (2) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information that could reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information (a) on criminal methods or techniques; (b) that is technical information relating to weapons or potential weapons; or (c) on the vulnerability of particular buildings or other structures or systems, including computer or communication systems, or methods employed to protect such buildings or other structures or systems.      (3) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information that was obtained or prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing policing services for a province or municipality pursuant to an arrangement made under section 20 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, where the Government of Canada has, on the request of the province or municipality agreed not to disclose such information.     (4) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(b) and (c), "investigation" means an investigation that (a) pertains to the administration or enforcement of an Act of Parliament; (b) is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or (c) is within a class of investigations specified in the regulations. Personal information 19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act.     (2) The head of a government institution may disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information if (a) the individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure; (b) the information is publicly available; or (c) the disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act. Third party Information 20. (1) Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains (a) trade secrets of a third party; (b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is confidential information supplied to a government institution by a third party and is treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party; (c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of, a third party; or (d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third party. Statutory prohibitions against disclosure 24. (1) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information the disclosure of which is restricted by or pursuant to any provision set out in Schedule II.      (2) Such committee as may be designated or established under section 75 shall review every provision set out in Schedule II and shall, not later than July 1, 1986 or, if Parliament is not then sitting, on any of the first fifteen days next thereafter that Parliament is sitting, cause a report to be laid before Parliament on whether and to what extent the provisions are necessary. Severability 25. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where a request is made to a government institution for access to a record that the head of the institution is authorized to refuse to disclose under this Act by reason of information or other material contained in the record, the head of the institution shall disclose any part of the record that does not contain, and can reasonably be severed from any part that contains, any such information or material. Notice to third parties 27. (1) Where the head of a government institution intends to disclose any record requested under this Act, or any part thereof, that contains or that the head of the institution has reason to believe might contain (a) trade secrets of a third party, (b) information described in paragraph 20(1)(b) that was supplied by a third party, or (c) information the disclosure of which the head of the institution could reasonably foresee might effect a result described in paragraph 20(1)(c) or (d) in respect of a third party, the head of the institution shall, subject to subsection (2), if the third party can reasonably be located, within thirty days after the request is received, give written notice to the third party of the request and of the fact that the head of the institution intends to disclose the record or part thereof.     (2) Any third party to whom a notice is required to be given under subsection (1) in respect of an intended disclosure may waive the requirement, and where the third party has consented to the disclosure the third party shall be deemed to have waived the requirement.     (3) A notice given under subsection (1) shall include (a) a statement that the head of the government institution giving the notice intends to release a record or a part thereof that might contain material or information described in subsection (1); (b) a description of the contents of the record or part thereof that, as the case may be, belong to, were supplied by or relate to the third party to whom the notice is given; and (c) a statement that the third party may, within twenty days after the notice is given, make representations to the head of the government institution that has control of the record as to why the record or part thereof should not be disclosed.     (4) The head of a government institution may extend the time limit set out in subsection (1) in respect of a request under this Act where the time limit set out in section 7 is extended under paragraph 9(1)(a) or (b) in respect of the same request, but any extension under this subsection shall be for a period no longer than the period of the extension under section 9. Third party intervention 28. (1) Where a notice is given by the head of a government institution under subsection 27(1) to a third party in respect of a record or a part thereof, (a) the third party shall, within twenty days after the notice is given, be given the opportunity to make representations to the head of the institution as to why the record or the part thereof should not be disclosed; and (b) the head of the institution shall, within thirty days after the notice is given, if the third party has been given an opportunity to make representations under paragraph (a), make a decision as to whether or not to disclose the record or the part thereof and give written notice of the decision to the third party.     (2) Representations made by a third party under paragraph (1)(a) shall be made in writing unless the head of the government institution concerned waives that requirement, in which case they may be made orally.     (3) A notice given under paragraph (1)(b) of a decision to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof shall include (a) a statement that the third party to whom the notice is given is entitled to request a review of the decision under section 44 within twenty days after the notice is given; and      (b) a statement that the person who requested access to the record will be given access thereto or to the part thereof unless, within twenty days after the notice is given, a review of the decision is requested under section 44.     (4) Where, pursuant to paragraph (1)(b), the head of a government institution decides to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof, the head of the institution shall give the person who made the request access to the record or the part thereof forthwith on completion of twenty days after a notice is given under that paragraph, unless a review of the decision is requested under section 44. Third party may apply for a review 44. (1) Any third party to whom the head of a government institution is required under paragraph 28(1)(b) or subsection 29(1) to give a notice of a decision to disclose a record or a part thereof under this Act may, within twenty days after the notice is given, apply to the Court for a review of the matter.     (2) The head of a government institution who has given notice under paragraph 28(1)(b) or subsection 29(1) that a record requested under this Act or a part thereof will be disclosed shall forthwith on being given notice of an application made under subsection (1) in respect of the disclosure give written notice of the application to the person who requested access to the record.     (3) Any person who has been given notice of an application for a review under subsection (2) may appear as a party to the review. Review by the Federal Court 49. Where the head of a government institution refuses to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof on the basis of a provision of this Act not referred to in section 50, the Court shall, if it determines that the head of the institution is not authorized to refuse to disclose the record or part thereof, order the head of the institution to disclose the record or part thereof, subject to such conditions as the Court deems appropriate, to the person who requested access to the record, or shall make such other order as the Court deems appropriate. 50. Where the head of a government institution refuses to disclose a record requested under this Act or a part thereof on the basis of section 14 or 15 or paragraph 16(1)(c) or (d) or 18(d), the Court shall, if it determines that the head of the institution did not have reasonable grounds on which to refuse to disclose the record or part thereof, order the head of the institution to disclose the record or part thereof, subject to such conditions as the Court deems appropriate, to the person who requested access to the record, or shall make such other order as the Court deems appropriate. 51. Where the Court determines, after considering an application under section 44, that the head of a government institution is required to refuse to disclose a record or part of a record, the Court shall order the head of the institution not to disclose the record or part thereof or shall make such other order as the Court deems appropriate. Costs 53. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Court under this Act shall be in the discretion of the Court and shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise.         (2) Where the Court is of the opinion that an application for review under section 41 or 42 has raised an important new principle in relation to this Act, the Court shall order that costs be awarded to the applicant even if the applicant has not been successful in the result.

Objet 2. (1) La présente loi a pour objet d'élargir l'accès aux documents de l'administration fédérale en consacrant le principe du droit du public à leur communication, les exceptions indispensables à ce droit étant précises et limitées et les décisions quant à la communication étant susceptibles de recours indépendants du pouvoir exécutif.      (2) La présente loi vise à compléter les modalités d'accès aux documents de l'administration fédérale; elle ne vise pas à restreindre l'accès aux renseignements que les institutions fédérales mettent normalement à la disposition du grand public. Droit d'accès 4. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l'accès aux documents relevant d'une institution fédérale et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur demande : a) les citoyens canadiens; b) les résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés.     (2) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par décret, étendre, conditionnellement ou non, le droit d'accès visé au paragraphe (1) à des personnes autres que celles qui y sont mentionnées.      (3) Pour l'application de la présente loi, les documents qu'il est possible de préparer à partir d'un document informatisé relevant d'une institution fédérale sont eux-mêmes considérés comme relevant de celle-ci, même s'ils n'existent pas en tant que tels au moment où ils font l'objet d'une demande de communication. La présente disposition ne vaut que sous réserve des restrictions réglementaires éventuellement applicables à la possibilité de préparer les documents et que si l'institution a normalement à sa disposition le matériel, le logiciel et les compétences techniques nécessaires à la préparation. Demandes de communication 6. La demande de communication d'un document se fait par écrit auprès de l'institution fédérale dont relève le document; elle doit être rédigée en des termes suffisamment précis pour permettre à un fonctionnaire expérimenté de l'institution de trouver le document sans problèmes sérieux. Enquêtes 16. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents : a) datés de moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et contenant des renseignements obtenus ou préparés par une institution fédérale, ou par une subdivision d'une institution, qui constitue un organisme d'enquête déterminé par règlement, au cours d'enquêtes licites ayant trait : (i) à la détection, la prévention et la répression du crime, (ii) aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales, (iii) aux activités soupçonnées de constituer des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada au sens de la Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité; b) contenant des renseignements relatifs à des techniques d'enquêtes ou à des projets d'enquêtes licites déterminées; c) contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales ou au déroulement d'enquêtes licites, notamment : (i) des renseignements relatifs à l'existence ou à la nature d'une enquête déterminée, (ii) des renseignements qui permettraient de remonter à une source de renseignements confidentielle, (iii) des renseignements obtenus ou préparés au cours d'une enquête; d) contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire à la sécurité des établissements pénitentiaires.      (2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents contenant des renseignements dont la communication risquerait vraisemblablement de faciliter la perpétration d'infractions, notamment : a) des renseignements sur les méthodes ou techniques utilisées par les criminels; b) des renseignements techniques concernant des armes actuelles ou futures; c) des renseignements portant sur la vulnérabilité de certains bâtiments ou ouvrages ou de réseaux ou systèmes divers, y compris des réseaux ou systèmes informatisés ou de communications, ou portant sur les méthodes employées pour leur protection.      (3) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication des documents contenant des renseignements obtenus ou préparés par la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, dans l'exercice de fonctions de police provinciale ou municipale qui lui sont conférées par une entente conclue sous le régime de l'article 20 de la Loi sur la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, si, à la demande de la province ou de la municipalité, le gouvernement du Canada a consenti à ne pas divulguer ces renseignements.     (4) Pour l'application des alinéas (1)b) et c), « enquête » s'entend de celle qui : a) se rapporte à l'application d'une loi fédérale; b) est autorisée sous le régime d'une loi fédérale; c) fait partie d'une catégorie d'enquêtes précisée dans les règlements. Renseignements personnels 19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication de documents contenant les renseignements personnels visés à l'article 3 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels.     (2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut donner communication de documents contenant des renseignements personnels dans les cas où : a) l'individu qu'ils concernent y consent; b) le public y a accès; c) la communication est conforme à l'article 8 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Renseignements de Tiers 20. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu, sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, de refuser la communication de documents contenant : a) des secrets industriels de tiers; b) des renseignements financiers, commerciaux, scientifiques ou techniques fournis à une institution fédérale par un tiers, qui sont de nature confidentielle et qui sont traités comme tels de façon constante par ce tiers; c) des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de causer des pertes ou profits financiers appréciables à un tiers ou de nuire à sa compétitivité; d) des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement d'entraver des négociations menées par un tiers en vue de contrats ou à d'autres fins. Interdictions fondées sur d'autres lois 24. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication de documents contenant des renseignements dont la communication est restreinte en vertu d'une disposition figurant à l'annexe II.      (2) Le comité prévu à l'article 75 examine toutes les dispositions figurant à l'annexe II et dépose devant le Parlement un rapport portant sur la nécessité de ces dispositions, ou sur la mesure dans laquelle elles doivent être conservées, au plus tard le 1er juillet 1986, ou, si le Parlement ne siège pas, dans les quinze premiers jours de séance ultérieurs. Prélèvements 25. Le responsable d'une institution fédérale, dans les cas où il pourrait, vu la nature des renseignements contenus dans le document demandé, s'autoriser de la présente loi pour refuser la communication du document, est cependant tenu, nonobstant les autres dispositions de la présente loi, d'en communiquer les parties dépourvues des renseignements en cause, à condition que le prélèvement de ces parties ne pose pas de problèmes sérieux. Avis aux tiers 27. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d'une institution fédérale qui a l'intention de donner communication totale ou partielle d'un document est tenu de donner au tiers intéressé, dans les trente jours suivant la réception de la demande, avis écrit de celle-ci ainsi que de son intention, si le document contient ou s'il est, selon lui, susceptible de contenir : a) soit des secrets industriels d'un tiers; b) soit des renseignements visés à l'alinéa 20(1)b) qui ont été fournis par le tiers; c) soit des renseignements dont la communication risquerait, selon lui, d'entraîner pour le tiers les conséquences visées aux alinéas 20(1)c) ou d). La présente disposition ne vaut que s'il est possible de rejoindre le tiers sans problèmes sérieux.     (2) Le tiers peut renoncer à l'avis prévu au paragraphe (1) et tout consentement à la communication du document vaut renonciation à l'avis.     (3) L'avis prévu au paragraphe (1) doit contenir les éléments suivants : a) la mention de l'intention du responsable de l'institution fédérale de donner communication totale ou partielle du document susceptible de contenir les secrets ou les renseignements visés au paragraphe (1); b) la désignation du contenu total ou partiel du document qui, selon le cas, appartient au tiers, a été fourni par lui ou le concerne; c) la mention du droit du tiers de présenter au responsable de l'institution fédérale de qui relève le document ses observations quant aux raisons qui justifieraient un refus de communication totale ou partielle, dans les vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis.     (4) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut proroger le délai visé au paragraphe (1) dans les cas où le délai de communication à la personne qui a fait la demande est prorogé en vertu des alinéas 9(1)a) ou b), mais le délai ne peut dépasser celui qui a été prévu pour la demande en question. Intervention de tiers 28. (1) Dans les cas où il a donné avis au tiers conformément au paragraphe 27(1), le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu : a) de donner au tiers la possibilité de lui présenter, dans les vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis, des observations sur les raisons qui justifieraient un refus de communication totale ou partielle du document; b) de prendre dans les trente jours suivant la transmission de l'avis, pourvu qu'il ait donné au tiers la possibilité de présenter des observations conformément à l'alinéa a), une décision quant à la communication totale ou partielle du document et de donner avis de sa décision au tiers.     (2) Les observations prévues à l'alinéa (1)a) se font par écrit, sauf autorisation du responsable de l'institution fédérale quant à une présentation orale.     (3) L'avis d'une décision de donner communication totale ou partielle d'un document conformément à l'alinéa (1)b) doit contenir les éléments suivants : a) la mention du droit du tiers d'exercer un recours en révision en vertu de l'article 44, dans les vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis; b) la mention qu'à défaut de l'exercice du recours en révision dans ce délai, la personne qui a fait la demande recevra communication totale ou partielle du document.     (4) Dans les cas où il décide, en vertu de l'alinéa (1)b), de donner communication totale ou partielle du document à la personne qui en a fait la demande, le responsable de l'institution fédérale donne suite à sa décision dès l'expiration des vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis prévu à cet alinéa, sauf si un recours en révision a été exercé en vertu de l'article 44. Recours en révision du tiers 44. (1) Le tiers que le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu, en vertu de l'alinéa 28(1)b) ou du paragraphe 29(1), d'aviser de la communication totale ou partielle d'un document peut, dans les vingt jours suivant la transmission de l'avis, exercer un recours en révision devant la Cour.     (2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale qui a donné avis de communication totale ou partielle d'un document en vertu de l'alinéa 28(1)b) ou du paragraphe 29(1) est tenu, sur réception d'un avis de recours en révision de cette décision, d'en aviser par écrit la personne qui avait demandé communication du document.         (3) La personne qui est avisée conformément au paragraphe (2) peut comparaître comme partie à l'instance. Révision par la Cour fédérale 49. La Cour, dans les cas où elle conclut au bon droit de la personne qui a exercé un recours en révision d'une décision de refus de communication totale ou partielle d'un document fondée sur des dispositions de la présente loi autres que celles mentionnées à l'article 50, ordonne, aux conditions qu'elle juge indiquées, au responsable de l'institution fédérale dont relève le document en litige d'en donner à cette personne communication totale ou partielle; la Cour rend une autre ordonnance si elle l'estime indiqué. 50. Dans les cas où le refus de communication totale ou partielle du document s'appuyait sur les articles 14 ou 15 ou sur les alinéas 16(1)c) ou d) ou 18d), la Cour, si elle conclut que le refus n'était pas fondé sur des motifs raisonnables, ordonne, aux conditions qu'elle juge indiquées, au responsable de l'institution fédérale dont relève le document en litige d'en donner communication totale ou partielle à la personne qui avait fait la demande; la Cour rend une autre ordonnance si elle l'estime indiqué. 51. La Cour, dans les cas où elle conclut, lors d'un recours exercé en vertu de l'article 44, que le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication totale ou partielle d'un document, lui ordonne de refuser cette communication; elle rend une autre ordonnance si elle l'estime indiqué. Frais et dépens 53. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), les frais et dépens sont laissés à l'appréciation de la Cour et suivent, sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, le sort du principal.     (2) Dans les cas où elle estime que l'objet des recours visés aux articles 41 et 42 a soulevé un principe important et nouveau quant à la présente loi, la Cour accorde les frais et dépens à la personne qui a exercé le recours devant elle, même si cette personne a été déboutée de son recours.

Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44

Loi sur l'équité en matière d'emploi 1995, ch. 44

Purpose 2. The purpose of this Act is to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfillment of that goal, to correct the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to the principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences. Designated groups 3. "designated groups" means women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities; Private sector employer 3. "private sector employer" means any person who employs one hundred or more employees on or in connection with a federal work, undertaking or business as defined in section 2 of the Canada Labour Code and includes any corporation established to perform any function or duty on behalf of the Government of Canada that employs one hundred or more employees, but does not include (a) a person who employs employees on or in connection with a work, undertaking or business of a local or private nature in Yukon, the Northwest Territories or Nunavut, or (b) a departmental corporation as defined in section 2 of the Financial Administration Act; Application 4. (1) This Act applies to (a) private sector employers; (b) the portions of the federal public administration set out in Schedule I or IV to the Financial Administration Act; (c) the portions of the federal public administration set out in of Schedule V to the Financial Administration Act that employ one hundred or more employees; and (d) such other portion of the public sector employing one hundred or more employees, including the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as may be specified by order of the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Treasury Board, in consultation with the minister responsible for the specified portion. [...] Employer obligations 5. Every employer shall implement employment equity by (a) identifying and eliminating employment barriers against persons in designated groups that result from the employer's employment systems, policies and practices that are not authorized by law; and (b) instituting such positive policies and practices and making such reasonable accommodations as will ensure that persons in designated groups achieve a degree of representation in each occupational group in the employer's workforce that reflects their representation in (i) the Canadian workforce, or (ii) those segments of the Canadian workforce that are identifiable by qualification, eligibility or geography and from which the employer may reasonably be expected to draw employees. Analysis and review 9. (1) For the purpose of implementing employment equity, every employer shall (a) collect information and conduct an analysis of the employer's workforce, in accordance with the regulations, in order to determine the degree of the underrepresentation of persons in designated groups in each occupational group in that workforce; and (b) conduct a review of the employer's employment systems, policies and practices, in accordance with the regulations, in order to identify employment barriers against persons in designated groups that result from those systems, policies and practices.     (2) Only those employees who identify themselves to an employer, or agree to be identified by an employer, as aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities or persons with disabilities are to be counted as members of those designated groups for the purposes of implementing employment equity.     (3) Information collected by an employer under paragraph (1)(a) is confidential and shall be used only for the purpose of implementing the employer's obligations under this Act. Reports of private sector employers 18. (1) Every private sector employer shall, on or before June 1 in each year, file with the Minister a report in respect of the immediately preceding calendar year containing information in accordance with prescribed instructions, indicating, in the prescribed manner and form, (a) the industrial sector in which its employees are employed, the location of the employer and its employees, the number of its employees and the number of those employees who are members of designated groups; (b) the occupational groups in which its employees are employed and the degree of representation of persons who are members of designated groups in each occupational group; (c) the salary ranges of its employees and the degree of representation of persons who are members of designated groups in each range and in each prescribed subdivision of the range; and (d) the number of its employees hired, promoted and terminated and the degree of representation in those numbers of persons who are members of designated groups.     (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employer is the person who or organization that was the employer on December 31 in the immediately preceding year.     (3) An employer may file a report using electronic media in a manner specified in writing by the Minister and, in such a case, the report is deemed to have been filed on the day that the Minister acknowledges receipt of it.     (4) Only those employees who identify themselves to their employer, or agree to be identified by their employer, as aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities are to be counted as members of those designated groups for the purposes of the report.    (5) A report shall be certified, in the prescribed manner, as to the accuracy of the information contained in it and shall be signed by the employer or, where the employer is a corporation, by a prescribed person on behalf of the corporation.     (6) An employer shall include in a report a description of (a) the measures taken by the employer during the reporting period to implement employment equity and the results achieved; and (b) the consultations between the employer and its employees' representatives during the reporting period concerning the implementation of employment equity.     (7) Where, in the opinion of the Minister, associated or related federal works, undertakings or businesses are operated by two or more employers having common control or direction, the Minister may, on the application of the employers, authorize them to file a consolidated report with respect to employees employed by them on or in connection with those works, undertakings or businesses.     (8) The Minister may, on the application of an employer, exempt the employer from any or all of the requirements of this section for a period not exceeding one year if, in the opinion of the Minister, special circumstances warrant the exemption.     (9) An employer shall, on filing a report with the Minister under this section, provide its employees' representatives with a copy of the report.     (10) The Minister shall, on receipt of a report, send a copy of it to the Commission. Records and Reports 19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), every report filed under subsection 18(1) shall be available for public inspection at such places as may be designated, and in such form as may be determined, by the Minister, and any person may, on payment of a prescribed fee, not to exceed the costs of furnishing a copy, obtain from the Minister a copy of any of the reports.     (2) The Minister may, on the application of an employer, withhold the employer's report from public inspection for a period not exceeding one year if, in the opinion of the Minister, special circumstances warrant the withholding. Compliance audits 22. (1) The Commission is responsible for the enforcement of the obligations imposed on employers by sections 5, 9 to 15 and 17.     (2) The Commission shall, in discharging its responsibility under subsection (1), be guided by the policy that, wherever possible, cases of non-compliance be resolved through persuasion and the negotiation of written undertakings pursuant to subsection 25(1) and that directions be issued under subsection 25(2) or (3) and applications for orders be made under subsection 27(2) only as a last resort.     (3) The Commission may designate any person or category of persons as employment equity compliance review officers for the purposes of conducting compliance audits of employers.     (4) No person who has been designated as an investigator under section 43 of the Canadian Human Rights Act to investigate a complaint under that Act in respect of an employer may, during the investigation, conduct a compliance audit of that employer.     (5) The Commission may authorize any officer or employee of the Commission whom the Commission considers appropriate to exercise any power and perform any duty or function of the Commission under this Act and any power so exercised and any duty or function so performed shall be deemed to have been exercised or performed by the Commission. Powers of compliance officers 23. (1) For the purposes of ensuring compliance with the provisions referred to in subsection 22(1), a compliance officer may conduct a compliance audit of an employer and, for that purpose, may (a) at any reasonable time, enter any place in which the officer believes on reasonable grounds there is any thing relevant to the enforcement of any of those provisions; and (b) require any person to produce for examination or copying any record, book of account or other document that the officer believes on reasonable grounds contains information that is relevant to the enforcement of any of those provisions.     (2) In conducting a compliance audit, a compliance officer may (a) reproduce or cause to be reproduced any record from a data processing system in the form of a print-out or other intelligible output and remove the print-out or other output for examination and copying; and (b) use or cause to be used any copying equipment at the place to make copies of any record, book of account or other document.     (3) Compliance officers shall be furnished with certificates in a form established by the Commission certifying their designation as compliance officers and, on entering a place under paragraph (1)(a), a compliance officer shall show the certificate to the person in charge of the place if the person requests proof of the officer's designation.     (4) The person in charge of a place entered pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) and every person found in the place shall (a) give the compliance officer all reasonable assistance to enable the officer to exercise the powers conferred on compliance officers by this section; and (b) provide the officer with any information relevant to the enforcement of this Act that the officer may reasonably require. Privileged information 34. (1) Information obtained by the Commission under this Act is privileged and shall not knowingly be, or be permitted to be, communicated, disclosed or made available without the written consent of the person from whom it was obtained.     (2) No member of the Commission or person employed by it who obtains information that is privileged under subsection (1) shall be required, in connection with any legal proceedings, other than proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act, to give evidence relating to that information or to produce any statement or other writing containing that information.     (3) Information that is privileged under subsection (1) may, on any terms and conditions that the Commission considers appropriate, be communicated or disclosed to a minister of the Crown in right of Canada or to any officer or employee of Her Majesty in right of Canada for any purpose relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act.     (4) Nothing in this section prohibits the communication or disclosure of information for the purposes of legal proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act.     (5) No information obtained by the Commission or a Tribunal under this Act may be used in any proceedings under any other Act without the consent of the employer concerned.

Objet 2. La présente loi a pour objet de réaliser l'égalité en milieu de travail de façon que nul ne se voie refuser d'avantages ou de chances en matière d'emploi pour des motifs étrangers à sa compétence et, à cette fin, de corriger les désavantages subis, dans le domaine de l'emploi, par les femmes, les autochtones, les personnes handicapées et les personnes qui font partie des minorités visibles, conformément au principe selon lequel l'équité en matière d'emploi requiert, outre un traitement identique des personnes, des mesures spéciales et des aménagements adaptés aux différences. Groupes désignés 3. « groupes désignés » Les femmes, les autochtones, les personnes handicapées et les personnes qui font partie des minorités visibles. Employeur du secteur privé 3. « employeur du secteur privé » Quiconque emploie au moins cent salariés au sein ou dans le cadre d'une entreprise fédérale au sens de l'article 2 du Code canadien du travail, ainsi que toute personne morale employant au moins cent salariés et constituée pour l'accomplissement de fonctions au nom du gouvernement du Canada, à l'exclusion : a) d'une personne qui emploie des salariés au sein ou dans le cadre d'une entreprise, d'une affaire ou d'un ouvrage de nature locale et privée au Yukon, dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest ou au Nunavut; b) d'un établissement public assimilé à un ministère aux termes de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques. Champ d'application 4. (1) La présente loi s'applique à : a) tous les employeurs du secteur privé; b) tous les secteurs de l'administration publique fédérale mentionnés aux annexes I ou IV de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques; c) tout secteur de l'administration publique fédérale figurant à l'annexe V de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques et comportant au moins cent salariés; d) tout autre élément du secteur public comportant au moins cent salariés, notamment les Forces canadiennes et la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, qui est désigné par décret pris sur la recommandation du Conseil du Trésor, après consultation avec le ministre responsable de l'élément du secteur public visé par le décret. [...] Obligations de l'employeur 5. L'employeur est tenu de réaliser l'équité en matière d'emploi par les actions suivantes : a) détermination et suppression des obstacles à la carrière des membres des groupes désignés découlant de ses systèmes, règles et usages en matière d'emploi non autorisés par une règle de droit; b) instauration de règles et d'usages positifs et prise de mesures raisonnables d'adaptation pour que le nombre de membres de ces groupes dans chaque catégorie professionnelle de son effectif reflète leur représentation : (i) au sein de la population apte au travail, (ii) dans les secteurs de la population apte au travail susceptibles d'être distingués en fonction de critères de compétence, d'admissibilité ou d'ordre géographique où il serait fondé à choisir ses salariés. Analyses 9. (1) En vue de réaliser l'équité en matière d'emploi, il incombe à l'employeur : a) conformément aux règlements, de recueillir des renseignements sur son effectif et d'effectuer des analyses sur celui-ci afin de mesurer la sous-représentation des membres des groupes désignés dans chaque catégorie professionnelle; b) d'étudier ses systèmes, règles et usages d'emploi, conformément aux règlements, afin de déterminer les obstacles en résultant pour les membres des groupes désignés.     (2) En vue de réaliser l'équité en matière d'emploi, seuls sont pris en compte dans les groupes correspondants les salariés qui s'identifient auprès de l'employeur, ou acceptent de l'être par lui, comme autochtones, personnes handicapées ou faisant partie des minorités visibles.     (3) Les renseignements recueillis par l'employeur dans le cadre de l'alinéa (1)a) sont confidentiels et ne peuvent être utilisés que pour permettre à l'employeur de remplir ses obligations dans le cadre de la présente loi. Rapport de l'employeur du secteur privé 18. (1) Au plus tard le 1er juin de chaque année, l'employeur du secteur privé dépose auprès du ministre, pour l'année civile précédente, un rapport comportant les renseignements conformes aux instructions réglementaires, et établi en la forme et selon les modalités réglementaires, qui donne les renseignements suivants : a) les branches d'activité de ses salariés, le lieu de son établissement et le lieu de travail de ses salariés, le nombre de ceux-ci et celui des membres des groupes désignés qui en font partie; b) les catégories professionnelles qui composent son personnel et la représentation des membres de ces groupes dans chacune d'elles; c) les échelles de rémunération de ses salariés et la représentation des membres de ces groupes figurant à chacune d'elles ou à chacun de leurs échelons réglementaires; d) le nombre des recrutements, des avancements et des cessations de fonctions ainsi que, dans chaque cas, la représentation des membres des mêmes groupes.     (2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), l'employeur est l'employeur au 31 décembre de l'année visée par le rapport.     (3) L'employeur peut transmettre le rapport par voie électronique selon les modalités que le ministre établit par écrit; le rapport est alors réputé déposé auprès du ministre le jour où celui-ci en accuse réception.     (4) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), seuls sont pris en compte dans les groupes correspondants les salariés qui s'identifient auprès de l'employeur, ou acceptent de l'être par lui, comme autochtones, personnes handicapées ou faisant partie des minorités visibles.     (5) L'exactitude des renseignements fournis dans le rapport visé au paragraphe (1) est attestée selon les modalités réglementaires. L'attestation est signée par l'employeur ou, dans le cas d'une personne morale, par son mandataire désigné par règlement.     (6) L'employeur ajoute dans son rapport les éléments suivants : a) l'énoncé des mesures prises en vue de réaliser l'équité en matière d'emploi et les résultats obtenus; b) le compte rendu des consultations tenues avec les représentants en vue de réaliser l'équité en matière d'emploi.     (7) Pour l'application de la présente loi, le ministre peut, sur demande, autoriser les employeurs qui, à son avis, exploitent des entreprises fédérales associées ou connexes, à déposer un seul rapport à l'égard des salariés qu'ils emploient dans le cadre de ces entreprises.     (8) Le ministre peut, sur demande, exempter pour une période d'au plus un an un employeur de l'une ou l'autre des obligations prévues au présent article si, à son avis, des circonstances spéciales le justifient.     (9) Dès qu'il dépose un rapport auprès du ministre, l'employeur en remet une copie aux représentants.     (10) Dès qu'il reçoit un rapport, le ministre en fait parvenir une copie à la Commission. Dossiers et rapports 19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le public peut consulter les rapports visés au paragraphe 18(1) aux lieux et en la forme désignés par le ministre et en obtenir un exemplaire auprès de celui-ci contre versement d'un droit réglementaire n'excédant pas le prix coûtant.         (2) À la demande de l'employeur, le ministre peut retenir le rapport pour une période maximale d'un an si, à son avis, des circonstances spéciales justifient le report de la mise à disposition. Contrôle d'application 22. (1) La Commission est responsable de la détermination de l'observation par les employeurs des articles 5, 9 à 15 et 17.    (2) Dans l'exercice de la responsabilité que lui confère le paragraphe (1), la Commission est tenue, en cas de non-observation, de mettre en oeuvre, dans toute la mesure du possible, une politique de règlement négocié en vue de l'obtention d'un engagement sous le régime du paragraphe 25(1) et de n'avoir recours aux ordres et ordonnances respectivement visés aux paragraphes 25(2) et (3) et 27(2) qu'en dernier lieu.     (3) La Commission peut désigner toute personne, à titre individuel ou collectif, comme agent de vérification de la conformité à l'équité en matière d'emploi.     (4) La personne chargée en vertu de l'article 43 de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne de faire enquête sur une plainte déposée sous le régime de cette loi à l'égard d'un employeur ne peut, tant que dure l'enquête, être désignée à titre d'agent d'application à l'égard du même employeur.     (5) La Commission peut déléguer à ses agents qu'elle estime qualifiés l'exercice des attributions que lui confère la présente loi; les actes du délégataire sont alors réputés être ceux de la Commission. Attributions des agents d'application 23. (1) Pour contrôler l'observation des articles mentionnés au paragraphe 22(1), l'agent d'application peut procéder à un contrôle d'application de l'employeur et : a) à toute heure convenable, procéder à la visite de tout lieu où il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, pouvoir trouver tout objet lié à l'application de la présente loi ou de ses règlements; b) exiger, aux fins d'examen ou de reproduction, la communication des registres, des livres de comptes ou d'autres documents où il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, pouvoir trouver des renseignements utiles.     (2) Dans le cadre de sa visite, l'agent peut : a) obtenir les documents sous forme d'imprimé ou toute autre forme intelligible à partir de tout système informatique et les emporter aux fins d'examen ou de reproduction; b) utiliser ou faire utiliser le matériel de reprographie se trouvant sur place pour reproduire les documents.     (3) L'agent reçoit un certificat établi en la forme fixée par la Commission et attestant sa qualité, qu'il présente, sur demande, au responsable du lieu visité.     (4) Le responsable du lieu visité, ainsi que toute personne qui s'y trouve, est tenu d'accorder à l'agent toute l'assistance possible dans l'exercice des pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par le présent article et de lui fournir les renseignements qu'il peut valablement exiger pour l'application de la présente loi ou de ses règlements. Protection des renseignements 34. (1) Les renseignements obtenus par la Commission dans le cadre de la présente loi sont protégés. Nul ne peut sciemment les communiquer ou les laisser communiquer sans l'autorisation écrite de la personne dont ils proviennent.     (2) Il ne peut être exigé d'un commissaire ou d'un agent de la Commission qui obtient des renseignements protégés dans le cadre de la présente loi qu'il dépose en justice à leur sujet, ni qu'il produise des déclarations, écrits ou autres pièces à cet égard, sauf lors d'une instance relative à l'application de la présente loi.     (3) Les renseignements protégés visés au paragraphe (1) peuvent, selon les modalités déterminées par la Commission, être communiqués à un ministre fédéral ou à un fonctionnaire ou agent de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada pour l'application de la présente loi.     (4) Le présent article n'empêche nullement la communication de renseignements dans le cadre d'une instance relative à l'application de la présente loi.     (5) Les renseignements obtenus par la Commission ou un tribunal dans le cadre de l'application de la présente loi ne peuvent être utilisés, sans le consentement de l'employeur concerné, dans des procédures intentées en vertu d'une autre loi.

Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21

Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels, L.R. 1985, ch. P-21

Purpose 2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada that protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a government institution and that provide individuals with a right of access to that information. Personal information 3. "personal information" means information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, (a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age or marital status of the individual, (b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved, (c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, (d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, (e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual by a government institution or a part of a government institution specified in the regulations, (f) correspondence sent to a government institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to such correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence, (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, (h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the individual by an institution or a part of an institution referred to in paragraph (e), but excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual, and (i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the individual, but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include (j) information about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution that relates to the position or functions of the individual including, (i) the fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution, (ii) the title, business address and telephone number of the individual, (iii) the classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual, (iv) the name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of employment, and (v) the personal opinions or views of the individual given in the course of employment, (k) information about an individual who is or was performing services under contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, the name of the individual and the opinions or views of the individual given in the course of the performance of those services, (l) information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred on an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit, and (m) information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years; Law enforcement and investigation 22. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) (a) that was obtained or prepared by any government institution, or part of any government institution, that is an investigative body specified in the regulations in the course of lawful investigations pertaining to (i) the detection, prevention or suppression of crime, (ii) the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province, or (iii) activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada within the meaning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, if the information came into existence less than twenty years prior to the request; (b) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information (i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation, (ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or (iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or (c) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security of penal institutions.     (2) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) that was obtained or prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing policing services for a province or municipality pursuant to an arrangement made under section 20 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, where the Government of Canada has, on the request of the province or municipality, agreed not to disclose such information.      (3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), "investigation" means an investigation that (a) pertains to the administration or enforcement of an Act of Parliament; (b) is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or (c) is within a class of investigations specified in the regulations.

Objet 2. La présente loi a pour objet de compléter la législation canadienne en matière de protection des renseignements personnels relevant des institutions fédérales et de droit d'accès des individus aux renseignements personnels qui les concernent. Renseignements personnels 3. « renseignements personnels » Les renseignements, quels que soient leur forme et leur support, concernant un individu identifiable, notamment : a) les renseignements relatifs à sa race, à son origine nationale ou ethnique, à sa couleur, à sa religion, à son âge ou à sa situation de famille; b) les renseignements relatifs à son éducation, à son dossier médical, à son casier judiciaire, à ses antécédents professionnels ou à des opérations financières auxquelles il a participé; c) tout numéro ou symbole, ou toute autre indication identificatrice, qui lui est propre; d) son adresse, ses empreintes digitales ou son groupe sanguin; e) ses opinions ou ses idées personnelles, à l'exclusion de celles qui portent sur un autre individu ou sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de prix à octroyer à un autre individu par une institution fédérale, ou subdivision de celle-ci visée par règlement; f) toute correspondance de nature, implicitement ou explicitement, privée ou confidentielle envoyée par lui à une institution fédérale, ainsi que les réponses de l'institution dans la mesure où elles révèlent le contenu de la correspondance de l'expéditeur; g) les idées ou opinions d'autrui sur lui; h) les idées ou opinions d'un autre individu qui portent sur une proposition de subvention, de récompense ou de prix à lui octroyer par une institution, ou subdivision de celle-ci, visée à l'alinéa e), à l'exclusion du nom de cet autre individu si ce nom est mentionné avec les idées ou opinions; i) son nom lorsque celui-ci est mentionné avec d'autres renseignements personnels le concernant ou lorsque la seule divulgation du nom révélerait des renseignements à son sujet; toutefois, il demeure entendu que, pour l'application des articles 7, 8 et 26, et de l'article 19 de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information, les renseignements personnels ne comprennent pas les renseignements concernant : j) un cadre ou employé, actuel ou ancien, d'une institution fédérale et portant sur son poste ou ses fonctions, notamment : (i) le fait même qu'il est ou a été employé par l'institution, (ii) son titre et les adresse et numéro de téléphone de son lieu de travail, (iii) la classification, l'éventail des salaires et les attributions de son poste, (iv) son nom lorsque celui-ci figure sur un document qu'il a établi au cours de son emploi, (v) les idées et opinions personnelles qu'il a exprimées au cours de son emploi; k) un individu qui, au titre d'un contrat, assure ou a assuré la prestation de services à une institution fédérale et portant sur la nature de la prestation, notamment les conditions du contrat, le nom de l'individu ainsi que les idées et opinions personnelles qu'il a exprimées au cours de la prestation; l) des avantages financiers facultatifs, notamment la délivrance d'un permis ou d'une licence accordés à un individu, y compris le nom de celui-ci et la nature précise de ces avantages; m) un individu décédé depuis plus de vingt ans. Enquêtes 22. (1) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) : a) soit qui remontent à moins de vingt ans lors de la demande et qui ont été obtenus ou préparés par une institution fédérale, ou par une subdivision d'une institution, qui constitue un organisme d'enquête déterminé par règlement, au cours d'enquêtes licites ayant trait : (i) à la détection, la prévention et la répression du crime, (ii) aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales, (iii) aux activités soupçonnées de constituer des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada au sens de la Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité; b) soit dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire aux activités destinées à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales ou au déroulement d'enquêtes licites, notamment : (i) des renseignements relatifs à l'existence ou à la nature d'une enquête déterminée, (ii) des renseignements qui permettraient de remonter à une source de renseignements confidentielle, (iii) des renseignements obtenus ou préparés au cours d'une enquête; c) soit dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de nuire à la sécurité des établissements pénitentiaires.     (2) Le responsable d'une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication des renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) qui ont été obtenus ou préparés par la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, dans l'exercice de fonctions de police provinciale ou municipale, qui lui sont conférées par une entente conclue sous le régime de l'article 20 de la Loi sur la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, si, à la demande de la province ou de la municipalité, le gouvernement du Canada a consenti à ne pas divulguer ces renseignements.     (3) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)b), « enquête » s'entend de celle qui : a) se rapporte à l'application d'une loi fédérale; b) est autorisée sous le régime d'une loi fédérale; c) fait partie d'une catégorie d'enquêtes précisée dans les règlements.

FEDERAL COURT

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                           T-1941-04

STYLE OF CAUSE:                           CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE v. CHIEF COMMISSIONER, CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

PLACE OF HEARING:                     Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:                       November 22, 2005

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER:             Blanchard J.

Confidential Reasons DATED:         April 5, 2006

DATED:                                               April 24, 2006

APPEARANCES:

Ms. Catherine Beagan Flood                                                     FOR THE APPLICANT

Mr. Wade Wright

Ms. Kathleen Fawcett                                                               FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP                                                  FOR THE APPLICANT

Toronto, Ontario

Ms. Kathleen Fawcett                                                               FOR THE RESPONDENT

Canadian Human Rights Commission

Ottawa, Ontario